Bomb sights for light bombers.

[gorizont]

I managed to dig out one source on the motor transport situation for the Germans Referenced

Madej V, German War Economy - The Motorization Myth Allentown Publishing 1984

Agrees with the vehicle availability figures as at june 1941, Doesnt give a figure for total truck numbers in the west during the normandy campaign, but does say that lift capacity for the support echelons had dropped to below 1000 tons per day , and that the average supply distance by June 1944 for the forces in Normandy had increased to over 500 km, mostly because of the Allied Interdiction campaign. Somewhat offset by stockpiles that had been made prior to the campaign. However the average daily trip distance for german trucks, according to Madej was 150 Kms per day. Distance to supply heads 500 km. Thruput capacity of the supply echelon, about 1000 tons per day per div. Average load carrying capacity per truck might be about 2.5 tons tare (made low by the return trip to depot empty). To move that 1000 tons per day, you are going to need around 1500 trucks, just in the rear echelons, then there are the vehicles needed to get from the forward epoits to the front lines.....maybe 200-800 vehicles attached directly to the Div (say an average of 500 vehicles). On average, therefore, in June 1944, in the normandy front, you are looking at an average of about 2000 vehicles per Div. There are of course the Horse drawn elements, but these generally did not undertake the kind of long haul heavy lift supply efforts we are talking about. The majority of Horse drawn transport was used to get additional ammunition to the Artillery regiments and heavy weapons groups.

Saying that Normandy was a static battle is untrue, except for those Divs located within fortresses like Cherbourg. The Static did rely on stockpiled supply, but the units in the lines could not. and this was the majority of formations engaged in the battle. A better example of a static battle might be the Somme or Verdun, where front lines might change by a few yards every day. This was not the case in Normandy....front lines were constantly changing, Divisions were constantly moving about.....it cannot be viewed as a static battle from a logistics POV

At 1000 tons per day, in conditions of heavy engagement such as normandy, ammunition expenditure alone for a german infantry Div can be as high as 500 tons per hour, however according to Dunnigan on average you might expect a minimum of 1500 tons per day, plus about 500 tons per day for other consummables. I expect water and fodder for the horse drawn transport could be obtained locally (amounting to about 140 tons per day of that 500 tons ancillary items) . However its no wonder that the germans were on a more less constant restricted ammunition regimethroughout the campaign....they didnt have the supply capability to heavily engage their divisions all the time. The campaign had to have been a nightmare for them

I found figures which showed that at Normandy german troops supllied from 15 to 35% of ammunition spent previous period. So...

 

[parsifal]

I am not going to challenge that, sounds very reasonable. But, likley that the 15-35% was concentrated along thise sectors that were static as you say. So, a few Divs....the ones fortified, wont need near as much transport, the ones undertaking the mobile battle, are likley to need a large supply network to support them.


This gets down to how badly the the german supply train was monstered by the allies. By accounts from both sides, it appears very badly, and at the forefront of that are those poor old P-47s that we have been discussing. they have their bad days, they have their good days, but overall, essential to allied victory IMO

 

[fastmongrel]

Nice info Parsifal but you do realise how unfashionable you are thinking about logistics. Everyone on the internet knows that armies (particulary German ones) magically supplied themselves using Fairy Dust and magic carpets.

Do you have the figures for how much fuel the allied supply lines were using when the logistics tail stretched all the way across France. Getting a gallon of fuel and a round of ammunition to a Sherman tank on the Belgian border must have taken a frightening amount of juice.

 

[Siegfried]

Hi Parcifal
I will try to find out figures.
Now I can refer to "D-day deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy invasion" by Mary Barbier, p/191 - "Shortage of vehicles forced the germans to rely on french rail system which forced delays in transporting reinforcements to Normandy."

That's more or less correct. A German division relied upon about 6000 horses. Sweddish Military Historian Nikolas Zetterling has carefully analysed the Normandy action. Basically he has determined that the German CER (Combat Efficiency Ratio) was about twice that of the allied one. He also notes that the Germans couldn't even supply enough amunition to their troops and artillery; transport was by rail followed by horse or truck if available to the front. Air power did not knock out many tanks at all. It was well known that a typhoon with rockets was too inaccurate to hit a tank. Rockets have dispersion and falloff. Even if there were trucks its I would think fuel would be an issue.

