Bomber offensive vs. Gemany: you are in charge

[bobbysocks]

i dont think you are going to get the us high brass to concede any tactic or strategy they have already made their minds up on. a stubborn lot if ever there was one. they didnt listen to mitchell, chennault, the raf, or the hosts of others who tried to tell them. it took heavy losses for them to decide self defending bombers are so self defending....

 

[drgondog]

i dont think you are going to get the us high brass to concede any tactic or strategy they have already made their minds up on. a stubborn lot if ever there was one. they didnt listen to mitchell, chennault, the raf, or the hosts of others who tried to tell them. it took heavy losses for them to decide self defending bombers are so self defending....

If we are permitted the prism of hindsight, and given supreme command of Allied Air Forces in Europe following Casablanca, I would frame the problems to be solved as follows:

Objective - shorten the war by destroying German capacity to wage effective war. Their ability to sustain a high capability force depended on a.) raw materials, b.) industrial base, c.) technology/innovation, d.) a healthy population with will to continue to supply labor, troops and logistical support and c.) a power grid to adequately support their industrial base and food production. Secondary but essential - kill the luftwaffe for D-Day invasion

Means and Assets of Airwar/Strategic and Tactical mid 1943 Casablanca Summit;
I. Strengths UK (ad Commonwealth) - RAF Heavy bomber force well trained and capable in 1943 to go anywhere in Germany and attack any target with large tonnage capability. Weakness - vulnerable to night fighters and less capable of 'precision bombing required to hit point targets of a city block size at night. Strength - good bombsights and bombers equally capable of precision bombing in daylight as US counterparts. Weakness - lack of daylight escort fighters to reduce losses to acceptable levels. Strengths - highly capable RAF Fighter and Tactical Air Command with comparable or better aircraft with respect to local air superiority. Weakness - range. RAF Medium bombers largely same as US in type and mission. Weakness - defense when target objectives exceeded escort range. Strength - extremely capable long and short range special ops in form of Mosquito night fighters, daylight intruders. Weakness - maybe not enough quantity to standardize US and UK staffing, TOE and aircraft to unify the missions.

II. Strengths US - Large and growing force of Heavy, medium and attack bombers capable of precision bombing in daylight when crews trained and weather favorable. Weakness - initially incapable of delivering multi range results on key targets without heavy losses. Small and rapidly growing 8th and 9th AF Fighter Command chartered intially with supporting Heavy bombardment strategic objectives deep in germany as well as Medium bomber objectives in France, Holland, Belgium to destroy logistics infrastructure capability. Weakness - no long range escort in early to late 1943.

III. Combined strengths
RAF/US BC had ability to go anywhere from UK to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany and attack key industrial targets. RAF/US had ability to cover bomber to Bremen, Frankfurt by late 1943 before Mustangs arrived. Weakness - no cover beyond Dummer lake, Stuttgart until December 1943.

Conclusions - Independently both 8th AF and RAK Bomber Command were experiencing heavy losses versus German Day and Night fighters while attempting to a.) destroy German cities and b. German industrial capability while giving the GAF a maximum effective defense capabilty versus day and night ops.

Change the game. RAF and US go to 90% daylight bombing in late 1943 to spread the GAF day fighter defenses and neutralize the NJG effectiveness as a single force. Re-assign RAF to attack key targets such as Schweinfurt, Ruhr valley dams, Merseburg, Misburg, etc during day light.

Shift priorities of P-38 assignment from PTO/MTO and move all to ETO to support both the RAF and USAAF on deep penetrations. Expedite production of P-51s (A and B) to ETO. P51A to escort RAF and US Medium daylight attacks as far as Brunswick and Friedrichshafen. Re-deploy P-47s to MTO and PTO for medium range escort until P-47N and P-51B and P-38s are available tomove from ETO.

Key emphasis - destroy chemical, oil, power generation, rail, ball bearings and armaments centers - skip the population concentrations unless a major industrial capability is in the center.

 

[wuzak]

Objective - shorten the war by destroying German capacity to wage effective war. Their ability to sustain a high capability force depended on a.) raw materials, b.) industrial base, c.) technology/innovation, d.) a healthy population with will to continue to supply labor, troops and logistical support and e.) a power grid to adequately support their industrial base and food production. Secondary but essential - kill the luftwaffe for D-Day invasion

As hindsight is a wonderful thing. I agree with you.
I think that attacking the transportation systems would give more downstream benefits than the other tragets. The problem is that such targets are often easily repaired.

