Biplanes for ww2: where could've these still mattered? (5 Viewers)

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Not biplanes.
Which weren't?

The Heinkel He50 was designed for the IJN, which was produced by Aichi as the D1A. The He50 in Luftwaffe service was replaced by the Hs123.

The Polikarpov U-2 (later redesignated as the Po-2) was best known as the night harassment aircraft of the Red Airforce's "Nacht-Hexxen".

The Curtiss SOC "Seagull" was replaced by the OS2U, with was to be replaced by the SO3C but after the Seamew's dismal performance, the SOC was brought back into frontline service through 1945 to supplement the Kingfisher.

All three mentioned:
He50 (including D1A)
U-2/PO-2
SOC
were most certainly biplanes.
 
The He50 in Luftwaffe service was replaced by the Hs123.
Replaced as a dive bomber yes, but I believe the He50 actually saw continued service as a night harassment raider in the same style as the PO2 until the end of the war?
 
Replaced as a dive bomber yes, but I believe the He50 actually saw continued service as a night harassment raider in the same style as the PO2 until the end of the war?
Yes, it was removed from training service and transferred to the Ost Front as an answer to the U-2 in a night harassment role.
 
Richtofhen asked in 1943 if Henschel could start making more for service on the Ost Front, but Henschel no longer had the tooling for production.
Yes, and also worth noting that LW when literally there were no more HS123's to use, continued to make use of ex Italian CR42's etc in the Balkans in similar / same type of groun d attack / night ops that they did with HS123's.

Obviously they werent survivable for long vs first rate fighters 1942-3 onwards but in arenas such as ground attack in harsh physical conditions and night attack where maneuverability counted as much as weapons load, where those first rate planes were limited in ops, the biplane could still do the job up to wars end. I'd inc Gladiator in the mix as well but it wasnt used as such but capable along with the Hind / Demon too I suppose if needed for that role. The Russians also had biplane nocturnal squadrons as well. Not aware of any Japanese nor US / Australian usage in the Pacific but if night attack ops were necessary in the ground support role reckon a biplane gave that extra agility and 'feel' you just could not get in a higher performance plane. Come to think of it, from memory I think the RAF used Tiger Moths and Harts / Audaxes during the Japanese invasion of Malaya, Burma and Middle East (Iraq) for nocturnal ground support / small supply drops- but I think thats outside of the intention of the original query.
 
The obsolete biplanes in RAF service in secondary roles such as trainers and target tugs etc. were to be used as bombers had the Germans invaded. Most famously the Tiger Moths were also to be used and bomb racks made and issued. An old acquaintance who flew AACU Westland Wallace's and later Hawker Henley's had Wallace bomb racks returned to the station for fitting were they needed for an invasion. IIRC the RAF identified about 600 potential emergency bombers for the task plus the Tiger Moths.
 
It could have been much more effective than the IL-2 as a ground attack aircraft.
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As a member of the of "Il-2 haters club" I'd like to see Su-2 and I-153 as two shturmovik types of VVS until new ground attack aircraft appears in 1943.
It would be nice to improve protection of I-153 , of course. Fuel tank, at least.
I did not mention the I-153, which also was used relatively successfully as an attack aircraft, only because it was not particularly effective. Its maximum bomb load was about 150 kg, and its design did not allow the installation of cannon armament. However, practice demonstrated that the I-153, when used as a ground attack aircraft, suffered significantly fewer losses than the Il-2 despite the lack of armor. And the I-207 could not only carry 500 kg of bomb load, but also could dive steadily with it at an angle of 70°. In addition, its design allowed the installation of two suspended 23-mm cannons instead of bombs. In general, this "little guy" had outstanding performance for 1940-1941 - but not as a fighter aircraft, as it was originally designed to be! In addition, its engine allowed the use of low-octane gasoline, the plane was sufficiently stable and very maneuverable, it did not make high demands on the level of pilot's training, takeoff and landing were not difficult. With the same engine, this biplane had the same maximum speed as the I-16, surpassing the latter in all other characteristics.
This is one of the problems of the Soviet Air Force - serious underestimation of many concepts due to tactical stereotypes. In particular, this relates to the concept of the fighter-bomber or generally unarmored light bomber-attack aircraft. The Soviets relied on armor, but it turned out that by 1941 the Germans had 20-mm antiaircraft guns whose shells easily penetrated any aircraft armor. A much more effective defense was maneuverability and speed - especially with an air-cooled engine. The Soviets did not immediately, but gradually realized that the P-40 was much more useful as a bomber than as a fighter, but at the same time the P-40 retained the ability to engage enemy fighters (albeit defensively), i.e. it could operate independently without additional escort. The Soviets did not recognize the combat potential of the P-47 at all - there is a rather arrogant characteristic from the famous test pilot Mark Gallai, saying that it was a very comfortable aircraft to fly it in a straight line, but it was not a fighter. The P-47 would hardly have been as successful as a fighter on the Eastern Front as it was on the Western Front - primarily due to lower altitudes of the major air combats where the P-47 had no advantage. But as a fighter-bomber it had excellent performance.
The Soviets had their own "evil genius" in the field of air force tactics in the late 1930s and early 1940s - the head of the Red Army's main aviation supply directorate, P.A.Alekseyev [ah-lehk-say-ehv], whose efforts prevented the I-207 from being adopted for service, despite the pilots' high estimates. This is not the only "merit" of Alekseyev - he was the only one who insisted on a single-seat version of the Il-2, in addition, due to his unjustifiably excessive requirements to the range of fighters, Soviet designers were forced to increase the capacity of fuel tanks, which greatly deteriorated maneuvering characteristics. The list can be continued.
 
