Blackburn Skua was it that bad?

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The Skua

The Blackburn Skua was a fighter/dive-bomber used by the British Fleet Air Arm in the early years of World War II. All but forgotten now the Skua was flown in combat over Norway, the beaches of Dunkirk and in the Mediterranean. It gained the distinction of being the first Fleet Air Arm aircraft to shoot down a German aircraft in World War Two (a Dornier Do Flying boat on 26th September 1939) and also being the first aircraft to sink a major warship in wartime when Skuas sank the cruiser Königsberg in Bergen harbour on 10th April 1940. The Skua was also the first aircraft to carry out an interception of an enemy aircraft controlled by shipbourne radar.
Specification:
Engine: Bristol Perseus XII nine cylinder, sleeve valve, air cooled radial engine rated at 815 hp (could give a higher power rating of over 900 hp for 5 mins on emergency boost).
Max Speed: 225 mph at 6,700 ft, 204 mph at sea level.
Service ceiling 20,500 ft (reached in 43 mins), the Skua had a very poor rate of climb.
Total fuel: 163 imperial gallons, giving a maximum range of some 760 miles (an endurance of over 4 hours).
Armament: Four Browning .303 machine guns in wings with 600 rounds per gun (nearly double the number of rounds-per-gun of a Hurricane or Spitfire). One Lewis .303 machine gun in rear cockpit (whenever possible the gunner would try to replace this with a Vickers "K" gun which was more reliable and had a higher rate of fire). One 500 lb semi-armour-piercing bomb(SAP) or one 500 lb armour-piercing (AP) or one 250 lb general purpose (GP) bomb recessed under fuselage and held in a bomb crutch to swing it clear of the propeller in dive bombing attacks. A "light series carrier" bomb rack could be fitted under each wing. Each carrier could hold 4 x 20 lb Cooper bombs or incendiaries or 2 x 40 lb bombs or incendiaries.
The 500lb AP and SAP bombs was only used against armoured warships, for attacks on merchant ships and ground targets the normal bombload was a 250 lb bomb in the fuselage recess and either 20lb or 40lb bombs on the light series carriers. The 250 lb bomb had only a little less explosive content than the 500lb SAP and AP bombs (the extra weight of the latter was down to the casing, needed to punch through armour). If used against ground targets the SAP and AP bombs would often bury themselves deep before exploding, reducing the blast effect. The small and largely ineffective 100 lb anti-submarine (AS) bomb could also be carried in the fuselage recess.

The Skua prototypes used the well tried Bristol Mercury engine but use of these engines in the huge Blenheim bomber programme meant that production Skuas had to use the new Bristol sleeve valve Perseus engine. There is no evidence that the Perseus engine as used on the Skua was particularly unreliable in itself, but the new sleeve valve technology must have made maintenance more difficult and the Perseus's small production run must have made spares hard to find as the war years rolled by. The spin characteristics of the Skua were bad enough to prompt the fitting of an anti-spin parachute in the tail to aid recovery.
When reading histories of the Fleet Air Arm in the Second World War you often find naval writers blame the lacklustre performance of the Skua on the RAF and Air Ministry who effectively ran the Fleet Air Arm and controlled its supply of aircraft until 24th April 1939. Meanwhile writers in the RAF camp blame the Skuas poor performance on the specifications laid down by the Admiralty, particularly for it having to share the role of fighter and dive bomber. It is interesting to note that both the USA's Dauntless dive bomber and the Japanese Aichi "Val" dive bomber are often praised for their ability to act as fighters in an emergency! It is also worth remembering that when Skuas joined the Fleet Air Arm they went to fighter squadrons which operated a mix of Hawker Nimrod single seat fighters and Hawker Osprey two seat fighter-bombers. There is no doubt that the FAA found the Osprey with its dual-role, longer endurance, and top speed only a little lower than its single seat stable-mate, a much more useful aircraft. A lot of the enthusiasm for "multi-role" aircraft in the FAA seems to have come from the pilots themselves, rather than the Admirals (see Geoffrey Till's book "Air Power and the Royal Navy 1914-1945"). The Skua was designed with a very specific task in mind, the sinking of enemy aircraft carriers, for which its single 500 lb bomb would have been more than adequate (only Britain developed and deployed aircraft carriers with armoured decks during World War II). The role of fighter was secondary (see chapter 9 of Peter C. Smith's "Dive Bomber! An Illustrated History" for details of how the specification for the Skua was drawn up). In combat however the Skua was forced to be used as a fighter much more often than as a dive bomber. Off Norway and in the Mediterranean its performance as a fighter was often better than might be imagined just looking at its modest speed in level flight. Its long endurance meant it could loiter at altitude (once it got there, it had a very poor rate of climb) and dive onto its victims.