 

[parsifal]

That's more or less correct. A German division relied upon about 6000 horses. Sweddish Military Historian Nikolas Zetterling has carefully analysed the Normandy action. Basically he has determined that the German CER (Combat Efficiency Ratio) was about twice that of the allied one. He also notes that the Germans couldn't even supply enough amunition to their troops and artillery; transport was by rail followed by horse or truck if available to the front. Air power did not knock out many tanks at all. It was well known that a typhoon with rockets was too inaccurate to hit a tank. Rockets have dispersion and falloff. Even if there were trucks its I would think fuel would be an issue.

Others have determinewd that the German CER was down to about 1.31 by this stage. But these figures (about 2, down to 1.31) are all highly misleading, because they dont incorporate all the factors that determine on field performance....like the force multiplier effect of airpower, the logistic shortages suffered by the germans, the effects of NGs, to name but a few. they are simply thoeretical comparisons of how a given force of men, devoid of any force multipliers, or external influences, could perform relative to an opposing group of men. This was not the case in normandy, it was anything but a 'level playing field" , which is why the heer, despite its inherent advantages (being entrenched, superiority in numbers, being attacked by amphibious forces, by an army lacking combat experience) to th4e 24 July, still managed to lose the battle and suffer over 100k more casualties than the Allies.

Man for man, because of these outside combat multipliers, the allies were several orders of magnitude superior than the Wehrmacht in Normandy.

 

[parsifal]

Nice info Parsifal but you do realise how unfashionable you are thinking about logistics. Everyone on the internet knows that armies (particulary German ones) magically supplied themselves using Fairy Dust and magic carpets.

Do you have the figures for how much fuel the allied supply lines were using when the logistics tail stretched all the way across France. Getting a gallon of fuel and a round of ammunition to a Sherman tank on the Belgian border must have taken a frightening amount of juice.

I think I do, but at home (330 km away at this moment)

yes, we are witnessing classic revisionist history at the moment....a uniquely internet forum phenomena, where people can and do say anything, and a few others will believe them. Unlike the traditional forms of research where you produce a paer and then have the findings reviewed by your peers,,,,now it is anything goes. The volume of information has exploded, the quality has imploded......

Some good images of tanks that appear to have been disabled by airpower and other causes

Axis History Forum • View topic - The battle of Mont Ormel and Das Reich's counterattack

 

[Siegfried]

Others have determinewd that the German CER was down to about 1.31 by this stage. But these figures (about 2, down to 1.31) are all highly misleading, because they dont incorporate all the factors that determine on field performance....like the force multiplier effect of airpower, the logistic shortages suffered by the germans, the effects of NGs, to name but a few. they are simply thoeretical comparisons of how a given force of men, devoid of any force multipliers, or external influences, could perform relative to an opposing group of men. This was not the case in normandy, it was anything but a 'level playing field" , which is why the heer, despite its inherent advantages (being entrenched, superiority in numbers, being attacked by amphibious forces, by an army lacking combat experience) to th4e 24 July, still managed to lose the battle and suffer over 100k more casualties than the Allies.

Man for man, because of these outside combat multipliers, the allies were several orders of magnitude superior than the Wehrmacht in Normandy.

The Heer wasn't entrenched, it wasn't even there in numbers by the start of the campaign. The German army was inferior in numbers to the allied forces not superior as you stated.

As Zetterlings research showed the CER was around 2 not 1.3 because the German numbers were simply much lower than claimed. Your casuality figure claims don't make sense in terms of the CER.

 

[Siegfried]

I think I do, but at home (330 km away at this moment)

yes, we are witnessing classic revisionist history at the moment
SNIP

Some good images of tanks that appear to have been disabled by airpower and other causes

Axis History Forum • View topic - The battle of Mont Ormel and Das Reich's counterattack

Revisionist history? There is nothing wrong with "Revisionism" the word means "to look again" and is about correcting the mistakes, removing deliberate obfusifications and biases of times past and to incorporate new information.

