Bomber offensive vs. Gemany: you are in charge

Zalogas Brandsens figures provide a good alternative view to jentz. Their figures are restricted to the east front only but give the following total Tank strengths for both sides (including SPGs). The figures do not include Soviet AFVs held in reserve in the interior MDs or in the Far east, they are soley the front line units in the ETO. German Strengths inlcude satellite armoured strengths on the eastern front, and include both runners, and those held in reserve, and those undergoing repairs. The strengths according to these sources are as follows (Axis/Soviet). The second set of numbers is the percentage growth from the starting baseline in August 1943

8/43: 3,555 / 6,200; 0/0
6/44: 3,970/11,600;111/187
9/44: 4,186/12,900; 117/208
11/44: 5,202/14,000; 146/226
12/44: 4,785/15,000; 134/241
1/45: 4,881/16,200; 137/261

German abilty to expand had been far slower than thier Soviet opponents. Soviet frontline tank strengths had grown at a rate more than four times that of the Axis

Moreover, as Zaloga points out, these figures belie the true strength of the wehrmacht tank formations. The overwhelming majority of those thousands of tanks were not operational, According to Zaloga the German tank strength for a slightly earlier period February 43, were as follows. the first number is the total AFVs available, the second number is the the number operational

2/42: 2671/465
3/42: 1503/440
1/43: 2374/495
4/43: 2555/600
10/43:3478/770

I tried to cross check these figures with other sources. The sources sources I have only deal with selected time frames within that period, but do tend to back up Zaloga. Nagorski more or less confirms Zalogas earlier figures whilst Moynahan and Dougherty each independantly corroborate Zalogas figures for the latter dates. Some of Zalogas figures, however, I could not corroborate.

However, getting back to the avilability figures, another, less credible on line source I found gives one detailed inventory for June 1944. It gives total wehrmacht AFV totals for both east and west front as 6200 vehicles, however, of these figures,, more than 1800 were of types no linger in production at that time.

I simply fail to see how it can be reasonably argued that Germany was not short of tanks, indeed, all manner of land weapons and transport, in the latter part of the war. Not when your main opponent is accumulating tanks at a rate four times faster than you (the Germans) are able to do.

RAF Bomber Command - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The greatest contribution to winning the war made by Bomber Command was in the huge diversion of German resources into defending the homeland; this was very considerable indeed. By January 1943 some 1,000 Luftwaffe night fighters were committed to the defence of the Reich – mostly twin engined Me 110 and Ju 88. Most critically, by September 1943, 8,876 of the deadly, dual purpose 88 mm guns were also defending the homeland with a further 25,000 light flak guns – 20/37 mm. The 88mm gun was an effective AA weapon, it was a deadly destroyer of tanks and lethal against advancing infantry. These weapons would have done much to augment German anti-tank defences on the Russian front.
To man these weapons the flak regiments in Germany required some 90,000 fit personnel, and a further 1 million were deployed in clearing up and repairing the vast bomb-damage caused by the RAF attacks.
This diversion to defensive purposes of German arms and manpower was an enormous contribution made by RAF Bomber Command to winning the war. By 1944 the bombing offensive was costing Germany 30% of all artillery production, 20% of heavy shells, 33% of the output of the optical industry for sights and aiming devices and 50% of the country's electro-technical output which had to be diverted to the anti-aircraft role.

Click to expand...

This is Wik, of course...

Strategic bombing during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The impact of bombing on German morale was significant according to Professor John Buckley. Around a third of the urban population under threat of bombing had no protection at all. Some of the major cities saw 55–60 percent of dwellings destroyed. Mass evacuations were a partial answer for six million civilians, but this had a severe impact on morale as German families were split up to live in difficult conditions. By 1944 absenteeism rates of 20–25 percent were not unusual and in post-war analysis 91 percent of civilians stated bombing was the most difficult hardship to endure and was the key factor in the collapse of their own morale.[155] The United States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that the bombing was not stiffening morale but seriously depressing it; fatalism, apathy, defeatism were apparent in bombed areas. The Luftwaffe was blamed for not warding off the attacks and confidence in the Nazi regime fell by 14 percent. Some 75 percent of Germans believed the war was lost in the spring of 1944, owing to the intensity of the bombing.[156]
Buckley argues the German war economy did indeed expand significantly following Albert Speer's appointment as Reichsminister of Armaments, "but it is spurious to argue that because production increased then bombing had no real impact". But the bombing offensive did do serious damage to German production levels. German tank and aircraft production, though reached new records in production levels in 1944, was in particular one-third lower than planned.[17] In fact, German aircraft production for 1945 was planned at 80,000, "which gives an idea of direction Erhard Milch and the German planners were pushing", "unhindered by Allied bombing German production would have risen far higher".[18]

Click to expand...

Again the myth of Speer, but anyway...

This sentence from wiki:

By January 1943 some 1,000 Luftwaffe night fighters were committed to the defence of the Reich – mostly twin engined Me 110 and Ju 88.

Click to expand...

Maybe someone (Erich?) could deny or confirm, 1000 night fighters in Jan 1943?

Looks too much for me....

Here the strength is stated as 378 serviceable aircraft, on 17 May 1943, the detailed list of planes is available also at the web page.

I found another source for german AFV vproduction and other things. I dont yet have a copy, but I saw it in one of those googlre reviews. lokks pretty good, so i intend to get a copy.

