Brits didn't want B-17?

[OldGeezer]

(I wasn't sure which area to put this in, I trust the admins will take care of that.)
While doing some fairly deep research into what was going on behind the scenes in Washington before the US entered WW2, I was able to trace a series of meeting notes and telephone call transcripts that described the political process of enabling the Anglo-French Purchasing Board to get information on American aircraft. One thing in particular jumped out at me, a letter from the Board dated April 5, 1940, after US policy was created to allow the Board to talk directly with US manufacturers, which they hadn't previously been allowed to do. "We note that a decision as to the release of the Boeing B.17 and Consolidated B.24 will be communicated to us later. From the general public information which we have, we can already say that we are not interested in the Boeing B.17, but would very much like to be authorized to study Consolidated B.24." (emphasis added by me)

I was under the impression that the whole "Flying Fortress" concept had captured everyone's imagination at that time, but clearly I was wrong.

There was another thing from this same time period, when FDR had for "reasons" put his Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, pretty much in charge of the whole business of the production and distribution (in the US and abroad) of American combat aircraft. This is an exchange regarding the gathering of actual combat experience to be used in developing US aircraft, between Morgenthau himself, his aide Purvis, and a Mr Pleven who I'm not familiar with, with emphasis added where appropriate:

Mr. Purvis: There is one (point?) I would like to mention, that we are receiving communications through the manufacturers that experience as to the combat conditions under which these planes would be used would be desired. We feel rather definitely that as between Governments we can of course give information, but to give information on such things to manufacturers would be quite wrong in principle.
HM Jr.: I was surprised when I saw that thing worded that way. It seems to me the thing to do – I agree with you entirely, our Attaches, Army and Navy, that they should see these planes under battle conditions and it seems to me the way the thing should be done.
Mr. (Pleven): In fact, it is the only way it can be, the only way you can get the information you want.
HM, Jr: They explained to me the only information they got was through the representative of the Curtiss Company who was over there and they were not satisfied with that, but if our Air Attaches can go to the front, and they should be permitted to go to the Front and see these planes under fighting conditions….

No wonder American aircraft of pre-Pearl Harbor vintage seem to have been designed in ignorance of "lessons learned" already by the British and French. By decree, such things were to be handled by Air Attaches, so at best the manufacturers would be getting information secondhand. And even then they'd get only what the Attaches were technically conversant with themselves, and what from that limited dataset they considered to be important enough to pass down to Curtiss and Lockheed and Boeing and all the rest. Those companies, Curtiss in particular, did send out their own people but it's shocking to me that official Washington felt that this was wrong, and that somehow a bureaucratic solution was preferable.

 

[MIflyer]

The RAF was not interested in high altitude daylight strategic bombing, and trying to do night bombing from the higher altitudes would have yielded even worse results. The B-24 was most probably of interest due to its big boxy fuselage and exceptional range. The RAF even secured a non-turboed LB-30 for use as Churchill's personal transport and they flew that bird all over the place..

The high altitude capabilities of the B-17 and B-24 looked even less attractive to the RAF given their limited experience with those operations.

But note that not only was the B-24 a favorite for the British for ASW, enabling them to close the Air Gap in the Atlantic, but when the RAF decided they needed large jamming aircraft to support their nigh ops over Europe, they went straight to the USAAF and asked for B-17's and B-24's. The high altitude capabilities of the American heavies not only enabled wider coverage for the jamming but also made them less vulnerable to interception.

 

[cammerjeff]

(I wasn't sure which area to put this in, I trust the admins will take care of that.)
While doing some fairly deep research into what was going on behind the scenes in Washington before the US entered WW2, I was able to trace a series of meeting notes and telephone call transcripts that described the political process of enabling the Anglo-French Purchasing Board to get information on American aircraft. One thing in particular jumped out at me, a letter from the Board dated April 5, 1940, after US policy was created to allow the Board to talk directly with US manufacturers, which they hadn't previously been allowed to do. "We note that a decision as to the release of the Boeing B.17 and Consolidated B.24 will be communicated to us later. From the general public information which we have, we can already say that we are not interested in the Boeing B.17, but would very much like to be authorized to study Consolidated B.24." (emphasis added by me)

I was under the impression that the whole "Flying Fortress" concept had captured everyone's imagination at that time, but clearly I was wrong.