Allied air power was NOT effective at destroying tanks in anyway weather using bombs or rockets. In fac many kill claims were really multiple claims on the same tanks that had already been disabled by At guns, or generally simply run out of fuel.

http://www.wlu.ca/lcmsds/cmh/back issues/CMH/volume 3/issue 1/C...
Air Force and Army OR researchers
prepared four Joint Reports in the fall and
winter of 1944-45.65 Again there was no
disagreement about the evidence. For example
in Joint Report No.3 titled "Rocket Firing
Typhoons in Close Support of Military
Operations" it was found that 350 rockets,
involving 44 sorties, would have to be fired at
a small gun position to obtain a fifty percent
chance of a hit. If Typhoons were to be
employed in a close support role they were
best used to reduce enemy morale and raise
the morale of allied infantry. Both doctrine
and the manner of planning operations needed
to be revised to take account of this.

Montgomery'S Scientists: Operational Research in Northwest Europe: Operational Research in Northwest Europe" contains a thorough analysis. I believe they found only 2-3% of tanks had been knocked out by rockets. Considering the 2000 aircraft lost by the allies this is not a good deal.

 

[parsifal]

Chris Lawrence, who is a member of the Dupuy Institute (and served as a US Army staff officer during the war in Bosnia in the 1990s) has analysed several models used to measure CERs, including those devised by Colonel Dupuy, Zetterlings model, that undertaken by the US military (with input from himself) , and several other models. The acepted term incidentally is Combat Effectiveness Values (CEVs), not Combat Effectiveness Ratios. CERs are a purely Zetterling invention. Nearly all other researchers, without exception, use the CEV terminology and adopt the same standards as Dupuy.

Whereas most of the models use a relative values, where values of less than 1.0 represent an axis advantage and values above 1.0 represent an Allied advantage, Zetterlings model is somewhat different in that it expresses its findings as a ratio, in favour of the germans. This mathemeatical model has been shown by others to naturally skew the results in favour of the Germans, and is not helped by Zetterlings failure to provide working details of how he arrived at his ratio.

Zetterling (also a member of the Dupuy institute) has subsequently tried to explain his position in his book in the following terms:

"In effect I can be said to have used the same methodology as shown in Numbers Predictions and War, page 99. I have used the overall casualties for the campaign and assumed an average allied theatre numerical superiority of 3-1. The choice of 1.4 rather then 1.3 to account for the advantage of defence was based on east front data. It must of course be remembered that the result I show is the "Score Effectiveness", which means that the "CEV" is the square root, which would suggest a German CEV superiority of about 1.5."

Lawrence and others have pointed out the numerous errors in the assumptions made by Zetterling, chief and most obvious amongst them being his assumptioons on ratios at the front. Whilst the allies overall enjoyed combat numbers many times in their favour, the combat ratios at the front were seldom that high, moreover his defence adjustment for Normandy (which were based on east front studies) are hotly challenged by many other, more qualified scholars in this subject.

Lawrence now works as a consultant in this field, and contributed to what many regard as the most accurate model in this field, still used by the US Army in its battalion sized evaluations of battle modelling. The original QJM (Quantified Judgement Model) was tested to 149 primarily division-level engagements for 1 to 5 days in length. While the model had a set of scaling factors that allowed it to be used in periods of less than a day for much smaller engagements...it had not been designedfor such. Furthermore, the model had been revised all through its life, and was revised again in the early 1990s to created the TNDM (Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model). Most analysts agree this refined modelling tool is by far the most accurate measure of CEVs for any engagement in the modern era. Whilst its application to WWII engagements has a rather limited dataset, it is still streets ahead of anything anyone else has ever done, including Zetterling.

