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Only if you can drag them to the Napier factory at gun pointI wonder if the sleeve valve chaps at Bristol can make an earlier go of helping Napier address the issues with the Sabre.
To be fair the US was just as bad. The USN and the Army were fighting each other for responsibilies and resources as well. In addition the Army Air Corp was doing everthing possible to gain their independence. Foreign enemies come and go but inter service rivalries are forever.Much like the RAF gave unsuitable aircraft to Coastal Command, the RAF did not see the protection of those outlying areas as their job.
Many (not all) RAF officers saw their mission as the establishing of the RAF as the nation's premier military service, displacing the Navy (army was to be dropped to No. 3 position).
In the mean time the RAF was suck up as money as it could from the treasury.
The lack of co-operation was astounding considering what was going in 1918. But at that time the flying services were subordinate to the Navy and the Army. The Flying services were supporting the Navy and the Army and not trying to win the war on their own.
The RAF wanted to do it's own thing and be seen as a war winning force, and they felt they could not do that being a "support" force. They had two jobs, defend Britain from the air (enemy bombers) and destroy the enemies ability to make war (destroy his factories) and anything else was a distraction. Sometimes a necessary one as they fought for more aircraft instead of ships for the navy or troops/equipment for the army. The whole "bomb the tribesmen" thing was a way to show that the RAF could do the pacifying job cheaper than ground troops.
Not to support the ground troops in actual combat.
I wonder how they'd hold up under the climate conditions. No doubt they could work from some islands without too much issue, but rain forest is hard on aircraft, even metal, much less wood.
The biggest user of Packard Merlins was the Lancaster Mk III. The only aircraft that comes close is the P51. In fact almost 1/2 of all Lancasters built were Packard powered. Early Lancaster production used RR built engines but during 1943 Packard Merlins became more predominant. In mid 1943 Packard also had its hands full switching over some of its production to 2 stage engines for P 51s . Good luck getting engines from either of those programs.I don't know, but Packard had enough to power all but the earliest units of Canada's CC&F Hurricanes and all of its production of DHC Mosquitos and Victory Lancasters.
If there is no Beaufighter, Australia still has the need. The Mosquito would do nicely.
Yeah, I think we've established that above. Merlins are definitely out. So, assuming Bristol focuses on engines or other projects, the RAAF needs a Beaufighter replacement.The biggest user of Packard Merlins was the Lancaster Mk III. Good luck getting engines from either of those programs.
This reminded me of the Lancaster that ran on three Packards and one RR Merlin.In fact more than 1/2 of all Lancasters built were Packard powered.
Well this is what the RAAF would have got if components from Britain for Beauforts and Beaufighters had dried up in the early war period.Yeah, I think we've established that above. Merlins are definitely out. So, assuming Bristol focuses on engines or other projects, the RAAF needs a Beaufighter replacement.
How about a Beaufighter with P&W R-2800s? I hate not having sleeve values.On an intellectual level, you're right, but man, no Beaufighter just hurts my heart. And they'd be sorely missed at Bismarck Sea where they did such a great job.
How about a Beaufighter with P&W R-2800s? I hate not having sleeve values.
Where does this come from? The Blenheim I was to be modified to the Bolingbroke as an interim General Reconnaissance strike aircraft, but the Bolingbroke was cancelled in December 1937 with the decision to go with the Beaufort as the intended RAF maritime strike aircraft, it could carry a torpedo, a mine or bombs. The other mine laying aircraft was the Hampden. The original Beaufort contract in 1936, off the drawing board, was for 78 aircraft, but two more requisitions in 1938 raised the total to 440, including the RAAF order of 50 (ex Bolingbroke) raised to 90 in August 1938. Then in March 1939 came the decision for 180 to be built in Australia, first 90 RAF, second 90 RAAF (So a total of 440 on order for RAF, 180 on order for RAAF). The next RAF Beaufort orders were in 1940.The Beaufort nearly didn't make into production. The RAF didn't want to buy a dedicated torpedo dropper. That would take away from the RAF's "true role" of bombing the enemy into submission by itself without the need for navy and army. It was only with a few modifications to the bomb bay of the Beaufort that made it suitable for carrying bombs "if needed" that the Beaufort made it into production.
Add one in June 1944, that is 2,1,2,*2* (or else add 1 in September) as either A52-12 or A52-24 was not counted.Australian monthly production numbers from March 1944 were: 2,1,2,1,0,1,2,6,5,7,9,10,11,6,12 total 75 by end of May 1945 rising to 108 on 15 Aug and an eventual 212.
Well, the Bolingbroke morphed into the Blenheim IV.Where does this come from? The Blenheim I was to be modified to the Bolingbroke as an interim General Reconnaissance strike aircraft, but the Bolingbroke was cancelled in December 1937 with the decision to go with the Beaufort as the intended RAF maritime strike aircraft, it could carry a torpedo, a mine or bombs.
So where were the plans to cancel the 1936 order, plus the additional aircraft ordered in 1938 and 1939? And the Beaufort had a bomb bay that could not take a torpedo, which was carried semi externally.The Beaufort nearly didn't make into production. The RAF didn't want to buy a dedicated torpedo dropper. That would take away from the RAF's "true role" of bombing the enemy into submission by itself without the need for navy and army. It was only with a few modifications to the bomb bay of the Beaufort that made it suitable for carrying bombs "if needed" that the Beaufort made it into production.
The Beaufort GR design included reconnaissance, flying higher helps spot things, while the then torpedoes limited low level speed requirements to 150 knots."The actually need for a torpedo bomber or general reconnaissance (maritime) aircraft to optimum cruise at 15,000ft is certainly subject to question?
Unless it was to keep the planes out of expected AA range when "filling in" as bombers over land?"