Were any British non-RR ww2-era aeroengines considered for land use?

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The more problematic obstacle to the Jumo 205 in WW2 is that 2-stroke opposed piston engines inherently have greater scavenging and thermal constraints than conventionnal 4-stroke engines. They work best when the transmission has excellent torque coverage, ideally hydromechanical types. WW2 transmissions are purely mechanical so the Jumo would face much the same constraints as the 5TD did in T-64 and the L60 in Chieftain...but probably worse. 1930's and WW2 tank designers simply didn't and couldn't put in the effort to make this work when there were simpler and in practice better solutions.

Electric Drive. Engine runs at best speed, while electric motors have good torque at 1 RPM to Maximum
 
The Meteor engine, based on the Merlin technology, ended up being transferred to Rover. Whittles Power Jets company was under Rover and they did not get along. Hives of Rolls Royce was told about the Whittle engine and that it could produce 1000 lb thrust; he was not impressed until he was told that was about what the Merlin produced. As a result Hives took S.B. Wilkes of Rover to dinner and suggested they trade Power Jets for the Meteor tank engine plant, and the situation for Whittle's company improved a great deal from then on.

But Ford in the USA had been asked to consider producing Merlins, got the manufacturing drawings, and then declined. But It Just So Happened that Ford later brought out a tank engine that greatly resembled the You Know What.
 
But It Just So Happened that Ford later brought out a tank engine that greatly resembled the You Know What.
Other than similar displacement and being a V-12 made of aluminum, not much- but did see the Merlin Drawings. Inspired, but hardly a clone

1939: Edsel was dealing with the French to get a big engine in Production at the new Factory Ford opened outside Paris the year before, but as things worked out, that wasn't an option after May 1940, and Old Man Henry hated the British so much, he spiked the deal for US production of Merlins for the UK. Making a Metric version of the Merlin for France was fine. Not Imperial spec for the British!
Despite Ford UK doing other Ford Products for the War.

Henry told his engine designers to make a better V-12 than the Merlin, to sell to the Navy. That resulted in the GG V-12

Thanks Henry, you crazy old Fool.

Packard got copy of the Imperial spec plans, and reworked it for US methods

on those methods...
Stanley Hooker's autobiography, Not Much of an Engineer,

"In my enthusiasm, I considered that Rolls-Royce designs were the ne plus ultra, until the Ford Motor Co. in Britain was invited to manufacture the Merlin in the early days of the War. A number of Ford engineers arrived in Derby, and spent some months examining and familiarizing themselves with the drawings and manufacturing methods. One day their Chief Engineer appeared in (Merlin development head Cyril Lovesey's) office, which I was then sharing, and said, 'You know, we can't make the Merlin to these drawings.'

"I replied loftily, 'I suppose that is because the drawing tolerances are too difficult for you, and you can't achieve the accuracy.'

"'On the contrary,' he replied, 'the tolerances are far too wide for us. We make motor cars far more accurately than this. Every part on our car engines has to be interchangeable with the same part on any other engine, and hence all parts have to be made with extreme accuracy, far closer than you use. That is the only way we can achieve mass production.'"
 
The Rolls-Royce / Rover swop of the Whittle engine production development for the RR Tank engine factory at Nottingham is well known and written-up in several sources. Sir Stanley Hooker writes in a somewhat jocular style but, there is an amusing quote in his book that describes the event. Ernest Hives, Managing Director RR, says to S B Wilkes, Chairman Rover, who were friends, "why are you playing around with this jet engine? It's not in your line of business, you grub about on the ground ..!" The story continues and the deal is agreed.

Hookers' autobiography is well worth it's very small cost in paperback. However, his earlier quote about manufacturing tolerances is somewhat anecdotal. By the time that RR production of the Merlin was established, mass production of Merlin parts was the standard and interchangeability of parts was normal. Notwithstanding that, the production drawings of RR differed in details from the motor companies and the drawings were all redrawn to suit, including changes of projection.

Eng
 
With regard to Ford USA and the RR Merlin, there is no doubt that Ford would take note of all details and technology that they could from their association with the RR product in the early days. However, the engines that they subsequently produced were completely new engineering and apart from the similar layout, materials and capacity, they are different designs.
Understandably, Ford had problems with these big engines, the V-12 was only ever really prototypes. The V-8 derivatives did find applications in vehicles, after considerable development.

Eng
 
Per Ogorkiewicz, the final Armstrong-Siddeley tank engine was an aircooled 180 hp V8 used in the Vickers Mark III and the A7, which doesn't appear to be linked to any known aircraft engine of that company. That effort allegedly ceased due to lack of funding.

Without going into the debate of aircooled vs liquid cooled tank engines and without knowing about the alleged technical issues this engine faced in both tanks, I'd argue there would still have been merit in continuing the Army-AS cooperation to obtain a more dedicated tank engine manufacturer and possibly more suitable engine designs. Moving to a V12 alone would yield 270 hp by the mid 30s, and it surely was possible to improve or extrapolate the AS Vee engine to obtain something more modern than the Liberty and more suitable than all the truck engine derivatives (Inline or flat).