Applying the TNDM to Normandy one comes up with typical CEVs of between 1.2 to 1.5, thats 1.2:1 to 1.5:1 in favour of the allies. AFAIK that does not include FPF multipliers like airpower and NGS. It does however take into account issues like defensive or attacking stance, terrain, supply state and the like. The accuracy of the TNDM is that when applied to the Normandy situation, it accounts for the casualty rates to within +/-5%. Thats why German casualties exceeded allied casualties during the campaign....if the campaign is expanded to its traditionally accepted end (to the end of August), german casualties were several orders of magnitude higher than allied.

The Dupuy Institute has in recent years produced a report on this very issue, using a range of models, including some of the material contained in Zetterlings analysis

In part this report draws the following conlcusions:

(The institute is the only think tank to have a) published attempt to measure German combat effectiveness done by Trevor N. Dupuy, which is in Appendix H of Hitler's Last Gamble (Trevor N. Dupuy, David L. Bongard, Richard C. Anderson). In that effort he analyzed 11 Ardennes battles using the TNDM. In those 11 battles, all from 16 Dec 44 - 11 Jan 45, the German CEV is higher in 7 of the cases. The average German CEV comes out to 1.03. The average US CEV comes out to 1.01. The fact that both averages exceed one is due to the use of simple averages (i.e. the inverse of a CEV of 1.48 is .68, which if average with 1.48, does not equal one).

In these 11 cases, it does appear like there was rough parity in perfmormance.

The Ardennes, however, was fought with mostly elite formations with no-one dug in 9initially), and the germans on the attack . In Normandy there was not as great a concentration of elite formations, and many units of the german Army were heavily dug in (such as at Cherbourg), plus the allies were coming out of an amphibious assault, a situation where the germans had intially a significant numbers and positional advantage)

Historical revisionism is the reinterpretation of orthodox views on evidence, motivations, and decision-making processes surrounding a historical event. Though the word "revisionism" is sometimes used in a negative way, constant revision of history is part of the normal scholarly process of writing history. However in most cases for WWII, it is the process of replacing well established, well researched historical facts and replacing them with historical fantasy and propaganda. that is what is happening here i am afraid.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

Allied air power was NOT effective at destroying tanks in anyway weather using bombs or rockets. In fac many kill claims were really multiple claims on the same tanks that had already been disabled by At guns, or generally simply run out of fuel.

[ For example in Joint Report No.3 titled "Rocket Firing Typhoons in Close Support of Military Operations" it was found that 350 rockets, involving 44 sorties, would have to be fired at a small gun position to obtain a fifty percent chance of a hit. If Typhoons were to be employed in a close support role they were best used to reduce enemy morale and raise the morale of allied infantry. Both doctrine and the manner of planning operations needed to be revised to take account of this.

There's something awry with the mathematics above; if 350 rockets achieve a 50% chance of a hit, it means that 175 rockets will hit the "small gun position," roughly equivalent to being hit by 175 25-pounder shells, and it would be one hek of a position that could withstand that.
An assessment of 83 Group's effort from 7-8-44, involving 35 missions equalling 295 sorties, which should have used 2360 rockets, caused the following damage:- Tanks 84 flamers, 35 smokers, 21 damaged; Met 54 flamers, 19 smokers, 39 damaged.
The report points out that "Great care was taken in assessing the claims, but with the number of sorties flown and the frequency speed of the attacks, some duplication is inevitable." (Probably why the tank total exceeds the number reported as being present.)
It also says that "The following conclusions may be drawn from the report: (i) The R/P weapon is the ideal armament for dealing with tanks. This is especially so if they are in the open. (ii) The chances of finding tanks are much greater when they are moving."
The pilots reported that "The first attacks caused confusion among the tank crews, who scrambled for cover and gave the impression that they had abandoned their tanks regardless of whether they were blocking the roads or not."
It's generally forgotten that a tank is completely disabled even if hit by only one rocket, which blows off a track, and not many crews are going to attempt a repair while being threatened by other aircraft.
It rather begs the question, if rockets were completely ineffectual, why did the RAF use them for 18 months, and the US Army continually call the Typhoons in to assist?

