Blenheim as a torpedo bomber?

Shortround6 said:

I might add that it didn't really need "hindsight" in many cases. Unfortunately in too many cases large blinders were used to ignore the lessons of WW I or willful disregard of those lessons was employed to justify the decisions made in the planning/procurement of aircraft and their deployment.
Inadequate testing/development of weapons (and all to often depending on hope/wishful thinking rather than tests and training) hampered the RAF even in it's "dream mission" (strategic bombing) let alone planes/units devoted to periphery tasks like maritime reconnaissance/coastal patrol.

Click to expand...

I couldn't agree more.

Why was the Air Staff so dismissive of torpedo attacks against shipping?
The FAA and the ballistics sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence had both come to different conclusions of which the Air Staff were well aware. During 1936 and 1937 FAA aircraft had undertaken a number of exercises using torpedoes against manouevering targets in various conditions and managed a corrected score of 34% hits. The correction was for casualties to AA etc. The uncorrected figure was 50%. Furthermore the ballistics sub-committee reckoned that one torpedo hit was sufficient to severely damage a large vessel, two or more hits would invariably result in a sinking.
The answer lies, once again, in inter Service rivalries. The Air Ministry was determined to resist Admiralty efforts, which were robust, to wrest control of shore based maritime squadrons and assets. In RAF memorandums this is described as the Navy's efforts to 'get a foot ashore' or even 'establish a bridgehead'. Indeed it was this that lead to the call in the mid '30s to the call for a medium bomber/torpedo carrier resulting in the Botha and Beaufort. If the Air Ministry could demonstrate that the RAF had a maritime strike capability, even if a dozen old biplanes, then Admiralty claims that the RAF was unable to perform naval support and trade protection roles could be countered and the Air Ministry's role as sole arbiter on aviation matters could be retained.

The RAF really believed that the only weapons aircraft should be deploying against shipping were bombs. Despite the results of various bombing trials in the 1930s the RAF also managed to discount the most accurate method of bombing shipping, dive bombing. Instead the RAF decided that 'pattern bombing' was the way to go.
How the bombers were supposed to navigate over the sea to find their targets was another question solved by wishful thinking, rather like the bomber v battleship question being decided in favour of the ship. In October 1938 the Deputy Director of Staff Duties, Group Captain F H Maynard wrote with breathtaking insouciance that long range navigation over sea and interception of naval targets amounted to "a comparatively simple exercise"
Later a plan to use Coastal Command aircraft to guide the bombers to their targets was mooted. The bomber crews couldn't 'Bradshaw', a reference to a famous Victorian railway guide book much used on cross country training flights, over the sea.

Cheers

Steve

Surprisingly the RAF didnt test or even train much with its bombs and bomb sights never mind testing and training with Torpedos, this resulted in a lot of deaths in the first 2 years to essentially dump scrap iron near (sometimes not even near) the targets . I sometimes think the RAF and the Air Ministry in the 30s thought that carrying guns and bombs was not the done thing and that all that mattered was flying in perfect formation at the Hendon airshow.

fastmongrel said:

Surprisingly the RAF didnt test or even train much with its bombs and bomb sights never mind testing and training with Torpedos,

Click to expand...

Bombing trials were intermittent and unscientific. I can't be exhaustive here, but as a rough guide the following trials against shipping were undertaken.

1931, trials against Centurion using the 'Fourth Vector' bomb sight, introduced in 1929. These were quite extensive, different heights were used and aircrews tried different bombing angles and scales of attack from single aircraft to large formations. A 32% uncorrected hit rate was claimed.

1932. No trials

1933. A series of trials for different techniques. High altitude 'precision' bombing by three aircraft from 9,000ft, high altitude 'pattern bombing' up to 16,000ft by a whole squadron, dive bombing with release at 1,500ft and bombing ahead of the ship with a buoyant ('B') bomb were all tried. Dive bombing was most accurate with a 38% hit rate.

1934. Similar trials at which despite the repeated success of dive bombing the RAF chose 'pattern bombing' by a whole squadron as the standard method for attacking shipping.

