wait, the first collumn are estiamted the 2nd guaranteed, and it's possible that stime are optimistic (it's not so uncommon), the guarantees speed are 328 and 350 mph and this are for clean plane, estimated with bomb racks (w/o bombs) are 337 and 356 mph, with 500 lbs bombs are 305 and 332 mph. sure it's fast at low, like the P-51 with Allison.
Bomb sights for light bombers.
- Thread starter davebender
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wait, the first collumn are estiamted the 2nd guaranteed, and it's possible that stime are optimistic (it's not so uncommon), the guarantees speed are 328 and 350 mph and this are for clean plane, estimated with bomb racks (w/o bombs) are 337 and 356 mph, with 500 lbs bombs are 305 and 332 mph. sure it's fast at low, like the P-51 with Allison.
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- #102
davebender
1st Lieutenant
A 1945 photograph of an A-36. Apparently it has been field modified since it rolled out of the factory during 1942.
Are you still going by the three picture you posted of A-36 cockpit ?
The 3 pictures were of the same aircraft, and with so many switches, instruments, levers, control collumn grip, and other things was missing from that cockpit, as well as a gunsight, how could you base you knowledge of what any operational A-36 had from those pictures ?
The 3 pictures were of the same aircraft, and with so many switches, instruments, levers, control collumn grip, and other things was missing from that cockpit, as well as a gunsight, how could you base you knowledge of what any operational A-36 had from those pictures ?
There is a more informative link about it - HyperWar: The US Army Air Forces in WWII: D-Day 1944
But I suspect here an example of an ordinary overclaiming.
All the mentioned air forces had about 2400 fighters and fighter-bombers plus 700 medium and heavy bombers in support.
So every aircraft according to the claims destroyed about 2 mororboats and one out of ten destroyed an armor (what armor? a tank or?).
Please look at your own post in the topic there you shows how not effective were Luftwaffe against armor of Soviet Union. And now do you belive that in the case of US and Britain pilots the matter is so different?
Hm...
Germans at D-Day had at Normandy the only 21st Panzer division. It had about 140 tanks and self-propelled guns. I wonder how Allies managed to find out about 400 "armors" from less than 200 (I don't see claims for german armors from other US and British forces - I guess if count them Germans had got not less than 1000 tanks in Normandy
)And it's not easy to coprehend what "a motor boat" means.
R-boat? or something about a two-meters long pleasure boat?
Anyway should we believe that no less every one pilot of Allies airforce destroyed about two boats in the campaign?
Second - I suppose that claims have a little concern in any aspect with bombing accuracy.
We have no statistic even with claims - what percentage of claims put down to dropped bombs.
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I think when they say motor transport they mean vehicles, trucks, cars, not water transportation. Armor would be tanks of all sizes, assualt guns, probably half tracks too. If a pilot sees a turret, a big gun, or tracks, to him it's a tank.
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- #106
davebender
1st Lieutenant
I believe firsthand testimony.
parsifal
Colonel
Not necessarily. Aircraft "looked over" were likley not intended for overseas service. They could well have been attached to the Training Command
I suppose they meant in fact vessels calling them motor-boat. Because as far as I know "boat" means only a marine vessel (usually small) and nothing else.
"Armour" means armoured truck or tank and I suppose the pilots claimed exactly such targets. It is another matter what they indeed took as "armour".
Edgar Brooks
Senior Airman
Hardly likely, since units deployed overseas would normally take their aircraft with them, and would need to become entirely comfortable before embarking, plus the Americans would not have been stupid enough to train their personnel in obsolete equipment, then send them abroad to use a sight they'd never seen.
parsifal
Colonel
fair enough, but then, how likley do you think it that the yanks would fit old fashioned bead sights to a modern aircraft like the A-36. That seems just as foolish dont you think?
What is so drop dead awful about a ring and post sight , you can still set up a lead angle, or drift angle for dive bombing, using the ring. It has it's advantages, bulbs don't burn out, or fuzes blow. Might not be the best under low light conditions, also easy for the ground grew to knock out of adjustment when working around the plane, not inflight adjustable either.
A lot of early WW2 aircraft Used the ring and bead, some had both the ring and bead outside, and a reflector inside the cockpit.
A lot of early WW2 aircraft Used the ring and bead, some had both the ring and bead outside, and a reflector inside the cockpit.
Edgar Brooks
Senior Airman
Not really, since the early sights were not always reliable, so it was quite common to see that the sight was hinged, so that it could be swung aside, in the event of a failure, and the pilot could revert to the R&B sight.
OK, I suppiose it's a result of my misunderstanding.
Anyway 21st Panzer division had hardly got more than 2000 "motor transports".
