The defense of the campaign tied up valuable resources that otherwise would have been deployed offensively, it's as simple as that.
Bomber offensive vs. Gemany: you are in charge
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TheMustangRider
Senior Airman
The Eight took on its initial offensive against Germany on a capacity pretty much underpowered of what it could have been, being forced to minimize itself in order to form the Twelfth AF and support Operation Torch.
U-boats bases on the French coast were well defended by a high concentration of flak guns and well protected by reinforced concrete pens which cost 8th AF raiders dearly, in return for pulverized concrete pens and U-boats relatively safe inside them.
On more than one occasion I've read about 8th AF vets of those early days of Eight AF operations in late 1942 and how bitterly they recall those missions which, to their opinion, were more useless than effective against the U-boat menace and how the Eight could have been better off pursuing more accessible targets in France and the Low Countries in the face of a slow growing rate for VIII BC.
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- #344
Thanks. The reason I'm asking is this: reading this
seemed like pointing that a lousy target choice made the AAF 'escalating losses'. So indeed that was 'AAF's Kasserine pass', when they went unprepared (in more than one category) vs. a seasoned opponent, with predictable results.
seemed like pointing that a lousy target choice made the AAF 'escalating losses'. So indeed that was 'AAF's Kasserine pass', when they went unprepared (in more than one category) vs. a seasoned opponent, with predictable results.
TheMustangRider
Senior Airman
I don't know exactly what priority level did U-boats had in AWPD-1 but I suspect it certainly was high given the promptness which the 8th planning officers took to tackle them.
The Battle of the Atlantic was without doubt a decisive battle for both belligerent factions but as history proved, one that was decided out in the sea rather than in the naval bases.
Kind of like the LW if one thinks about it: it suffered from the heavy bombardments to the industries that fed and maintained it but, given German resolve and resourcefulness, it was a struggle that had to be dealt with in the skies.
The Battle of the Atlantic was without doubt a decisive battle for both belligerent factions but as history proved, one that was decided out in the sea rather than in the naval bases.
Kind of like the LW if one thinks about it: it suffered from the heavy bombardments to the industries that fed and maintained it but, given German resolve and resourcefulness, it was a struggle that had to be dealt with in the skies.
bbear
Airman 1st Class
Thank you. I understand and your points and actually they highlight why I'm thinking this way.
1, Aerial bombrdment of GAF and factories particularly at night would be bloody and grim for civilians - but not the aim.
2. Welcome to the ETO. I don't mind a nasty surprise, there was some overconfidence at that time. Any degree of intimidating U boats off the surface was welcome in 1942 as an advantage of a first mision set though i thnk u-boat killls in that period was one.
3, Exactly, the original question changed the situation into a 'what-if' scenario by putting someone in overall command.
4, That's for night ops and under the biggest 'speculation alert' heading. I've been reading about how diffcult a night interception is. How slow, how dangerous. How expensive and how few the pure night fighters were. How the searchlights worked in teams. Is it possible to bomb deep into germany at night with twin engine escorts and fewer losses overall? I was thinking out loud how to obtain the best limited passive defence (how fast how high) and how to calculate the effect. Where would a contemporary description be? Now I know that it is not not wise to do that here. Thanks for the cautionary tone and I expect to get a roasting - but i owed you an explanation.
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
I may be incorrect on this but the initial bombing campaign on the U-Boat pens by the USAAF was encouraged and politely asked for by the British - mainly because of the effect of the U-Boats on the convoys. The USAAF took it up as a somewhat 'exercise' and training for USAAF crews. That was the impression that I have gotten after reading several books over the years but I may be mistaken.
bbear
Airman 1st Class
The RAF BC and LW made an advantage of night bombing when they found it hard to survive with limited day escort. If the 8th AF invested mightily and early in night flying they could co-ordinate with BC and with the same advantage bomb the GAF in pursuit of Pointblank objectives starting much earlier deeper into germany and with lower losses than sustained in 1943. That's the newbie thought I never did buy into the night/day round the clock pressure theory. Normallly an attack would seek to overwhelm a defence at one time, Not form an orderly queue to give the defence a shift sytem.
I expect a roasting..
