michaelmaltby
Colonel
"..... the most immoral thing the Allies could have done would have been to lose the war."
Bang on.
Bang on.
British night Bomber Losses-AA or night fighters?
- Thread starter IdahoRenegade
- Start date
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As many of you will be aware from my contributions elsewhere the bombing offensives, particularly that of Bomber Command, have been something I have been interested in for more years than I care to remember. I have also invested more hours than I care to remember reading and researching the subject. I have found myself (not here) having to justify things which should not need any justification. Niellands was correct when, in 2001, he wrote the piece which I quoted, to identify this as a topic which has not only been controversial since 1940, but one in which one aspect, the moral aspect, has begun to dominate all others. It is a dangerous tendency, revisionist, and must always be argued. The fact that I find myself mounting similar arguments in 2016 shows that it is not something that will go away.
The bacon is much appreciated, who doesn't like bacon? It shows that at least some people do 'get it'.
Cheers
Steve
The bacon is much appreciated, who doesn't like bacon? It shows that at least some people do 'get it'.
Cheers
Steve
I've just had a look through this thread and see that there is a misunderstanding of the maths of just how an ongoing loss rate, seemingly low, can actually effect an organisation over a period of time.
Near the end of the war (March 1945) the Director of Bomber operations wrote a paper which addressed this issue. It was entitled
"What is the Highest Percentage of Losses That the Royal Air Force Could Stand Over a Period of 3 Months of Intensive Operations".
I will use the data from this, in the form of various selected quotations, to explain.
1) Aircraft in Bomber Command missing on operations during the five years 1940/44 have fluctuated between 1.8% and 4.4% of sorties despatched. There were occasions when losses rose considerably higher in certain units for short periods with the result that the units concerned were suspended from operations to enable them to rehabilitate themselves or to re-equip with an improved type of aircraft."
Three examples are given. The period March to August 1942 when losses on the Halifax squadrons of 4 Group were such that they were withdrawn from operations for four weeks to rest and train crews. The period August to November 1943 when Stirling losses led to them being suspended from bombing operations against targets in Germany. The period from November 1943 to February 1944 when losses of Halifax IIs and IVs of 4 Group led to them permanently being suspended from operations against targets in Germany.
2) A table to explain the effect of the Halifax loss rates gives the following sobering numbers.
An 8.1% loss rate meant that 8% of crews would survive 30 missions.
A 10.8% loss rate meant that just 3.2% of crews would survive 30 missions
The numbers are put in context thus.
"If the total wastage rate including crashes and postings is 7% the proportion of crews who would survive a tour of 30 operations is only 10% which means that most of the experienced Squadron and Flight Commanders with their best crews would rapidly be lost. Thereafter, operational losses would rise rapidly by reason of the unduly high percentage of inexperienced crews."
"Two main factors limit the loss rate which can be sustained - operational efficiency and morale. The first is dependent upon the average level of experience amongst the crews in the Squadrons. The higher the loss rate the the lower the level of experience and the lower the operational effectiveness. This factor is largely independent of the intensity of operations. Morale, which is to some extent governed by the standard of operational efficiency, is closely related to the intensity of operations to which, for a given loss rate, the actual losses over a period are proportional. Experience suggests that the factor of operational efficiency will impose an earlier limitation on the acceptable loss rate than that of morale."
The conclusion explains just what was considered sustainable for Bomber Command.
"Operational experience in this war, therefore, indicates that a strategic bomber force would become relatively ineffective if it suffered operational losses in the region of 7% over a period of 3 months' intensive operations, and that its operational effectiveness may become unacceptably low if losses of 5% were sustained over this period."
I hope this helps!
Cheers
Steve
Near the end of the war (March 1945) the Director of Bomber operations wrote a paper which addressed this issue. It was entitled
"What is the Highest Percentage of Losses That the Royal Air Force Could Stand Over a Period of 3 Months of Intensive Operations".
I will use the data from this, in the form of various selected quotations, to explain.
1) Aircraft in Bomber Command missing on operations during the five years 1940/44 have fluctuated between 1.8% and 4.4% of sorties despatched. There were occasions when losses rose considerably higher in certain units for short periods with the result that the units concerned were suspended from operations to enable them to rehabilitate themselves or to re-equip with an improved type of aircraft."
Three examples are given. The period March to August 1942 when losses on the Halifax squadrons of 4 Group were such that they were withdrawn from operations for four weeks to rest and train crews. The period August to November 1943 when Stirling losses led to them being suspended from bombing operations against targets in Germany. The period from November 1943 to February 1944 when losses of Halifax IIs and IVs of 4 Group led to them permanently being suspended from operations against targets in Germany.
2) A table to explain the effect of the Halifax loss rates gives the following sobering numbers.
An 8.1% loss rate meant that 8% of crews would survive 30 missions.
A 10.8% loss rate meant that just 3.2% of crews would survive 30 missions
The numbers are put in context thus.
"If the total wastage rate including crashes and postings is 7% the proportion of crews who would survive a tour of 30 operations is only 10% which means that most of the experienced Squadron and Flight Commanders with their best crews would rapidly be lost. Thereafter, operational losses would rise rapidly by reason of the unduly high percentage of inexperienced crews."
"Two main factors limit the loss rate which can be sustained - operational efficiency and morale. The first is dependent upon the average level of experience amongst the crews in the Squadrons. The higher the loss rate the the lower the level of experience and the lower the operational effectiveness. This factor is largely independent of the intensity of operations. Morale, which is to some extent governed by the standard of operational efficiency, is closely related to the intensity of operations to which, for a given loss rate, the actual losses over a period are proportional. Experience suggests that the factor of operational efficiency will impose an earlier limitation on the acceptable loss rate than that of morale."
The conclusion explains just what was considered sustainable for Bomber Command.
"Operational experience in this war, therefore, indicates that a strategic bomber force would become relatively ineffective if it suffered operational losses in the region of 7% over a period of 3 months' intensive operations, and that its operational effectiveness may become unacceptably low if losses of 5% were sustained over this period."
I hope this helps!
Cheers
Steve