It was actually the pilot who was responsible for navigation and who had the maps in his cockpit. Having said that the TAG was essential to the pilot finding his way back to the carrier; the Skua carried an ingenious device that picked up radio signals from a rotating beacon on the aircraft carrier. This allowed to TAG to work out the bearing of the carrier and thus the Skua could find its way home even if the carrier had to change position because of enemy action. To work out the bearing the Telgraphist-Air gunner (TAG) in the Skua had to know the rotational speed of the beacon on the carrier (this made it extemely difficult for the enemy to use the same signals to home in on the carrier). The whole process was complicated, and could never have been done by the pilot, hence the need for a second crewman. Having said that a navigator (called an Observer in the wartime FAA) could be carried on a Skua for the purposes of finding the way to a target - For example the raid on the Königsberg and the flight to find the SS Fanad Head were both led by Skuas with an Observer, rather than a TAG, on board.

The Skua was built to Specification O.27/34 issued in 1934, two prototypes were ordered in 1935 and the first prototype (K5178) did not fly until nearly two years later on 9th Feb 1937. In October of that year it went for handling trials at A.&A.E.E. Martlesham.The second prototype (K5179) did not fly until 4th May 1938, and the first production Skua (L2867) flew on 28th August 1938. A total of 190 Skuas had been ordered as far back as July 1936, even before the first prototype had flown. Thus production was started a full two years after the order. However deliveries were prompt after that and over 150 had been delivered by the time War started, with all but one being delivered by the end of 1939. This meant that the Skua was very much a "new" aircraft when it first went to war and its pilots were still finding their way in this big metal monoplane aircraft with retractable undercarriage and enclosed cockpits, all a novelty to British carrier pilots of the time.

One thing that should never be forgotten when considering the Skua is that it was custom-designed for operation from aircraft carriers. Its wings folded back to lie alongside the fuselage so that the aircraft could fit onto the lifts of even the oldest of the Royal Navy's carries. The small floor-space required by the Skua meant more could be carried aboard. The Skua was also built to float on water if ditched, with water-tight compartments to give the necessary bouyancy, and there was a dingy in a compartment in the rear fuselage; released by pulling a cable (although it didn't always work - see "Oh Calamity!")

The Skua had a major disadvantage in that it been designed without any armour protection for the crew or self-sealing fuel tanks to cope with bullet and shrapnel holes. An armoured windscreen and some armour plate behind the pilot was provided for combat squadrons in late 1940, but the poor TAG in the rear seat had no such protection and faced being roasted alive by the blow-torch flames of a burning fuel tank blown back by the airflow. It is reported that before each combat mission the TAG had to sign for a small bag which contained corks of various sizes with which he was expected to plug any bullet holes in the fuel tank!
Considering the small production run of only 190 aircraft the number of combats the Skua was involved in is phenomenal. See the "Norway" "Mediterranean" and "Dunkirk" pages for more details
So, the Skua was designed as a Divebomber, and happened to be pressed into service as an emergency fighter as an exigency of war. Hurricane MkIs converted to Sea hurricanes could not have carried bombs, could not possess the necessary range, (Skuas had an operational range of 750 miles, to the hurricanes 425 mile range) lacked the navigational refinements and would have basically halved the air complements for british carriers at the beginning of the war (wing folding may have , been introduced later, but as a 1939 emergency measure, one would have to reasonably assume that they would not have wing folding)
On the other hand, there is little argument that as a day fighter, the Hurricane would have been far superior. Its just the little detail that the specification to which the Skua was designed could not be met by the Hurricane….it was an aircraft with a different role…
 