1935/1936 No trials

The results of the 1933 and 1934 trials led to disagreement between the Air Ministry and Admiralty who came to different conclusions from the same data. Whilst the Air Ministry was happy with the conclusions it had drawn the Admiralty felt more work was needed, particularly into the effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire. The Admiralty also deemed the trials unscientific as they were always carried out in near perfect conditions and both pilots and bomb aimers were familiar with the target areas.This advice, and to be fair similar opinions from within the Air Ministry expressed by Director of Staff Duties Sholto-Douglas for one, were ignored.
So it was that the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield,suggested that the Imperial Committee for Defence should conduct an investigation into bombing and anti-aircraft defences and any other areas where there were sources of contention. The British, as anyone who has been reading this thread will have realised, love a committee.
The Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshall Sir Edward Ellington, agreed to the proposal but said that he did not want "too much of a scientific analysis", which neatly sums up the RAF's attitude to the coming trials.

1937. A Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence was set up in February to oversee the trials. It was preponderantly scientific in make up, men like Henry Tizard, Sir Frank Smith and R H Fowler were all scientists. Initially they analysed the data from all the previous trials and concluded that it was insufficient for the drawing of 'reliable conclusions'. Furthermore 'the bomb v battleship controversy had indeed been carried out on the basis of aspirations rather than actuals.' That's committee speak for wishful thinking.

Again I have to skim the detail which would fill a book, but the part of the extensive trials in 1937 and 1938 into anti-aircraft gunnery showed serious weaknesses in the Admiralty's original conclusions, even against 80 mph 'Queen Bees'. It is often claimed that the inability of ships to defend themselves against a skilful and determined aerial attack came as a huge surprise to the Admiralty once the war started but in 1938 the Sub-Committees report came down in favour of the bomber. Both Service staffs broadly agreed with the conclusions. This led the Admiralty to investigate more closely the subject of torpedo and dive bombing attacks whilst the Air Ministry concluded that the bomber would indeed always get through and felt vindicated.
The widespread belief in the Navy that it could defend its ships with anti-aircraft fire shows that the Air Ministry did not have a monopoly on wishful thinking, though the report did lead to the acknowledgement that some form of fleet defence aircraft would be required, leading to the interim Sea Gladiator and then Fulmar.

The bombing part of the investigation took place in late 1937 and early 1938. The venerable Centurion was again made available. The results of dive bombing and level bombing were found to be similar. Bombing accuracy fell off with height. A low release height was more accurate but an altitude of 10,000ft was recommended to ensure penetration of armoured decks, a contradiction which could not be resolved. The effects of a vessels avoiding action were considered minimal.

1939 these trials continued. Both Services now tried for more scientific rigour. The establishment of yet another committee, the Service Marking Committee, to oversee the plotting of bomb trajectories and resting sites was a reflection of this. It may be that the looming war concentrated minds, inter-Service cooperation certainly did improve. There were problems. Most bombing was done by Overstrands, only in mid 1939 did the RAF provide more modern types (Wellingtons, Whitleys and Blenheims were used) and on only a few days was the weather less than good.

There was still inertia. The problems of navigation, particularly over sea, were ignored, even after Bomber Command was handed the responsibility of attacking the German High Seas Fleet in October 1937.

There was testing and trials in the 1930s, but until the establishment of Tizard's Sub-Committee they were almost useless, the vague results were interpreted by the different Services to reinforce their own prejudices. From 1937 through to the outbreak of war more scientific testing was done, but not enough and not varied enough. Most bomber crews did not get involved in any of this testing and it is quite true that when the war started many navigators had never undertaken a long over sea flight.
It wasn't until early 1938 that Bomber Command aircraft were authorised to make flights "to any great distance from the coast" in Ludlow-Hewitt's words. It was not until around a year before hostilities that Bomber Command aircraft received aeronautical charts as opposed to the topographical survey maps then in use, neither did they have the most basic gear for survival at sea.