Historicaly transportation was hit in teh lead up to D-Day as the primary target system, but it had been targetted earlier, with mining operations in waterways, for example.

I. Strengths UK (ad Commonwealth) - RAF Heavy bomber force well trained and capable in 1943 to go anywhere in Germany and attack any target with large tonnage capability.

The RAF did, indeed, have a very impressive heavy lift capability.

Weakness - vulnerable to night fighters

I think the solution to this would to move up the approval to use the latest British nightfighters - Mosquitoes and Beaufighters - over the continent earlier. Historically only those with older radar sets, like Mosquito NF.IIs, were cleared for operations over mainland Europe earlier. Mosquitoes began to be equipped with Mk.VIII and Mk.X (SCR 720) radar sets in late 1943.

less capable of 'precision bombing required to hit point targets of a city block size at night.

I would dispute this. By late 1943 bombing aids and pathfinding methods could give the RAF equivalent results to the 8th AF. Also the introduction of teh master bomber, who would control teh bombing, call for additional marking when required, and correct for bomb drift.
617 squadron pioneered low level target marking, at first with Mosquitoes and then with Mustangs, giving even better results.

Strength - good bombsights and bombers equally capable of precision bombing in daylight as US counterparts.

Harris didn't think so, until his own crews proved him wrong.
Precision bombing requires an unobstructed target, long straight bomb runs and bombing invidually - for maximum accuracy. These would be troublesome for either without local air superiority.

Weakness - lack of daylight escort fighters to reduce losses to acceptable levels.

Something they shared with the USAAF. The RAF didn't think they were possible, so didn't try to develop them, the USAAF didn't think they were necessary.
In any case, the solution for the RAF was probably the same as the 8th AF - P-51B/Mustang III. Or the RAF could have pushed Supermarines for more range on teh Spitfire - particularly the XIV, which was being developed through 1943.

Strengths - highly capable RAF Fighter and Tactical Air Command with comparable or better aircraft with respect to local air superiority. Weakness - range.

Very true. Range is an issue that could have been solved with the appropriate priority but with the emphasis on heavy bombers at night this wasn't really addressed by the RAF.

RAF Medium bombers largely same as US in type and mission. Weakness - defense when target objectives exceeded escort range. Strength - extremely capable long and short range special ops in form of Mosquito night fighters, daylight intruders. Weakness - maybe not enough quantity to standardize US and UK staffing, TOE and aircraft to unify the missions.

That was always the big issue with the Mosquito - the production mix. Mosquito bombers could have provided a highly efficient daylight bombiing force, but where do you take them from? NFs, FBs, PRS?

II. Strengths US - Large and growing force of Heavy, medium and attack bombers capable of precision bombing in daylight when crews trained and weather favorable.

The weather was a very big factor in the success of daylight bombing. Also the Germans could employ countermeasures such as decoys and smoke screens to prevent accurate aiming. The necessity of bombing in formation on the lead's signal also lead to a reduction in the bombing accuracy and effectiveness.
The USAAF also tended towards a higher number of smaller bombs, reasoning that they were more likely to hit something.

Weakness - initially incapable of delivering multi range results on key targets without heavy losses.

This is the big weakness. But it was overcome through sheer industrial capacity. Churning out equipment and aircrew to replace those that were lost.

Small and rapidly growing 8th and 9th AF Fighter Command chartered intially with supporting Heavy bombardment strategic objectives deep in germany as well as Medium bomber objectives in France, Holland, Belgium to destroy logistics infrastructure capability. Weakness - no long range escort in early to late 1943.

This was an error in doctrine that went back many years. If a long range escort fighter need to be developed after the hierarchy discovered it was necessary (mid-late 1943) it would have been too late.

III. Combined strengths
RAF/US BC had ability to go anywhere from UK to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany and attack key industrial targets. RAF/US had ability to cover bomber to Bremen, Frankfurt by late 1943 before Mustangs arrived. Weakness - no cover beyond Dummer lake, Stuttgart until December 1943.

