Edgar Brooks
Senior Airman
Just to bring this up-to-date, on 31-5-44, Luftwaffe strength stood at 4929, and I refuse to believe that 4629 of those were on the Eastern Front.
Bomb sights for light bombers.
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MacArther
Staff Sergeant
Yes, there were more on the Western front....In Germany...or blown up....or unserviceable.
Edgar Brooks
Senior Airman
The report specifically says "serviceable." There were also 4573 10-1-45, after Bodenplatte, and even 3331 9-4-45.
Edgar Brooks
Senior Airman
Which just proves that they were caught completely on the hop; check the days following, and you'll find more activity, remembering that the hierarchy were still forlornly waiting for the main blow to arrive at Calais, two Lancaster Squadrons having fooled them into believing that a second invasion force was heading that way.
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Only some lines from "Bergström"
Thus, while almost two Allied aircraft were lost for every German aircraft loss, these losses should be compared with each side's numerical strength. During this period, the Allied air forces performed 99,000 sorties over France (Clark, p. 98 ), while the Luftwaffe only flew 13,315 sorties over France (Prien, "JG 1/11", p. 1051). Thus, the Allied loss rate was only around 1 % while the German loss rate was almost
5 %.
cimmex
Thus, while almost two Allied aircraft were lost for every German aircraft loss, these losses should be compared with each side's numerical strength. During this period, the Allied air forces performed 99,000 sorties over France (Clark, p. 98 ), while the Luftwaffe only flew 13,315 sorties over France (Prien, "JG 1/11", p. 1051). Thus, the Allied loss rate was only around 1 % while the German loss rate was almost
5 %.
cimmex
Some more:
Out of a total of 13,000 Allied aircraft on 6 June 1944, less than 10 % were lost over France between 6 and 30 June 1944. Out of 1,300 Luftwaffe aircraft in France (the peak number, reached on 10 June), around 50 % were lost between 6 and 30 June 1944.
cimmex
Out of a total of 13,000 Allied aircraft on 6 June 1944, less than 10 % were lost over France between 6 and 30 June 1944. Out of 1,300 Luftwaffe aircraft in France (the peak number, reached on 10 June), around 50 % were lost between 6 and 30 June 1944.
cimmex
Edgar Brooks
Senior Airman
Having read neither "Bergstrom," "Clark," or "Prien," I can't comment, but thank you for confirming that there were a heck of a lot more than 300 Luftwaffe a/c available to combat the Allies, which is what our friend, in Australia has been trying to claim.
Any chance we can get back to bombsights, now?
Any chance we can get back to bombsights, now?
parsifal
Colonel
Im from Aus and im certainly not claiming that....oh you mean the other guy......
You have a great many sources but no cites.
In terms of the CER.
The Germans, being outnumbered (which is now evident from Zetterlings detailed analysis of unit strength, one of his biggest if not biggest contributiuons to the debate) inflicted a higher percentage of casulaties on the allies in proportion to their numbers than the allies did in reverse.
That's what both the CER and CVR do, they factor in the reality that having a superior number of combat troops over an opponent confers a big positive non linear advantage that is roughly a 'square' factor. Other factors incorporated are the advantages of defense over offense.
The Germans, with harsh and bitter experience from the Franco-Prussian war, WW1 and WW2 were extremely effective, organised and well lead fighters. In fact their experience goes back to one of the greatest Military analysists and strategists of all time von Clausiwitz who coined the phrase 'the fog of war' and developed the concept of skirmishing to a high level after he went to work for the Tsar as a way of fighting Napoleon after yet another French invasion.
There are many assertions posing as facts.
The Luftwaffe managed just over 300 sorties on the first day compared to about 14000 allied ones. The Germans had bet on the d-day landings being 2 weeks latter and so most aircraft were in the east or in Germany as part of defense of the Reich as were most troops, had they bet on an earlier date things might have turned out different. Estimates of Luftwaffe aircraft available on d-day itself go to as low as 80 aircraft.
Either way you can count on the Luftwaffe being outnumbered at least 10:1 and likely 20:1. My claim for 20,000 allied aircraft is likely correct when one considers that besides the approximitly 11500 allied aircraft commited to Normandy other US airforces and RAF Commands and carrier based forces flew sorties over the rest of the France and other parts of occupied Europe that had to be dealth with by the same Luftwaffe Gruppen.
