British night Bomber Losses-AA or night fighters? (1 Viewer)

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IdahoRenegade

Airman 1st Class
125
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Oct 2, 2015
Sagle, Idaho
I happen to be watching a WWII history show right now and it mentioned that British night bomber losses were running around 10% per mission. I never realized night bomber losses were particularly high. So, first question, was this accurate, at least in late 42-43? And if so, were the losses mostly due to anti-aircraft fire or night fighters? I don't know much about AA fire control-were the individual guns actually directed by radar? Or was aiming dependant on seeing bombers via searchlights and tracking them optically? Or was it just point in the general direction and hope to hit something? Thanks.
 
An ORS study in early 1943 looking at 1942 figured average losses were about 55% fighters, 30% flak, 15% non-enemy action. This took into account operations on all targets and the loss rate was about 4.5%.

After a Fliegerkorps XII document was captured in mid '43 they reassessed fighter losses to 64%

EDIT:

With regard to searchlights - they figured roughly 60% of flak losses were while held in searchlights and 28% of fighter losses.
 
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I happen to be watching a WWII history show right now and it mentioned that British night bomber losses were running around 10% per mission. I never realized night bomber losses were particularly high. So, first question, was this accurate, at least in late 42-43? And if so, were the losses mostly due to anti-aircraft fire or night fighters? I don't know much about AA fire control-were the individual guns actually directed by radar? Or was aiming dependant on seeing bombers via searchlights and tracking them optically? Or was it just point in the general direction and hope to hit something? Thanks.

Night bombing averaged 2.71% loss rate. Day was 1.24%.
BC - Statistics
 
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I don't know much about AA fire control-were the individual guns actually directed by radar? Or was aiming dependant on seeing bombers via searchlights and tracking them optically? Or was it just point in the general direction and hope to hit something? Thanks.

Fire control radars became widespread asset by 1942, the Flak arm now needed 4000 of heavy (75mm and up) shells fired to kill an aircraft. Granted, plenty were damaged to a lower or higher degree. Most of heavy guns being located west of Berlin.
After 1942, the shell expenditure per aircraft killed increased. Probably the main factor being introduction of Window and other counter-measures by the RAF, plus the introduction of Lancater and Mosquito while phasing out older types. As the seasoned gun crews were shipped to the Eastern front after the Staingrad disaster, they were replaced by teenage boys and older men, sometimes also by foreign men of all sorts. All of this, coupled with barrels experiencing wear, it took 16000 (16 thousand) heavy shells to kill an allied aircraft in 1944.
 
The loss rate varied greatly as the war progressed and was considerably lower as the end of the war approached in late 1944 and early 1945. For most of the war, the majority of those who entered Bomber Command did not survive.

Of every 100 airmen who joined Bomber Command, 45 were killed, 6 were seriously wounded, 8 became Prisoners of War, and only 41 escaped unscathed (at least physically). Of the 120,000 who served, 55,573 were killed. Of those who were flying at the beginning of the war, only ten percent survived.

On a single night, Bomber Command suffered more losses than did Fighter Command during the entire Battle of Britain.

Bomber Command's Losses
 
Many of Bomber Commands A/C flew from North England, the North Yorkshire Moors are littered with crash sites caused mainly by navigation errors, wing Icing low fuel and fog bound airfields. There were three emergency airfields Carnaby, Manson and Woodbridge whith huge runways and "FIDO" fog dispersal, in addition another 9 airfields used FIDO.

As with many conflicts the technology evolved on both sides, the RAF development of the bomber stream, night fighters feints diversions and window matched by the LW development of night fighters RADAR defensive lines of flak with controlled gun laying.
 
Of course there are targets like mine laying and targets like Berlin, some targets of BC in France had almost no flak or night fighter defences at all, places like Berlin made up for it.
 
I have losses by Type and even by Type and Group, as wella s the total losses and tons of bombs dropped down to Type, but I don't have any statistics, especially from a reliable source, with losses divided by day and night.

So, appreciate that link, Milosh.
 
Professor Hans Westermanns book on Flak during the war presents a serious challenge to those often quoted ratios on cause of losses. Ive got a copy at home, but from memory, the figures are closer to 30% to the fighters (in 1942) and 70% to the flak arm.

The figures from the quoted report are, in my opinion fatally flawed because they are based (mostly) on LW claims. The LW, under Milch's stewardship was quite biased in favour of the night fighter force over the Flak arm so any opportunity to diminish the perceived successes of the flak arm were eagerly taken up.

