Bombing Germany

[Zipper730]

It was Churchill who pushed for the bombing of Germany's eastern cities in early 1945. It was he who asked Sinclair, on 25th January, what plans the RAF had made for 'blasting the Germans in their retreat from Breslau.' Churchill had seen a report from the Joint Intelligence Sub-committee which suggested that the Germans might collapse by mid April ('45) if the Soviet offensives in the East were successful, but might hold out until November if the Germans could consolidate. He was understandably keen to do anything possible to help the Soviets, and it is from this that the assault on Germany's eastern cities, including Dresden, stems.
Sinclair forwarded Churchill's inquiry to Portal, who replied that oil, jet assembly plants and submarines should have top priority but agreed that the Allies should use the available effort
"...in one big attack on Berlin and attacks on Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz, or any other cities where a severe blitz will not only cause confusion in the evacuation from the East but will hamper movement of troops from the West."
At least Portal was attempting justification by some valid military objective. Churchill was not satisfied by this reply, and made this clear, writing the following morning.
"I did not ask you last night about plans for harrying the German retreat from Breslau. On the contrary, I asked whether Berlin and no doubt other large cities in East Germany, should not now be considered attractive targets. I am glad that this is under 'examination'. Pray report to me tomorrow what is going to be done."
It was Bottomley (Portal was leaving for the Mediterranean) who informed Harris of Churchill's desires, issuing an effective order to Harris before consulting the Americans (Spaatz) or the Combined Chief's of Staff.
"I am, therefore, to request that subject to the qualifications stated above and as soon as moon and weather conditions allow, you will undertake such attacks with the particular object of exploiting the confused conditions which are likely to exist in the above mentioned cities during the successful Russian advance."
He notified Churchill that the attacks could occur as soon as the moon permitted, after the night of 3/4 February.

You'd figure with the RAF's philosophy on winning wars, he'd have just said "Since the Germans suffered a serious defeat, and their morale is low, I figure we can crack their will to fight once and for all by flattening a shitload of cities in rapid succession -- the high death toll, the rapidity of strike to strike, and the helplessness of government to fend of the attacks, should do it."

Churchill was the instigator of, and was responsible for, the attacks on the cities in eastern Germany, including Dresden.

I thought General Spaatz had revived the idea of Operation Thunderclap, and revised it to include attacks on several cities rather than a huge attack on Berlin?

Harris, once again, was just doing what he was told, to the best of his and his Command's now considerable ability.

In this case you're correct.

In terms of percentage of population killed Pforzheim was the worst, yet most people have never heard of it.

I didn't actually know the percentage of the population killed (22% based on the normal population levels), just that 17,600 were killed, 83% of the overall surface area wiped out, and 89% of the city core.

Harris was, as is well known, a firm advocate of area bombing and had to be more or less compelled to undertake the more precise tasks demanded of him in the run up to Overlord and thereafter, though he did undertake them and with some success. Nobody ever asks why?
Harris had good reason to doubt the ability of his Command to make precision attacks, as demanded by the Oil and Transport Plans.

Actually as early as 1942, there was an effective raid carried out on a Renault plant in Billancourt. Of course, the raid was carried out at low altitude, and losses might have been steep.

He had figures for bomb lifts required for such targets prepared by Bomber Command's own ORS. These figures were different from those prepared by Zuckermann, one of the main proponents of the Oil and Transport Plans and this led to a good deal of bad feeling and friction at the time and long after the war. Dickins and the men of his ORS did not believe that Zuckermann understood or allow for many operational factors, what in Clausewitzian terms we would call 'friction' or the 'fog of war'. This was introduced into Dickin's calculations as the 'operational factor' to which Zuckermann took exception.

It's ironic that the USAAF greatly valued Zuckermann's input. I'm not sure if we were anymore accurate or were able to avoid substantial losses owing to day-fighter escort.

Harris resistance to precision attacks was not due to an irrational belief that area attacks and the devastation of German cities would win the war, though he did believe this.

There were numerous cases he would exaggerate claims of weather conditions to avoid small scale targets, and hit cities, so there was definitely a degree of stubbornness in him. And as I said earlier, there was at least one case where he practically dared Portal to fire him.

He also had a dim view of "panacea targets" like oil, though ironically that would bring Germany to its knees.

As for the other issue of discussion

.

Actually you're both sort of right.

War is essentially a continuation of politics by other means, and politics is about power: And when things come down to power, it's often down to a matter of luck, force, and cunning (might makes right, which is inherently amoral). If right and wrong is involved, it's in the cause of the war, but not the methods to do it which would be considered objectionable to most human beings.

Regardless the conduct of wars does vary from conflict to conflict for various reasons: Some wars do seem to be "cleaner" than others, and others a great deal "dirtier". Examples of "dirty" conduct would include the following (and this is not in order)

• Actual or attempted genocide/extermination of population in captured territory, particularly when surrender has already been achieved
• Needlessly sadistic practices: Rape (Japan), sodomy, bayonetting pregnant women (Japan, USSR in Afghanistan), using people for decapitation practice (Japan), attacks targeted at children (i.e. using weapons that look like toys, slitting the throats of children in front of their parents, supposedly these events occurred in Afghanistan)
  
• Enslavement of the conquered populace
• Deliberate targeting of non-combatants/civil population
  
• Use of biological warfare agents (they are indiscriminate and know no boundaries; their use would also be considered IMHO to be arguably foolish)
  
• Use of chemical warfare, particularly on non-combatants
  
• Sinking of lifeboats (providing they aren't somehow able to pose a threat -- i.e. sniping at a nearby combat ship)
  
• Other: During one of the many CIA interventions in South America, there was a few cases of people that were hooked up with electrodes so they could be 'controlled' like some kind of marionette (they were fully conscious otherwise), they were basically steered into an area of decent size, and were blown up. This is so fucked up I have trouble even writing it with a straight face.