The Fulmar
The specifications for this type show a marked improvement in comparison to the Skua
General characteristics
• Crew: Two
• Powerplant: 1× Rolls-Royce Merlin 30 liquid-cooled inline V-12, 1,300 hp (970 kW)
Performance
• Maximum speed: 272 mph at 7,250 ft (438 km/h at 2,200 m)
• Range: 780 mi (1,255 km)
• Service ceiling: 27,200 ft (8,300 m)
• Initial rate of climb: 366 m/min (1200 ft/min)
• Wing loading: 28 lb/ft² (137 kg/m²)
Armament
• 8 × 0.303 in (7.7 mm) Browning machine guns wing-mounted, and occasionally 1 × .303 in (7.7 mm) Vickers K machine gun in rear cabin
• 2 × 100 lb (45 kg) or 250 lb (110 kg) bombs

The Fulmar, a navalised version of the P.4/34 was submitted to meet Specification O.8/38 for a two-crew fleet defence fighter. As it was not expected to encounter fighter opposition, high performance or maneuverability was not considered important but long range and heavy armament were. The provision of a navigator/wireless operator was considered essential for the long, over-ocean flights which would be required.
Looking much like its sister, the Battle, the Fulmar prototype was aerodynamically cleaner and featured a folding wing that was 16 in (41 cm) shorter than its bomber lookalike. The prototype P.4/34 K5099 first flew on 13 January 1937 at Fairey Aviation's Great West Aerodrome (now London Heathrow Airport) with Fairey test pilot Chris Staniland at the controls. After the first flight tests, the tail was revised, being raised 8 in (20 cm).
The first prototype Fulmar acting as "flying mock-up" was powered by a 1,080 hp (810 kW) Rolls Royce Merlin III engine. With this engine, performance was poor, the prototype only reaching 230 mph (370 km/h). With the Merlin VIII engine - a variant unique to the Fulmar and with supercharging optimised for low-level flight - and aerodynamic improvements, speed was improved to 255 mph (410 km/h), which, owing to the desperate need for modern fighters, was considered adequate. As a simple derivative of an existing prototype, the Fulmar promised to be available quickly and an initial order for 127 production aircraft was placed in mid-1938 [3] and the first example flew from Fairey's facility at RAF Ringway near Manchester on 4 January 1940 and the last of 600 Fulmars was delivered from Ringway on 11 December 1942
The first squadron to be equipped with the Fulmar was No. 806 Squadron FAA in July 1940 and this squadron began operating from HMS Illustrious shortly afterwards. The Fulmar was not well matched with land-based fighters. The Navy had specified a two-seat machine, feeling that a navigator was needed to cope with the challenges of navigating over the open ocean. As a result, the Fulmar was far too large and unwieldy when it came into contact with single-seat, land-based opposition, as it did in the Mediterranean Theatre. Yet its long range was useful at times as evidenced in the 1941 chase of the German battleship Bismarck where Fulmars acted as carrier-borne spotters, tracking and trailing the fleeing battleship.
First seeing action on Malta convoy protection patrols in September 1940, the sturdy Fulmar was able to achieve victories against its far more agile Italian and German adversaries. By the autumn, Fulmars had shot down ten Italian bombers and six enemy fighters, while giving top cover to the Swordfish raid on Taranto.
Fulmars played a prominent role in the ill-fated raid on Kirkenes and Petsamo in July 1941.
By 1942, the Fulmar was being replaced by single-seat aircraft adapted from land fighters such as the Supermarine Seafire or by American single seat fighters such as the Grumman Martlet. It saw useful service in nighttime roles as a convoy escort and intruder and was used to train crews for the Fairey Barracuda. On the other hand, its flight characteristics were considered pleasant, its wide undercarriage provided good deck handling capacities and it had excellent fuel capacity and range. Fulmars were used in long-range reconnaissance after they were withdrawn as fighters. Most Fleet Air Arm fighter aces scored at least part of their victories in Fulmars, for example, Sub Lieutenant S.G. Orr, finished the war with 12 confirmed air victories, as the third-highest scoring pilot in the FAA.
At one time, 20 squadrons of the FAA were equipped with the Fulmar. It flew from eight fleet aircraft carriers and five escort carriers. No. 273 Squadron RAF operated them for some months in 1942 from China Bay, Ceylon, seeing action against Japanese forces during the raid on 9 April 1942 ; though about half the squadron personel were Navy. Fulmars destroyed 112 enemy aircraft, which made it the leading fighter type, by aircraft shot down, in the Fleet Air Arm during the Second World War. The Fulmar ended its front line operational career on 8 February 1945, when a Fulmar MK II night-fighter from No. 813 Squadron had a landing accident at the safety barrier on HMS Campania and was written off .
Approximately 100 Fulmars were converted to a night fighter variant, but had limited success in this role.
Once again, the Hurricane option is not realistic because it could not meet the multi-role specification 08/38. The Hurricane once again lacked the range and the navigational capabilities to undertake all of the required mission undertaken by the Fulmar. It did possess superior fighter performance but would have lacked wing folding in the early versions if we postulate an availability from 1939. That basically halves the aircraft availability from British carriers which would have had disastrous impacts on operations. That and the short range, inability to undertake the spotting role, and a complete lack of adequate range makes the type wholly inappropriate for the type of fighting the RN was engaged in 1939. far from enhancing the capabilities of the RN, these shortcomings would have lead to even heavier losses and the likely defeat of the alliance as a result
 
