Brewster Buffalo - what is the verdict? (1 Viewer)

[Elvis]

What I thought made the F4F better was that the Navy gave Grumman not only a second chance, but relaxed the requirements too.

Were the requirements that stringent?
The way I understand it, the Navy was just looking at getting away from biplane technology, because the F3F was becoming obsolete.

 

[SaparotRob]

I read somewhere (not any of Prof. Propwash's work) that after the acceptance trials the Navy decided the requirements were too stringent. This allowed the Wildcat some advantages in the fuselage over the Buffalo. Grumman had already realized the XF4F1 was a poor effort.
This is why I usually don't answer threads seriously. I can't really back up my "facts". I was really hoping S Shortround6 , or buffnut453 would have joined in.

 

[buffnut453]

The competition which Brewster won is somewhat confused and confusing. Grumman originally fielded yet another derivative of its biplane fighter series, designated the XF4F-1, which was clearly inferior to the Brewster product. Grumman did a "quick" redesign, basically turning the prototype biplane into a monoplane with the designation XF4F-2. The XF4F-2 still proved inferior to Brewster's offering and so Grumman redesigned it again, designating it the XF4F-3, and this time they won a contract.

I suspect the Navy going with Grumman was largely down to the company's well-established history of delivering aircraft to the Service. Despite offering a better product during the procurement, Brewster was a risky proposition due to its lack of experience delivering and sustaining military aircraft.

 

[Elvis]

I read somewhere (not any of Prof. Propwash's work) that after the acceptance trials the Navy decided the requirements were too stringent. This allowed the Wildcat some advantages in the fuselage over the Buffalo. Grumman had already realized the XF4F1 was a poor effort.
This is why I usually don't answer threads seriously. I can't really back up my "facts". I was really hoping S Shortround6 , or buffnut453 would have joined in.

Don't worry Rob, I'm not gonna fight you on this. I'm sure you've researched your facts and you're not posting something, "just for exercise", as they used to say.

 

[Elvis]

The competition which Brewster won is somewhat confused and confusing. Grumman originally fielded yet another derivative of its biplane fighter series, designated the XF4F-1, which was clearly inferior to the Brewster product. Grumman did a "quick" redesign, basically turning the prototype biplane into a monoplane with the designation XF4F-2. The XF4F-2 still proved inferior to Brewster's offering and so Grumman redesigned it again, designating it the XF4F-3, and this time they won a contract.

I suspect the Navy going with Grumman was largely down to the company's well-established history of delivering aircraft to the Service. Despite offering a better product during the procurement, Brewster was a risky proposition due to its lack of experience delivering and sustaining military aircraft.

Thank you. That clears a lot up.
It's my understanding that the Brewster factory wasn't really setup for high volume production, either (completed planes had to be lowered down from the second story?).
Do you know if they had already remedied that issue by the time of the Navy contract?

 

[buffnut453]

Thank you. That clears a lot up.
It's my understanding that the Brewster factory wasn't really setup for high volume production, either (completed planes had to be lowered down from the second story?).
Do you know if they had already remedied that issue by the time of the Navy contract?

In short...no. That said, it must be remembered that high volume production wasn't really a thing when the Buffalo was first constructed. The Grumman F3F biplane fighter only managed a production run of 147, while its predecessor, the F2F numbered only 55. The US was a long way from being the arsenal of democracy when production of the F2A-1 began in 1938.

 

[Elvis]

In short...no. That said, it must be remembered that high volume production wasn't really a thing when the Buffalo was first constructed. The Grumman F3F biplane fighter only managed a production run of 147, while its predecessor, the F2F numbered only 55. The US was a long way from being the arsenal of democracy when production of the F2A-1 began in 1938.

True. Thanks for indulging me.

 

[MIflyer]

The F4F was the first operational fighter anywhere with two stage supercharging, using essentially the same engine that was first used on the XP-37 but rejected in favor of a turbosupercharger-equipped R-1830, , producing the P-43. I did some research at the Smithsonian and came away convinced that the Rex intercept combined with the Y1B-17 having the same top speed as the F2A but TEN THOUSAND FEET HIGHER caused the USN to suddenly desire a high altitude fighter. The USAAC did not have to actually hit USN ships with bombs but just simulate doing so in a wargame in order to get Navy battleships cancelled in favor of Army bombers - just like the Washington Times headlines screamed when Gen Mitchell sank those German ships. Note that, unlike the F4F and F6F, neither the F7F or F8F had two stage superchargers; by that time the USN had found that the only high altitude bombers it would encounter would have big white stars painted on them. Ironically, the USN in that same time frame developed the Bat radar guided glide missile, which needed a high altitude bomber to launch it, since the only way to make sure it would reach the target was to launch from high altitude - but the USN had none!

Story about Grumman Iron Works. When the prototype F4F was being tested they got a report from the USN that the airplane had engaged the wire and pulled the hook and various entrails right out of the airplane. Roy Grumman looked at the drawings of the parts and asked his design what overload factor he had used. The designer replied "1.5". Roy Grumman told him to resign to a factor of 2.0. When the designer was finished with the redesign he showed the drawings to Mr Grumman, who asked, "Are you sure that will stand the loads?" The designer said, "Yes." Roy Grumman replied, "Fine! Then double all the material thicknesses you have there and we will build it that way."
By the way, I tried telling General Dynamics to do that and they laughed their asses off.

 

[Barrett]

I knew several Buffalo pilots including USN, USMC, and RAAF. All of them liked it AS A FLYING MACHINE. No less an authority than Marion Carl said he would've done as well at Midway in an F2A v. his F4F. New Zealand's leading ace against Japan, Geoff Fisken, said he liked the Brewster for its .50 caliber armament and dive performance. (His previous ride was a Vickers Vildebeest, IIRC.