And I should point out that even in WWII there were numerous restraints that were practiced

• Germany: They developed some the deadliest poison gases (the G-series), yet didn't use them
• United States, United Kingdom: As a general rule, the practice of shooting up aircrews while in their parachutes was frowned upon. We also refrained from using poison gas, and the U.K. refrained from the use of bioweapons.

There are variables that affect wars that most people do not even think about, and that would include high-finance and war-profiteering

1. High-Finance: Banks that operate internationally have no loyalty to any particular nation (unless it is convenient to their interests) and see nations, by in large, as appendages to their affairs (even in WWII, this was the case). They often are quite comfortable with funding both sides of a war, which is actually quite lucrative (sociopathic as it is), as it facilitates massive profits, and allows one to determine the winner and loser. Even if no conquest occurs, it's still beneficial as wars are economically wasteful and serve to further indebt nations to them.
2. War Profiteering: Many companies that were part of war industry were not necessarily totally loyal to the United States (Sperry for example was a multi-national company that the US Navy didn't trust for that reason; Ford sold shitloads of vehicles to Germany), and provided you aren't loyal to any one country, funding both sides can actually be useful provided you are able to avoid being on the losing side. Since companies that specialize in military technology profit from military operations, they will get very powerful in war and conflict, and might even manipulate the system to suit their interest (more wars).

I should point out modern intelligence operations were based heavily on international banking. In the 1800's the Rothschilds* were utilized by the British because they had an elaborate intelligence network that eclipsed even the British government. This of course backfired on the British when they operated in their own interest, and profited handsomely off of it.

Many of the personalities in the OSS (and early CIA) were Wall Street Lawyers and Bankers (Dulles was both), the SOE (Special Operations Executive) was under the control of MEW (Ministry of Economic Warfare).

BTW: I wish to issue a disclaimer, partially because you need a disclaimer on everything you say these days, and secondly because of the fact that the comment about high-finance could easily be a means for anti-semitic folks to justify their positions or even bolster them.

1. I'm not Anti-Semitic: I don't have any objections to people, as a general rule because of their religion or ethnicity. I usually try to judge people on a case-by-case basis.
   
2. There are many bankers such as the Rockefellers who are not Jewish and act the same as the Rotschilds. My opinion that their behavior has nothing to do with their religion, but more by their personality (disorders), and their profession (which tends to attract people who fall into the Dark Tetrad).

 

[stona]

You'd figure with the RAF's philosophy on winning wars, he'd have just said "Since the Germans suffered a serious defeat, and their morale is low, I figure we can crack their will to fight once and for all by flattening a shitload of cities in rapid succession -- the high death toll, the rapidity of strike to strike, and the helplessness of government to fend of the attacks, should do it."

I thought General Spaatz had revived the idea of Operation Thunderclap, and revised it to include attacks on several cities rather than a huge attack on Berlin?

As I said Churchill promoted the attacks on cities in eastern Germany in support of the Soviet offensives. Bottomley (acting for Portal) instructed Harris to prepare the attacks WITHOUT consulting the CCS or Spaatz.
It had nothing to do with 'flattening a shitload of cities in rapid succession' something that was anyway impossible. Some of the other attacks in this series were not effective or successful. As someone else has pointed out, we remember Dresden because it went ;horribly right'. This also has nothing to do with the RAF/Bomber Command philosophy on winning the war.

Operation Thunderclap, as originally planned, never took place. It was conceived as a joint Bomber Command/USSTAF attack on Berlin as a response to the V-1 offensive. It was shelved largely because of Spaatz's objections.
The idea that an attack on Berlin might shock the Nazi government into surrender did begin to gain traction in late January 1945. Air Commodore Bufton (Chairman of the Combined Strategic Targeting Committee, a joint RAF/USSTAF staff) wrote on 22nd January, when the Soviet Offensive in the East was just 10 days old,
"German radio has recently shown signs of hysteria in broadcasts to the people, and a heavy air attack on the capital and other big towns now might ruin an already shaky morale."
This was more wishful thinking, but the British Joint Intelligence Committee was now interested, but quite rightly discounted the effects on morale, preferring to adapt the operation to support the Soviet offensive. The JIC report observed that this version of Thunderclap
"would create great confusion, interfere with the orderly movement of troops to the front, and hamper the German military and administrative machine."
This is the report that Churchill saw, and the one that caused him to throw his weight behind this idea, asking Portal what was being done to 'blast the Germans'.
Meanwhile at the weekly air commanders conference in Paris, the possible use of "the heavies in the new military situation" was discussed. Tedder, who had presumably seen or at least heard of the JIC report (from Bufton), asked if the time had come for 'Thunderclap'. Now, finally, Spaatz agreed that the time had come but he
"felt that the operation should be held in instant readiness, but not ordered either until the Russians were on the Oder in strength, or across it."
Tedder accepted Spaatz's recommendation, but this was certainly not what Churchill had in mind.
Spaatz was nobody's fool, he did not believe that Thunderclap in any form would end the war, though like everyone else he hoped it might. He did believe that a large raid on Berlin would show solidarity with the Russians and disrupt that cities ability to aid the defence of the eastern front.
On 28th January Spaatz returned to England. He had lunch with Bottomley (standing in for Portal). He did not agree to bomb any eastern German cities apart from Berlin. Spaatz gave Doolittle the following priorities, oil (visual), Berlin (visual or blind), the Ruhr, Munich and Hamburg. The 8th AF's fighters were instructed to cover the bombers, attack oil targets and to "interrupt traffic from West to East towards Berlin and Dresden." On the same day the targets for US air forces in Berlin were delivered and included, with typical American optimism, the Gestapo headquarters, the RLM and the Alexanderplatz railway station, all in the administrative centre of Berlin.
It is evident that the British and Americans had rather different perceptions of what Thunderclap should be.
After his meeting with Spaatz, Bottomley saw Tedder in Paris where they agreed to maintain oil as the top priority with attacks on Berlin when good visual conditions allowed, with Leipzig and Dresden next on the list of priorities.
On 31st January Bottomley communicated the new priorities to Portal. The top priority remained the synthetic oil plants, but he went on to say
"Next in priority for Air Forces operating in the UK is attack of Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden and other associated cities where heavy attack will cause great confusion in civilian evacuation from the east and hamper movement of reinforcements for other fronts."
The very next day Spaatz read this new list of priorities to the weekly air commanders' conference. No one questioned it and it passed almost by default. This was very much the JIC/Churchillian version of Pointblank, and this is why the raid on Dresden occurred. It was a completely normal raid that went very well (for Bomber Command), it is only its success and the lateness of the date that makes it any more remarkable than dozens of others.