Cheers

Steve

I've been looking at the specific case of the Blenheim for use by Coastal Command. The British aircraft industry had an unfortunate practice of 'fading out' obsolete types and gradually switching production to newer types, in an effort to keep up the total number of aircraft available. This led to 'stop gap' orders, which swelled the relative proportion of superseded aircraft and delayed the supply of more advanced aircraft. I'm sure a list of such aircraft is not required on this forum, but the Blenheim falls into this category. The term 'stop gap' was applied to the Blenheim as early as March 1938 when it was mentioned as the only aircraft that could fill certain General Reconnaissance squadrons.
In early 1939 the Blenheim was considered 'beyond effective operational value' but the Air Ministry still ordered 62 aircraft as a 'stop gap' until the Beaufort came into production.
It seems unlikely, given the status of the Blenheim at this time, relative to the Beaufort, that it would even be considered as a torpedo bomber. We know that the Beaufort would have a difficult introduction into service, but the men at the Ministry in 1938/9 did not.
There was no phoney war for Coastal Command and the Command struggled to fulfill its mission requirements with its Hudsons and Ansons, the latter of which could not even patrol closer than 60 miles from the Norwegian coast due to its limited range. Germany's major naval units could, and did on occasion, sail undetected through the Baltic to the North Atlantic. During the first month of the war 9 reconnaissance aircraft were lost on North Sea Patrols, some shot down by Luftwaffe float planes. This prompted the AOC-in-C of Coastal Command, Air Chief Marshall Sir Frederick Bowhill, to raise with the Air Ministry either raising the performance of reconnaissance types to something comparable with the enemy fighters or providing fighter escort. Neither was possible in 1939. At the end of 1939 the only aircraft available which fulfilled some of the requirements for a maritime reconnaissance fighter was the Blenheim IV. The Air Ministry was asked on 29th September 1939 for three Blenheims to be used for trial purposes with Coastal Command.Though the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshall Sholto-Douglas agreed that "...it will be necessary in the future to provide reconnaissance aircraft with increased range, manoeuvrability and defensive power" he also made it clear that these would be the Botha and Beaufort. 20 Bothas would be delivered to Coastal Command by the end of December and Beauforts were expected to start operational service from mid November, following trials with No. 22 Squadron.The Blenheims were not forthcoming.
If Coastal Command was unable to obtain an effectively unmodified version of an aircraft already described by the Air Ministry itself as a 'stop gap', what chance was there of the Air Ministry sanctioning the potentially fruitless and certainly expensive conversion to a torpedo bomber, for which role two other types were already authorised? The answer, I'm afraid, is zero.

The only positive to emerge from Bowhill's request in 1939 was that it sowed the seeds for future success in the later anti-shipping campaign. Those seeds would germinate about two years later with the introduction in late 1941 of the Beaufighter.

Cheers

Steve
Edit. I should say that Coastal Command would later get Blenheims. They equipped three squadrons in early 1940 at a time when the two Beaufort squadrons were grounded. They were only ever reconnaissance aircraft and nobody else wanted them.
The situation prompted Bowhill to write.

"I have no Striking Force whatever. It is one continual promise from the production side which never materialises, and to think that this Command started this war (and is still in the same position) with Vildebeests as a Striking Force is extraordinary."

Thank you for posting the wievs and realities among the different branches of UK's military

Granted, once Bothat and Beaufort are in the pipeline, the torpedo-carrying Blenheim is nothing but a further duplication of effort. In the same time, it is too bad the Hampden was not tested with torpedo earlier, as a back-up against either Botha or/and Beaufort being flops, and then cancel Botha and order 400-500 of those from Blackburn.
Similar scenario can be drawn for the torpedo-carrying Blenheim.

At this period aircraft production, even of the obsolete/stop gap types, was being dangerously accelerated. The problems with the Botha and Beaufort were not discovered until far too late. The Botha was a hopeless case and the Beaufort was grounded and had severe limitations imposed on its use, after it arrived at operational squadrons. They were both very nearly flops.
I agree that it would have been nice to have other options, poor Bowhill had no viable torpedo aircraft at all early in the war. He would carry the can for his Command's poor start to the war, but it was never his fault, he simply didn't have the equipment to allow him to fulfill the unrealistic mission demanded of him.

I think in the case of the Hampden the problem would have been prising it from the hands of Bomber Command. It was used as a torpedo bomber, but only after they were withdrawn from service with Bomber Command. You would have a very slim chance convincing men like Ludlow-Hewitt or Portal, a slightly better chance with Peirse and zero chance with Harris (I've ignored that interim chap, between Peirse and Harris, whose name I can never remember ) that they should give up a single bomber to another Command.
It says a lot for the emphasis placed on the bombing campaign and the political leverage that Bomber Command had, that the names that have cropped up in senior and influential roles on the Air Staff/Air Ministry in this story went on to command Bomber Command.
I haven't looked at the operational history of the Hampden as a torpedo bomber, so I've no idea how good it was. It seems to have been a fairly simple conversion. It's a type which drops off my radar once it leaves Bomber Command.

Cheers

Steve

I'd try not to steal any historical Hampden's from the Bomber Command, but have more of them produced as torpedo bombers.