As noted in this thread, the F2A suffered from poor carrier suitability (weak landing gear), and VF-3 kept some aircraft off the flight schedule in order to have a few for an emergency.
With limited production, some parts and even aircraft were hand-fitted, as I recall from one or two USN guys.

Also as noted, the company was rotten with corruption (two managers went to prison) and incompetence. I do not think that any F3A Corsairs went to combat--retained for operational training.

 

[jimmaas]

I knew several Buffalo pilots including USN, USMC, and RAAF. All of them liked it AS A FLYING MACHINE. No less an authority than Marion Carl said he would've done as well at Midway in an F2A v. his F4F. New Zealand's leading ace against Japan, Geoff Fisken, said he liked the Brewster for its .50 caliber armament and dive performance. (His previous ride was a Vickers Vildebeest, IIRC.

As noted in this thread, the F2A suffered from poor carrier suitability (weak landing gear), and VF-3 kept some aircraft off the flight schedule in order to have a few for an emergency.
With limited production, some parts and even aircraft were hand-fitted, as I recall from one or two USN guys.

Also as noted, the company was rotten with corruption (two managers went to prison) and incompetence. I do not think that any F3A Corsairs went to combat--retained for operational training.

The 'two managers' were not Brewster Aeronautical officials, but salesmen who operated a Brewster-adjacent sales firm. Their stint in Lewisburg Federal Penitentiary was unrelated to Brewster but rather for breaking neutrality laws selling Curtiss Condors in South America. And the Fleet Air Arm did use the Brewster Corsair operationally in the Far East.

 

[EwenS]

Andm the Fleet Air Arm did use the Brewster Corsair operationally in the Far East.

You will find that some of the FAA front line squadrons used the Brewster built Corsair III while working up, but they swapped them out for Vought built Corsair II or Goodyear built Corsair IV before joining their parent carriers and entering combat. Corsair III also turn up in second line squadrons, including in Ceylon, for use in things like refresher training, where they occasionally turned up on carriers during deck landing training.

You can find the histories of the FAA Corsair squadrons here.

Front Line Squadrons Menu

1830-1838 ( excluding 1832), 1841-1843, 1845, 1846, 1848-1853.

 

[MIflyer]

In the book "Corsair KD431 The Time Capsule Fighter" they describe the 'restoration" of a British Goodyear-built Corsair which fortunately remained almost original because it was given to a mechanic's training school. They figured out that the wings possibly were built by Brewster.

"All of them liked it AS A FLYING MACHINE."

Which is why I'd rather have an F2A than any other WWII aircraft. And nobody else would have one.

 

[EwenS]

In the book "Corsair KD431 The Time Capsule Fighter" they describe the 'restoration" of a British Goodyear-built Corsair which fortunately remained almost original because it was given to a mechanic's training school. They figured out that the wings possibly were built by Brewster.

"All of them liked it AS A FLYING MACHINE."

Which is why I'd rather have an F2A than any other WWII aircraft. And nobody else would have one.

This is what Dana Bell said almost year ago.

FAA Pilots impression of the Corsair

I'm in the middle of the book, the Forgotten Fleet, The Story of the British Pacific Fleet by John Winton. He has a chapter on the Hellcat and Corsair, filled with first hand accounts. A squadron leader was in the US to take delivery of a squadron of Corsairs, here's his impression: Half...

ww2aircraft.net

 

[Snautzer01]

Dana Bell

I miss him. Dont know what happened but why isnt he with his people?
The ones that buy the books.

Yes i looked back. But still. This is an audience. A big dedicated one.

Please get your ass back.
An internet fitty is not a reason to cut sales in something you put mind and money to.

Get plse back D Dana Bell

 

[bf109xxl]

Well, if we apply a consistent factor of overclaiming across all claims (e.g. 2.5), we can still get a relative indicator of a fighter's operational performance. It's probably no less accurate than trying to solve the unsolvable with bad/missing data.

It is possible to make some realistic estimates on overclaiming. Finnish overclaiming was different in periods of 1939/40 (smaller) and of 1941/44 (significantly larger). If you consider the AA claims you come on the the value of 2-2.5 for total overclaiming. And I have to repeat: there are historians who try to find out the truth by scrupulously analyzing EVERY loss/victory in the air war. And their work deserves the highest respect.

I'm not sure there's a "mass audience" for Brewster kills while in Finnish service. There isn't much of a "mass audience" for the Buffalo at all. Indeed, in this day and age, aviation history is a pretty niche area of interest.

Yes, it is. It's a matter of national pride in Finland.

As to your last point, you've previously stated that history is about "truth" and now you're claiming that authors use claim ratios for propaganda purposes. Neither are correct, IMHO.

Don't attribute to me what I have not stated. I stated that using claims instead of confirmed victories or enemy data is a way of propaganda.

Historians seek to explain WHY something happened rather than trot out a boring set of statistics or figures.

Without quantitative estimates, the reasoning of historians is of zero value. I don't need ready-made answers, I need reliable data and/or archival documents put into circulation. And obtaining such data is the primary task of historians. Statistics (and figures) is not boring, it is charming.

That's why we have the concept of historiography so historians can review how positions/attitudes on a topic have changed over time.

I do not need concepts. I need reliable data.

I still say that trying to chase down data on every single kill/loss is an unachievable goal

In many cases it is an achievable. And can be used further for reasonable estimations/extrapolations.

and actually doesn't inform much more than data that's more readily to hand.

Sometimes it avoids the misconceptions that the available data provide.

I admire the devotion of people who seek to do that but, at the end of the day, it's the operational outcome that matters.

I have ordered books by Geust on the subject, after reading and analyzing them I will be able to comment on the topic of operational outcome.