There is more to this, Malta, Yalta, Anderson's heart attack, the Quesada plan/Operation Clarion,attack on Munich (Twining ordered by Spaatz at Marshall's prompting) for much the same reasons as the British wanted to go after Leipzig/Dresden, and much, much more, but I don't have time to write a book

Cheers

Steve

 

[Zipper730]

As I said Churchill promoted the attacks on cities in eastern Germany in support of the Soviet offensives. Bottomley (acting for Portal) instructed Harris to prepare the attacks WITHOUT consulting the CCS or Spaatz.
It had nothing to do with 'flattening a shitload of cities in rapid succession' something that was anyway impossible. Some of the other attacks in this series were not effective or successful. As someone else has pointed out, we remember Dresden because it went ;horribly right'. This also has nothing to do with the RAF/Bomber Command philosophy on winning the war.

Operation Thunderclap, as originally planned, never took place. It was conceived as a joint Bomber Command/USSTAF attack on Berlin as a response to the V-1 offensive. It was shelved largely because of Spaatz's objections.

What objections?

The idea that an attack on Berlin might shock the Nazi government into surrender did begin to gain traction in late January 1945. Air Commodore Bufton (Chairman of the Combined Strategic Targeting Committee, a joint RAF/USSTAF staff) wrote on 22nd January, when the Soviet Offensive in the East was just 10 days old,
"German radio has recently shown signs of hysteria in broadcasts to the people, and a heavy air attack on the capital and other big towns now might ruin an already shaky morale."
This was more wishful thinking, but the British Joint Intelligence Committee was now interested, but quite rightly discounted the effects on morale, preferring to adapt the operation to support the Soviet offensive. The JIC report observed that this version of Thunderclap
"would create great confusion, interfere with the orderly movement of troops to the front, and hamper the German military and administrative machine."
This is the report that Churchill saw, and the one that caused him to throw his weight behind this idea, asking Portal what was being done to 'blast the Germans'.

So, he saw the idea and modified it to his purpose?

Meanwhile at the weekly air commanders conference in Paris, the possible use of "the heavies in the new military situation" was discussed. Tedder, who had presumably seen or at least heard of the JIC report (from Bufton), asked if the time had come for 'Thunderclap'. Now, finally, Spaatz agreed that the time had come but he
"felt that the operation should be held in instant readiness, but not ordered either until the Russians were on the Oder in strength, or across it."

The Oder river is the border between Germany and Poland?

He did believe that a large raid on Berlin would show solidarity with the Russians and disrupt that cities ability to aid the defence of the eastern front.

If I recall somebody in the RAF proposed using the tactical air-forces to bomb and strafe the troops and interdict supplies. However, Churchill didn't want to hear it, and wanted to flatten cities.

He did not agree to bomb any eastern German cities apart from Berlin. Spaatz gave Doolittle the following priorities, oil (visual), Berlin (visual or blind), the Ruhr, Munich and Hamburg. The 8th AF's fighters were instructed to cover the bombers, attack oil targets and to "interrupt traffic from West to East towards Berlin and Dresden." On the same day the targets for US air forces in Berlin were delivered and included, with typical American optimism, the Gestapo headquarters, the RLM and the Alexanderplatz railway station, all in the administrative centre of Berlin.

Actually the February 3, 1945 attack on Berlin was aimed squarely at the city and the population: While targets were placed on the map, specific targets, it was largely a pretext for what they were actually aiming at.

This was very much the JIC/Churchillian version of Pointblank, and this is why the raid on Dresden occurred. It was a completely normal raid that went very well (for Bomber Command), it is only its success and the lateness of the date that makes it any more remarkable than dozens of others.

A raid that went horribly right as wuzak stated, and fires were progressing better than even expected by the time the second wave of bomber went over the city, the master-bomber actually gave an order bomb to the left and right of the fires (they were using a fan-type of attack profile to widen out the bomb-track).

I've heard different figures for overall surface destruction: Some sources list 15-16 square miles, others around 2.51 square miles. Regardless the raid was a glowing success in the literal sense.

 

[GrauGeist]

The Oder river is the border between Germany and Poland?

Before WWII, the German border was actually much further east than the Oder.

Poland ended up with a large portion of German territory after WWII, their borders now being west of the Oder.

 

[wuzak]

Actually as early as 1942, there was an effective raid carried out on a Renault plant in Billancourt. Of course, the raid was carried out at low altitude, and losses might have been steep.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BRKnLO-HJu8


The RAF's largest bombing raid so far - on Paris - WWII Today

"The plan called for the massed use of flares and a very low bombing level so that crews could hit the factory without too many bombs falling in the surrounding town. There were no Flak defences. 223 aircraft bombed the target, reporting excellent results. Only 1 Wellington was lost. The main raid lasted 1 hour and 50 minutes."

"The raid was considered a great success and the destruction caused in the factory received much publicity. Unfortunately, French civilian casualties were heavy. There were many blocks of workers' apartments very close to the factory."

Bombing from low altitude with little or no opposition would make for much better accuracy, no doubt.

