The defense of the campaign tied up valuable resources that otherwise would have been deployed offensively, it's as simple as that.
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The defense of the campaign tied up valuable resources that otherwise would have been deployed offensively, it's as simple as that.Defending against a sustained bombing camapign was very costly for the Germans, let there be no mistake or misinformation in that regard. Where most of the criticism of the Bombing campaign arose is becuse claims were made about what it could do before and during the war, that it simply could not do. Countries could not be brought to surrender by bombing alone. From those bombastic and embarasing claims has arisen in the postwar endless debates, the opportunity for revisionists and German apologists to raise questions about the fundamental failures of bombing on a much more generic and widespread scale. none of these postwar aopologists and revisionists have much to go on, but it hasnt stopped virutally an entire cottage industry springing up to support the various notions that are carried with it.
Thank you for your kind comments and questions. I'll wait a while. But I will answer every query.
Care to elaborate the bolded part?
-Going after U-boat pens is exactly what the 8th AF did during its initial phase of operations over Nazi-occupied Europe without much impact to the German U-boat campaign in the Battle of the Atlantic and causing the AAF escalating losses.
Interesting summary bbear.
If I'm allowed I'd like to make a couple of points regarding some of them.
-Not using aerial bombardment as means of civilian demoralization while not bombing by day is IMO a tough task to accomplish given the rudimentary technology available during WWII (specially early in the war) to pursue night-time bombardment of industrial targets without devastating the urban areas in which they were located.
-Going after U-boat pens is exactly what the 8th AF did during its initial phase of operations over Nazi-occupied Europe without much impact to the German U-boat campaign in the Battle of the Atlantic and causing the AAF escalating losses.
-Integrating the Allied effort with commanders that had vastly different views of strategic air power applications was a very difficult challenge to overcome and IMHO one that consistently pursued throughout the combined Allied strategic campaign.
-Taking defenses (defensive machine guns?) and armor away from heavy bombers would have been seen as suicidal to bomber crews as their light-loaded Libs, Forts or Lancs would not have been able to outrun single or twin engine LW fighters.
Care to elaborate the bolded part?
Hi, bbear,
Many agreeable points in your post.
Could you please explain why there would not be the day bombing? And elaborate a bit about the last commentary?
The RAF BC and LW made an advantage of night bombing when they found it hard to survive with limited day escort. If the 8th AF invested mightily and early in night flying they could co-ordinate with BC and with the same advantage bomb the GAF in pursuit of Pointblank objectives starting much earlier deeper into germany and with lower losses than sustained in 1943. That's the newbie thought I never did buy into the night/day round the clock pressure theory. Normallly an attack would seek to overwhelm a defence at one time, Not form an orderly queue to give the defence a shift sytem.
I expect a roasting..
All that baloney aside- as I put myself in that position I could see I would have to make choices for political reasons. In an alliance you just have to bargain and manouvre for the leeway to take a decision. Even if the decision is - stop arguing and lets follow our orders. I started off wanting to get rid of the political masters. I ended up understanding why they had to be involved in the CBO and why they found it impossible to truly combine the offensive. So now I have a lot of respect for Haig and the generals. It's just very very sad.
Thank you. I understand and your points and actually they highlight why I'm thinking this way.
1, Aerial bombrdment of GAF and factories particularly at night would be bloody and grim for civilians - but not the aim.
2. Welcome to the ETO. I don't mind a nasty surprise, there was some overconfidence at that time. Any degree of intimidating U boats off the surface was welcome in 1942 as an advantage of a first mision set though i thnk u-boat killls in that period was one.
3, Exactly, the original question changed the situation into a 'what-if' scenario by putting someone in overall command.
4, That's for night ops and under the biggest 'speculation alert' heading. I've been reading about how diffcult a night interception is. How slow, how dangerous. How expensive and how few the pure night fighters were. How the searchlights worked in teams. Is it possible to bomb deep into germany at night with twin engine escorts and fewer losses overall? I was thinking out loud how to obtain the best limited passive defence (how fast how high) and how to calculate the effect. Where would a contemporary description be? Now I know that it is not not wise to do that here. Thanks for the cautionary tone and I expect to get a roasting - but i owed you an explanation.
they sure went after them....but IIRC the results were minimal because they were so fortified. they even tried using remote control war weary b17s and 24s packed with explosives ( code named aphrodite and anvil )...but those didnt pan out well either.
They were also limited by the lenght of the B-17s bomb bay, nothing longer than a 2000 lb GP bomb would fit. A 2000 lb bomb just didn't have enough weight or body strenght to penetrate the roof on the sub pens. Even if a smaller, shorter, Tallboy had be developed, by the time it had be reduced to the length of the B-17's bomb bay, it would have been useless. Some B-17s were modified to could carry up to 1000 lb external on each wing, but that's no help for this situation.,
Wasn't a Kennedy killed in one of those operations?
The RAF BC and LW made an advantage of night bombing when they found it hard to survive with limited day escort. If the 8th AF invested mightily and early in night flying they could co-ordinate with BC and with the same advantage bomb the GAF in pursuit of Pointblank objectives starting much earlier deeper into germany and with lower losses than sustained in 1943. That's the newbie thought I never did buy into the night/day round the clock pressure theory. Normallly an attack would seek to overwhelm a defence at one time, Not form an orderly queue to give the defence a shift sytem.