I don't have the figures but what you are suggesting is to offset some production intended as bombers for Bomber Command to supply torpedo bombers to Coastal Command. This is rather similar to the Admiralty doing the same to Hurricane production for its Sea Hurricanes, something it was unable to do in 1941 and hardly in 1942, even after Fighter Command was relegating the type from front line service in Europe. You'd have a better chance of obtaining second hand aircraft for conversion but given the prevailing attitude of the Air Staff, the influence of Bomber Command and as the low priority accorded Coastal Command I don't think it could have been done historically. I've not noticed any early request from Coastal Command for the type either.

Harris, as Deputy Chief of Air Staff partially backed an idea of Beaverbrook's to transfer Coastal Command to the Navy. Harris wanted to transfer the responsibility for maritime air operations to the Navy whilst keeping the resources then existing in Coastal Command, a sort of back door expansion of Bomber Command. He argued once again that equipping Coastal Command was a serious drain on aircraft and personnel and prevented the expansion of Bomber Command and, as he put it, the "air war proper" would suffer. He also quoted Churchill's opinion of Inskip, that his was "the strangest appointment since Caligula appointed his horse a Consul of the Roman Empire."
This did not go down well with Chief of Air Staff Portal or Vice-Chief of Air Staff Freeman who commented.

"The paper makes me despair and want to go back to MAP...The need for your [Harris] having a trained staff officer is urgent. The paper is hypothetical and egotistical."

But Harris had support in even higher places. Churchill wrote.

"Fighters are streaking ahead, and it is a great comfort we have so good a position in them. We must, however, increase our bomb deliveries on Germany and it appears that some of the types and patterns most adapted to this are not coming forward as we had hoped."

It wasn't until 15th April 1941 that Coastal Command was afforded some protection by a new inter-Service agreement, one provision of which was that no squadrons could be transferred from Coastal Command without Admiralty agreement.

Now, whilst I don't believe it was a historical option it would be an interesting exercise to imagine what might have happened had Coastal Command had a couple of squadrons of Hampdens. Coastal Command didn't mount any torpedo operations early in the war because it couldn't. What if it could have?

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

I don't have the figures but what you are suggesting is to offset some production intended as bombers for Bomber Command to supply torpedo bombers to Coastal Command. This is rather similar to the Admiralty doing the same to Hurricane production for its Sea Hurricanes, something it was unable to do in 1941 and hardly in 1942, even after Fighter Command was relegating the type from front line service in Europe. You'd have a better chance of obtaining second hand aircraft for conversion but given the prevailing attitude of the Air Staff, the influence of Bomber Command and as the low priority accorded Coastal Command I don't think it could have been done historically. I've not noticed any early request from Coastal Command for the type either.
...

Click to expand...

(my emphasis)
Nope - Blackburn produces 400-500 Hampdens under license, instead of Botha, starting in 1939
Same goes with Sea Hurricane - not steal what is earmarked for RAF, but produce extra aircraft for the RN.

Bowhill first suggested the Hampden as a solution to the Beaufort's limited range, it couldn't reach the Kiel Canal or some of the important enemy anchorages and shipping lanes in the Kattegat. This was in a letter of 12th June 1941. This is shortly before Bowhill was replaced by Air Chief Marshall Sir Philip Joubert at Coastal Command. Joubert was more interested in competing with Bomber Command for long range aircraft to cover the 'Atlantic Gap' and anti-submarine operations in general. He was not supportive of his Command's anti-shipping role. He did not consider that attacking shipping was the primary role of Coastal Command's Strike Force and wrote to Portal saying so on 4th July 1941. It wasn't until 15th December that Joubert wrote to Freemen regarding the Hampden. It is worth quoting at length as it shows what was thought of the Hampden and also how he claims it as his idea!

"As you know we are in a mess about the Beauforts, and it has occurred to me that as the Hampden is becoming obsolescent from Bomber Command's point of view, it might be handed over to Coastal Command. It can carry two torpedoes or two mines and can travel far. It would be excellent for torpedo work and mining in the Bay of Biscay and on the Norwegian coast, and for the bombing of submarine bases and enemy shipping. Indeed it would make an excellent a/s [anti-submarine] craft as well."

Freeman's response was cautious arguing that far from being obsolescent the Hampden was still extremely useful to Bomber Command "with its flexibility between bombing by day or night and sea mining..." Freeman was however a supporter of Coastal Command, he had threatened to resign earlier if the maritime squadrons were handed over to the Admiralty, and he threw his weight and considerable influence behind what Joubert described as a "tremendous effort of organisation and drive" in securing an immediate allocation of 24 Hampdens which were to equip a new Coastal Command squadron, No. 415 (Canadian).
In January 1942 the order was modified so that 40 aircraft were to be delivered immediately and that 12 aircraft a month were to be modified to carry torpedoes thereafter. No. 415 Squadron did get its Hampdens by the end of January and commenced operations in April 1942. Additional aircraft did not start arriving until April and the other three Hampden squadrons (Nos. 144, 455, 489) did not become operational until mid to late 1942.