There was another thing from this same time period, when FDR had for "reasons" put his Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, pretty much in charge of the whole business of the production and distribution (in the US and abroad) of American combat aircraft. This is an exchange regarding the gathering of actual combat experience to be used in developing US aircraft, between Morgenthau himself, his aide Purvis, and a Mr Pleven who I'm not familiar with, with emphasis added where appropriate:

Mr. Purvis: There is one (point?) I would like to mention, that we are receiving communications through the manufacturers that experience as to the combat conditions under which these planes would be used would be desired. We feel rather definitely that as between Governments we can of course give information, but to give information on such things to manufacturers would be quite wrong in principle.
HM Jr.: I was surprised when I saw that thing worded that way. It seems to me the thing to do – I agree with you entirely, our Attaches, Army and Navy, that they should see these planes under battle conditions and it seems to me the way the thing should be done.
Mr. (Pleven): In fact, it is the only way it can be, the only way you can get the information you want.
HM, Jr: They explained to me the only information they got was through the representative of the Curtiss Company who was over there and they were not satisfied with that, but if our Air Attaches can go to the front, and they should be permitted to go to the Front and see these planes under fighting conditions….

No wonder American aircraft of pre-Pearl Harbor vintage seem to have been designed in ignorance of "lessons learned" already by the British and French. By decree, such things were to be handled by Air Attaches, so at best the manufacturers would be getting information secondhand. And even then they'd get only what the Attaches were technically conversant with themselves, and what from that limited dataset they considered to be important enough to pass down to Curtiss and Lockheed and Boeing and all the rest. Those companies, Curtiss in particular, did send out their own people but it's shocking to me that official Washington felt that this was wrong, and that somehow a bureaucratic solution was preferable.

Was this meeting before or after the RAF's not to successful use of the dozen or so B-17C's they had purchased? Those few operations proved that the equipment and tactics for 20,000 ft or higher missions were not yet up to the task yet.

 

[nuuumannn]

he RAF was not interested in high altitude daylight strategic bombing, and trying to do night bombing from the higher altitudes would have yielded even worse results. The B-24 was most probably of interest due to its big boxy fuselage and exceptional range. The RAF even secured a non-turboed LB-30 for use as Churchill's personal transport and they flew that bird all over the place..

The high altitude capabilities of the B-17 and B-24 looked even less attractive to the RAF given their limited experience with those operations.

But note that not only was the B-24 a favorite for the British for ASW, enabling them to close the Air Gap in the Atlantic, but when the RAF decided they needed large jamming aircraft to support their nigh ops over Europe, they went straight to the USAAF and asked for B-17's and B-24's. The high altitude capabilities of the American heavies not only enabled wider coverage for the jamming but also made them less vulnerable to interception.

Some of this is accurate some of this is not. The inaccurate parts are that it was not the "RAF" who rejected the B-17, just RAF Bomber Command, and the RAF had no interest in high altitude strategic bombing bit, because they did. In fact, Bomber Command bought B-17Cs because it wanted to evaluate them in combat conditions for purchase, to test whether the type could be used as effectively at the altitudes that the US claimed it could. Let's not forget one thing. Compared to what the USAAC had as its standard, ie most numerous bomber in service in 1940 and 1941, the B-18 Bolo, the RAF was capable of achieving greater altitudes with heavier bomb loads across greater ranges than the Bolo with the bombers it had. The B-17 was available in very small numbers until mid to late 1941, remembering that the B-17C and D models were the first viable production variants, of which of the former, 20, or around 50 percent of available B-17Cs built by that time, were sent to Britain for combat operations.

Along with the B-17s, designated Fortress Is in RAF service, a team of US civilian scientists accompanied the aircraft and immediately there were problems. The engines kept packing up and the first hull loss was because of an engine fire on the ground. It took 90 Sqn three months to become operational on the Fortress, it was so problematic. The second loss came from an aircraft operating at its optimum altitude of 31,000 feet that suddenly dived into the ground, killing its RAF crew and the civilians aboard. This was because of icing jamming the flight controls. During the few bombing raids the squadron carried out, because of low serviceability, only a few aircraft get airborne over the target areas and these almost all succumbed to icing issues, flight controls froze, bomb bay doors refused to open, guns jammed, the whole episode was one problem after another. Eventually, Bomber Command heads determined that the Fortress I was not suited for combat operations, so rejected the type.