Conclusions - Independently both 8th AF and RAF Bomber Command were experiencing heavy losses versus German Day and Night fighters while attempting to a.) destroy German cities and b. German industrial capability while giving the GAF a maximum effective defense capabilty versus day and night ops.

Change the game. RAF and US go to 90% daylight bombing in late 1943 to spread the GAF day fighter defenses and neutralize the NJG effectiveness as a single force. Re-assign RAF to attack key targets such as Schweinfurt, Ruhr valley dams, Merseburg, Misburg, etc during day light.

I suppose that could work, providing there was enough co-ordination. Perhaps some feints where either the 8th of BC would occasionally form up and head towards target, attracting the attention of the defenders. They would fly until the limit of their escorts' range and then could choose to turn back if they were successful in drawing the defences. Meanwhile, the other force can go to another target relatively unmolested.

Shift priorities of P-38 assignment from PTO/MTO and move all to ETO to support both the RAF and USAAF on deep penetrations. Expedite production of P-51s (A and B) to ETO. P51A to escort RAF and US Medium daylight attacks as far as Brunswick and Friedrichshafen. Re-deploy P-47s to MTO and PTO for medium range escort until P-47N and P-51B and P-38s are available tomove from ETO.

I think switch from strict escort duties to fighter sweeps and Luftwaffe hunting.

Key emphasis - destroy chemical, oil, power generation, rail, ball bearings and armaments centers - skip the population concentrations unless a major industrial capability is in the center.

Rail, road and waterways. Bomb and mine them, particularly around the Ruhr Valley. Stop or restrict the movement of raw materials through occupied Europe. This should give the biggest benefits for the cost.

 

[parsifal]

DG has pretty much nailed it in my opinion

 

[drgondog]

I have no real issue with any of Wuzak's counterpoint/observations.

For me the summary (with one MAJOR problem to be solved) is to combine RAF and USAAF heavy bombers in daylight raids in summer of 1943 after Hamburg, and combined, hit the major priority targets in cmbination, in daylight -

With hindsight I would hit oil and chemicals first, power generation (Dams/hydro/Grid centers) and ball bearings second, engine plants third. No question Marshalling Yards critical as nexus points for load switching, dumping and acquisition - particularly when time was critical (i.e moving men, material to Normandy in June 1944)

Aside from LW (and huge daylight losses during the July 1943 to Feb 1944 - somewhat mitigated by extra P-38s - was the 'simple' issue of 2000+ bombers taking off and landing in the same general 14 hour window. East Anglia was crowded enough as it was.

The reason I would not initially hit Rail and Barge and Bridges is that there were a myraid of re-route options when choke points were struck.

IMO there were three significant advantages the RAF brought to daylight bombing. First was heavier tonnage and more bombs to the target with larger bombs per sortie for more destuctive results per hit. Second was the ability to hit targets (better results whether 'hit' or not) on targets obscured by cloud cover. Last, the huge stress placed on LW day fighter force - compelling them to throw perhaps more NJG units and even more reserves from East and South... and I would speculate that RAF losses might be less - and Certainly less when P-51B/Mk III arrived in numbers in Jan-April 1944.

 

[Siegfried]

A lot of the targets mentioned are "one hit wonders". For instance attacks on the German oil industry were delayed untill a few months before D-day so that the effect would be concentrated around the landings. Had the bombing commenced earlier the Germans would have responded and eventually recovered much of their production capacity as they did in many other areas. The Edmund Geilenberg Plan consisted of dispersed mini plants plus a few deep underground plants as well as hardening of critical areas of the plants.

Edmund Geilenberg - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I would say that had the plants been hardened with basic precautions such as semi submerging of key parts of the plant and armour concrete around key areas much of the oil bombing campaigne would have had limited effects.

Albert Speer eschewed building these plants underground as he thought putting the resources into wining a war before a bombing campaign began was a better way.

 

[Milosh]

I would put power generation targets at the top of the list. From memory, there was 4-5 major power stations (fueled by coal) that produced 70% of the electric power for Germany. No electricity and no machines can operate.

 

[tomo pauk]

Not so easy to relocate disperse either

 

[parsifal]

A lot of the targets mentioned are "one hit wonders".

