Bomber Losses: USAAF vs RAF

[Airbone Bunny]

Regarding British night bombing there is something that has always nagged me: why they reacted so poorly, or didn't react at all, to the introduction of Schräge Musik cannons by German night fighters?.

That puzzles me because from 1943-44 those Schräge Musik applications were widely used; you would assume the RAF should have implemented some kind of countermeasures by then, but as far as I know, there was nothing…

I read that one of the reasons the RAF didn't counter effectively was because British bombers were not well suited to carry and use ventral turrets. But that seems like a poor excuse

 

[pbfoot]

Regarding British night bombing there is something that has always nagged me: why they reacted so poorly, or didn't react at all, to the introduction of Schräge Musik cannons by German night fighters?.

That puzzles me because from 1943-44 those Schräge Musik applications were widely used; you would assume the RAF should have implemented some kind of countermeasures by then, but as far as I know, there was nothing…

I read that one of the reasons the RAF didn't counter effectively was because British bombers were not well suited to carry and use ventral turrets. But that seems like a poor excuse

the advantage was carrying 3 times the bombload of the B17, I can't comment on how effective "schrage music " was but I really doubt it was effective as a normal attack

 

[mhuxt]

Everything I've read indicates it was far more effective. Less chance of being seen, no turbulence off the aircraft in front, no debris flying back at the attacker, larger target area to aim at, easier to avoid hitting the bombload, etc.

I've also read that priority for fitting the oblique weapons went to experience crews - new guys had to "make do" with horizontal attacks.

I believe a lot of the attacks were put down to flak, but as to what the Operational Research Section knew, and when they knew it, I agree is a mystery.

 

[Watanbe]

"schrage music " was very effective.

 

[fastmongrel]

The RAF heavies were designed for a ventral dustbin turret you can see them in the original design for the Manchester and Halifax but the RAF didnt think they were worth the weight. When later on they they were needed to combat Schrage Musik H2s had been fitted in the ventral turrets place.

I have read somewhere that towards the end of the war a Canadian wing unofficially took out the H2s from its aircraft and fitted a handheld 0.5 Browning in the radome blister cant remember where I read it though.

 

[JoeB]

Also a reason why oblique guns were effective was that the fighter a fighter approaching from below was often silhouetted against the ground and hard to see, the bomber against the sky and easier to see. And effective anti-bomber armament was heavier than any single practical turret on a bomber even if it did see the fighter in time.

On the original question, with early war technology (used by the some combatants throughout the war) a night bomber was much less accurate but much less vulnerable. With the technological advances incorporated by the British in their night bombing, and Germans in their night defenses, that relationship could actually invert: night bombing could become as accurate or more as daylight depending on exact method and conditions; but the night bomber could become every bit as vulnerable or more as the day one. That was the state of things ca. early-mid 1944 where accuracy of day and night bombing overlapped, depending on all the variables of exact method (within Oboe range or not, what weather conditions in daylight etc) but RAF night losses over Germany proper in that period tended to be heavier in % of sorties than USAAF day bombing with the benefit of escorts.

Joe

 

[Marshall_Stack]

Although I don't have any data, it seems that the likelihood of completing a tour was less for that of an airman of the RAF than of the USAAF. If someone had the data, that would be interesting to see. Also, does the ruggedness of the Lancs and Halifaxes compare to the B-17s?

 

[pbfoot]

Looking at Shrage Musik from my point of view , I'd rather sit back and lob 20mm from afar against the 303's rather then try and snuggle up underneath an aircraft , to me it would seem harder to aim from below as opposed to astern in all my years of reading and listening I have never heard of one guy flying in BC ever mention the thing but I stand to be corrected

 

[Erich]

@ pb

the SM attack was preferred by experienced and non-experienced alike in 1945. some of the aces still felt due to some jamming in the SM installation that the forward fire-power was the trusted method

E ~

 

[Airbone Bunny]

@ pb

the SM attack was preferred by experienced and non-experienced alike in 1945. some of the aces still felt due to some jamming in the SM installation that the forward fire-power was the trusted method

E ~

I just realized something: you don't even need Schräge Musik in your fighter to attack a bomber from below. You can just make a normal attack from below using frontal fire

That means that even without Schräge Musik, british bombers were already awfully vulnerable to attacks from below. Schräge Musik didn't create the flaw, it just exploited it in a logical and rational way.

Perhaps it is not coincidence that Schräge Musik was not a cabinet design; it was born directly in the operational units, and my humble hyphotesis is that there was a reason for that. I can imagine a Luftwaffe night fighter coming back from a mission thinking "You know, those crazy british blokes are flying with no ventral turrets! I can't believe they are doing that .... perhaps I should modify my plane to take adavantage of their madness"

Anyway, I know that most experts and historians talk very well of british bombers, particularly the Lancaster; but, for me, the lack of ventral firepower has always been an unnaceptable flaw. No idea who was resposible for that (faulty designers, insensitive high command, reckless operational management) but that was a serious black spot.