 

[Vincenzo]

Edgar i thinked, i had read that, that with 350 rockets they got 50% (0,5) probability of a (one) hit not that they take 175 hit, but maybe i'm in wrong

 

[Edgar Brooks]

Edgar i thinked, i had read that, that with 350 rockets they got 50% (0,5) probability of a (one) hit not that they take 175 hit, but maybe i'm in wrong

I'm not sure how you can have .5 of a hit, and, if 349 rockets had missed, out of 350, there would have been some serious lapses in training.
This is a photo of a Mk.III tank, hit by four rockets (four were fired at it by a Hurricane, in the desert); I trust that the report of the damage is still legible.

As an aside 1556 Typhoons were lost, to all causes including accidents, 649 before D-day, and 53 after VE-day, so maybe the authorities thought that 854 were a price worth paying, during the charge across Europe, to rid us of Nazism.
I'd also like to add that Typhoons were tasked with shutting down radar sites, before D-day; with each one out of action for an average 3 months, it made a huge contribution to the success of D-day.

 

[fastmongrel]

Edgar that tank must have been hit by the 25 pound AP warhead but iirc the Typhoons in Europe fired the 60 pound HE warhead and relied on blast effect not penetration.

 

[tomo pauk]

This is what Tony Williams says in his book 'Rapid fire':
-Under test conditions, Hurricane IID was achieving a hit rate of 25% by it's cannons, while RPs were achieving less than 5% - all for tank-sized target. Under combat conditions, RP's accuracy dropped to 0,5%.

But, while Hurri IID was something akin to flying 6pdr, Typhoon was akin to small flying MLRS/Katyusha, but far more accurate. And after it dispensed it's rockets, it's cannons were far too good asset not to be used to attack ground positions and vehicles.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

Edgar that tank must have been hit by the 25 pound AP warhead but iirc the Typhoons in Europe fired the 60 pound HE warhead and relied on blast effect not penetration.

The make-up of the rockets is irrelevant; this thread concerns gunsights, and four hits from four rockets is not 25%. For the Avranches strikes, the vehicles hit, at a rate of .5%, even allowing for 100% duplication, would have required 25,200 rockets, yet they used 2,560. Once they'd come up with the adjustable sight, to allow for drop, and used Beamont's method of having the sight reflecting straight off the windshield, accuracy improved over what had been achieved in the desert.

 

[Siegfried]

The make-up of the rockets is irrelevant; this thread concerns gunsights, and four hits from four rockets is not 25%. For the Avranches strikes, the vehicles hit, at a rate of .5%, even allowing for 100% duplication, would have required 25,200 rockets, yet they used 2,560. Once they'd come up with the adjustable sight, to allow for drop, and used Beamont's method of having the sight reflecting straight off the windshield, accuracy improved over what had been achieved in the desert.

This 0.5% hit rate is for the Normandy period AFAIKT.

British opperational research post Normandy itself determined that very few tanks were knocked out by airpower: less than 5%. This research involved injspecting the tanks themselves. Where a tanks showed multipile hits it was usually the case of a tank that had already been disabled by AT guns, brocken down or run out of fuel. Less than 5% of panzers were destroyed by airpower. Most of those hits were on already dead tanks. If a tank got caught in the open the best solution was to just ignore the attack and batton down the hatch. The guns were accurate but could do not harm while the rockets were powerfull enough but lacked any accuracy.

Given the amount of tank warefare the Germans were involved in and the extreme need for AT weapons it is interesting to note that they never used their experience to introduce air fired AT rockets despite extensive experimentation.

The one system that did see minimal service was the Panzerblitz II a derivative of the R4M "Orkan" (Hurricane)

The combination of folding fins and spin stabalisation did, apparently, significantly reduce dispersion on these missiles as compared to conventional missiles.

Allied 5 inch rockets seem to have been effective anti ship weapons, not anti tank weapons.

Back to the light bomber bomb sight issue.

The TSA-2D continiously computing 'toss bombing sight' was meant to aim not only bombs but rocket projectiles in the form of the BT 700 rocket propelled bomb and this indeed is how rockets were aimed by some jet age fighter bombers.