Coastal Command, however, wanted whatever long-range platforms it could have, and so 90 Sqn's Fortress Is went to Northern Ireland and were the first of many B-17s that command successfully operated. Also, the British didn't "go straight to the USAAF and asked for B-17 and B-24s", the aircraft were either directly ordered before or were a part of Lend Lease agreements, therefore they were aircraft already destined for the RAF off the production lines. Not only that, but the use of these platforms was because Bomber Command didn't have enough airframes to spare without compromising on available bombers, so these types were used instead. It was a vital, but largely unsung role they played.

Before the USA entered the war, the British saw it as a gold mine of airframes and in its buildup to match the Germans and around 1938 orders were placed for US-built aircraft of all kinds, some of which were rejected, not just the B-17, for various reasons, either unsuitability for combat or some other technical reason, but others were ordered in vast numbers. One thing that is worth mentioning is that US aircraft were highly regarded in RAF and FAA service because of their build quality and ease of operation, even though some were not taken on, such as the early model B-17. Evaluation reports of its performance in Britain were positive, crews liked flying them and so on, but operationally, the early model Forts were just not suitable for combat. They had no armour plating, no self-sealing tanks, inadequate defensive armament, no heating and they could not operate at the altitudes the US said they could in the European combat environment.

 

[nuuumannn]

Was this meeting before or after the RAF's not to successful use of the dozen or so B-17C's they had purchased? Those few operations proved that the equipment and tactics for 20,000 ft or higher missions were not yet up to the task yet.

Correct, the B-17C was simply not up to the task. The B-17E and F models were a vast improvement because of changes instigated from British experience, and these two types became the Fortress IIs in RAF service and were ordered in numbers by Coastal Command.

 

[OldGeezer]

Was this meeting before or after the RAF's not to successful use of the dozen or so B-17C's they had purchased? Those few operations proved that the equipment and tactics for 20,000 ft or higher missions were not yet up to the task yet.

I believe it was about this same time, which makes the Board's comment even stranger. I'm still digging through the primary source material and hope to get some clarification on how this all played out.

 

[buffnut453]

I believe it was about this same time, which makes the Board's comment even stranger. I'm still digging through the primary source material and hope to get some clarification on how this all played out.

The RAF order for B-17s was levied in early 1940. The aircraft were delivered starting in March 1941 and the first operational mission was in early July 1941.

 

[OldGeezer]

The RAF was not interested in high altitude daylight strategic bombing, and trying to do night bombing from the higher altitudes would have yielded even worse results. The B-24 was most probably of interest due to its big boxy fuselage and exceptional range. The RAF even secured a non-turboed LB-30 for use as Churchill's personal transport and they flew that bird all over the place..

The high altitude capabilities of the B-17 and B-24 looked even less attractive to the RAF given their limited experience with those operations.

But note that not only was the B-24 a favorite for the British for ASW, enabling them to close the Air Gap in the Atlantic, but when the RAF decided they needed large jamming aircraft to support their nigh ops over Europe, they went straight to the USAAF and asked for B-17's and B-24's. The high altitude capabilities of the American heavies not only enabled wider coverage for the jamming but also made them less vulnerable to interception.

But the B-24's much-ballyhooed Davis Wing was even more optimized for high altitude efficiency. Something isn't adding up. I guess desperation to get any sort of combat aircraft was driving these decisions, particularly in that frantic period just before the fall of France, and the chaos that ensued within the Board immediately thereafter.

 

[Shortround6]

April 5, 1940

The date is very important as in the following few months.
Also important is the order history, from Wiki so...............
Early orders, placed before the XB-24 had flown (Dec 29th 1939), included 36 for the USAAC, 120 for the French Air Force and 164 for the Royal Air Force (RAF).

The early production or semi-production B-24s were built more to British standards (operational) to start with power turrets at least on the top and tail and with a large bomb bay.
The early B-24s did not have turbo-chargers, however the XB-24, despite it's advanced aerodynamics (worth of study?) with the Davis wing did not turn as hoped as far as speed goes and more power was needed. All told just about 200 B-24s/LB-30s without turbos were built. However they didn't show up until mid/late 1941 except for the 6 LB-30As that showed up in March 1941. These were actually 6 of the YB-24 contract and the US got 6 B-24Ds in return out of the UK/French contract allotment later.

No self sealing tanks, no armor, no turrets and P&W R-1830s with single speed, single stage superchargers. By March/April of 1941 the British were NOT going to fly them in daylight over German territory.