 

[stona]

Special operations like the Billancourt raid are not representative of the main force operations for which I gave extensive data above. In this context they are a red herring.

Churchill always liked Harris to flatten cities, but that is not all that Harris was doing in early 1945. In January Bomber Command dropped about 30% of its tonnage on oil targets and more than 20% on the German marshaling yards which were supporting the Ardennes offensive. About half the tonnage went on area raids.

In early January Spaatz believed that the diversion of the US 8th AF's effort to tactical bombing in support of the 'Battle of the Bulge' had relieved the pressure on Germany's oil industry. This along with other factors worrying to the Allies (new U-Boats, tank production, etc) caused Spaatz to tell Doolittle, who in turn told Eisenhower, that the US Air Forces should return to strategic bombing as soon as possible. Eisenhower disagreed, given the parlous state of the ground battle, but on 6th January Spaatz gained Eisenhower's agreement that two thirds of the bombing forces could return to strategic bombing with oil as the top priority. He reflected a general feeling in USSTAF that continuing to bomb marshaling yards and other tactical targets west of the Rhine would lengthen the war. On 9th January Spaatz gained SHAEF approval to bomb jet production facilities, visually, on the same priority as oil targets. He was regaining control and directing his forces to attack the targets he wanted to attack.
It is Spaatz's whole belief in the strategic bombing of these pressure points in the German war economy, that had led him not to support Thunderclap as he believed it to be a diversion from the main effort. The British JIC version of Thunderclap was hardly more appealing to him, though it did serve a direct military objective, in support of Russian ground operations, something he had just freed his forces from in respect of Anglo-American ground operations. His agreement to bomb Berlin and order fighter operations against West-East communications was a concession in this context.
The minutes of the 11th January air commanders conference show just how frustrated Spaatz, Doolittle and Anderson were by the diversion of their forces. Anderson noted that the strategic air forces
"were paying a tremendous price by concentrating on helping ground forces."
Many targets (oil, ball bearing,aircraft factories, U-boat yards...) would have to be hit again.
Spaatz and Bottomley agreed 'Directive N0. 3 for the Strategic Air Forces in Europe' on 12th January and issued it on 16th January. It covered all the above, and pandered to the British with the inclusion of 'important industrial areas' as priority targets. Portal only agreed provisionally, the Air Staff in Washington asked Spaatz to consider raising the priority of U-Boat related attacks and ground support. In the case of the later they might as well have asked him to cut off his hands. Airmen did not like ground support, they did not, from the earliest days of air power, see it as a job for them, doing the Army's work. By the late '40s support by tactical forces had been conceded, but it was still seen as a diversion for the heavy bombers of the strategic air forces. It was less of a problem in the US than in the UK (with a recently independent Air Force) but it still existed.

The 3rd February raid can not be considered part of Thunderclap as it was not part of a combined Anglo-American round the clock operation as originally conceived. Spaatz had conceded an agreement to attack Berlin, as shown earlier. It is also worth noting that Doolittle objected at length and vehemently to the operation, writing to Spaatz that
"we will, in what may be one of our last and best remembered operations, violate the basic American principle of precision bombing of targets of strictly military significance..."
He argued more convincingly that
"the chances of terrorizing into submission, by merely an increased concentration of bombing, a people who have been subjected to intense bombing for four years is extremely remote."
Spaatz's reply was somewhat non-committal, prompting Doolitle to ask.
" Is Berlin still open to air attack? Do you want priority oil targets hit in preference to Berlin if they definitely become visual? Do you want center of city hit or definitely military targets such as Spandau, on the Western outskirts?"
Spaatz annotated his copy of the message sent in reply.
"Told Doolitle to hit oil if visual assured: other wise, Berlin - center of the city."
This makes American priorities quite clear, and Thunderclap, or an unrecognisable, watered down version of it, was not top of the list.
It also makes it clear that, over Doolittle's objections, this was indeed to be an attack on the city in what the Americans euphemistically called an 'area type raid'.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Zipper730]

Special operations like the Billancourt raid are not representative of the main force operations for which I gave extensive data above. In this context they are a red herring.

I guess the Billiancourt raid was an unusual operation for the RAF (low alt penetration), though I never thought of it as a special operation as generally those were carried out by specialist squadrons.

Churchill always liked Harris to flatten cities, but that is not all that Harris was doing in early 1945. In January Bomber Command dropped about 30% of its tonnage on oil targets and more than 20% on the German marshaling yards which were supporting the Ardennes offensive. About half the tonnage went on area raids.

That I didn't know, I was just under the impression that after 1944, the RAF just went back to busting cities, and when Dresden was gone, they just kept flattening everything left.

In early January Spaatz believed that the diversion of the US 8th AF's effort to tactical bombing in support of the 'Battle of the Bulge' had relieved the pressure on Germany's oil industry.

There probably is some truth for this, but fundamentally if you're going to commit to occupying somebody (and the Germans were good candidates), you might as well cover your troops.

I'm surprised heavy bombers would be useful for CAS operations: Sounds like a way to just kill everybody.

The 3rd February raid can not be considered part of Thunderclap as it was not part of a combined Anglo-American round the clock operation as originally conceived. Spaatz had conceded an agreement to attack Berlin, as shown earlier. It is also worth noting that Doolittle objected at length and vehemently to the operation, writing to Spaatz that
"we will, in what may be one of our last and best remembered operations, violate the basic American principle of precision bombing of targets of strictly military significance..."

At the very least it was a desire to avoid looking bad from a legacy standpoint, at best it was a desire to avoid hitting non-military targets.

As an interesting note, I was under the impression that the raids in 1942 were aimed at either no specific target or merely any target that was available?

He argued more convincingly that
"the chances of terrorizing into submission, by merely an increased concentration of bombing, a people who have been subjected to intense bombing for four years is extremely remote."