A proper rocket sight would take into account the aircrafts altitude, speed, angle of incidence and therefore estimate range to provide a superelevation to the gunsight or it would use the pullup/toss method.

Such sights were absolutely necccesary to maintain accuracy as standoff distances had to increase.

FW 200 were deadly accurate at sinking ships: the method was to overfly the ship and release 3 bombs. Given the beam of a ship is likely to be 20m, the effect of the raised deck and super structure likely to broaden the target to 40m and given that the 5 second fusing of the bombs ensured that hits over 30 m ahead the waterline would simply tunnel beneath the water to detonate beneath the ship and break its back a string of 3 bombs was unlikely to miss.

However more effective defenses require higher speeds, higher altitudes and greater standoff distances. That is why more sophisticated bomb sight are required.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

When, exactly, was the Fw 200 listed as a light bomber?

 

[Siegfried]

Chris Lawrence, who is a member of the Dupuy Institute (and served as a US Army staff officer during the war in Bosnia in the 1990s) has analysed several models used to measure CERs, including those devised by Colonel Dupuy, Zetterlings model, that undertaken by the US military (with input from himself) , and several other models. The acepted term incidentally is Combat Effectiveness Values (CEVs), not Combat Effectiveness Ratios. CERs are a purely Zetterling invention. Nearly all other researchers, without exception, use the CEV terminology and adopt the same standards as Dupuy.

I suppose when one looks for a dozen points of view one can always find one that supports ones own POV.

In fact Chris Lawrence, whose authority you appeal to has stated or rather conceded the following:

1. The Germans and the US were roughly equivilent in combat effectiveness, with the US being within 20 to 30 percent of the Germans (possibly lower). This appears to have been especially true in Italy.
2. The Germans and the UK were within the same order of magnitude of combat effectiveness, with the UK perhaps being somewhat inferior (by 20 to 50 percent).....

Whereas most of the models use a relative values, where values of less than 1.0 represent an axis advantage and values above 1.0 represent an Allied advantage, Zetterlings model is somewhat different in that it expresses its findings as a ratio, in favour of the germans. This mathemeatical model has been shown by others to naturally skew the results in favour of the Germans, and is not helped by Zetterlings failure to provide working details of how he arrived at his ratio. He does provide details, not to the actuarial level though.

This is all subjective style without substance. What you are saying is that saying that the Germans had a CER of 2:1 over the Allies is unfair. It should be expressed as 1:0.5 or some manner more comfortable to private ryan. A number is a number and had the Germans peformed as poorly they also would have looed poorly by the same rules.

Zetterling (also a member of the Dupuy institute) has subsequently tried to explain his position in his book in the following terms:

"In effect I can be said to have used the same methodology as shown in Numbers Predictions and War, page 99. I have used the overall casualties for the campaign and assumed an average allied theatre numerical superiority of 3-1. The choice of 1.4 rather then 1.3 to account for the advantage of defence was based on east front data. It must of course be remembered that the result I show is the "Score Effectiveness", which means that the "CEV" is the square root, which would suggest a German CEV superiority of about 1.5."

Yes indeed the CEV is the square root of the CER which makes it smaller than the CER and more acceptable to you?

Lawrence and others have pointed out the numerous errors in the assumptions made by Zetterling, chief and most obvious amongst them being his assumptions on ratios at the front. Whilst the allies overall enjoyed combat numbers many times in their favour, the combat ratios at the front were seldom that high, moreover his defence adjustment for Normandy (which were based on east front studies) are hotly challenged by many other, more qualified scholars in this subject.

No, Lawrence actually agreed with Zetterling on his use of these figures: see link below.

Some of your interpretations of the dupoy institute blog you are quoting from are as "non linear" as this preceding statement.

Man for man, because of these outside combat multipliers, the allies were several orders of magnitude superior than the Wehrmacht in Normandy.

German combat figures - The Dupuy Institute Forum

Applying the TNDM to Normandy one comes up with typical CEVs of between 1.2 to 1.5, thats 1.2:1 to 1.5:1 in favour of the allies.