Should refer to this earlier discussion Flak vs fighters
 
Lt.Col. Edward (not Hans) Westermann states that Flak was killing about 1 (one) aircraft during the night in second half of 1941, for example (pg. 230 of his theis). Or, 15-44 aircraft mothly, May through August. That is for 3500+ heavy Flak employed, plus thousands of light pieces.
RAF was probably loosing more bombers due to the pilot's/crew mistakes than to Flak in 1941.
 
It seems to me, at least from the figures published above, that the RAF's Bomber Command had a much higher loss rate than the American's in the day light?
 
The only figures I have are these:
Between January and April 1941, flak accounted for 79% of the 144 aircraft downed in the West. In 1944 Flak accounted for 3,500 American planes destroyed; fighters shot down about 2,900 in the same time period. Between June and August 1944 the US 8thAF lost 341 aircraft to flak with a staggering 10,972 damaged. For the 15th AF these figures are 313 and 3,357 respectively.
 
The LW orbat shows, on June 24th 1941, that there are 148 servicable machines (neither has radar installed). In all of 1941, the NFs were responsible forr 421 kills*, some where achieved as far as England. Allowing for lower number of machines earlier in the year, and greater as year draw to the end, we can see that for each deployed night fighter, almost 3 kills are made.
In the same time, the 3500 of heavy Flak guns and thousands of lighter guns that were deployed in the West shot down less than 500 British A/C during the night. Makes 0.14 aircraft killed per heavy Flak deployed, and perhaps 0.05 per AA gun of any size.
Or, NF vs. heavy Flak ratio of 2.84:0.14, ie. 20 times greater efficiency to make a kill during 1941.

*we can debate that 421 is the number of claims not kills. So my math takes a slight kick, but still the heavy & expensive investment in the Flak looks like an extravagant way to spend limited German assets, including material, money, factories producing guns, shells, propellant, explosives, fine mechanics, electronics, and manpower that bloated from 1/2 of million in 1940 on.
 
The LW orbat shows, on June 24th 1941, that there are 148 servicable machines (neither has radar installed). In all of 1941, the NFs were responsible forr 421 kills*, some where achieved as far as England. Allowing for lower number of machines earlier in the year, and greater as year draw to the end, we can see that for each deployed night fighter, almost 3 kills are made.
In the same time, the 3500 of heavy Flak guns and thousands of lighter guns that were deployed in the West shot down less than 500 British A/C during the night. Makes 0.14 aircraft killed per heavy Flak deployed, and perhaps 0.05 per AA gun of any size.
Or, NF vs. heavy Flak ratio of 2.84:0.14, ie. 20 times greater efficiency to make a kill during 1941.

*we can debate that 421 is the number of claims not kills. So my math takes a slight kick, but still the heavy & expensive investment in the Flak looks like an extravagant way to spend limited German assets, including material, money, factories producing guns, shells, propellant, explosives, fine mechanics, electronics, and manpower that bloated from 1/2 of million in 1940 on.
 
I knew that 1 and a half or 2 and a half % was way off.
The key to seeing the horrible sacrifice was missions over Germany.
Those figures are over 20 %. About the same as USAAF without escorts over Germany, until Merlin engined Mustangs were available in force.
As an American & a retired military type I resent the he'll out of our people being used and sacrificed as political pawns, to prove we could strike deep into Germany with no escorts, using tight formations, no escorts.
Well, we could, as long as 20% + losses were OK.
They weren't. The damage done in those strikes prior to fighter escorts there and back didn't shorten the war a day.
God bless them all, RAF and USAAF loses were both terrible, and damn sure weren't anyone's 2-3%.
Doug
 
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I knew that 1 and a half or 2 and a half % was way off.
The key to seeing the horrible sacrifice was missions over Germany.
Those figures are over 20 %. About the same as USAAF without escorts over Germany, until Merlin engined Mustangs were available in force.
As an American & a retired military type I resent the he'll out of our people being used and sacrificed as political pawns, to prove we could strike deep into Germany with no escorts, using tight formations, no escorts.
Well, we could, as long as 20% + losses were OK.
They weren't. The damage done in those strikes prior to fighter escorts there and back didn't shorten the war a day.
God bless them all, RAF and USAAF loses were both terrible, and damn sure weren't anyone's 2-3%.
Doug

One way the USAAF reduced the loss rate was to send more aircraft.
 

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