One of the key, if not the key weapon for driving back of the allied invasion was supposed to be an 'light bomb' sight, the TSA-2D. It was supposed to toss bomb allied ships and landing aircraft from high speed fighters ranging from Me 262, Me 163 rocket propelled aircraft and fast piston aircraft. Apart from the use of normal bombs with duel impact and time delay fuzes a series of rocket boosted bombs such as the BT 700 (BT = bord torpedo's) was to be also aimed by this sight. These highly connical weapons would pierce the water at a shallow angle due to their speed and tunnel several hundred meters. Impact, hydrostatic and time fuses were fitted but the primary idea was to detonate by magnetic influence fuze below the ship to break its back. This gave both a good standoff range and a very broad hit area.
Exactly why this sight did not make it to service by this time is a somewhat puzzling, it was likely a manufacturing resource issue as an earlier version, the TSA-2A was passed over.
They were seeing some service with KG-51's Me 262A2a in 1945.
The Germans were also experimenting with rockets of equivalent dimension to the large allied rockets: howerver they dispersed either 15 or 30 4g SHL4 hollow charge cluster munitions. There are illustrations in Wolfgang Fleischers "German Air Dropped Weapons". The time setting for the optimal time to bloom the cluster would require or at least benefit greatly from a computing sight.
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parsifal
Colonel
Which is a little better than a great many opinions and no sources
I dont know about Zetterlings numbers analysis, but there are many sources that give ratio of forces and casualties suffered. One source is the Portsmouth Historical Institute, but there are many others. Whilst it should be acknowledged that accurate figures for losses and numbers are imprecise at best, even taking into account Zetterlings work, its a very big stretch to argue that the Allies outnumbered the Axis in terms of frontline strengths during the campaign. For example, the Portsmouth Institute says that on the first day the allies managed to put ashore 10000 men, and suffered 9000 casualties (not all of them permanent, or fatal ....the estimated permanent casualties were about 5500, of which about 2500 were suffered at Omaha). This source puts German permanent casualties at an estimated 13000 men. The combat strength of the Allied forces on that first day reached an estimated maximum of 39000 men, they were faced by a total of just under 100000 German troops (say a frontline strength of about 55-60000 men). Saying that German formations in the West, prior to engagement is not supported by facts. The Germans on the Eastern Front had formations that were running at about 40% authorised strength, but on the western front, prior to Normandy, the germans were using this front to rebuild their formations. Most formations in France were at 90-100% TOE strength on the first day of the campaign. As the battle progressed, the rifle strengths of German formations took a nosedive, mostly because of the interdiction campaign whereas allied formations could be rested and rebuilt. But thats a function of the campain, and a terstament to the effectiveness of Allied all arms warfare, not to the superiority of the germans on the battlefield.
Moreover, it took some time for the Allies to overtake the germans in terms of frontline and total strengths. According to the US online History website, "By nightfall on June 6, more than 9,000 Allied soldiers were dead or wounded, but more than 100,000 had made it ashore and secured French coastal villages. Within weeks, supplies were being unloaded at Utah and Omaha beachheads at the rate of more than 20,000 tons per day. By June 11, more than 326,000 troops, 55,000 vehicles, and 105,000 tons of supplies had been landed on the beaches. By June 30, the Allies had established a firm foothold in Normandy. Allied forces crossed the River Seine on August 19.
Moreover it was not until the third week of the campaign that the Germans were overtaken in terms of numbers. by June 11, the estimated frontline strength had reched about 400000 men. 39000 men were lost outright when Cherbourg fell. Panzer lehr lost 2000 men in a single day. There were never anything like those casualty rates suffered by the Allied forces in any part of the campaign
Your position here moreover, seems to have shifted. You started out by saying that Allied casualty rates were twice that of german rates. Clearly the data that we do have does not support that. The Germans appear to have suffered around 425000 casulaties through to the end of Falaise, compared to somewhere in the order of 209-235000 Allied casualties. You have not responded to, or refuted those numbers, though you are sticking to the line that Germans were killing twice as many allies as the allies were inflicting on the Germans. I cant see how that can be sustained when a maximum of 1.4 million allied soldiers were deployed to the theatre in the time frasme, and less than a fourth of those were frontline combat troops, yet they managed to inflict casualties of around 425000. I cannot see how it can then be claimed that allied loss rates were twice that of the germans, or that they outnumbered the Germans in terms of frontline boots on the ground.
The germans had a fine military tradition and a solid basis from which to build their army, these are valid issues to consider. So too did the British Army. The other allies like the americans and canada, had less in terms of military traditions, but they were excellently trained, led and equipped, and were imbued with a fighting spirit at least equal to that of the germans. There is no evidence to support the notion that the younger nations that participated in the fighting were in any way handicapped by that.