What the different governments or RAF or US Army wanted to find out about newest battle conditions was often overcome by timing/practical realities.
Curtiss had engineers dealing with the French with the Hawk 75s almost from the start in Sept 1939. The British didn't get any Hawk 75s (except for one loaner) until the fall of France so any Curtiss representatives would have been in France (?) in early April of 1940 and evacuated to Britain in the following weeks.
I will note that one Lt. Hubert Zemke had been sent to England at some point in 1940 as a combat observer. He was still there in July of 1941 and writing reports on the Tomahawks at least (and probably other things).
There is also a large time lag, Zemke was writing reports in June/July on the Tomahawks that had been built Starting in Sept 1940 and there were several different models the early ones having unprotected tanks (of any type) and no pilot protection, things improved with later models.

In May of 1941 Don Berlin, C.B. Clark and Rod Malloy went to England to investigate Curtiss aircraft introduction to service. This may have been the only US designer to go to Britain?
However this was many months after the P-40D&E had been ordered and indeed it was the same month that the P-40D flew and several months after XP-46 flew.

 

[EwenS]

A little bit of clarification is needed here. Just how much input was there from the experience in Europe to go from the B17C/D to the B-17E given the amount of change that took place?

The B-17E was ordered on 30 Aug 1940 and first flew on 5 Sept 1941.

In Aug 1940 the BoB was at its height and the RAF was giving up on strategic bombing in daylight. There was very little RAF experience to go on.

British interest in the B-17 went back as far as 1938, and while there were initial discussion to acquire 20 B-17C in 1940, an additional acquisition of 63 B-17D/E were planned at that time. Then Britain's dollar crisis hit home. The British contract for 20 B-17C was finally signed during the second half of Jan 1941. The aircraft were delivered across the Atlantic to Britain between May & July 1941. 90 squadron RAF was formed to operate them on 7 May 1941 and flew its first operation on 8 July and its last of 22 operations from Britain on or around 24 Sept 1941. There was no time for RAF feedback to reach Boeing to allow them to make the extensive changes required to arrive at the B-17E.

Once Lend Lease kicked started in March 1941, the US Army indicated that they could release 135 B-17 between May 1941 & June 1942 (40% of then planned production). June 1941 saw Britain place an order for 300 B-17E. At one point it was envisaged that Britain might get as many as 50 per month between Sept 1941 & March 1943. But issues of Boeing building up construction rates to achieve that and then on 5 Nov 1941 the USAAF announced, following FDRs decision to expand the air arm to 84 groups, the British allocation was reduced to just 99 aircraft.

Following Pearl Harbor the USAAF grabbed as many aircraft present in the USA as it could. As a result just 45 B-17E were delivered to Britain as Fortress IIA starting in March 1942. They were followed by another 19 B-17F from Oct 1942. All these went to Coastal Command. Later in 1944 3 B-17G were delivered for use by Coastal Command.

 

[Shortround6]

But the B-24's much-ballyhooed Davis Wing was even more optimized for high altitude efficiency. Something isn't adding up. I guess desperation to get any sort of combat aircraft was driving these decisions, particularly in that frantic period just before the fall of France, and the chaos that ensued within the Board immediately thereafter.

The whole of 1939 was a frantic period for aircraft purchases in the US. As noted in the previous post the French and British had ordered 284 B-24s compared to 36 by the US at one point in time. Problem was that planes ordered in the fall of 1939 often did not show up until the summer/fall/winter of 1940. Planes ordered in the spring/summer of 1940 were tacked onto the previous orders and even with plant expansion(new buildings) delivery wasn't going to happen until spring/summer of 1941 or ever fall of 1941. Fighters are faster to build than bombers.

 

[Shortround6]

Following Pearl Harbor the USAAF grabbed as many aircraft present in the USA as it could. As a result just 45 B-17E were delivered to Britain as Fortress IIA starting in March 1942. They were followed by another 19 B-17F from Oct 1942. All these went to Coastal Command. Later in 1944 3 B-17G were delivered for use by Coastal Command.