Other german divisions could hardly have more than 1900 "motor transports" and no one knows how many operational.
Look at battle order:
The following units were deployed in a static defensive mode in the areas of the actual landings:
716th Infantry Division (Static) consisted mainly of those 'unfit for active duty' and released prisoners.
352nd Infantry Division, a well-trained unit containing combat veterans.
91st Air Landing Division (Luftlande – air transported), a regular infantry division, trained, and equipped to be transported by air.
709th Infantry Division (Static). Like the 716th, this division comprised a number of "Ost" units who were provided with German leadership to manage them.
Other divisions occupied the areas around the landing zones, including:
243rd Infantry Division (Static) (Generalleutnant Heinz Hellmich), comprising the 920th Infantry Regiment (two battalions), 921st Infantry Regiment, and 922nd Infantry Regiment. This coastal defense division protected the western coast of the Cotentin Peninsula.
711th Infantry Division (Static) (Generalleutnant Josef Reichert), comprising the 731st Infantry Regiment, and 744th Infantry Regiment. This division defended the western part of the Pays de Caux.
30th Mobile Brigade (Oberstleutnant Freiherr von und zu Aufsess), comprising three bicycle battalions.
As far as I know a static infantry division had no more than 200 trucks and cars. 352nd Infantry Division should have slightly more than 800 motor vehicles. 91st Air Landing Division hardly had more than 300 ones.
So Allies pilots claimed of at least in one and a half times more motor vehicals destroyed than Germans actually had at disposal (operational and non-operational).
I have taken amount of vehicles at the german divisions as maximum.
Look at figures in http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/germanhorse/index.html
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parsifal
Colonel
Bear in mind that the MV figures you are posting are for vehicles organic to the divisions. Far greater numbers were controlled at Corps and Army Level.
For example, the 185 divisions committed to barbarossa, had, on the 22 June 1941 248000 vehicles under the command of those formations. However the overall 831400 vehicles in totat were committed to the operation. For the heer, the vast majority of trucks were attached to the higher HQs and were providing rear area lodictic support between the supplyheads and the HQs. Army level trucks would transport supply from the railhead to Army HQ, whilst Corps MV parks would provide logicitcs from Army HQ to the Divisional supply dumps. Russia proved heavily destructive to the German vehicle park. Being rather lightweight, the trucks attached to the higher HQs found the Soviet roads very roug going, which drove up breakdowns and loss rates greatly. In the west,1939-41 the heaviest attrition for German trucks occurred in the frontline echelons, which had resulted in a rather modest attrition rate for the german vehicle park. In North Africa from the middle of 1942 onwards, the RAF discovered the weak link in German military machine, its tail. And the RAFs medium and FB doerces went to work on the Panzer Armee Afrikas suply chain. This strategy was repearted in both Italy (less successfully) and France (far more successfully) as the medium steadily forced back the effective rail supply heads from the front, increasing the reliance on trucks for supply of the frontline forces
The Germans and the italians lost about 80000 vehicles in North Africa....a mnassive percentage of their overall truck production. Dont know how many trucks were destroyed in the Normandy campaign, but it had to be a lot since the germans in Normandy suffered chronic supply shortages of just about everything imaginable. ive read that the Germans could only manage to get about 20000 filers to the shattered field formations up till the end of September0. Replacements (ersatz) Bns were available, but they could not reach the front because there was no safe path and no transport to get them there.
I've beard in mind all your arguments and cannot agree with them in respect of situation with German transport in Normandy and Allied claims.
1) Normandy June 1944 was not a Russian front or North Africa. In North Africa there was a mobile war without a front line. Station defence was only at population places (towns, oasises).
German units were well supplied with transport.
In Normandy they had mostly station divisions to defend in a non-mobile way. So they hadn't got transport in the same proportion as at North Africa or in 1941 in Russia.
2) All the claims are for the first day of invasion or no more than the first stage. Look at an amount of sorties - overall about 12500. For 2400 aircrafts and 700 bombers in support it is for no more than two days - and more possible for one (about a three sorties for each aircraft).
Taking into account that aircrafts made their flights from England it become clear that coudn't invade deep into german-occupied territory. So it is more probable they had chances to hit only transport attached to the listed units.
maybe anybody here knews German statistic about their losses in the first days of the invasion?
3) It is just pure claims without been checked out with german data - am I right?
For me usage of such data for calculation of effeciency is a dubious method.
4) moreover it is evident that such data couldn't afford to estimate effeciency of bombing for P-47 and their accuracy (with bombs).
parsifal
Colonel
Hi Gz
You posted in reply before I could correct an error....The figures i should have posted was that as at June 1941 there were 208 divs in the german Army, and a toal of 831400 vehicles. 550000 vehicles supported the offensive into Russia, the remainder were kept in the west or supported Rommels drive in Africa.