Working against the Germans was their very limited equipment levels, the large number of caualties their army had suffered by 1944, the supply shortages they were suffering, the fact that a significant proportion of their formations werent even German in nationality (with motivation issues that went with that). other formations like certain SS formations were excellent in motivation, but poorly officered. Other formations had virtually no transport, and the list goes on and on.
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parsifal
Colonel
Which is a little better than a great many opinions and no sources
I dont know about Zetterlings numbers analysis, but there are many sources that give ratio of forces and casualties suffered. One source is the Portsmouth Historical Institute, another is the American Historical Association, but there are many others, more substantial than those, including many in print. Whilst it should be acknowledged that accurate figures for losses and numbers are imprecise at best, even taking into account Zetterlings work, its a very big stretch to argue that the Allies outnumbered the Axis in terms of frontline strengths during the campaign. For example, the Portsmouth Institute says that on the first day the allies managed to put ashore 100000 men, and suffered 9000 casualties (not all of them permanent, or fatal ....the estimated permanent casualties were about 5500, of which about 2500 were suffered at Omaha). This source puts German/Axis permanent casualties at an estimated 13000 men. The combat strength of the Allied forces on that first day reached an estimated maximum of 39000 men, they were faced by a total of just under 100000 German troops (say a frontline strength of about 55-60000 men). Saying that German formations in the West were understrength , prior to engagement is not supported by facts. The Germans on the Eastern Front had formations that were running at about 40% authorised strength, but on the western front, prior to Normandy, the germans were using this front to rebuild their formations. Most formations in France were at 90-100% TOE strength on the first day of the campaign. As the battle progressed, the rifle strengths of German formations took a nosedive, mostly because of the interdiction campaign whereas allied formations could be rested and rebuilt. But thats a function of the campain, and a terstament to the effectiveness of Allied all arms warfare, not to the superiority of the germans on the battlefield.
Moreover, it took some time for the Allies to overtake the germans in terms of frontline and total strengths. According to the US online History website, "By nightfall on June 6, more than 9,000 Allied soldiers were dead or wounded, but more than 105,000 had made it ashore and secured French coastal villages. Within weeks, supplies were being unloaded at Utah and Omaha beachheads at the rate of more than 20,000 tons per day. By June 11, more than 326,000 troops, 55,000 vehicles, and 105,000 tons of supplies had been landed on the beaches. By June 30, the Allies had established a firm foothold in Normandy. Allied forces crossed the River Seine on August 19.
Moreover it was not until the third week of the campaign that the Germans were overtaken in terms of numbers. by June 11, the estimated frontline strength had reched about 400000 men. 39000 men were lost outright when Cherbourg fell. Panzer Lehr lost 2000 men in a single day. There were never anything like those casualty rates suffered by the Allied forces in any part of the campaign
Your position here moreover, seems to have shifted. You started out by saying (or at least implying) that Allied casualty rates were twice that of german rates. Clearly the data that we do have does not support that. The Germans appear to have suffered around 425000 casulaties through to the end of Falaise, compared to somewhere in the order of 209-235000 Allied casualties. You have not responded to, or refuted those numbers, though you are sticking to the line that Germans were killing twice as many allies as the allies were inflicting on the Germans. I cant see how that can be sustained when a maximum of 1.4 million allied soldiers were deployed to the theatre in the time frasme, and less than a fourth of those were frontline combat troops, yet they managed to inflict casualties of around 425000. I cannot see how it can then be claimed that allied loss rates were twice that of the germans, or that they outnumbered the Germans in terms of frontline boots on the ground.
The germans had a fine military tradition and a solid basis from which to build their army, these are valid issues to consider. So too did the British Army. The other allies like the americans and canada, had less in terms of military traditions, but they were excellently trained, led and equipped, and were imbued with a fighting spirit at least equal to that of the germans. There is no evidence to support the notion that the younger nations that participated in the fighting were in any way handicapped by that.
Working against the Germans was their very limited equipment levels, the large number of caualties their army had suffered by 1944, the supply shortages they were suffering, the fact that a significant proportion of their formations werent even German in nationality (with motivation issues that went with that). other formations like certain SS formations were excellent in motivation, but poorly officered. Other formations had virtually no transport, and the list goes on and on.
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We're talking land warfare on a air power forum ?