To add to this the US Army grabbed 75 of the British LB-30s after Pearl Harbor but since the aircraft were supposed to be delivered with armament and turrets fitted in Britain there was a scramble in the US just to arm them. A twin .50 power turret in the top but every other gun mount was manual .50 cal.
Some went to Java (briefly) 3 went to Alaska, 6 went to Midway (post battle) and 17 wound up in Panama with ASV radar. 23 are supposed to have been given back to the British in 1943? Wonder if they got new engines
I believe none of them had trubo charged engines and they problably didn't need them in areas they were flying in (or they flew them in areas that didn't need turbos)

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Note the date of the report 5 April 1940, it was a US Presidential election year, recall the outcry when a person serving in the French military was killed in a DB-7 crash in 1939, lots of US neutrality declarations, lots of new war suspicion about handing information out, lots of US restrictions on what its attaches could do. Also as of April 1940 the western allies did not have a lot to say about US designs in combat but would have results from more intensive flying. Curtiss involvement means France, plenty of H-75 in French service pre war, DB-7 were arriving, only 11 exported in 1939, units still working up in early 1940. Lots of Hudsons in RAF service but again not a lot of combat experience. The fall of France changed things, the US gained a great deal of access to British data, starting from the need to convince the US Britain could and would fight on, some results were a USN officer on board HMS Illustrious before and during the Taranto raid, US personnel went on RAF bomb raids in Albania, there were USN co-pilots on board all 3 Catalinas that located Bismarck and so on.

Combat lessons from mostly British experience from mid 1940 met the stress the system was under to suddenly produce numbers versus the production cost of changes. The time delays also mean sometime in 1941 to make the changes.

As of early 1940 the B-24 looked to be the better design, the B-17 was 5 or so years old and needed a major update to become competitive, the B-24 promised to be faster, longer ranged with larger bomb loads. The French ordered 165 as the LB-30. As part of the late 1940 adjustments the US allowed the British to take some B-24 ordered for the USAAF, in part as the British released some R-1820 from their orders for USAAF B-17 airframes awaiting engines.

With only 20 B-17C a RAF massed raid would be maybe 10 of them. This was still a time the RAF was willing to try day cloud cover raids on Germany, going to high level was the other alternative, the higher the bombers flew the harder to intercept, the Battle of Britain lessons saw the 1941 RAF wanting the ability to fight at 30,000 feet or higher. According to 2 Group its Fortress I came with ash trays, carpet, padded walls and Thermos flasks. They did test climbs to 38,000 feet and bombed Cologne from 35,000 feet. On 12 August 1941 the Luftwaffe managed to intercept one B-17 over Brest at 32,000 feet, showing altitude alone would not be enough and in any case all too often the aircraft was leaving contrails, very bad for raids with only 1 or 2 aircraft. Lots of lessons were learnt about the gaps between designed and actual performance of the on board equipment.

The RAF report on the Fortress I, B-17C put the maximum bomb load at 7,400 pounds of bombs, alternative loads were 2x2,000 pound, 4x1,100 pound and 8x600 pound. So at 53,500 pounds loaded weight, with 7,400 pounds of bombs it took 37 minutes to climb to 30,000 feet at which it could cruise at 240 mph for a total range of 1,900 miles. By the looks of it maximum fuel load of 2,075 imperial gallons meant no bombs, range 2,900 miles.

The first B-17 raid was on 8 July 1941 but Bomber Command seems to have declared the squadron operational on the 12th which is when 90 squadron is included in the strength returns, meant to have 16 aircraft, seems to have started with around 8 rising to 12 in early September, falling back to 9 at the end of the month. In the 205 days to 1 February 1942 when the strength reports cease, average aircraft serviceable 3.5, average crews available 4.42, average aircraft with crew 3.16, for the 77 days to 15 September when missions were being done, 3.47, 4.86 and 3.3, maximum of 5 serviceable aircraft reported on 17 days, 9 crews on 1 day, 5 crews and aircraft on 16 days

Michael Bowyer in his Book 2 Group RAF gives the operations log as 52 sorties on 17 strike days over 3 months, July to September 1941, no more than 4 sorties on any given strike day.

8 July, two attacked primary, 1 had engine trouble and attacked a secondary target.
23 July, all returned early, 2 due to contrails, 1 for an unknown reason.
24 July all 3 sorties attacked primary.
26 July, one attacked primary target, one abandoned due to weather

2 August, 1 bombed primary, 1 abandoned due to joining the wrong formation, 1 bombed secondary target due to cloud.
6 August, 2 sorties attacked primary target but 1 is described as jettisoning bombs.
12 August, 3 attacked primary target (but 2 of these bombed through cloud), 1 abandoned due to engine trouble.
16 August, 2 abandoned due to weather, 2 bombed primary target (1 of which was intercepted)
19 August, 1 abandoned due to contrails, 1 abandoned due to frozen guns.
21 August, 2 abandoned due to contrails (1 of these also had frozen guns), 1 abandoned due to supercharger problems.
29 August, 1 abandoned take off, 1 abandoned due to contrails and engine trouble.
31 August, 1 attacked primary, 1 attacked secondary, 1 abandoned due to supercharger problems.