So, historically, the Hampden became operational with Coastal Command from early 1942, which begs the question, what would have been done with them a year or two earlier?

Cheers

Steve

tomo pauk said:

(my emphasis)
Nope - Blackburn produces 400-500 Hampdens under license, instead of Botha, starting in 1939
Same goes with Sea Hurricane - not steal what is earmarked for RAF, but produce extra aircraft for the RN.

Click to expand...

That's going beyond 'what iffery' into the realms of fantasy

Cheers

Steve

Why?

Could the Lockheed Hudson carry a torpedo. I know it had a fairly small bomb bay but put a reserve fuel tank in the bomb bay and carry a fish externally. Thats if it wouldnt snap in half.

Coastal Command could have benefited from Hampdens. Coastal Command was part of the RAF, the RAF fought hard in the 1930s (and after the war incidentally) to keep it. Any extra production would have gone to Bomber Command, just as new built Hurricanes went to Fighter or other RAF Commands before the Navy. If the Admiralty, the Senior Service who had the Prime Minister as First Lord of the Admiralty couldn't prise a type out of the hands of the RAF at the Air Ministry, what chance did the least regarded of all RAF Commands have?
Coastal Command was very much the poor man of RAF Commands at this time. This was reflected in a woeful supply of men and materiel.Whilst the RAF, even at periods of high pressure, maintained an operational ready rate of 70%-80% in Coastal Command this was closer to 40%. For every hour a General Reconnaissance aircraft (like an Anson) flew it needed 20 hours of maintenance, for the flying boats this figure was 91/2 hours. The Command, unlike others within the RAF, didn't have the means to manage this. The Air Staff in the late 1930s funded Coastal Command just enough to sustain its existence and prevent it being snatched by the Admiralty. The result was that it couldn't even begin to fulfill its operational requirements until 1942. Any early expansion of the type you are suggesting was historically impossible. Some things might have changed, Bowhill tried very hard to no avail and was not sparing in his criticism of the Air Ministry, but the idea that a substantial number of front line bombers could have been diverted is fantastic.
Cheers
Steve

If Coastal Command had gone to the Navy at the same time as the FAA where would the Admiralty have got the funds and aircraft. They could barely squeeze the aircraft they had out of government as it was.

fastmongrel said:

If Coastal Command had gone to the Navy at the same time as the FAA where would the Admiralty have got the funds and aircraft. They could barely squeeze the aircraft they had out of government as it was.

Click to expand...

Exactly. I doubt they'd have had much more luck than Coastal Command had in attaining aircraft, they certainly wouldn't have got aircraft destined for Bomber Command. I think that had that transfer to Admiralty control occurred the strike capacity of the land based maritime units may well have disappeared altogether, at least for a few years. The Air Staff only maintained it (with Vildebeest for heaven's sake) as a means to blocking that transfer.
The Admiralty would have concentrated on the reconnaissance and anti-submarine roles (as Joubert initially did, his comment above about anti-shipping/mining operations in the Bay of Biscay was in support of his plan to attack the ships operating out of that area to support and re-supply the U-Boats operating in the Atlantic). The Navy would have used its own FAA strike aircraft as it historically did. I think an impetus pushing the Admiralty for land based maritime strike aircraft may have come later with the need for operations against the Italians in the Mediterranean, which is a lot smaller than the Atlantic, but all this is speculation.
Cheers
Steve

I think there is a great What If to be written about the RFC and RNAS staying seperate and equal services.

Now that we're discussing the British bombers, would some kind soul please rectify the tid-bit on the Wikipedia entry about the Whitley - it is stated that Mk. II was "Powered by 920 hp (690 kW) two-stage supercharged Tiger VIII engines: 46 built"
It was two-speed supercharged, not two-stage.

.duplicate post

tomo pauk said:

Now that we're discussing the British bombers, would some kind soul please rectify the tid-bit on the Wikipedia entry about the Whitley - it is stated that Mk. II was "Powered by 920 hp (690 kW) two-stage supercharged Tiger VIII engines: 46 built"
It was two-speed supercharged, not two-stage.

Click to expand...

Done