That's a valid point: The RAF pounded the daylights out of them relentlessly, particularly since late 1943.

Spaatz's reply was somewhat non-committal, prompting Doolitle to ask.
" Is Berlin still open to air attack? Do you want priority oil targets hit in preference to Berlin if they definitely become visual? Do you want center of city hit or definitely military targets such as Spandau, on the Western outskirts?"
Spaatz annotated his copy of the message sent in reply.
"Told Doolitle to hit oil if visual assured: other wise, Berlin - center of the city."
This makes American priorities quite clear, and Thunderclap, or an unrecognisable, watered down version of it, was not top of the list.
It also makes it clear that, over Doolittle's objections, this was indeed to be an attack on the city in what the Americans euphemistically called an 'area type raid'.

It ironically wasn't our first area-raid. Far as I know that was Munster.

 

[stona]

It might have been better to describe the raid on the Renault plant as experimental. Although Gee equipped aircraft were not used the 'Shaker' technique intended for use with Gee was used. It was all an effort to concentrate the bombing in space and time. At Billancourt Bomber Command managed to get 121 aircraft an hour over the target. The attack also benefited from optimal weather and weak defences, none of which were expected over the Ruhr against which Bomber Command had been directed to make its main effort. During March and April, following the Billancourt raid, the Command made eight attacks on Essen, all using the full 'Shaker 'protocol, with Gee, all with poor results. 212 bombing photos were analysed and of them only 22 could be plotted within five miles of the city centre. Billancourt was very much an exception, NOT the rule.

As a slight aside, after the Billancourt raid, the Vichy regime declared a day of national mourning in a pretty cynical attempt to make some political mileage from the event. It was a precursor to the sort of posters put up in Rouen in 1944, after British raids on that city, showing Joan of Arc kneeling on rubble with the caption "Murderers always return to the scene of their crimes."

Harris always liked attacking Germany's cities because he believed that this was the best way to win the war. However, he has been badly treated over his Command's alleged lack of effort against what he described as 'panacea targets'.
Between 1st June '44 and 8th May '45 Bomber Command devoted 15% of its total sorties (22,000 of 155,000) to oil targets and dropped 99,500 tons of bombs on them. Both these figures EXCEED the effort made by the 8th Air Force which devoted 13% of its sorties (28,000 of 220,000) and dropped 73,000 tons of bombs on oil targets between 12th May '44 and 8th May '45. As far as attacks on oil targets, Bomber Command made a substantially greater effort than the 8th Air Force, though reading most histories (Hastings!) you could never know this.

The use of aircraft at all, but particularly a strategic bomber force in a a tactical role (more interdiction than close air support in modern terms, though they certainly did attempt CAS as well, sometimes with disastrous results) was still a contentious subject during WW2, Immediately before the war the RAF, relatively recently independent, deemed any attempt to cajole it into any role in support of the Army as a potential first step on the road to a loss of that hard won independence.

The US Air Forces generally specified a specific, military, target in targeting plans. However, throughout their periods of operations the 8th AF devoted 13% of its bomb load to city attacks, compared with 51% for Bomber Command. The 15th AF dropped only 4% of its bombs on city areas.
This is reflected in the make up of their bomb loads. The proportion of incendiaries is a good indication of the intended target, city/area raids utilise a high proportion of this type of ordnance. The percentage of incendiary ordnance carried by the various forces was 21% for Bomber Command, 15% for the 8th and 2% for the 15th.

Cheers

Steve

 

[michaelmaltby]

Recently read "The German War: A Nation Under Arms 1939, 1945, Soldiers and Citizens" by Nicholas Stargardt. Very interesting perspective on civilian moral after 1942 (Stalingrad). Much material gleaned from Gestapo records of what was overheard by people in casual conversation. Highly recommended.

 

[stona]

By an amazing coincidence I have this book in a paperback version pre-ordered from Amazon.

It does get very good reviews and recommendations, I'm looking forward to receiving it after 1st September.

Not really covering much of the German and British experience of bombing, concentrating more on the lesser known Italian and French experiences is 'Bombing, States and Peoples in western Europe 1940-1945". I give it a conditional recommendation as it is really a collection of essays, edited by Baldoli, Knapp and Overy, and is not a particularly easy read. For those with a serious interest in the title subject there is plenty to enjoy.

Cheers

Steve

 

[michaelmaltby]

I look forward to your impressions of the book when you've read it, Steve.

 

[stona]

It has occurred to me that I nonchalantly referred to an attack using the 'Shaker' protocol, without explaining what that was, and not everyone will be aware of the various attack protocols developed by Bomber Command through the war.

'Shaker' was the first and it was intended for use with Gee equipped aircraft, though this was not the case at Billancourt.
It can be broken down into 3 phases.
1) 'Illuminator' aircraft drop flares over the target (these would normally be the Gee equipped aircraft).
2) 'Finders' drop incendiaries to confirm the target.
3)'Followers', the main force aircraft, bomb the incendiaries.

Other protocols developed as different navigation aids and types of pyrotechnic target indicators (TIs) were developed. What we know as target indicators, familiar from late war footage of bombing raids, were only developed after the introduction of Gee and with half an eye on a path finder force, and were not available for the earlier 'Shaker' attacks. The first TIs were not used until a raid on Berlin on 16th January 1943, nearly a year after the Billancourt raid.

The various attack protocols were given code names after the home towns of various Bomber Command officers. The names of the principle protocols, 'Newhaven', 'Paramatta', and 'Waganui', certainly indicate the cosmopolitan make up of Bomber Command. British and Canadians made up the majority of aircrew, but significant numbers of Australians and New Zealanders (certainly relative to their small populations) meant that the backbone was very much British and 'old' Commonwealth, though men from many other nations served. As a Briton all I can say is that we were very lucky to have them all.

