Brewster Buffalo

Juha3 · Aug 29, 2020

PFVA63 said:
Hi,
Hopefully not getting too far off track but as noted by others it appears that the Finnish Airforce continued to use their B239s straight through to the end of the Continuation War with the Soviet Union (25 June 1941 – 19 September 1944 (3 years, 2 months, 3 weeks and 4 days)) [See Wikipedia].

As for the Bf109s, it is my understanding that they were not purchased until early 1943, with the first batch of 14 being delivered on March 14th of that year, and another 16 delivered on May 10th with that types first successful combat in the Finnish Airforce occurring on March 24th [see Link].

The link above notes some combined operations with both Finnish B239s and Bf109s such as an event on 21 May that appears to have included 11 Finnish Bf109s, 12 German flown Bf109s and 16 B239s. As such it does not appear that the Bf109 "replaced" the B239 in Finnish service but rather started to become their top fighter with others, including the B239, continuing to support them.

Specifically the link above also notes that during the Soviet's Summer offensive of 1944:

"During the Soviet offensive, which lasted 38 days, The Finnish Bf-109s and B-239s claimed 425 Soviet aircraft destroyed and another 78 damaged, while the Fw-190s of II/JG 54 led by Major Erich Rudorffer scored a further 126 victories."

Regards
Pat

Some small corrections, the Continuation War ended on 4 Sept 44
the first batch of 109Gs were 16 factory-new 109G-2s, the second 14 were second-hand but completely overhauled 109G-2s, some had been so badly damaged that they were in practice rebuilt planes. Later we got replacement G-2s for the lost ones via Luftpark Pori and still later more from Germany which were mostly sub-type G-6s for replacement of losses and re-equiptment for new units. Altogether we got 159 109Gs.

Finns used survived B239s also against Germans during the early part of the Lapland War in late 1944

Dana Bell · Aug 30, 2020

The mixed USMC Buffalo/Wildcat force at Midway had the advantages of radar. When the approaching Japanese force was detected on radar, the marines had time to get to 14,000 feet, well above it. The Japanese didn't expect to be detected and stationed their A6Ms below the strike force - they expected this would allow them to intercept the Americans as Midway's defensive fighters tried to climb. Marine survivors thought their first "free pass" at the Japanese bombers "...was quite good." As they attempted a second pass at the bombers the Zeros were among them - the rest of the story is pretty well documented.

(From BuAer interview of LtCol Ira L. Kimes, USMC -- 31 Aug 1942. Original in US National Archives)

Cheers,

Dana

buffnut453 · Aug 30, 2020

Mad Dog said:
In no way at all did the Buffalo have any performance advantage over any Japanese opponent at the altitudes the Allies fought with Buffalos, not even the Nakajima Ki-27, and definitely not compared to their most common opponents, the Ki-43 and the Zero.

Contemporary reporting would suggest otherwise. The combat reports for 67 Sqn's engagements over Rangoon on 23 and 25 Dec 1941 have survived. On the former date, the Sqn was only faced with Ki-27s while on Christmas Day they faced a mix of Ki-43s and Ki-27s. The combat reports indicate the British and New Zealand pilots all perceived that the Buffalo had a speed performance advantage compared to both the Ki-27 and the Ki-43.

Mad Dog said:
The only good tactic the RAF Buffalo pilots had was to try and get a height advantage of 3000-odd feet and make a diving attack out of the sun, but because the Buffalo climbed so badly and the RAF had no early warning, the situation of diving on the Japanese rarely presented itself.

The lack of early warning was the primary problem. Even if the RAF had operated Spitfires in Singapore, they would still have struggled to intercept the Japanese formations. The arrival of Hurricanes in Singapore was hoped to provide a critical performance improvement compared to the Buffalo but it just didn't happen because the Hurricanes, even though faster and better-climbing than the Buffalo, still couldn't reach the Japanese bombers in time.

buffnut453 · Aug 30, 2020

Dana Bell said:
The mixed USMC Buffalo/Wildcat force at Midway had the advantages of radar. When the approaching Japanese force was detected on radar, the marines had time to get to 14,000 feet, well above it. The Japanese didn't expect to be detected and stationed their A6Ms below the strike force - they expected this would allow them to intercept the Americans as Midway's defensive fighters tried to climb. Marine survivors thought their first "free pass" at the Japanese bombers "...was quite good." As they attempted a second pass at the bombers the Zeros were among them - the rest of the story is pretty well documented.

(From BuAer interview of LtCol Ira L. Kimes, USMC -- 31 Aug 1942. Original in US National Archives)

Cheers,

Dana

Hi Dana,

It didn't help that VMF-221 was still using Divisional tactics that had been superseded by the battle pair in much of the USN. Also, despite the early warning advantage that radar afforded, the VMF-221 was committed in a rather piecemeal fashion (in part due to the Divisional formations), allowing the escorting Zeros to defeat the defending fighters in detail.

Cheers,
Mark

buffnut453 · Aug 30, 2020

Greg Boeser said:
You bring up a good point of the disadvantages faced by the Allied pilots flying Brewsters in the early Pacific War. The RAF machines were not well maintained, suffering all sorts of mechanical issues, from engine failure to gun failures. This I lay at the feet of the leadership. SEA was for the British a colonial backwater and suffered from all manner of shortages. This was made worse by the sad fact that it became the dumping ground for officers that were not up to snuff for the "real" war in Europe. When the Japanese attacked they simply could not shake off their peacetime mentality and respond effectively. Here I am talking about the high command as the squadrons were more than willing to fight, often being held back by staff officers who lacked initiative. This resulted in opportunities missed and aircraft lost on the ground due to failure to react in a timely fashion. Much of air fighting was at low to medium altitude. The lack of early warning certainly was a significant disadvantage for the RAF. But again, this is not the fault of the machine, but of the circumstances of its employment.