The Firefly

The Firefly followed the same formula as the Fulmar, but was much more powerful and useful. Designed to N.5/40 - a merger of N.8139 and N.9139 - it was a clean stressed-skin machine with folding elliptical wings housing the four cannon and with the trailing edge provided with patented Youngman flaps for exceptional manoeuvrability and to used use at low speeds and in cruise. Unlike the installation on the Barracuda, these flaps could be recessed into the wing.
The pilot sat over the leading edge, with the observer behind the wing. The main wartime version was the Mk 1, widely used from the end of 1 943 in all theatres. Fairey and General Aircraft built 429 F.1s, 376 FR.Is with ASH radar and then 37 NF.2 night fighters. There followed the more powerful Mk Ill, from which derived the redesigned FR.4 with two-stage Griffon and wing-root radiators. There were 160 of these

Designed to Admiralty Specification N.5140, calling for a two-seat reconnaissance strike fighter, the Fairey Firefly represented a considerable advance over the company's earlier Fulmar. A cantilever low-wing monoplane of all-metal construction, it had a conventional tail unit, retractable tailwheel landing gear and accommodation for the pilot and navigator/radio-operator in separate enclosed cockpits. Power was provided by a 1,730 hp (1290 kW) Rolls-Royce Griffon IIB engine, but later production Firefly F.Mk 1 aircraft had the 1,990 hp (1484-kW) Griffon XII. The first of four development aircraft was flown on 22 December 1941, and the first production Firefly F.Mk 1 aircraft were delivered in March 1943. A total of 459 of this version was built, 327 by Fairey and 132 by General Aircraft under sub-contract. The addition of ASH radar beneath the engine identified the Firefly FR.Mk 1, of which 236 were built, and a number of Firefly F.Mk Is modified to Firefly FR.MK 1 standard had the designation Firefly F.Mk IA. A Firefly NF.Mk 11 night-fighter version was developed, but when it was realised that its AI Mk 10 radar could be pod mounted beneath the engine, as with the ASH radar of the Firefly FR.MK 1, the planned 328 aircraft programme was cancelled. Instead, 140 Firefly FR.MK Is were modified on the production line to Firefly NF.Mk 1 configuration, the 37 Firefly NF.Mk IIs that had been built being converted back to Mk 1 standard.