Cheers

Steve

 

[wuzak]

Between 1st June '44 and 8th May '45 Bomber Command devoted 15% of its total sorties (22,000 of 155,000) to oil targets and dropped 99,500 tons of bombs on them. Both these figures EXCEED the effort made by the 8th Air Force which devoted 13% of its sorties (28,000 of 220,000) and dropped 73,000 tons of bombs on oil targets between 12th May '44 and 8th May '45. As far as attacks on oil targets, Bomber Command made a substantially greater effort than the 8th Air Force, though reading most histories (Hastings!) you could never know this.

Interesting stats Steve.

I have Masters of the Air by Donald L Miller which says that the 8thAF did more missions against oil targets than the RAF, but used smaller bombs and thus were less effective than the RAF.

The stats you provided show an average bomb load of 4.5 tons per sortie for the RAF vs 2.75 tons for the RAF.

 

[Zipper730]

It might have been better to describe the raid on the Renault plant as experimental. Although Gee equipped aircraft were not used the 'Shaker' technique intended for use with Gee was used. It was all an effort to concentrate the bombing in space and time.

I assume 'shaker' was a code-name?

Regardless, the profile would eventually evolve to use radio-navigation aids, a pathfinder force to drop flares over target, finders to deploy incendiaries, and then the main-force aircraft would begin to bomb.

Was this altered in anyway other than the use of Oboe as well as Gee, and H2S in pathfinders? I remember later on that the RAF would drop explosives first to bust open the building, then incendiaries to light up the insides of the buildings. Or did the main-force drop explosives and incendiaries as described?

At Billancourt Bomber Command managed to get 121 aircraft an hour over the target. The attack also benefited from optimal weather and weak defences, none of which were expected over the Ruhr against which Bomber Command had been directed to make its main effort.

Which would make it a suicidal mission due to the flak and night-fighters.

Harris always liked attacking Germany's cities because he believed that this was the best way to win the war.

This is know, but what was not often known was that he was not the only person behind this and Churchill instigated this.

However, he has been badly treated over his Command's alleged lack of effort against what he described as 'panacea targets'.

I think the issue was that he could have allocated more of his effort to destroying refineries as it would have ended the war faster.

Between 1st June '44 and 8th May '45 Bomber Command devoted 15% of its total sorties (22,000 of 155,000) to oil targets and dropped 99,500 tons of bombs on them. Both these figures EXCEED the effort made by the 8th Air Force which devoted 13% of its sorties (28,000 of 220,000) and dropped 73,000 tons of bombs on oil targets between 12th May '44 and 8th May '45.

The RAF had bombers that could carry heavier bomb-loads a given distance as well as fundamentally larger payloads.

The use of aircraft at all, but particularly a strategic bomber force in a a tactical role (more interdiction than close air support in modern terms, though they certainly did attempt CAS as well, sometimes with disastrous results) was still a contentious subject during WW2

Of course the bomber-guys hated being relegated to support the Army, and the accuracy wasn't always very good.

Immediately before the war the RAF, relatively recently independent, deemed any attempt to cajole it into any role in support of the Army as a potential first step on the road to a loss of that hard won independence.

The RAF from 1939-1941 was in danger of being dismembered.

The US Air Forces generally specified a specific, military, target in targeting plans. However, throughout their periods of operations the 8th AF devoted 13% of its bomb load to city attacks, compared with 51% for Bomber Command. The 15th AF dropped only 4% of its bombs on city areas.

Makes sense since the USAAF's doctrine was as a rule based more on denial (destroying the ability to fight).

This is reflected in the make up of their bomb loads. The proportion of incendiaries is a good indication of the intended target, city/area raids utilise a high proportion of this type of ordnance. The percentage of incendiary ordnance carried by the various forces was 21% for Bomber Command, 15% for the 8th and 2% for the 15th.

I thought the RAF was using 50-90% incendiaries?

Cheers

The various attack protocols were given code names after the home towns of various Bomber Command officers. The names of the principle protocols, 'Newhaven', 'Paramatta', and 'Waganui', certainly indicate the cosmopolitan make up of Bomber Command.

If I may ask what are the nature of these profiles?

 

[wuzak]

The RAF had bombers that could carry heavier bomb-loads a given distance as well as fundamentally larger payloads.

The point Stona was making was that the effort expended by the RAF on oil targets was proportionally greater than the USAAF's.

That is, 15% of Bomber Command sorties in the period were against oil targets vs only 13% for the USAAF's.

Makes sense since the USAAF's doctrine was as a rule based more on denial (destroying the ability to fight).

And, to a degree, denial that they actually aim at cities, or that their military objectives were in the centre of cities and had no hope of hitting the target without damaging large areas of the surrounding city.

 

[stona]

The percentage of incendiaries is by weight. Incendiary ordnance is much lighter than high explosive and the bomb containers relatively bulky, and also incidentally often in short supply.

One of the reasons for the relatively poor showing of the 8th Air Force against oil targets at this time was its diversion to supporting the Army, much bemoaned by Spaatz, Anderson and others.

The principle marking systems I gave above, there were of course variations and developments and in this the Bomber Groups enjoyed some autonomy. For example, It was 5 Group that developed the 'timed run' from indicators placed some distance from the target that would therefore not be obscured by the results of the bombing. This also allowed for 'sector bombing' when each aircraft of a squadron flew its timed run from the markers on a slightly different bearing (usually two degrees), and time for run, which meant that the sixteen aircraft of the squadron bombed a fan shaped sector of thirty two degrees, something that worked to perfection at Dresden.

Anyway the basic protocols were as follows.

NEWHAVEN
1) Flares dropped by Path Finder Force (PFF), blind, using H2S or Oboe (Musical Newhaven) to illuminate target area.
2) Second wave from PFF drop target indicators (TIs) visually using light from flares.
3) Main Force bombs on TIs.

