British escort fighter--what might it have been like?

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Ruhr is full of valid targets, where Luftwaffe needs to get up and defend if RAF attacks in force.
A slipper tank under the belly adds a lot of drag. I'd suggest 30+99 imp gals of internal fuel to be augmented with a 100-110 gal drop tank.
Fitt the 33+33G rear tanks plus 90G dropper, warm up taxi and take off and climb to 20,000ft on rear upper 33G, COG is restored then fly as far as the Ruhr on the 90G dropper. You can have the fighter cover fly out with say 5 minute intervals relaying out and back looking for trouble, shorter ranged MkV's can do close escort over the channel protecting both the outgoing bombers and fighters and the same on their return, the the P47's arrive they can join the MkV's flying the shorter leg plus circling Luftwaffe fighter bases bouncing 109's/190's as they take off and land.
 
Not British and early war, but a single seater that had long range for that type of fighter in 1940 and was being looked at as a long range fighter:

 
The P51 is doing nothing until the 60 series arrives, putting more fuel into the Spit gets you an escort fighter equal to anything in the air and able to fly to the Ruhr and back in the second half of 1942, much earlier than what actually happened.
How so, werent single stage Packard Merlins fitted into P-40s?
 
Arsenal VG 33) Fighter Aircraft has some rather over optimistic numbers going for it.

Here is one.

" Its range was 746 miles (1,200 km) with 106 gallons (400 L) of internal fuel. Two fixed 26-gallon (100 L) external tanks could be attached under the wings to extend the aircraft's range to 1,118 miles (1,800 km)."

See if you can figure out what is wrong there. Just in those two sentences.

Now compare it to other aircraft, also note that the D.520 using a slightly different version of the same engine used 636 liters of fuel to fly 1200 km.
 
Now is that with or without the aux fuel.
Weights for this thing are all over the place,

Now since they only flew two of the production versions there maybe some wishful thinking going on or confusion as to what a plane in service condition could actually do.

The Germans don't seem to have taken much notice of it. Like trying to send off a small batch to Finland or Italy or Bulgaria.
 
I know that there'll be some variables here, namely time period and such, but what if the British had their own long range escort fighter? Naturally, it can't really be a Spitfire or a Hurricane since they're too short legged early war (and Spitfire for most of the war). But, from say 39-42, 42-45, what would a single seat, long range high performance escort fighter be like? The biggest thing as far as spec is enough fuel internally to have a 700-800 mile range, and the ability to use drop tanks. It also has to be heavily armed for the period (which from 42-45 basically means 4x20mm cannons), and be a great dogfighter per tactics of the period. This will address one of the few shortcomings of the P-51, given that it was a bit heavy due to being built to outdated USAAF load requirements (largely resolved with the H variant, but that doesn't really count here).

So I'll open the floor to the forum members to discuss.
See here: Escort Spitfire - a missed opportunity for longer reach? - Royal Aeronautical Society
 

This covers the reasons why the Spitfire could have been modified into a long-range escort fighter and, as has been mentioned in another thread on the subject, it was discussed and trials, which the author Paul Stoddart mentions in his article, were carried out to determine the feasibility both in the UK and USA. As previously mentioned, the reason the RAF did not get its long-range escort Spitfires was because of C-in-C Air Staff Lord Portal, who dismissed the concept of long-range fighters and wouldn't back down on that, despite opposition expressed by various individuals in the air staff. Churchill even stated that this attitude "closed many doors" for Bomber Command and its desire for escort fighters. This was before the USA entered the war, so it puts things into perspective regarding discussions on the matter.

The article's conclusion begins with the following: "There was surely no insuperable obstacle to developing a long-range escort version of the Spitfire." Considering the effort that went into producing a sea-going carrier borne variant, the effort to produce a long-ranged Spitfire was certainly something that could have been done.
 
The article's conclusion begins with the following: "There was surely no insuperable obstacle to developing a long-range escort version of the Spitfire." Considering the effort that went into producing a sea-going carrier borne variant, the effort to produce a long-ranged Spitfire was certainly something that could have been done.

Agreed all the way.
 
Why would the RAF develop a long range air superiority fighter for which it had no need or doctrine?

Even when it had Mustangs in quantity, the RAF had no real interest in carrying out long range daylight bomber raids as it had developed its bomber force into a highly effective night time force.
 
Why would the RAF develop a long range air superiority fighter for which it had no need or doctrine?

Need was certainly there during the whole war. Yes, there was no doctrine covering the LR fighter.

Even when it had Mustangs in quantity, the RAF had no real interest in carrying out long range daylight bomber raids as it had developed its bomber force into a highly effective night time force.

RAF was trying to bomb targets in Germany during the day, however Luftwaffe didn't get the memo. RAF was also fighing in North Africa and Asia, there the long range was essential, and night bombing was rarely employed.
 
RAF was trying to bomb targets in Germany during the day, however Luftwaffe didn't get the memo. RAF was also fighing in North Africa and Asia, there the long range was essential, and night bombing was rarely employed.
The RAF rapidly gave up long range daylight bombing into defended airspace very early in the war.

Northern Europe, North Africa etc were tactical operations, for which existing fighters were quite adequate.
 
RAF was also fighing in North Africa and Asia, there the long range was essential, and night bombing was rarely employed.
War with Italy broke out in June 1940. By the end of the year the RAF had established a 4 squadron night bomber force of Wellingtons split between Egypt & Malta. Targets were in Libya, Italy and even the Balkans for a while in 1941

They were assisted in their work by flare dropping Albacores from shore based FAA squadrons.