Fireflies entered service first with No. 1770 Squadron at Yeovilton, Somerset, on 1 October 1943. Later embarked on HMS Indefatigable, they were active in operations against the German battleship Tirpitz in Norway during July 1944. They also saw action against Japanese oil refineries in Sumatra, in attacks on the Carolines and against shipping and ground targets in the Japanese home islands. In 1950, after war broke out in Korea, Firefly Mk 5s were operated from Australian and British light fleet carriers, and in 1954 the type was in action in the ground-attack role in Malaya. Just over two years later the Firefly was retired after 13 years of valuable service.
Specifications (Fairey Firefly AS.Mk 5)
Type: Two Seat Naval Reconnaissance Fighter / Anti Submarine Strike Aircraft
Design: Fairey Aviation Design Team
Manufacturer: The Fairey Aviation Company
Powerplant: (AS.Mk 5) One 2,250 hp (1678 kW) Rolls-Royce Griffon 74 12-cylinder Vee piston engine. (Mk I up to No 470) One 1,730 hp (1290 kW) Rolls-Royce Griffon IIB 12-cylinder Vee liquid-cooled; (from No 471) 1,990 hp (1485 kW) Griffon XII. (Mks 4-7) One 2,250 hp (1678 kW) Griffon 74 12-cylinder Vee piston engine.
Performance: (AS.Mk 5) Maximum speed 386 mph (618 km/h) at 14,000 ft (4265 m); cruising speed 220 mph (354 km/h); service ceiling 28,000 ft (8534 m). (Mk I) Maximum speed 316 mph (509km/h); initial climb rate 1,700 ft (518m) per minute; service ceiling 28,000 ft (8534 m). (Mk 4) Maximum speed 386 mph (618 km/h); initial climb rate 2,050 ft (625 m) per minute; service ceiling 31,000 ft (9450 m).
Range: (AS.Mk 5) 1300 miles (2092 km) on internal fuel. (Mk I) 580 miles (933 km) on internal fuel. (Mk 4) 760 miles (1223 km) on internal fuel.
Weight: (AS.Mk 5) Empty 9,674 lbs (4388 kg) with a maximum take-off weight of 16,096 lbs (7301 kg). (Mk I) Empty 9,750 lbs (4422 kg) with a maximum take-off weight of 14,020 lbs (6359 kg). (Mk 7) Empty 11,016 lbs (4997 kg) with a maximum take-off weight of 13,970 lbs (6337 kg).
Dimensions: (Mk 4 - 6) Span 41 ft 2 in (12.55 m); length 37 ft 11 in (8.51 m); height 14 ft 4 in (4.37 m); wing area 330.0 sq ft (30.66 sq m). (Mk I - III) Span 44 ft 6 in (13.55m); length 37 ft 7 in (11.4 m); height 13 ft 7 in (4.15 m).
Armament: (Mk I) Four fixed 20 mm Hispano cannon in wings and underwing racks for up to two 1,000 lbs (454 kg) of bombs or sixteen 60 lbs (27 kg) rocket projectiles. (Mk 4 and 5) usually similar to 1 in most sub-types. (Mk 6) no guns, but underwing load increased to 3,000 lbs (1362 kg) and varied. (Mk 7) no guns, but underwing load remained at 3,000 lbs (1362 kg) and equipment changed.
Variants: Firefly F.Mk 1, Firefly FR.Mk 1, Firefly F.Mk IA, Firefly NF.Mk 11, Firefly NF.Mk I, Firefly T.Mk 1, Firefly T.Mk 2, Firefly T.Mk 3, Firefly F.Mk III, Firefly F.Mk IV, Firefly FR.Mk 4, Firefly TT.Mk 4, Firefly Mk 5, Firefly Mk 6, Firefly FR.Mk 5, Firefly NF.Mk 5, Firefly AS.Mk 5, Firefly AS.Mk 6, Firefly TT.Mk 5, Firefly TT.Mk 6, Firefly, AS.Mk 7, Firefly T.Mk 7 ASW, Firefly U.Mk 8, Firefly U.Mk 9.
Avionics: AI Mk X radar, ASH Scanner, sonobuoys.
History: First flight 22 December 1941; first production F.1 26 August 1942; production FR.4. 25 May 1945; final delivery of new aircraft May 1955.
Operators: United Kingdom (RN), Canada (RCN), Australia.
Number Built: ~1533

In this case the case is made that the Firefly was not as effective as the later war US Hellcats and Corsairs. Yet once again, we find that the Hellcats and Corsairs would have been unable to meet the design specification N5/40. It is worth noting that the design specs for the Firefly were issued before the Hellcat or Corsair were available, so it would have been an enormous leap of faith not to initiate the design and production of the firefly at a time when neither US type was available . Moreover, neither US type could fulfil the multi-role mission assigned to the Firefly. Neither the Hellcat or the Corsair could undertake the all-weather missions of the Firefly, could not undertake long range strike missions. They could undertake the night fighter role but it is a mute point as to how effective either the Brit or the US types type and were since by the time they were operational as night fighters, the opposition had ceased to be numerous. I have read, but cannot confirm of several night interceptions of He11s by Fireflies over the North Sea, so it should not require too much argument to establish the types credentialas as an effective night fighter….
 