PARAMATTA
1) PFF drops TIs blind using H2S or Oboe (Musical Paramatta). There is no visual identification of the target.
2) Main Force bombs on TIs.

WANGANUI
1) PFF drops parachute TIs using H2S, Oboe (Musical Wanganui) and Broadcast Winds (exactly what it sounds like). This is a blind sky marking technique for use when the target is obscured by cloud.
2) Main Force bombs using floating TIs as the aiming point.

All the systems developed with 'backers up' to remark or adjust the aiming point and the introduction of master bombers who could make any adjustments and instruct incoming crews which markers to bomb on, hence avoiding any markers that fell wide of the target.

Only one of the systems involves any visual identification of the target and this is a reflection of the weather in NW Europe, particularly over the winter months when longer hours of darkness allowed for longer operations, and the everlasting problem of trying to see in the dark.

Newhaven was generally the most accurate. Late in the war PFF Mosquitos would drop the initial TIs, visually, from only 800 ft. If the aiming point was correctly identified it could be marked very accurately. At Dresden the initial TIs went down within 100 metres of the aiming point (the Ostragehege Stadium).

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

Which would make it a suicidal mission due to the flak and night-fighters.

This, in relation to the 121 aircraft per hour at Billancourt and later RAF raids needs some clarification.

There were two principle objectives in concentrating the bomber stream. A concentration over the target was essential to achieve the concentration in space and time needed to create the most destructive of all effects, the fire storm, but the primary driving factor was an attempt to lower losses.
By May 1942 Bomber Command had a fairly complete picture of the rapidly improving German air defence system and it had become obvious that the previous haphazard routing of raids was no longer possible. Harris noted that

"It was also clear that concentration both in time and space was vital, not only over the target, but on the route as well."

One of the aims of the famous 1,000 bomber raids was to show that concentration could lower losses. The idea was simply to saturate and thereby overwhelm the defences. The raids did indeed show, in the words of the ORS report, that

"...there was something to be gained by concentration."

Harris again, writing of this time (1942).

"[A force of] 250-300 aircraft was wholly inadequate to saturate the then existing defences of a major industrial town of half a million or more inhabitants. But if we attacked with a larger force, supposing we could get one, should we be able to organise it in such a way as to get a really high concentration over the target? It was becoming obvious that the degree of concentration we had achieved thus far was not going to be good enough, but there was no previous experience to show whether it would be practical to put many hundreds of aircraft over a target at a rate of, say, ten a minute; in the past such a concentration would have been thought of as absurd as it was dangerous, for this was six times as high concentration as had been aimed at towards the end of 1941."

The most obvious danger of such concentrations was collision. But Bomber Command's own ORS worked out that at the lower concentrations the chance of collision was less than one half of one percent, whereas that of being shot down by fighter or flak was a three or four percent. The chance of collision could be raised significantly as long as it reduced the chance of losses to other causes, because it would still reduce the overall loss rate.
The ORS

"..envisaged ten aircraft crossing a given point every minute which meant ten aircraft scattered randomly in a box of sky three miles long by five or more miles wide and nearly two miles deep."

Put like that it doesn't seem so bad and in fact collisions were very rare.

Jump ahead to the often discussed raid on Dresden in February 1945 and we find that all 244 aircraft of the first wave bombed between 22.13 and 22.28. In just 15 minutes 881 tons of bombs fell on the central districts of the city, 57% high explosive, 43% incendiary, by weight. This represents about 16 aircraft per minute/976 per hour passing over the aiming point, figures well in excess of those even Harris hoped for three years earlier.
The Americans like to describe the initial air assaults on Baghdad with the phrase 'shock and awe' but they looked like a few party poppers compared to this.

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

was there a point in the BC offensive when their switch of some effort to so-called precision attacks like their attacks on oil later in the war, were undertaken in daylight? It seems to me that as the war drew closer to german surrender, the ability of the LW to inflict losses grew less and less. As a percentage of total force committed, the RAF had suffered frightful attrition rates in the first half of 1944. Later, as a percentage of total forces committed this percentage fell right away. Perhaps the RAFs belated switch to more "useful" targets was linked to their need to assess this success to loss rates they were expecting?

 

[stona]

The idea of operating by day as well as night had certainly been raised by Portal and the Air Ministry in early 1944 (maybe even earlier).
Harris was implacably opposed to it, a perspective held since the expensive daylight raids of 1942, and he argued against any daylight operations.
The Air Ministry felt that escorted daylight raids could be effective over the occupied countries and western Germany, and also that there needed to be some capacity for daylight operations, should some 'emergency' arise during the invasion. Night losses were also added to the reasons to shift to daylight operations.
Harris replied that daytime operations would be costly, believing nothing had changed since 1942, and would be no more accurate than night time operations already being undertaken. The only case for daytime tactical operations would be if the Americans, who were trained for these operations, could, for some reason not undertake them. He also believed that there were insufficient escorts and that the British bombers had insufficient fire power to fend off a well executed fighter attack, unlike the Americans who had the tactics and training to concentrate their firepower. British bombers did not fly in a tight formation by day, but a loose gaggle. Finally British bombers operated below 18,000ft where flak was most effective.
Harris' arguments were all valid until, on 6th June, the Luftwaffe failed to materialise. Bomber Command started a series of escorted daylight raids from mid month. The loss rate for these sorties in June and July was just 0.4%.
The bombing over the summer was analysed by Bomber Command's ORS and various tactics developed for daylight operations. Oboe ground marking could be directly transferred from night time operations. Additional techniques were added. The simplest was simply visual bombing, assuming the target was unobscured. Gee-Dead Reckoning was developed, involving either bombing over a Gee fix or making a timed run from a Gee fix. Finally, and most complicated, Oboe and G-H formation techniques were introduced. These were a version of the American 'toggling on the Group leader' system. The leading aircraft would use one of the systems to bomb and everyone else would bomb when he did. These attacks could be delivered regardless of the weather on the ground, but were limited by the range of the device used, and depended on the accuracy of the leader's bombing and the rest of the raid keeping him in sight (remember, no American style formations). The other techniques were dependent on reasonable weather.