Just very roughly, there were approximately 140 divs attached to the eastern Front at the beginning of the campaign, and about 70 divs retained in the the occupied territories. 550000/140 is roughly 3982 vehicles per div, whilst the ratio for vehicles per div for those on occupation duties was slightly higher at 4000. Allowing for the inherent inaccuracy that goes with figures like this, the vehicles attached to occupation forces were at about the same rate as those in the East.
Not exactly sure what happened after June 1941, through to June 1944. The German vehicle park took a very bad hit, and overall losses reduced the numbers (I will try and dig out by how much). I agree that priority might be given to the east, because that was a mobile war,. however that should not be overplayed. In the West the german rail supply system was being heavily worked over, such that the rail net was down to about 19 or 20% of minimum requirements in France by June 1944. A lot of supply was being shipped out directly from Germany to the front lines. Thats a lot of truck. So, whilst I cannot yet give you precise figures on truck availability in the west, you are incorrect to make the assumptions you are (basically)/
When the allies did break out,they were unable to rely on the french railnet for many weeks/months after capture. The allies brought in plenty of trains to replace the shaky and unreliable french engines and rolling stock that had been left behind, but the rail network....lines, bridges, marshalling yards and the like had been so comprehensively wrecked (much more by allied and resistance efforts than by german demoilition) that it would take basically till 1945 to repair it. It was a major constraint on allied operations. To an extent the allies managed to address this with a major trucking effort called the red ball express,....imagine how much harder it must have been for the germans, who had a fraction of the truck pool of the allies....
You posted in reply before I could correct an error....The figures i should have posted was that as at June 1941 there were 208 divs in the german Army, and a toal of 831400 vehicles. 550000 vehicles supported the offensive into Russia, the remainder were kept in the west or supported Rommels drive in Africa.
Just very roughly, there were approximately 140 divs attached to the eastern Front at the beginning of the campaign, and about 70 divs retained in the the occupied territories. 550000/140 is roughly 3982 vehicles per div, whilst the ratio for vehicles per div for those on occupation duties was slightly higher at 4000. Allowing for the inherent inaccuracy that goes with figures like this, the vehicles attached to occupation forces were at about the same rate as those in the East.
Not exactly sure what happened after June 1941, through to June 1944. The German vehicle park took a very bad hit, and overall losses reduced the numbers (I will try and dig out by how much). I agree that priority might be given to the east, because that was a mobile war,. however that should not be overplayed. In the West the german rail supply system was being heavily worked over, such that the rail net was down to about 19 or 20% of minimum requirements in France by June 1944. A lot of supply was being shipped out directly from Germany to the front lines. Thats a lot of truck. So, whilst I cannot yet give you precise figures on truck availability in the west, you are incorrect to make the assumptions you are (basically)/
When the allies did break out,they were unable to rely on the french railnet for many weeks/months after capture. The allies brought in plenty of trains to replace the shaky and unreliable french engines and rolling stock that had been left behind, but the rail network....lines, bridges, marshalling yards and the like had been so comprehensively wrecked (much more by allied and resistance efforts than by german demoilition) that it would take basically till 1945 to repair it. It was a major constraint on allied operations. To an extent the allies managed to address this with a major trucking effort called the red ball express,....imagine how much harder it must have been for the germans, who had a fraction of the truck pool of the allies....
parsifal
Colonel
I managed to dig out one source on the motor transport situation for the Germans Referenced
Madej V, German War Economy - The Motorization Myth Allentown Publishing 1984
Agrees with the vehicle availability figures as at june 1941, Doesnt give a figure for total truck numbers in the west during the normandy campaign, but does say that lift capacity for the support echelons had dropped to below 1000 tons per day , and that the average supply distance by June 1944 for the forces in Normandy had increased to over 500 km, mostly because of the Allied Interdiction campaign. Somewhat offset by stockpiles that had been made prior to the campaign. However the average daily trip distance for german trucks, according to Madej was 150 Kms per day. Distance to supply heads 500 km. Thruput capacity of the supply echelon, about 1000 tons per day per div. Average load carrying capacity per truck might be about 2.5 tons tare (made low by the return trip to depot empty). To move that 1000 tons per day, you are going to need around 1500 trucks, just in the rear echelons, then there are the vehicles needed to get from the forward epoits to the front lines.....maybe 200-800 vehicles attached directly to the Div (say an average of 500 vehicles). On average, therefore, in June 1944, in the normandy front, you are looking at an average of about 2000 vehicles per Div. There are of course the Horse drawn elements, but these generally did not undertake the kind of long haul heavy lift supply efforts we are talking about. The majority of Horse drawn transport was used to get additional ammunition to the Artillery regiments and heavy weapons groups.