AFAIK that does not include FPF multipliers like airpower and NGS.

In fact he comes up with the ratio is favour of the Germans though someone grudgingly.

Indeed it doesn't include airpower. 20000 allied aircraft against 300 German ones.

The Germans were still outnumbered, they still inflicted casualties at a 50% greater level than they suffered, irrespective of whether they were on the offense or defense and they did so while they lacked any air power against overwhelming allied air-power and they lacked transport and lacked ammunition and hadn't even begun to reinforce Normandy. That particular TNDM is looking shaky and incomplete.

Historical revisionism is the reinterpretation of orthodox views on evidence, motivations, and decision-making processes surrounding a historical event. Though the word "revisionism" is sometimes used in a negative way, constant revision of history is part of the normal scholarly process of writing history. However in most cases for WWII, it is the process of replacing well established, well researched historical facts and replacing them with historical fantasy and propaganda. that is what is happening here i am afraid.

Denile isn't just a river in Egypt I'm afraid.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

Indeed it doesn't include airpower. 20000 allied aircraft against 300 German ones.

Do you pluck your figures from thin air? The RAF had 5,252 aircraft, for the attack on Normandy, and the Americans had 5294, which I cannot make add up to 20,000.

The Germans were still outnumbered, they still inflicted casualties at a 50% greater level than they suffered, irrespective of whether they were on the offense or defense

Figures, please, and an indication of what "casualties" means, and includes (dead, wounded, etc.,) and no doubling up as you did with the Allied air power.

 

[parsifal]

The Germans during the Normandy campaign did not inflict 50% more casualties than they suffered in Normandy. they suffered a total of 288000 casualties to the 25 August, compared to 235000 on the allied side. these are conservative figures. Other sources put the committment and losses as follows:
Allied troops
1,452,000 (by 25 July)
2,052,299 (by 21 August, in northern France alone) Including service personnel)
German
380,000 (by 23 July) (combat) troops approx1,000,000 (total)
1,400,000 (25 August under the command of OB West)


Other sources on casualties
So unless you are comparing comparing combat troops of the german army to total troops of the Allies, there is no way that the Allies outnumbered the germans in combat. Just to give some context to this rather farcical discussion, a British Infantry Division had 55000 men attached, and just 4200 combat Infantry attached. Against a German Infantry Division, with a combat echelon of 12000 men, about approximately 6500 combat personnell, the British division in the frontline was actually outnumbered.

Losses (prior to Falaise) (other sources)

Allies
226,386 casualties
Germans

209,000- 450000, generally quoted as 386000 casualties. Thats prior to Falaise

At Falaise, you can add another 18000 deaths to the germans losses and at least 45000 captured in the pocket alone. Allied losses amounted to less than 15000 in this phase of the battle. Generally the Normandy campaign is acknowledged as ending at the conclusion of the Falise Pocket. If we did continue the "narmandy Campoaign to the advance to the Germans fontier (about the end of Septemeber, the losses of the germans army skyrocket. Name your preference

Adding all that up the allies are said to have suffered, all up somewhere in the order of 225000 casualties during the campaign. German casualties amounted to somewhere between 285-512000 casualties, depending on who you believe. The generally accepted figure to the end of Falaise is 445000. thats a loss ratio of nearly 2:1 against the germans

I agree with Edgar, except he is quoting aircraft numbers, and I am quoting casualties. I dont know where you are getting your claims on losses, but it certainly has nothing to do with reality. They look dremed up, trumped up and grosly innaccurate to me

As for all the discussion about CERs and CEVs, just rememeber the starting point, which is agreed by Lawrence. Thee figures are all over tyhe place. this means they are an unreliable measure, which is why I brought in the numerous discussions that professionals have had about them. You can choose to rely on them if you want, and themn seek to parade that as proff to your cockamamy casualty figurees. i hope they get dismissed as the revisionist propaganda that they are , because Germans casualties from Normandy on were never less than Allied casualties.

And just to put all this into perspective, your claim is that allied losses were at least 2x greater than German losses during the campaign. How?????????