The book details are R L DiNardo ; Germany's Panzer Arm

Just flicking through the online preview, its packed full of good stuff by the look of it. According to this source, Germany's Tank Park went through the following permutations

1/41:4400
4/41:4700
7/41:5300
10/41: 4900

1/42:4900
4/42:4500
7/42:5200
10/42:5900

1/43:5800
4/43:3700
7/43:4100
10/43:4300

1/44:5100
4/44:5500
7/44:7300
10/44:4200

1/45:5200


It has monthly breakdowns for production and servicibility rates. With regard to the latter he confirms a generally low level of servicibility on the eastern front as compared to the west.

I think a good source and worth a second look. Will try and secure a hard copy if its not too expensive I think.

But if the above figures are correct, and they do seem to correlate to Zaloga, if a little low, then Germany was not producing enough AFVs to permit significant expansion of the avilable tank park

tomo pauk said:

Here the strength is stated as 378 serviceable aircraft, on 17 May 1943, the detailed list of planes is available also at the web page.

Click to expand...

That seems much more like it.
In May 1943 the Luftwaffe establishment of all fighters,in all theatres was only 1,786.
Cheers
Steve

Just a thought but the general view is that everyone is talking about how many of X were built, be it a tank or an aircraft was built. I was reading some papers about Spitfire production in the UK and the person in charge was under huge pressure to explain why the number of aircraft delivered was less than the planned amount. His reply was simple, instead of concentrating on building aircraft he concentrated on producing the most servicable aircraft, that meant less aircraft and more spare parts. The effort needed to produce one aircraft could easily produce spares for more than one aircraft to be made servicable. He won his case.

Looking at the German production figures and low servicability is it possible that they made the mistake that the guy in the UK was being asked to do. ie meet production targets and not concentrate on what would produce the most servicable tanks/planes whatever

From the Jentz graphs, we don't know how many of the tanks on-hand were actually serviceable, combat-worthy tanks.

Similar to such aircraft servicibility figures, tank servicibility figures tended to fluctuate wildly even during the day. Higher in the morning (before fighting), lower in the evening. If a tank steps on a mine and looses a track, it will be unservicable for a couple of hours or days for example. A tank with an engine failure in noon may be serviceable again by the evening after an engine change. So there is not much point in sticking to figures on any given day, and sometimes there were even machinations with reports - Kershaw for example writes that some armored formations reported their Hanomags 'immobile' after they received a hint that another unit was supposed to take over them. Suddenly all of them developed various engine issues, and regrattably, could not be effectively transferred. Of course after some hasty 'repairs' the units own Panzergranadiere made good use of them again.

tomo pauk said:

From the Jentz graphs, we don't know how many of the tanks on-hand were actually serviceable, combat-worthy tanks.

Click to expand...

this is possible for the graphs for tanks in east front, page 230 on volume 2 english edition (that available......)
unlucky are only graphs is not easy the stime of number probably around 30% of Pz IV need repair at 30 december '44

Di Nardo in his book, has pretty good figures on AFV serviceability which he summarises in a number of graphs in his statistical annexure. However the narrative is also quite revealing. At pages 20-21 for example he states.

"By 1944 disruptions in production caused by bombing and the ever increasing combat losses was causing acute shortages of spare parts and skilled maintenance personnel. On the eastern front the shortage of spare parts came back with a vengeance to haunt the Germans. On the 10 March units of onevs 2 Ukr front captured the German supply depot at Uman, where over 300 immobilised tanks were captured. According to the AGS report, these tanks were all damaged and could not be repaired because of a lack of spare parts. Evacuation of the non-operational tanks was impossible due to choronic shortages in rolling stock and prime movers.

Given the poor maintenance situation in the various theatres especially on the eastern front, Hitler ordered in November 1943 that damaged tanks be sent back to Germany for repair. This way the tanks could be brought closer to the spare parts they needed. The effort however was a failure, for several reasons. First, the maintence performed in Germany proved no better than that performed at the front. Having maintenance performed in Germany involved the setting up of a number of new organizations, thus consuming scarce men and resources. There were additional strains placed on the transport system which proved unsustainable. There were delays in the processes of transport. It was found the average transport time to and from the front was 8 weeks. The new system blew repair times out to an average of 10 months. Guderian strongly argued that the best measure to address the problem was to improve the situation was to increase the supply of spare parts.".

The shortage of spare parts had a measurable effect on combat operations

"By 5th july 1944 2Pz XX had been action since 9 June reported that the lack of spare parts in its inventory was now critical and was preventing the Division from further combat operations. This was a relatively common occurrence for the Germans by this stage of the war.

The vehicle situation was equally poor. Panzer divs on all fronts were reporting problems with excessive wear for all MT. Some Divs had to make do with over age vehicles. The 8 Pz XX for example had not had a major refit of its vehicle park since 1941. This had the effect that the division in 1944 was no longer fully motorized, only about 1/3 of its Infantry could be moved by truck. This division, along with others was forced to rely on horse drawn transport for much of its support. The 23 Pz XX reported in August 1944 that the average mileage of its truck park was over 12000 miles per vehicle. 1st Pz Div reported that its vehicle serviceability rates after a month of fighting in 1944 was down to an average daily availability of 29%"

With regard to MT availability, Di Nardo gives some valuable insights.

"German truck losses from January to August 1944 ran at 109000 vehicles, well in excess of the entire production numbers of 1943. 1944 production levels could not nearly keep pace with this loss rate".

Di Nardo does have graphs included that show the readiness rates. In January 1941, the Panzerwaffe had over 90% 0f its vehicles listed as ready. By January 1942, it was down to 55%. It recovered in the summer to a high of 78% before plummeting again to 58% in the 2nd week of July (after Kursk I expect) . From that point until January 1945 there was a gradual increase back to about 90%. Di Nardo explains this by stating the obvious….in a year marked by near constant retreats, any unserviceable vehicles were rapidly lost to the enemy, leaving only those vehicles still combat worthy as the only survivors.