Considering that a bunch of companies like Rover and Meadows eventually built Meteors and that Leyland had come very close to producing it before chickening out over the technical risks, I still believe that as long as the British govt paid, they could have set up production of any modified aircraft engine before the war no matter what the Air Ministry said. At the end of the day, the problem really was that the govt prioritized aviation needs to a very high degree over the Army's. I won't go into whether that was the only possible path.
 
Ford had problems with these big engines, the V-12 was only ever really prototypes. The V-8 derivatives did find applications in vehicles, after considerable development.
Did have a proper V-12 for the US true Heavy Tank Prototypes, the T29 and up.

Development time
Ford: Decline and rebirth, 1933-1962 (pub.1963)

It will be recalled that in June 1940 Henry Ford had begun to develop a liquid-cooled motor for his hypothetical 1000-a-day pursuit plane, and that after the plane was abandoned he had continued to develop the engine, confident that one day it would be used by some type of American airplanes. He had invested about $2,000,000 in the project, and by July 1941 had a motor practically ready for use. The basic design was evolved by an engineer named Cornelius Van Ranst. Sheldrick called him "a dreamer of the first rank, and a clever, clever designer," but thought that he lacked the toughness to stick with a design to the finish. Others had a better opinion of Van Ranst. And in this instance he had produced a brilliant design with a cylinder block and crankcase in one aluminum unit. The result was lightness combined with strength. A novel valve system helped to make the engine outstanding. The discussion of tanks, with its overtone of worry about power, now in mid-July of 1941 turned attention anew to Van Ranst's engine. Edsel Ford and Sorensen discussed the possibility of using it for the M4, called in the engineers, and decided, says Sheldrick, "that by taking eight cylinders of the twelve-cylinder aircraft engine ... we could make an excellent tank engine." Van Ranst was told to plan an 8-cylinder adaptation. A week later, on July 22, Sheldrick had business in Washington, and took along some drawings of the proposed model. At dinner he showed them to Major Emerson Cummings of Army Ordnance. Cummings was immediately interested, and Sheldrick went back to report. No contract was drawn. "We were feeling quite patriotic about that time and we just started working on it on our own." Sorensen summoned the engineers, set a date, and snapped: "All right. Get busy and don't drag the seats of your pants. Tanks are being built and the Government has no engine for them." While this work went forward, the company was asked how quickly it could begin tank production. Edsel, Sorensen, Wibel, and Sheldrick went to Washington, and on September 17 inspected a model of the M4. The design was not final, and automotive firms were asked to make suggestions. Sheldrick objected forcibly to the final drive housing in the front of the tank. He convinced Army officials that his position was sound, was told to redesign that unit, and had a new nose prepared by Ford engineers which was accepted October 20. Meanwhile, on September 19, the government had asked for a sample of the new Ford engine, and on October 10 the company agreed to manufacture the M4. It proposed on October 23 that negotiations cover armor castings, armor plates, and a tank assembly plant costing $45,190,000. The Rouge steel technicians had developed a method for manufacturing armor with water-cooled dies. These prevented warpage (which had attended manufacture by water cooled sprays), and cut the time involved from two hours to less than eight minutes. On December 9 the government guaranteed adequate advances to build facilities for the production of 400 tanks a month. The M-4 thus became a Ford design in part as to body, and wholly as to engine; for the GAA-V-8, as Van Ranst's model was called, soon became the standard power unit for all medium tanks
...
American entry into the war had also found the tank program short of the production stage, though preparations were well along. Facilities for manufacture had been developed at Highland Park (314,144 sq. ft.) and the Rouge (189,200 sq. ft.) an aluminum foundry at the Lincoln plant and an armor plate building at the Rouge (finished July 12, 1942) being vital to the project. Production followed rapidly. On April 25 the first GAA engine was completed, a tank model was ready May 13, tests were successful, and on June 4 the first tank rolled off the assembly line, two months in advance of schedule


It worked out that Ford didn't get a decent contract for build actual M4 tanks, building under 3000 M4s and M10 TDs, while Chrysler at Detroit and GM's Fisher Plant made almost 36,000 Medium Tanks

Back to the Engine, Two years from a test cylinder to Mass Production is not bad, at all. It's just too bad it wasn't a V10 or V12 from the beginning
 
With regard to Ford USA and the RR Merlin, there is no doubt that Ford would take note of all details and technology that they could from their association with the RR product in the early days.
Anyone have the firm date where the Ramp Head Merlin design was jettisoned for the later Merlin?
In 1939, Ford should have only been seeing the revised Mk1 Merlin, correct?
 
Anyone have the firm date where the Ramp Head Merlin design was jettisoned for the later Merlin?
In 1939, Ford should have only been seeing the revised Mk1 Merlin, correct?
Hi
The Merlin F (first flown March 1936) had the Ramp Head and this became the Merlin I, 172 produced until 1937. These were only produced due to the urgency of the situation. The Merlin G (passed type test in November 1936) became the Merlin II, 1,283 built between 1937-39. It would have been rather harder to find a 'Ramp Head Merlin' than others in 1939 (Merlin III started production before the outbreak of war).
Sources: 'British Piston Aero-Engines and Their Aircraft' by Alec Lumsden, pages 204-205. & 'Rolls-Royce Piston Aero Engines - a designer remembers' by A A Rubbra, pages 64-68.