Parsifal, could you please divide the excerpts from the sources and your views/opinions? Like wrapping them to quote tags or something?
 
I take it you have not much to say. These are excerpts from various sources, but are my own work as the text is not original. There is therefore no need to use quotes, as they are not quotes perse, rather an amalgam of multiple sopurce material

I want to see you try and say the Hellcat and Corsairs were superior to to the Fulmars and Skuas in 1940 just one more time......
 
So it is obvious that we have reached an impasse about the issue. On the one hand we have the historical situation that saw the Gladiator, Skua, Fulmar and later the Firefly introduced. On the other hand we have the assertion that the RN would have been better off if it had waited until the Hurricane was available for service. In the case of the Firefly, the argument is slightly different, basically it runs that the Fleet air marm made a mistake to order and construct the Firefly, and would have been better off just sitting back and relying on the hellcat and corsair production.

I'm posting to the warfare forums for about a decade. I also try to learn about warfare for last 30 years. During that time, I've seen people question quality of German Russian tanks, Allied tanks, Italian Japanese planes, partisans, scouts, ships, stategies and tactics. And many people made valuable points about the shortcomings, while proposing something both better and available for the era.

Yet, the only thing that stands beyond any sort of criticism is RN policy of purchase, esp in 1935-45 time frame.
 
I take it you have not much to say.
Well, there you are wrong.
These are excerpts from various sources, but are my own work as the text is not original. There is therefore no need to use quotes, as they are not quotes perse, rather an amalgam of multiple sopurce material

I want to see you try and say the Hellcat and Corsairs were superior to to the Fulmars and Skuas in 1940 just one more time......

Parsifal, since I've said TWICE that I've made typo ONCE, should I take this like personal or something?
Still no numbers about Fulmar/Firefly night bad weather kills...
 
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Can you please explain then why the US would build 7,000 Helldivers, which had the same or inferior performance as a bomber to a Firefly?

Now why would I explain why US bought Helldivers, and why anybody would do that in this thread?
And could you please quote your post in this thread that states combat ranges of Faireys, Corsair Hellcat?
 
Well I thought Parsfail's posts #61, 62, 63 were very good and informative, and I too have that excellent 'Dive Bomber' book.

Whilst some have advocated Sea Hurricanes for a multi-role function - even before it was used as a fighter-bomber OTL. I think a more plausible alternative scenairo would have been Hawkers putting forward a Skua replacement in the form of a Sea Henley i.e. Fighter Dive-Bomber.
Shouldn't be a problem putting guns in the wings, and while any naval additions may degrade max speed from the 290+ mph, it will be much faster than a Skua, while range was nearly 200 miles more. Indeed, it could negate the need for the Fulmar.
 
Yet, the only thing that stands beyond any sort of criticism is RN policy of purchase, esp in 1935-45 time frame.

Oh, I think one can criticise the RN policy of Purchase in that time frame. After all the Roc was not exactly a steller idea:lol:

But since it was never used on a carrier substituting something else wouldn't have made much difference to historical operations.

The Fairey Albacore was another plane whose time had come and gone before it entered squadron service. While the crews that manned it did good service It was time for the Naval Air Service to be looking at a monoplane torpedo bomber. THe thing is that it would have to be purpose built and not an adaptation of an existing airframe. The specification that lead to the Barracuda was issued about one year after the Albacores specification. As to why it took 6 years to go from specification to service use of the Barracuda, maybe somebody elese knows.