Liberator II night bombers became operational in early 1942 in limited numbers.

In mid-1942 detachments from several Halifax squadrons were sent to Egypt where they were consolidated into 462 squadron later renumbered 614.
 
The RAF rapidly gave up long range daylight bombing into defended airspace very early in the war.

Northern Europe, North Africa etc were tactical operations, for which existing fighters were quite adequate.

RAF had no escorts for their bombers. So after a few times the LW intercepted and downed a good number of bombers, the daylight missions against protected targets were abandoned.
Air cover was needed for the convoys in the Med (and in Atlantic), the job falling to the Beaufighters and, if a carrier can be spared, on Fulmars and the like. A proper LR fighter with performance comparable to the current short-ranged fighter was needed, but there was none for a few good years. Note that RAF gave contract to Bristol for the long range Beaufighter before 1940.
Long-range fighters certainly have had their role in subduing the Axis forces in Sicily and further northwards. Americans even used the A-36 as escorts for the B-25s, pointing to the lack of the 'proper' escort force in the theater, both in quantity and quality.
 
Why would the RAF develop a long range air superiority fighter for which it had no need or doctrine?
Things change.
With a given level of technology the bombers can fly further than the fighters. Simple math, scale an existing shape up by 20% in 3 dimensions and the interior volume increases by 72.8%. The wing area increases by 44%, A bomber has a lot more space to put fuel, crew and so on.
British did not help themselves when they used lower technology level propellers.

The British did fit power turrets to defend the bombers sooner than anybody else. They thought they didn't need long range fighters.

Meanwhile the Germans put cannon into interceptors (so did the French, British were working on it) and the 1936-37 British bombers (with their 1938-39 turrets) ran into German 1936-37 fighters with 1939 engines (BD 601s instead of Jumo 210s) and 1939 cannon.

A lot simplified but that is how the British wound up night bombing, now if you are night bombing you don't need escort fighters. Turns out you can't hit crap by night bombing unless you have some fancy electronics.

Meanwhile the British get new propellers, engines (in part due to 100 octane fuel) gain 20-30% in power for no increase in weight and so on.
BTW you can always design/build a new fighter in less time than a new bomber because of the size so the "technology" didn't always stay the same. It also takes time to set up production lines so sometimes technology get's stuck.

Now mix in institutional inertia. AKA "doctrine" also governs things like training, force structure (how many fighters vs how many bombers are being built per month/year) and it is hard to switch doctrines even if you want to. Throw in some more "institutional inertia" in the pride of certain leaders not wanting to admit they were wrong.
All of this was going on before the summer of 1942. Summer of 1942 sees the 2 stage Merlins show up in service with another jump in the power to weight ratio of engines (powerplant weight went up but power went up even faster).

trying not to pick on the British here. The Germans bought Bf 110s as "distant" escorts for bombers, Fly ahead of the bombers and knock out/disperse interceptors before the bombers get there, needed twin engine aircraft, also didn't figure in radar.
Americans in 1939 were specifying 2000 mile range for medium bombers (800-900 mile radius?) at the same time they were ordering the first P-40s. Try and build a 2000 mile single engine fighter with a 1000-1100hp engine. Turns out the bombers didn't quite work out at that range.

Back to the British. At what point does a long range fighter become feasible from a technical standpoint? and what is meant by "long range"
 
Back to the British. At what point does a long range fighter become feasible from a technical standpoint? and what is meant by "long range"

It is a feasible thing at least when the Merlin II is available.
'Long range' is probably 500 miles for the British - to reach NW quarter of interwar Germany, Ruhr included; from France, to reach best part of Germany; if France is the enemy this means reaching the best part of France from the UK?
 
Turns out you can't hit crap by night bombing unless you have some fancy electronics.

Neither could you hit much visually in daylight at the 8th found out and started using radar bombing to cut through the industrial has and bad weather over Europe much of the time.
Once the 'fancy electronics' had been invented, the case for daylight bombing rather went away.
Using Oboe, the RAF were hitting well within 100m of the aim point, while the much touted Nordon bombsight was only achieving a 1,500m CEP of in daylight.

Let's be clear here, the primary mission of the USAAF heavies from late 44 wasn't to destroy targets, it was to force the Luftwaffe to come up and fight and be destroyed.
 
It is a feasible thing at least when the Merlin II is available.
'Long range' is probably 500 miles for the British - to reach NW quarter of interwar Germany, Ruhr included; from France, to reach best part of Germany; if France is the enemy this means reaching the best part of France from the UK?
And you have a mismatch it the ranges of the bombers and fighters. The Blenheim I was good for 1000 miles (actually with a higher cruise speed somewhat less) and the newer bombers, Wellington and Hampden were well above that. The Whitley was always a night bomber.
Granted at the time (late 30s?) many people thought the fighters could cruise at the same speed as the bombers. But buying fighters that were much shorter ranged than the Bombers they were supposed to escort?
 
And you have a mismatch it the ranges of the bombers and fighters. The Blenheim I was good for 1000 miles (actually with a higher cruise speed somewhat less) and the newer bombers, Wellington and Hampden were well above that. The Whitley was always a night bomber.
I've messed up - the radius needed is 500 miles,, not range; fighters were already with 500 mile range as-is.
 

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