buffnut453
Captain
The concept, as whole, only works as long as your expected enemy FAILS to develop power turrets of their own and/or fails to develop larger than rifle caliber machine guns. Had the Germans, for instance, developed a power turret in this time period then you would have had your hypothetical squadron/formation of Defiants flying a parallel course and similar speed to a squadron/formation of He 111s with power turrets of their own. Kill to loss ratio would not have been good.
True, but depending on your enemies not to do what you yourself are doing at some point several year in the future is poor planning. The French were fitting power turrets/mountings on some bombers in 1939/40.
Power turrets were not secret technology. Yes the Germans screwed up by trying to jump to remote control barbecues instead of using manned turrets but planning your air defense strategy/tactics in 1937/38 on the assumption that the Germans WILL NOT develop and fit power turrets in 1940/41 seems to be wishful thinking.
In fairness, NONE of the Axis powers developed a really effective power turret set-up for ANY of their bomber aircraft. Even the USAAF struggled with bomber defences. When the B-17E/F started operations in August 1942 it had virtually no forward defences. It wasn't until the B-17G came along over a year later that the type finally received a decent power-operated front turret.
The point I'm trying to make is that new military technology is inevitably evolutionary in nature, with new capabilities being neutralized by an adversary's change in technology or tactics. While your points are valid about the Defiant, there's a degree of retrospectroscopy about them. After all, if it was so blindingly obvious, why didn't ANY Axis nation develop power-operated turrets and why did the B-17 start its combat career in the middle of 1942 without adequate forward-facing defensive weapons?
Sometimes, a particularly foresighted individual (Dr R.V. Jones is one example) has the ability to think through the logical results of technology to "see the end from the beginning". All too often, however, the lessons are only learned in the harsh petri dish of combat...with concomitant loss of brave personnel until a fix is found and implemented.