 

[Amsel]

Freeman Dyson, who was an analyst for Operations research of RAF Bomber Command in World War II, commented on the effectiveness of Schräge Musik: "The cause of losses ... killed novice and expert crews impartially. This result contradicted the official dogma...I blame the ORS and I blame myself in particular, for not taking this result seriously enough...If we had taken the evidence more seriously, we might have discovered Schräge Musik in time to respond with effective countermeasures."

From Wiki

 

[Watanbe]

I just realized something: you don't even need Schräge Musik in your fighter to attack a bomber from below. You can just make a normal attack from below using frontal fire

That means that even without Schräge Musik, british bombers were already awfully vulnerable to attacks from below. Schräge Musik didn't create the flaw, it just exploited it in a logical and rational way.

Perhaps it is not coincidence that Schräge Musik was not a cabinet design; it was born directly in the operational units, and my humble hyphotesis is that there was a reason for that. I can imagine a Luftwaffe night fighter coming back from a mission thinking "You know, those crazy british blokes are flying with no ventral turrets! I can't believe they are doing that .... perhaps I should modify my plane to take adavantage of their madness"

Anyway, I know that most experts and historians talk very well of british bombers, particularly the Lancaster; but, for me, the lack of ventral firepower has always been an unnaceptable flaw. No idea who was resposible for that (faulty designers, insensitive high command, reckless operational management) but that was a serious black spot.

Adding more ventral power, would of helped little and slowed the Lancaster down. It was very hard for the gunners in a Lancaster to spot a German NF let alone shoot one down.

 

[Marshall_Stack]

Adding more ventral power, would of helped little and slowed the Lancaster down. It was very hard for the gunners in a Lancaster to spot a German NF let alone shoot one down.

Then why have any guns at all?

 

[Watanbe]

Then why have any guns at all?

as a deterrent to attack and to act as spotters against NF. The guns weren't useful, the guns they hard were somewhat worth having but very rarely shot anything down.

 

[tomo pauk]

I don't buy it that 3 turrets are useful and good in one hand, and on the other the 4th turret would've wastly hamper the performance.

Either have the full set of guns or delete them all.

 

[Waynos]

The dustbin turrets that used to be fitted to RAF bombers like the Wellington were deleted because they were inefficient and draggy, and it was believed that the power operated turrets at the front and rear would suffice. Wellingtons later got beam guns and subsequent designs were fitted with power operated mid upper turrets but of course the belly was still left undefended.

 

[parsifal]

Just a small point....Mosquitoes operating in the bomber role were completely unarmed, and yet suffered the lowest attrition rate of any bomber in the allied inventory.. They undertook some of the most dangerous missions of the war I am told. The idea of a heavily armoured, heavily armed, slow moving and large bomber was one way to solve the defensive issue. The other pathway was for a smaller, faster, more manouverable and usually unarmed bomber, examples of which include the blenheim and mosquito. Its intersting to note that the speed/manouverability formula didnt always work....the blenheim was judged too slow and quite vulnerable during the war....whilst the success of the mosquito is self evident.

I happen to believe that the decision to build large bombers was the wrong one. For every Lancaster, the Britis could have fielded three or four Mosquitoes. Building successors to the Mosquito was technologically less challenging than building a successor to the Lancaster (or B-17 for that matter) and each unit loss would have been less painful than the losses of heavies that were suffered

 

[drgondog]

Although I don't have any data, it seems that the likelihood of completing a tour was less for that of an airman of the RAF than of the USAAF. If someone had the data, that would be interesting to see. Also, does the ruggedness of the Lancs and Halifaxes compare to the B-17s?

You would have to do a study 'pre- Mustang/post Mustang' and factor in the attrition of day figher pilot losses versus NJG night fighter attrition. That would be 'complicated'

 

[Marshall_Stack]

Just a small point....Mosquitoes operating in the bomber role were completely unarmed, and yet suffered the lowest attrition rate of any bomber in the allied inventory.. They undertook some of the most dangerous missions of the war I am told. The idea of a heavily armoured, heavily armed, slow moving and large bomber was one way to solve the defensive issue. The other pathway was for a smaller, faster, more manouverable and usually unarmed bomber, examples of which include the blenheim and mosquito. Its intersting to note that the speed/manouverability formula didnt always work....the blenheim was judged too slow and quite vulnerable during the war....whilst the success of the mosquito is self evident.

I happen to believe that the decision to build large bombers was the wrong one. For every Lancaster, the Britis could have fielded three or four Mosquitoes. Building successors to the Mosquito was technologically less challenging than building a successor to the Lancaster (or B-17 for that matter) and each unit loss would have been less painful than the losses of heavies that were suffered

I agree. I liked the P-38 Droop Snoot idea. Too bad it wasn't adopted more. Apparently the USAAF was already committed to the 'heavies" and did not want to admit that they might have gotten it wrong...

 

[diddyriddick]

If I might add something here...

One thing that we haven't discussed here is that the role of demolition of Axis industry and infrastructure was not the only reason for the heavy bombing campaign in general, and the Eighth Air Force specifically. At least late in the war, the Allied high command wanted German fighters to engage the heavies; the more you take out over the Ruhr, the less you have to deal with over Normandy. Once Allied fighters were able to provide cover deep into Germany, this was possible.