Saying that Normandy was a static battle is untrue, except for those Divs located within fortresses like Cherbourg. The Static did rely on stockpiled supply, but the units in the lines could not. and this was the majority of formations engaged in the battle. A better example of a static battle might be the Somme or Verdun, where front lines might change by a few yards every day. This was not the case in Normandy....front lines were constantly changing, Divisions were constantly moving about.....it cannot be viewed as a static battle from a logistics POV
At 1000 tons per day, in conditions of heavy engagement such as normandy, ammunition expenditure alone for a german infantry Div can be as high as 500 tons per hour, however according to Dunnigan on average you might expect a minimum of 1500 tons per day, plus about 500 tons per day for other consummables. I expect water and fodder for the horse drawn transport could be obtained locally (amounting to about 140 tons per day of that 500 tons ancillary items) . However its no wonder that the germans were on a more less constant restricted ammunition regimethroughout the campaign....they didnt have the supply capability to heavily engage their divisions all the time. The campaign had to have been a nightmare for them
Madej V, German War Economy - The Motorization Myth Allentown Publishing 1984
Agrees with the vehicle availability figures as at june 1941, Doesnt give a figure for total truck numbers in the west during the normandy campaign, but does say that lift capacity for the support echelons had dropped to below 1000 tons per day , and that the average supply distance by June 1944 for the forces in Normandy had increased to over 500 km, mostly because of the Allied Interdiction campaign. Somewhat offset by stockpiles that had been made prior to the campaign. However the average daily trip distance for german trucks, according to Madej was 150 Kms per day. Distance to supply heads 500 km. Thruput capacity of the supply echelon, about 1000 tons per day per div. Average load carrying capacity per truck might be about 2.5 tons tare (made low by the return trip to depot empty). To move that 1000 tons per day, you are going to need around 1500 trucks, just in the rear echelons, then there are the vehicles needed to get from the forward epoits to the front lines.....maybe 200-800 vehicles attached directly to the Div (say an average of 500 vehicles). On average, therefore, in June 1944, in the normandy front, you are looking at an average of about 2000 vehicles per Div. There are of course the Horse drawn elements, but these generally did not undertake the kind of long haul heavy lift supply efforts we are talking about. The majority of Horse drawn transport was used to get additional ammunition to the Artillery regiments and heavy weapons groups.
Saying that Normandy was a static battle is untrue, except for those Divs located within fortresses like Cherbourg. The Static did rely on stockpiled supply, but the units in the lines could not. and this was the majority of formations engaged in the battle. A better example of a static battle might be the Somme or Verdun, where front lines might change by a few yards every day. This was not the case in Normandy....front lines were constantly changing, Divisions were constantly moving about.....it cannot be viewed as a static battle from a logistics POV
At 1000 tons per day, in conditions of heavy engagement such as normandy, ammunition expenditure alone for a german infantry Div can be as high as 500 tons per hour, however according to Dunnigan on average you might expect a minimum of 1500 tons per day, plus about 500 tons per day for other consummables. I expect water and fodder for the horse drawn transport could be obtained locally (amounting to about 140 tons per day of that 500 tons ancillary items) . However its no wonder that the germans were on a more less constant restricted ammunition regimethroughout the campaign....they didnt have the supply capability to heavily engage their divisions all the time. The campaign had to have been a nightmare for them
parsifal
Colonel
having the bulk of a division attached to the logistics echelons is not a uniquely German issue. Most people quote that in 1944 a british Infantry Div had 18000 men attached and about 2000 vehicles. Kinda right, but then not really. in reality if the logistic tail of the division is included, it had an average of 55000 men and well over 6000 vehicles attached.
The germans were never that lavish, but it was nothing for their tails to double the size of th division to around 20-25000 men. Thats for the normandy campaign. There were 70 US Divs ready for the normandy campign with about 2.5m men directly attached to the divisional structure, or about 35000 men per div. US logistics tended to emphasize Corps control, so the trucks and manpower attached to the Corps offset the apparent manpower diference compared to the Brits.
The germans were never that lavish, but it was nothing for their tails to double the size of th division to around 20-25000 men. Thats for the normandy campaign. There were 70 US Divs ready for the normandy campign with about 2.5m men directly attached to the divisional structure, or about 35000 men per div. US logistics tended to emphasize Corps control, so the trucks and manpower attached to the Corps offset the apparent manpower diference compared to the Brits.
Hi Parcifal
I will try to find out figures.
Now I can refer to "D-day deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy invasion" by Mary Barbier, p/191 - "Shortage of vehicles forced the germans to rely on french rail system which forced delays in transporting reinforcements to Normandy."