Incidentally, even the gaggle did not escape analysis. Sir George Thomson, Scientific Advisor at the Air Ministry argued that by broadening the gaggle from a two to three mile front, thus reducing the tail, losses to flak could be halved. Bomber Command's ORS felt the logic was solid, but a major counter argument came from Fighter Command who felt strongly that fighter escort was more effective on a narrow front. The last word went to the Senior Air Staff Officer, on 8th December '44, and it is interesting for the light it sheds on Bomber Command's opinion of the USAAF tactics at this late stage of the war.

"I consider that our losses in daylight operations due to flak have so far been extremely light and certainly compare favourably with the Americans.
Groups are doing everything possible to reduce the length of the 'gaggle' in order to entirely eliminate the 'tail' which is what Sir George Thomson is after.
So long as a 'gaggle' is our accepted formation ( a 'gaggle' implying that each aircraft is flying and bombing as an independent unit as opposed to a set place in a fixed formation), I do not think that much more can be done to ensure that aircraft are placed in the best possible theoretical position in regard to freedom from flak. It is largely a question of method and training and I feel that many Americans would gladly give up their set formations for our 'gaggles', but their operational and pre-operational training makes this impossible in the same way that it would be difficult for us to change to their or any other set formations."

Cheers

Steve

 

[Zipper730]

The point Stona was making was that the effort expended by the RAF on oil targets was proportionally greater than the USAAF's.

That is, 15% of Bomber Command sorties in the period were against oil targets vs only 13% for the USAAF's.

So basically some either felt they could do more, or felt that Harris was half-assing it?

And, to a degree, denial that they actually aim at cities, or that their military objectives were in the centre of cities and had no hope of hitting the target without damaging large areas of the surrounding city.

Well, the destruction of the cities often resulted in massive industrial damage. However, the point I was making out since the first page was that basically the populations themselves were the target, industrial sights were not serious objectives.

Harris actually said this several times, and almost leaves me wondering if he wanted this to be made known? One thing that I can say that I respect about Harris was that he generally seemed the most willing to either tell the truth or at least remotely attempt to do so. General LeMay was fairly similar in many respects (LeMay in some ways was more admirable actually, not so much because he was straight forward and direct, but it was because he was willing to fly into battle with his men and take the risk with all of them).

The percentage of incendiaries is by weight. Incendiary ordnance is much lighter than high explosive and the bomb containers relatively bulky, and also incidentally often in short supply.

So they were low density and took up a lot of space in the bays?

One of the reasons for the relatively poor showing of the 8th Air Force against oil targets at this time was its diversion to supporting the Army, much bemoaned by Spaatz, Anderson and others.

I'm surprised they didn't just use the A-20's, A-26's, B-25's and B-26's to do that and leave the B-17's and B-24's to hit the oil-refineries.

In fact, since the RAF was attacking oil as early as 1940, I'm surprised that the first deep-penetration raids into Germany weren't directed at these targets. While ball-bearings seemed an interesting target, they don't seem to be particularly difficult to manufacture and the Germans seemed to always be building factories even in the wreckage of the rubble the RAF always seemed to create.

Oil on the other hand is either refined from places naturally or made artificially, which seems to require specialized facilities. I'm not sure how much resistance they expected over either target and how much damage you needed to put either out of action.

The principle marking systems I gave above, there were of course variations and developments and in this the Bomber Groups enjoyed some autonomy.

While this is a little beyond the scope of the discussion, there is something that has been in my mind recently based on a few books I read: When the RAF acquired nuclear weapons, how centralized were they in comparison to SAC?

For example, It was 5 Group that developed the 'timed run' from indicators placed some distance from the target that would therefore not be obscured by the results of the bombing.

So they dropped the markers slightly long or short, and set it up so they'd drop a certain amount of time after overflying the flare?

This also allowed for 'sector bombing' when each aircraft of a squadron flew its timed run from the markers on a slightly different bearing (usually two degrees), and time for run, which meant that the sixteen aircraft of the squadron bombed a fan shaped sector of thirty two degrees, something that worked to perfection at Dresden.

And with multiple squadrons, some dropped at the same time, and other at different intervals to stretch out the fan?

Anyway the basic protocols were as follows.

NEWHAVEN
1) Flares dropped by Path Finder Force (PFF), blind, using H2S or Oboe (Musical Newhaven) to illuminate target area.
2) Second wave from PFF drop target indicators (TIs) visually using light from flares.
3) Main Force bombs on TIs.

PARAMATTA
1) PFF drops TIs blind using H2S or Oboe (Musical Paramatta). There is no visual identification of the target.
2) Main Force bombs on TIs.

WANGANUI
1) PFF drops parachute TIs using H2S, Oboe (Musical Wanganui) and Broadcast Winds (exactly what it sounds like). This is a blind sky marking technique for use when the target is obscured by cloud.
2) Main Force bombs using floating TIs as the aiming point.

All the systems developed with 'backers up' to remark or adjust the aiming point and the introduction of master bombers who could make any adjustments and instruct incoming crews which markers to bomb on, hence avoiding any markers that fell wide of the target.

So musical always involved the use of Oboe, blind involved H2S?

Only one of the systems involves any visual identification of the target and this is a reflection of the weather in NW Europe, particularly over the winter months when longer hours of darkness allowed for longer operations, and the everlasting problem of trying to see in the dark.

Just out of curiosity, when was the first night-vision systems fielded? Basically I'm talking about a system that works by either amplifying existing light a couple dozen/hundred times, or using infrared imaging.

At Dresden the initial TIs went down within 100 metres of the aiming point (the Ostragehege Stadium).

So that was the start of the fan?