Agree entirely, although it should be borne in mind that very few RAF personnel in the Far East had any operational experience, to include the groundcrews. Of the 5 Buffalo squadrons, 67 and 243 were formed in Singapore with just a small cadre of combat-experienced pilots (typically no more than 2-3 per squadron). No.21 Sqn had been in Singapore for some time flying Wirraways but, again, no operational experience. Nos. 453 and 488 Sqns were Article XV units formed in Australia and New Zealand respectively, with mostly brand new pilots and locally-grown groundcrew. The challenges of operating under combat conditions should not be underestimated, particularly given the rudimentary nature of some of the forward airfields in northern Malaya. I would agree entirely, though, that AHQFE demonstrated a marked a lack of imagination and failed to mandate an adequate, operationally-relevant training syllabus in the period Apr-Nov 1941.

Greg Boeser said:
The most common fighter type encountered by RAF Buffalos was the Ki-27. Only two sentai of Japanese Army AF were equipped with Ki-43. Yes, the Zero was a formidable foe, better top speed, better acceleration, more maneuverable, and flown by the best pilots in the Pacific in 1941-1942. The RAF and Commonwealth pilots as well as the US Marine pilots simply lacked the training and experience in comparison.

The Ki-43 was the principal fighter used during the Japanese offensive down Malaya. It was employed in "aerial extermination action" which we'd refer to in modern parlance as offensive counter-air (source: Yokoyama, Hisayuki (2004), 'Air Operational Leadership on the Southern Front' in Bond, Brian and Tachikawa, Kyoichi eds., British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War 1941-1945 (London and New York: Frank Cass)). The IJAAF tried to use the Ki-27s as escorts in Burma on 23 Dec 41 and the results were so bad that the 50th Sentai was immediately re-tasked to support the Burma front. For the most part, Ki-27s were primarily used to defend Japanese-occupied airfields. The Ki-43's role was to secure air superiority and it did the job very well, although the British didn't comprehend how badly the IJAAF was suffering from lack of spares and replacement airframes.

"Only two sentai" of Ki-43s was still a force of 59 fighters. During the fighting for Malaya, the only Buffalo units were 21 Sqn and 453 Sqn which seldom could field a total of 12 operational aircraft (21 Sqn had abandoned 7 damaged airframes at Sungei Patani and 453 Sqn's hoped-for reinforcement resulted in the loss of 3 aircraft because the pilots lost their way and crash-landed, wrecking the aircraft. Three further Buffalos were lost trying to take off in the middle of a Japanese air attack on 13 Dec, again due to lack of early warning). Thus, even if we only count the 64th Sentai as operational over Malaya, we still have some 30 Ki-43s going up against less than 12 Buffalos during the majority of the campaign.

At the point of engagement, the Buffalo was almost always seriously outnumbered and, due to lack of warning, at a tactical disadvantage. I also agree entirely that the Japanese fighter pilots, both IJAAF and IJN, were among the best fighter pilots, with training heavily influenced by operational lessons learned over China. The A6M was arguably the best fighter in the world in late-1941 and the Ki-43 wasn't too far behind it, not least because both were designed to operate with drop tanks, something that the Allies took years to implement on their fighters. Outnumbered and flown by inexperienced pilots against some of the best pilots and opposition fighters in the world, it's no wonder that the Buffalo performed poorly.

PFVA63 · Aug 30, 2020

Greg Boeser said:
PFVA63,
The Bf-109 didn't replace so much as supercede the B-239 as the premier Finnish fighter type.

Hi,
Yes, that's more or less the point I was trying to make in the 3rd paragraph of my previous post where I noted that in March 1944;

PFVA63 said:
"it does not appear that the Bf109 "replaced" the B239 in Finnish service but rather started to become their top fighter with others, including the B239, continuing to support them."
...

Specifically if you look at information regarding the Bf109 and B239 in Finnish service (including the link that I provided) you begin to see that although the Finns eventually operated 160 some odd Bf109s overall during the war, they definitely weren't available in large numbers initially and at times due to attrition and maintenance issues at times as few as 13 may have been operational in late 1944.

Additionally, you can see that although the Bf-109s were assigned to squadrons that were considered to be the top Finnish squadrons at the time you can see that the B239s were not withdrawn from service but rather transferred to other squadrons where they continued to operate through the Continuation War and into the Lappland War (as Juha has noted).

As such I'm not sure that comments like "The Finnish Buffalos flew against very poorly trained and poorly led Soviet pilots in flying coffins at low levels where the Buffalo performed best. As soon as the Soviets got decent fighters and some training, the Finns had to switch to Bf109Gs to avoid being massacred" are fully accurate.

The arrival of higher performance fighters like the Bf-109 was definitely needed and played a big part in helping Finland continue the ongoing war, but that does not mean that the B239s were then cast aside as being useless in the continuing defense of the country, much like probably in most any country where an air force begins to transition to newer airframes from older ones.

Pat