The whole Blackburn Firebrand story needs a little explaining.:lol:

When looking at Naval aircraft one has to keep in mind the Naval requirements. And just because a land plane was used from carriers doesn't mean it was a good idea. Please look at the Grumman Wildcat and a Hurricane. Similar powered engines. Similar sized wings. Yet the Wildcat is a rather heavier aircraft. Landing gear and structure had to deal with higher vertical velocity landings. The Wildcat carried much more fuel. The Wildcat had a heavier radio/comm gear intallation. Then we get to the folding wing part.
Also please note that the Wildcat isn't ordered into production until Aug of 1939 and the first production plane isn't delivered until Aug of 1940. This is the fixed wing version.
A "TRUE" Sea Hurricane built from the start to incorperate Naval requirements is going to have even less performance than the Sea Hurricanes they did get. While such a plane would have better performance than the Fulmar is it going to be good enough to make much difference against land based 109s? Especially in 1939-40 using the MK III Merlin engines.
 
Folks,

Interesting discussions but the pivotal issue appears to have been a predilection in the FAA for mult-role, or at least multi-purpose, aircraft. This was perhaps driven by the relatively smaller size of the RN's aircraft carriers compared to those of America and Japan, or maybe by the pre-war political tug-of-war between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry over who "owned" aircraft operating from aircraft carriers (the latter ultimately won the argument until, if memory serves, 1939 when the Admiralty took charge again - it would be interesting to view these political machinations with the issuance of specifications for the Skua, Roc, Fulmar, Firefly etc).

KR
Mark H (LKBS)
 
I dont think anyone here is saying the RN FAA was beyond criticism. Of the "big three" naval powers, Britain FAA was the least well prepared.

But what does draw criticism are these simplistic comparisons that dont lookat the unique situations that the RN was fightiung under. It is not valid to compare the operational requirements of the pacific navies to those of the RN. The situations and the requirements were so different as to make comparisons meaningless. The need for high performance combat machines at just about any cost was a luxury that could not be adopted in the Atlantic. The weather, the closed nature of the seas, the paucity of carrier numbers made other issues just as, if not more important. And then, if you add into the mix the peculiarities of the RN itself, you tend to get rather strange results. Oh and one more thing to note....insofar as the FAA was concerned, it was not its own master until 1937. The procurement machine that you want to attackj was actually controlled by the RAF until 1938 IIRC.

So what were the shortcoming of the FAA. I would say numbers mostly, followed by some faulty doctrines. The lack of high performance is obvious as well. But the FAAs strengths were enough to cancel out its shortcomings, and it eventually won decisively...
 
Hello Shortround
at least one reason to long development history of Barracuda was that it was torpedo bomber/dive bomber, again one of those multi-purpose a/c for RN. Also Swordfish and Albacore could dive bomb but the double role was more difficult for a monoplane and so complicated the development.

Juha
 
Here's some info on loss/success for the Fulmar in the Med 40-42 based on my study of Shores' two books on Malta.

lost - 40

1 - D-520
3 - CR-42
1 - MC-200
1 - MC-202
1 - RE-2001 (or 109)
3 - FAA
5 - Ground (air attack)
1 - AA
1 - Z-1007bis
6 - S-79
1 - Z-506B
1 - Z-501
1 - Ju-88
3 - Ju-87
11 - op losses

Kills - 67

5 x Z-1007bis
4 x BR-20M
15 x S-79
5 x S-84
1 x S-81
13 x Z-506B
9 x Z-501
5 x Ju-87
8 x Ju-88
1 x Ju-52
1 x Bf-110
 
Here's some info on loss/success for the Fulmar in the Med 40-42 based on my study of Shores' two books on Malta.

lost - 40

1 - D-520
3 - CR-42
1 - MC-200
1 - MC-202
1 - RE-2001 (or 109)
3 - FAA
5 - Ground (air attack)
1 - AA
1 - Z-1007bis
6 - S-79
1 - Z-506B
1 - Z-501
1 - Ju-88
3 - Ju-87
11 - op losses

Kills - 67

5 x Z-1007bis
4 x BR-20M
15 x S-79
5 x S-84
1 x S-81
13 x Z-506B
9 x Z-501
5 x Ju-87
8 x Ju-88
1 x Ju-52
1 x Bf-110