Mike
 
The R-670 and R-985 radial aircraft engines probably were the leading tank engines in the world in 1941, being rugged, reliable, durable, and most importantly, available. The fact that you could pretty easily pull a bad jug meant they were easy to maintain as well. The R-670 was used not onl in the M3 Stuart but also landing craft and amphibious tanks (go visit the USMC Museum at Quantico). But the combination of their large diameter and the need to run the driveshaft forward to the front wheels led to our tanks sticking up vertically rather high and thus being bigger targets.
 
Anyone have the firm date where the Ramp Head Merlin design was jettisoned for the later Merlin?
In 1939, Ford should have only been seeing the revised Mk1 Merlin, correct?

By 1939 the ramp head Merlin I had been superceded by the one-piece block Merlin II and the Merlin III. Exactly what design material was passed to Ford USA, I do not know.

Eng
 
The R-670 and R-985 radial aircraft engines probably were the leading tank engines in the world in 1941, being rugged, reliable, durable, and most importantly, available. The fact that you could pretty easily pull a bad jug meant they were easy to maintain as well. The R-670 was used not onl in the M3 Stuart but also landing craft and amphibious tanks (go visit the USMC Museum at Quantico). But the combination of their large diameter and the need to run the driveshaft forward to the front wheels led to our tanks sticking up vertically rather high and thus being bigger targets.

You left out the Guiberson diesel radials. A great little engine.

 
In the post-WWII time period up through the perhaps the 1980's, surplus Allison V-1710 V12's were used to pump fracking fluid into the oil fields of the American west.
 

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With regard to Ford USA and the RR Merlin, there is no doubt that Ford would take note of all details and technology that they could from their association with the RR product in the early days. However, the engines that they subsequently produced were completely new engineering and apart from the similar layout, materials and capacity, they are different designs.
Understandably, Ford had problems with these big engines, the V-12 was only ever really prototypes. The V-8 derivatives did find applications in vehicles, after considerable development.

Eng

Did have a proper V-12 for the US true Heavy Tank Prototypes, the T29 and up.

Development time
Ford: Decline and rebirth, 1933-1962 (pub.1963)

It will be recalled that in June 1940 Henry Ford had begun to develop a liquid-cooled motor for his hypothetical 1000-a-day pursuit plane, and that after the plane was abandoned he had continued to develop the engine, confident that one day it would be used by some type of American airplanes. He had invested about $2,000,000 in the project, and by July 1941 had a motor practically ready for use.

Back to the Engine, Two years from a test cylinder to Mass Production is not bad, at all. It's just too bad it wasn't a V10 or V12 from the beginning

Hi,
You quoted my reply with a repeat of my point. So what is your point about the V-12 prototypes?

Poor old Henry F. I guess he had a vision of beating the V-1650 and the V-1710.

Ultimately, Ford USA built a sound AFV engine, but I don't think that was a miracle, they were a huge company. The GAA turned out to be a compromise that just made the grade at utility power level and was better overall than the local tank engines of the time.

As for "V10 or V12", the V12 obviously did not fit the requirements of the time and V10 probably would not either, as I am certain that is how they would have built it.

Eng
 
You need 4 things for a high speed tank.
1, Engine.
2, Suspension.
3, Transmission.
4, Steering gear.

T-34 had 1 & 2.
Some other tanks had one or two elements. The Cromwell had about 3 1/2. The suspension could not handle the speed on rough ground.
If you cannot steer the tank at high speed on rough ground your proving ground speed doesn't do much good in combat.
Not singling out the the British, The US built 250 T-23 tanks with electric transmissions that were not high speed but had enough other problems that they never should have been put into production.
 
You need 4 things for a high speed tank.
1, Engine.
2, Suspension.
3, Transmission.
4, Steering gear.

T-34 had 1 & 2.
Just curious, how many WWII medium tanks were faster than the T-34? I still understand the criticism of the T-34 for strong swinging when driving on rough terrain, but it turns out somehow illogical: the tank is (very) fast, but the conditions are met only two of the four. Something is wrong here.
 
You need 4 things for a high speed tank.
1, Engine.
2, Suspension.
3, Transmission.
4, Steering gear.

T-34 had 1 & 2.
Some other tanks had one or two elements. The Cromwell had about 3 1/2. The suspension could not handle the speed on rough ground.
If you cannot steer the tank at high speed on rough ground your proving ground speed doesn't do much good in combat.
Not singling out the the British, The US built 250 T-23 tanks with electric transmissions that were not high speed but had enough other problems that they never should have been put into production.
Cromwell's suspension was one of the better ones of the war for offroad movement though. It's just that the tank initially had such a high power to weight ratio and such high gearing that it was easy to reach speeds which would break that suspension. But some other suspensions would have been unbearable/would have broken even before.
 

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