I would think that of course the Germans inflicted more causulties, they were fighting from prepared defensive positions, with preperpared fallback positions. A defense almost always inflicts more hurt on a attacking force. They're in bunkers, dugouts, with prepared, cleared fields of fire. If a defense can't inflict more death on the attackers than they receive, by a gross amount, they are going to fail.
I would think that of course the Germans inflicted more causulties, they were fighting from prepared defensive positions, with preperpared fallback positions. A defense almost always inflicts more hurt on a attacking force. They're in bunkers, dugouts, with prepared, cleared fields of fire. If a defense can't inflict more death on the attackers than they receive, by a gross amount, they are going to fail.
parsifal
Colonel
First off, yes, often happens around here that we talk land operations on air forums.
In relation to losses , yes one would expect the defender to take less casualties than an attacker, however firstly, the assertion being made is that the germans inflicted twice as many casualties on the Allies regardless of whether they were attacking or defending. secondly, whilst full details on losses are lacking, the information that is available suggests german losses were about twice as bad overall during the campaign as was suffred by the allies. There is some variance in the numbers, because of incomplete records, but Allied losses were about 209-235000, compared to 288-450000 for the germans, depending on your cutoff point and who you believe. The generally and most widely accepted loss rates for the Germans to a point just after Falaise is 425000 casualties. The Germans certainly were not inflicting casualties at a rate of 2 for every one. It was more like 1:2 against them, down to about 1:1.4 against them. this is disputed by Siegfried, but he does not have any numbers or sources as yet
parsifal
Colonel
According to Antony Beevor (D-Day The Battle For Normandy(first Published 2009 Penguin Books) 592 pages, at page 263, he states " by 30 June , the British Army had suffered 24668 casualties since the invasion began, while the Americans had lost 34,034men. German losses for the same period were 80,783".....
Overall German to Allied casualties were running at 1.38:1. At this same stage there were 346000 +/- 10000 Allied troops deployed into Normandy, compared to approximately 400000 German troops.
These exchange rates occurred just after the fall of Cherbourg, that had seen the loss of 39000 Germans in one swoop. however it also was at the height of the Bocage fighting, incorporated the hard fighting at the times of the landings and saw some of the heavy fighting around Caen. These were battles where the german defensive capabilities were significantly enhanced by the terrain, and the effects of air support diminished by those same terrain factors.
As I have been saying from the beginning, all this talk of CEVs, CERs and other combat ratios are very unreliable, and should not be used to draw any firm conclusions about the fighting capabilities of the respective armies. They are essentially a predictive tool that can be used when other sources are not available. In this case, there are some records on strengths and losses, that clearly show the Germans as the inferior force in this battle (not in terms of numbers, in terms of combat effectiveness). The Germans outnumbered the Allies at this time (or at worst were only marginally inferrior in numbers), yet had suffered close to 40% greater casualties, and were losing the positional battle to boot. They were on the strategic defensive, and were in terrain that greatly favoured the defence. As tyrodtom points one would expect the allies, as the attackers, to be suffering more heavily as the attackers, but they werent.
My opinion is that it was not that the individual allied soldier was better than the individual German. Its just that the Allies enjoyed so many advantages that acted as combat multipliers for them that it was virtually impossible for them not to achieve combat superiority in most situations
I am also not saying that the germans were not effective. their methods of defence were first class, but this could not offset the inherent advantages enjoyed by the Allies. As Beevor also notes "On the eastern Front the Germans had learnt from Soviet bombardments to minimise losses in defence. They applied these lessons to good effect in Normandy. Their front line was no more than a light screenof machine gun positions and delay squads. Several hundred yard further back a rather more substantial line was prepred. behind that was usually a third line that contained a counterattack force, ready to counterattack immediately.
The germans knew well that the best moment to catch the allies off guard was just after they had taken a position. More casualties were commonly inflicted on the allies at this moment than during the actual assault (by the allies). The allies were often slow to dig in, and would often resort to using German trenches. These were often booby trapped, and always preregistered by German artillery.......(the allies) found the Germans to were very adept at camourflage." Beevor also gives praise to the German abilities at entrenching which he considered to be superior to that of the allies. Most of these advantages can be put down to their experiences in Russia.
Overall German to Allied casualties were running at 1.38:1. At this same stage there were 346000 +/- 10000 Allied troops deployed into Normandy, compared to approximately 400000 German troops.