All that baloney aside- as I put myself in that position I could see I would have to make choices for political reasons. In an alliance you just have to bargain and manouvre for the leeway to take a decision. Even if the decision is - stop arguing and lets follow our orders. I started off wanting to get rid of the political masters. I ended up understanding why they had to be involved in the CBO and why they found it impossible to truly combine the offensive. So now I have a lot of respect for Haig and the generals. It's just very very sad.
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- #349
Did the LW and BC found the advantage of night bombing? I can agree that it was harder to kill a night bomber, but it was also harder for the night bomber to really plant it's bomb where it should. It took the BC from late 1939 to mid 1943 to achieve such a level of accuracy to actually hit a big city, Dambusters notwithstanding. And even after mid 1943 there were set backs.
Conversely, if the RAF concentrated on long range/high performance day fighters from 1941 on, the LW would've find themselves with pants down once they started Op Barbarossa and MTO operations. That example would also show the USAAF that escorted day bombing provides a handy opportunity to eliminate enemy AF from skies - that being a crux of Pointblank?
Be it as it was, the CBO was stretching LW thin - they had to design produce tools and crews for both day night duties, with enough fuel to keep the planes operating. No wonder LW started to collapse in 1944.
Chill out, man
You seem like a knowledgeable decent person.Oh boy. I have no respect for Haig, many a French Russian/Soviet generals - sorry, many of them are butchers in my eyes, plain simple. I mean - infantry charges against MGs and minefields???
wuzak
Captain
Maybe the 8th was asked to go after the subs, but their doctrine required them to bomb strategic targets. So instead of going after U-boats at sea they scratched the tops of the pens.
In the early days of the 8th in Britain, there was a lot of pressure to join the RAF in the night campaign. This was against what all the 8th AF commanders stood for, so they resisted for all they were worth.
In the early days of the 8th in Britain, there was a lot of pressure to join the RAF in the night campaign. This was against what all the 8th AF commanders stood for, so they resisted for all they were worth.
bobbysocks
Chief Master Sergeant
they sure went after them....but IIRC the results were minimal because they were so fortified. they even tried using remote control war weary b17s and 24s packed with explosives ( code named aphrodite and anvil )...but those didnt pan out well either.
wuzak
Captain
Their bombs weren't big enough.
It required Tallboy and Grand Slam, but these were 2+ years into the future.
It required Tallboy and Grand Slam, but these were 2+ years into the future.
bobbysocks
Chief Master Sergeant
they were still bombing them in '45...
They were also limited by the lenght of the B-17s bomb bay, nothing longer than a 2000 lb GP bomb would fit. A 2000 lb bomb just didn't have enough weight or body strenght to penetrate the roof on the sub pens. Even if a smaller, shorter, Tallboy had be developed, by the time it had be reduced to the length of the B-17's bomb bay, it would have been useless. Some B-17s were modified to could carry up to 1000 lb external on each wing, but that's no help for this situation.,
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TheMustangRider
Senior Airman
Not roasting from my part mate, we all are learners here. Some, of course are older and much more experienced and knowledgeable than others.
-Precise night-time bombardment of relatively small targets such as LW airfields and factories was next to impossible during a big part of the air war over Europe; and making life bloody and grim for civilians, apart from hitting industrial targets weather permitting, is to me exactly what the CBO historically did during the war.
-I may be wrong but the taking of both Allied bombing forces by Eisenhower before D-Day proved how difficult it was to vector both bomber commands, their commanders -and their doctrines- to work side by side without fiery opposition in the face of targets priorities.
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Wasn't a Kennedy killed in one of those operations?
wuzak
Captain
The wing racks could carry a 4000lb bomb.
In fact, they could, and did, carry teh 4500lb Disney Bomb
Disney bomb - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
wuzak
Captain
Yes Joe Kennedy.
TheMustangRider
Senior Airman
The problem I see with that is that making the Eight to adapt to night bombing before giving a chance to daylight bombing would be the same as forcing the AAF commander to give up their fervent beliefs in high-precision daylight strategic bombing without a fight and before proving, in their view of the time, that it could work and the self-defending bomber rendering German war-making industries to rubble was the most effective and efficient way of pursuing the war.