Hi Nikedamus
I've come up with much the same . Factoring out the Operational losses and AA and destroyed on ground , the Air to Air combats are nearly 3 to1 in favour of the Fulmar . Not Bad for an A/C that was developed from a Light Bomber
Cheers
Terry McGrady
 
no, its not bad. The Fulmar did provide valuable services during it's deployment on carriers in the Med and should not be discounted. At the same time, it's limitations were also on display, increasing as time went by. It's limited climb and speed made it tough to intercept speedy bombers and of course against single engine fighters, it was at a severe disadvantage. However coupled with decent FD, it's weaknesses in changing it's vectoring could be compensated for somewhat....emphasis on somewhat, for example during Pedestal it was confined primarily to sealevel/low level interceptions because it simply couldn't get to altitude fast enough either from patrol, or taking off from the carrier as reinforcements to intercept in time. Additionally, it's very large size and unwieldly nature also made it more vulnerable to enemy bomber return fire as well as enemy fighters. An additional positive mentioned, important for the British given the large # of unblooded pilots shiped, was the generous ammo coupled with alot of MG's

Overall it might be said that the design philosphy embraced the assumption that carrier fighters by default would compare unfavorably to land based fighters thus attributes other than pure performance vs. enemy fighters might be stressed or at least focused on. This gave the plane a limited scope and a shelf life but it wasn't a "bad" plane per se. On land, at Malta, the plane was quickly relegated to night ops due to it's vulnerability to fighters.
 
Great summary, and agree pretty much in entirety.

The argument that has raged over this thread is whether the RN would have been better off with adopting the Sea Hurricane earlier, rather than developing the Fulmar.

In one sense the SH was better, namely in combat performace. However in terms of range, nav ability, strike and recon capability, I think the SH was unable to do the task, or would have done it poorly. Given the limited capacity of Brit carriers, multi role functionality was considered essential in RN carrier doctrine....

Was this a valid position for the RN to adopt???? i think that it was
 
Hi, Nikademus,
Could you please provide some info about the distances between kills/intercepts and carriers (from wich Fulmars were flown)? And some info about Sea Gladiators would be greatly appreciated.
 
Hi, Nikademus,
Could you please provide some info about the distances between kills/intercepts and carriers (from wich Fulmars were flown)? And some info about Sea Gladiators would be greatly appreciated.

UK carriers generally flew patrols around the carrier's immediate vacinity in section strength (3 aircraft....sometimes 4) These would be given titles by color aka "Blue section", "Yellow section", "Red section" etc etc. These sections were controlled by the home carrier and vectored onto contacts detected by radar. Sometimes a standing patrol might make a visual contact first but usually radar would detect them first. Combats often occured within visual sight of the carrier and convoy/escorts which during the really hairy times meant that UK fighters might have to fight through and/or watch out for their own AA. For some of the larger raids, assuming availability, any leftover fighter planes would be in ready condition and would be scrambled and vectored. Assigned patrol height varied initially......it might be as low as 2000 feet or as high as 13-15k. Wartime experience + availability of more powerful navalized aircraft saw the Fulmars assigned to low alt patrol sections due to their poor climb and speed. Sea Hurricanes would take the high patrols.

Against unescorted bomber opposition or the lone snooper, the Fulmars were effective though against the speedier bombers like the Ju-88 catching one was difficult and advance vectoring very important. During one notable action a Fulmar crew was shagrinned to see a Ju-88 with a damage to an engine still out hauling them as it made it's escape.

After Illustrious was badly damaged, Malta became home for section of 806 Fulmars. Initially, these operated during the day, patroling and scrambling to intercept enemy contacts. Initially they didn't do too bad but after the Luftwaffe showed up, general "Fulmar" policy was for the big planes to remain around the fringes of a raid and to try and pick off stragglers, leaving the infighting to the speedier, more nimble Hurricanes. Little success was acheived because they were too slow to have much chance of catching a speedy Ju-88 or Bf-110 fleeing the scene [Shores]

Fulmar daylight ops came to a prompt end after the first 109E's showed up right from day one. March 2, 41 a notable day as the full section of Fulmars got jumped by a Kette of 109's that thankfully only made one slashing pass,badly shooting up all three planes which promptly made emergency landings. Amazingly none of the three pilots were wounded.

Sea Gladiator.

Including the planes based during the earliest days of the fighting on Malta, Sea Gladiators scored approximately 11 kills 40-41. None were lost in combat as far as I can tell.

7 x S-79
2 x S-81
1 x Z-506B
1 x Z-501
 
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