These exchange rates occurred just after the fall of Cherbourg, that had seen the loss of 39000 Germans in one swoop. however it also was at the height of the Bocage fighting, incorporated the hard fighting at the times of the landings and saw some of the heavy fighting around Caen. These were battles where the german defensive capabilities were significantly enhanced by the terrain, and the effects of air support diminished by those same terrain factors.
As I have been saying from the beginning, all this talk of CEVs, CERs and other combat ratios are very unreliable, and should not be used to draw any firm conclusions about the fighting capabilities of the respective armies. They are essentially a predictive tool that can be used when other sources are not available. In this case, there are some records on strengths and losses, that clearly show the Germans as the inferior force in this battle (not in terms of numbers, in terms of combat effectiveness). The Germans outnumbered the Allies at this time (or at worst were only marginally inferrior in numbers), yet had suffered close to 40% greater casualties, and were losing the positional battle to boot. They were on the strategic defensive, and were in terrain that greatly favoured the defence. As tyrodtom points one would expect the allies, as the attackers, to be suffering more heavily as the attackers, but they werent.
My opinion is that it was not that the individual allied soldier was better than the individual German. Its just that the Allies enjoyed so many advantages that acted as combat multipliers for them that it was virtually impossible for them not to achieve combat superiority in most situations
I am also not saying that the germans were not effective. their methods of defence were first class, but this could not offset the inherent advantages enjoyed by the Allies. As Beevor also notes "On the eastern Front the Germans had learnt from Soviet bombardments to minimise losses in defence. They applied these lessons to good effect in Normandy. Their front line was no more than a light screenof machine gun positions and delay squads. Several hundred yard further back a rather more substantial line was prepred. behind that was usually a third line that contained a counterattack force, ready to counterattack immediately.
The germans knew well that the best moment to catch the allies off guard was just after they had taken a position. More casualties were commonly inflicted on the allies at this moment than during the actual assault (by the allies). The allies were often slow to dig in, and would often resort to using German trenches. These were often booby trapped, and always preregistered by German artillery.......(the allies) found the Germans to were very adept at camourflage." Beevor also gives praise to the German abilities at entrenching which he considered to be superior to that of the allies. Most of these advantages can be put down to their experiences in Russia.
Above some of the BT weapons which ranged from BT200 to BT1400 (number = approx warhead weight in kg)
They got to the point of testing in lakes.
Meant to target the allied invasion fleet. Above is an inverted Me 163 wind tunnel model fitted with these weapons.
I suppose the concept could certainly sink battleships and cruisers outside of gun range.
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With the known extremely short endurance of the Me-163, are you sure this could even hit targets well within normal gun range?
It's evident, and even more evident now, the Germans needed a department to look at projects so time and resources wouldn't be wasted on " stupid" ideas.
The Allies did have such a agency, but some slipped by them too. Look up the Panjandrum Wheel.
It's evident, and even more evident now, the Germans needed a department to look at projects so time and resources wouldn't be wasted on " stupid" ideas.
The Allies did have such a agency, but some slipped by them too. Look up the Panjandrum Wheel.
I don't see an anti-shipping Me 163 as stupid at all especially if it was the longer ranged Me 263 version. The Me 263, BT 700 weapon and TSA-2D bombsight were all independantly developed weapons so the expense was only in integrating them. The range is given in "Luftwaffe Secret Projects: Ground attack and special purpose aircraft" as a radious of around 45 knautical miles or so (don't have book with me).
Once airborn they would be beyond interception. The weakiness is of course the range, it can protect only a narrow section of coast. These interceptors and their pilots would need to do double duty intercepting bombers or reconaisance aircraft using either these aircraft; otherwise they'd just be wasting time waiting for an invasion fleet on their stretch.
The strength of the weapon was its extremely potent weaponry the warhead is equal to a truely massive torpedo, its detonation in an area that can not be easily protecred, the expected high accuracy and pk and the difficulty in intercepting.
Ofcourse the Luftwaffe didn't atually decide to produce it; however they did investigate it.
Once airborn they would be beyond interception. The weakiness is of course the range, it can protect only a narrow section of coast. These interceptors and their pilots would need to do double duty intercepting bombers or reconaisance aircraft using either these aircraft; otherwise they'd just be wasting time waiting for an invasion fleet on their stretch.
The strength of the weapon was its extremely potent weaponry the warhead is equal to a truely massive torpedo, its detonation in an area that can not be easily protecred, the expected high accuracy and pk and the difficulty in intercepting.
Ofcourse the Luftwaffe didn't atually decide to produce it; however they did investigate it.
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