A lot of the targets mentioned in DGs assessment were historically hit, just not in the order he specified, and in some instances with less emphasis in terms of resources. These targets were hit repeatedly historically and did not prove to be one hit wonders in the actual conflict. Why all of a sudden would they magically acquire such status?

For instance attacks on the German oil industry were delayed untill a few months before D-day so that the effect would be concentrated around the landings

Its a very debateable point. I think the decision wass siply a matter of finding the right target priority, and this took some time. In actual fact, both BC and the USD 8th were detailed the destruction of the French communications and rail net i as their priority targets in the lead up to D-=Day, rather than deep penetration attacks on oil installations per se.

Had the bombing commenced earlier the Germans would have responded and eventually recovered much of their production capacity as they did in many other areas.

Another highly debateable statement. There is no evidence to support either of the two notions pedalled in this piece. Germany may not necessarily have responded adequately (she may well have not been able to) and there is not evidenece that actual German potential could have been recovered after the "bomb proffing of her oil industry (if that were in fact possible). In any event, spending money and manpower to do that work hands the allies a victory in itself. As it was, the establishement of the synthetic plants cost germany a bomb prewar, making them harder targets only adds to that cost, something that would have knowck on effects somewhere. Personally i doubt they had the resources or capability to achieve the outcomes you are suggesting.

I would say that had the plants been hardened with basic precautions such as semi submerging of key parts of the plant and armour concrete around key areas much of the oil bombing campaigne would have had limited effects.

As above, making the germans expend resources to achieve that outcome hands a bloodless victory to the Allies in itself, moreover I dont think that given the resources available to the germans that such an outcome is at all relaistically achievable. If it was, I think they would have at least done it to some of their petrochemical industry. they didnt, and I think that was partly bewcause they couldnt

 

[wuzak]

Another highly debateable statement. There is no evidence to support either of the two notions pedalled in this piece. Germany may not necessarily have responded adequately (she may well have not been able to) and there is not evidenece that actual German potential could have been recovered after the "bomb proffing of her oil industry (if that were in fact possible). In any event, spending money and manpower to do that work hands the allies a victory in itself. As it was, the establishement of the synthetic plants cost germany a bomb prewar, making them harder targets only adds to that cost, something that would have knowck on effects somewhere. Personally i doubt they had the resources or capability to achieve the outcomes you are suggesting.



As above, making the germans expend resources to achieve that outcome hands a bloodless victory to the Allies in itself, moreover I dont think that given the resources available to the germans that such an outcome is at all relaistically achievable. If it was, I think they would have at least done it to some of their petrochemical industry. they didnt, and I think that was partly bewcause they couldnt

It would have taken years to put the synthetic oil industry underground.

 

[TheMustangRider]

For instance attacks on the German oil industry were delayed untill a few months before D-day so that the effect would be concentrated around the landings. Had the bombing commenced earlier the Germans would have responded and eventually recovered much of their production capacity as they did in many other areas. The Edmund Geilenberg Plan consisted of dispersed mini plants plus a few deep underground plants as well as hardening of critical areas of the plants.

The major offensive against Oil didn't start until after the Normandy landings in favor of the Transportation Plan on grounds that it could cause a faster, more meaningful short-term impact on German logistics and mobility to repulse an Allied invasion than the Oil Plan offered.

Months before D-Day and still without a clear air superiority of the 8th AF over much of Nazi-Occupied Europe, Pointblank targets were still being pursued aggressively by Doolittle in an effort to draw and defeat the Luftwaffe in the air.

IMO the Edmund Geilenberg Plan seems interesting and perhaps promising; I believe however that it would have taken years to be fully executed and time was not a luxury Nazi Germany afforded in late 1944 into 1945.

 

[Siegfried]

The truth is that the allied anti synthetic oil bombing campaigne began in May 1944, a full month before opperation Overlord with some 21 major missions and 4000 tons of bombs dropped. It was effective however follow up campaigns were repeatedly required to prevent repair which initially required 2 weeks to restore full production.

If that campaign had of been started much earlier in the absence of the stressfull high fuel demands and high resource demands d-day placed on the Germans the allies would have played their hand too early.