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I did not mention the I-153, which also was used relatively successfully as an attack aircraft, only because it was not particularly effective. Its maximum bomb load was about 150 kg, and its design did not allow the installation of cannon armament. However, practice demonstrated that the I-153, when used as a ground attack aircraft, suffered significantly fewer losses than the Il-2 despite the lack of armor. And the I-207 could not only carry 500 kg of bomb load, but also could dive steadily with it at an angle of 70°. In addition, its design allowed the installation of two suspended 23-mm cannons instead of bombs. In general, this "little guy" had outstanding performance for 1940-1941 - but not as a fighter aircraft, as it was originally designed to be! In addition, its engine allowed the use of low-octane gasoline, the plane was sufficiently stable and very maneuverable, it did not make high demands on the level of pilot's training, takeoff and landing were not difficult. With the same engine, this biplane had the same maximum speed as the I-16, surpassing the latter in all other characteristics.
This is one of the problems of the Soviet Air Force - serious underestimation of many concepts due to tactical stereotypes. In particular, this relates to the concept of the fighter-bomber or generally unarmored light bomber-attack aircraft. The Soviets relied on armor, but it turned out that by 1941 the Germans had 20-mm antiaircraft guns whose shells easily penetrated any aircraft armor. A much more effective defense was maneuverability and speed - especially with an air-cooled engine. The Soviets did not immediately, but gradually realized that the P-40 was much more useful as a bomber than as a fighter, but at the same time the P-40 retained the ability to engage enemy fighters (albeit defensively), i.e. it could operate independently without additional escort. The Soviets did not recognize the combat potential of the P-47 at all - there is a rather arrogant characteristic from the famous test pilot Mark Gallai, saying that it was a very comfortable aircraft to fly it in a straight line, but it was not a fighter. The P-47 would hardly have been as successful as a fighter on the Eastern Front as it was on the Western Front - primarily due to lower altitudes of the major air combats where the P-47 had no advantage. But as a fighter-bomber it had excellent performance.
The Soviets had their own "evil genius" in the field of air force tactics in the late 1930s and early 1940s - the head of the Red Army's main aviation supply directorate, P.A.Alekseyev [ah-lehk-say-ehv], whose efforts prevented the I-207 from being adopted for service, despite the pilots' high estimates. This is not the only "merit" of Alekseyev - he was the only one who insisted on a single-seat version of the Il-2, in addition, due to his unjustifiably excessive requirements to the range of fighters, Soviet designers were forced to increase the capacity of fuel tanks, which greatly deteriorated maneuvering characteristics. The list can be continued.
I-207... Thanks for reminding. I didn't read about it for many years. Need to refresh my knowledge.
Agree about P-40 and the stupid weird evaluation of P-47.
Soviet middle/low level executives did have an excuse for the lack of flexibility though.
Once Stalin said that "Il-2s were needed as a bread" and Army said that they needed more of Il-2s, the die was cast in the field of close air support tactics. Same could be seen in other fields as fighter developments as you mentioned, when all had to be sacrificed in the race for speed, then for range, etc., Because the Party said so...
 
One item I'd like to propose some thought about would be the utility of Biplane Coastal Defenders for a nation like Norway in 1940. Of course, in reality their Air Force was relatively small and under-equipped in the real-world, but if some SBC-4s were procured alongside more active participation by the Gloster Gladiators in the initial defense, I am curious how well they would've faired at projecting power against the German invasion fleet.

A couple of factors worth considering:
- Initial invasion fleet were transiting into Norwegian territory during the night, where aircraft like the Gladiator or our hypothetical SBC-4s would be ineffectual. However, as in reality, the Coastal Batteries could serve as night-time deterrence forces, as even the ability to deter German naval action until the morning would allow the mustering of Norwegian air elements.
- The real-life Luftwaffe was relatively 'light' on escorting elements for Norwegian assaults, and made heavy use of He-111s and Ju-52s--the latter of which would've been vulnerable to Gloster Gladiators and even SBC-4s alike.
- Due to their lower take-off and stall speeds, and generally lower take-off distances, smaller 'dispersed' airbases may be feasible even in proximity to some of the fjords, requiring a lower permanent presence and allowing greater effective 'projection' if exploited. However, of course, this results in the tradeoff of a smaller 'strike' force for any aircraft which are in-range of enemy vessels or aircraft.
- SBC-4s had decent speed and range for a biplane with such payload capacity, but they were substantially limited by their armament. There is potential, however, of a more 'French-style' interpretation of multi-purpose combat aircraft, with the reasonable payload allowance of the Helldiver being allowed to facilitate drop tanks as well as hypothetical 'gunpods' for interception duties against Ju-52 / He-111 flights in complement to the Gloster Gladiators. These would not be ideal aircraft for such missions, but I suspect that for a nation like Norway where procurement is fairly sparse, being able to 'repurpose' such aircraft for these roles at distant airbases would be appreciated.

In no circumstance are these biplanes first-rate combatants, but they may provide as a strong resisting force against German fleet and air assets, and could have further opportunity to deliver bloody jabs against troop carriers, vessels and craft.

In-reality the Norwegian air force was limited far more by their small force size moreso than the technological deficiencies of their Gloster Gladiators. Further investment (or, crucially, delivery) into a larger biplane fleet might've allowed for far stiffer resistance against Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine movements. It is part of the reason I'm entertaining the idea of Norwegian procurement of SBC-4s, since the US as a neutral nation would likely have fewer delivery interruptions that Norway historically suffered with their Gloster Gladiator orders. Would this reinvigorated aircraft force be enough so to stagger the actual invasion? I doubt so, but who knows.
 
I wonder if Gregor FDB-1 could find it place in CAS role. With more powerful engine.
Let Canada rule the skies.
(And Georgia be proud not only about P-47!).
In 1941, the Gregor must do 370mph, or it will be hit and then run from. My estimate is that it does 310mph with 1200HP, and that is without military equipment. Any radial engined figher coming out in 1941 needed 2000HP.
 
I-207... Thanks for reminding. I didn't read about it for many years. Need to refresh my knowledge.
Agree about P-40 and the stupid weird evaluation of P-47.
Soviet middle/low level executives did have an excuse for the lack of flexibility though.
Once Stalin said that "Il-2s were needed as a bread" and Army said that they needed more of Il-2s, the die was cast in the field of close air support tactics. Same could be seen in other fields as fighter developments as you mentioned, when all had to be sacrificed in the race for speed, then for range, etc., Because the Party said so...
Incidentally, the I-153s were quite successful in one of their most unusual roles - the night escort of the U-2. Funnily enough, but this function was of some use - losses of U-2s were reduced.
The Stalin's role in the development of the IL-2 was not decisive. The pilots immediately wanted a two-seat version, but Ilyushin could not provide the required characteristics, and Alekseyev (whom I mentioned above) insisted on a single-seat version. The result was a rather weird airplane, but still more efficient compared to all available alternatives (prototypes are not considered!). Stalin had no choice - he was forced to put the factory directors who, frankly speaking, had gotten a bit cocky by 1941, in their place. I am not justifying Stalin - only pointing out the specific features of the functioning of the system he created.
 
One item I'd like to propose some thought about would be the utility of Biplane Coastal Defenders for a nation like Norway in 1940. Of course, in reality their Air Force was relatively small and under-equipped in the real-world, but if some SBC-4s were procured alongside more active participation by the Gloster Gladiators in the initial defense, I am curious how well they would've faired at projecting power against the German invasion fleet.
Thats actually an interesting thought. I remember reading about how the Swordfish that were operating in Norway (IIRC, 'Bring Back My Strinbag') survived interception because the 109s found them almost impossible to intercept when they were flying within the fjords. Apparently they'd hug the fjord walls and contours and the 109s simply couldn't draw a bead without risking hitting the landscape.

Knap of the earth flying like a modern helicopter, probably would make them survivable where geography allowsed.
 

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