Hardening oil plants turned out to be not that expensive or onerous. The pipes and pressure vessels operated at 700 bar and could take direct hits from bombs unscathed. Cables can be run in trenches while critical parts of the plant such as electrical control cabinets and personnel can be placed in bomb proof concrete blockhouses. This greatly reduces any major damage to only those parts of plant directly hit by large bombs and ensures quick recovery. Earlier campaigns are also less effective due to the mitigating availability of Romainian oil. If you start the campaigne 1 year before overlord the German synthetic oil industry would be well forewarned, hardened and also dispersed with fully bomb proof plant likely in use in some areas. Certainly costly for the Germans but also for the allies and a life saving respite for the people of German cities.

 

[gjs238]

For quite some time, the the bomb raids were the only instrument available for Allies to bring the war to Germany. However, those raids whole Combined bomber offensive is criticized sometimes. So how would you conduct it, both during day night, with equipment historically available?

Seriously consider deploying B-29's in Europe instead of India and China.

 

[tomo pauk]

What would you do between 1941-44?

 

[TheMustangRider]

Seriously consider deploying B-29's in Europe instead of India and China.

What would happen to the thousands of B-17s/B-24s already being turned out in mass production.
They would have to fit somewhere else within the Allied effort as their numbers are too great to become redundant.
Aircrews would have to be re-trained as well consuming a certain amount of time.

 

[drgondog]

Seriously consider deploying B-29's in Europe instead of India and China.

B-29s weren't the answer in 1943 or 1944. The answer was 'put great tonnage of the right mix of bombs during daylight on the right targets'. The B-17, Lancaster, Halifax, B-24s were capable. The losses IMO for combined daylight attacks on the key industries would not have been significantly higher simply because the LW would have been taxed even more to attack 2000+ combined RAF/US heavy bombers streaming into Germany every day... provided that a complete shift of P-38s from other theatres had occurred to form the first deep target escort.

IMO -The combined fighter and bomber commands would have suffered grievous losses but would have also dealt the LW more losses deep inside Germany that they otherwise would not experience until Feb-May 1944. If I am correct about the assumption the fighter losses would have been closer to 1:1 rather than 8th AF ratios of ~7:1 in 1944 but Allies far better positioned with streams of much better fighter pilot trainees to pick up the slack and German industry would be on its heels in late 1943/early 1944 - much faster than actual results.

 

[tomo pauk]

Bill, what was the exchange ratio in the ETO, for fighters alone, in second half of 1943?

 

[VBF-13]

What would happen to the thousands of B-17s/B-24s already being turned out in mass production.
They would have to fit somewhere else within the Allied effort as their numbers are too great to become redundant.
Aircrews would have to be re-trained as well consuming a certain amount of time.

I suppose that fact had a big impact. That is to say, that had to be a hard habit to quit, once they got it underway. I'm just a novice on this, understand, but that'd be my observation.

 

[gjs238]

B-32's were slated to be deployed to MTO and eventually ETO.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/b-29s-over-germany-4013-17.html

From Wiki..

" Initial plans to use the B-32 to supplement the B-29 in re-equipping B-17 and B-24 groups before redeployment of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces to the Pacific were stymied when only five production models had been delivered by the end of 1944, by which time full B-29 operations were underway in the Twentieth Air Force."

"The Army Air Forces wanted to begin replacing B-17s and B-24s with B-32s in the summer of 1944. The plan called for Mediterranean-based B-24 bomb groups to transition first, followed by other groups in the 15th Air Force and finally 8th Air Force groups. Because the B-32 test program was so far behind schedule, however, not a single B-32 was ever sent to the Mediterranean or European Theaters of Operation."

Factsheets : Consolidated B-32

 

[drgondog]

In the second half 1943, the exchange rate moved from about 1.5:1 in favor of the P47 in July to about 3.5:1 by December with P-38 dragging the ratio down. It climbed to ~ 6:1 with Mustangs higher and P-38s lower than P-47 between Jan 1 and May 30, 1944, then increased to end of war.

Caution - these are from 8th AF VCB in context of air victory credits to Macr weighted losses air to air. USAF Study 85 is very slightly lower but differs only in removing a series of double credits that leaked into 8th VCB.

I do not know what the RAF or 9th AF exchange rate is because I haven't looked at 9th AF macrs, nor do I have the RAF VC's.