2 September, 1 bombed primary, 1 abandoned due to contrails, 1 abandoned due to intercom problems.
4 September, 2 abandoned due to engine trouble but 1 of these bombed a secondary target, 1 abandoned due to intercom problems.
6 September, 3 attacked primary, 1 abandoned with engine trouble.
8 September, 2 lost (both shot down by fighters), 2 abandoned due to weather (1 of these attacked by fighter)
15 September, 1 abandoned due to contrails
16 September, 1 abandoned due to engine problems.
20 September, 1 attacked primary target
25 September, 1 abandoned due to contrails.

Bomber Command says 51 sorties, 24 attacking, 27 aborts, 94x1,100 pound bombs dropped, 46.16 long tons, 2 aircraft missing, 1 category E due to enemy action. The first operation was Day Raid 48, the last Day Raid 109. WR Chorley has 6 Bomber Command B-17 losses, 3 on raids, 1 on the ground (Caught fire during engine test), 2 during test flights (1 from entering cumulus cloud, 6 RAF and 1 USAAC personnel killed, 1 RAF survivor, 1 high altitude turbulence, all 6 RAF crew killed)

Interestingly the combat losses were on a raid on Oslo (trying to attack twice in 3 days was a mistake) and a raid on Brest, 42 sorties to Germany, 19 attacking, 22 aborts, 1 attacked a non German target.

The 38 B-17C were built July to November 1940, after the April report, the 42 B-17D February to April 1941, the 512 B-17E September 1941 to May 1942, 170 B-24 and 144 B-17 types built in 1941.

The US of B-17 and B-24 for electronic warfare by Bomber Command was down to bomb bay and jammer designs, the US types had more suitable bomb bays for the electronics. If the He111 V-1 raids had continued then the Wellington AWACS experiment of controlling a group of Mosquito night fighters over the North Sea would have been replaced by B-24.

 

[OldGeezer]

The date is very important as in the following few months.
Also important is the order history, from Wiki so...............
Early orders, placed before the XB-24 had flown (Dec 29th 1939), included 36 for the USAAC, 120 for the French Air Force and 164 for the Royal Air Force (RAF).

The early production or semi-production B-24s were built more to British standards (operational) to start with power turrets at least on the top and tail and with a large bomb bay.
The early B-24s did not have turbo-chargers, however the XB-24, despite it's advanced aerodynamics (worth of study?) with the Davis wing did not turn as hoped as far as speed goes and more power was needed. All told just about 200 B-24s/LB-30s without turbos were built. However they didn't show up until mid/late 1941 except for the 6 LB-30As that showed up in March 1941. These were actually 6 of the YB-24 contract and the US got 6 B-24Ds in return out of the UK/French contract allotment later.
View attachment 837927
No self sealing tanks, no armor, no turrets and P&W R-1830s with single speed, single stage superchargers. By March/April of 1941 the British were NOT going to fly them in daylight over German territory.

What the different governments or RAF or US Army wanted to find out about newest battle conditions was often overcome by timing/practical realities.
Curtiss had engineers dealing with the French with the Hawk 75s almost from the start in Sept 1939. The British didn't get any Hawk 75s (except for one loaner) until the fall of France so any Curtiss representatives would have been in France (?) in early April of 1940 and evacuated to Britain in the following weeks.
I will note that one Lt. Hubert Zemke had been sent to England at some point in 1940 as a combat observer. He was still there in July of 1941 and writing reports on the Tomahawks at least (and probably other things).
There is also a large time lag, Zemke was writing reports in June/July on the Tomahawks that had been built Starting in Sept 1940 and there were several different models the early ones having unprotected tanks (of any type) and no pilot protection, things improved with later models.

In May of 1941 Don Berlin, C.B. Clark and Rod Malloy went to England to investigate Curtiss aircraft introduction to service. This may have been the only US designer to go to Britain?
However this was many months after the P-40D&E had been ordered and indeed it was the same month that the P-40D flew and several months after XP-46 flew.

I have some of the Curtiss Fly Leaf company newsletters/magazines from the WW2 era and they have articles about how the P-40s in particular were doing in RAF hands; theycertainly did their best to try and get on-the-spot info in the combat zones. There was also a lesser-known Curtiss effort to get technical experts into Iran (then still interchangeably known as Persia) in connection with the Shah's purchase of either Hawk 75s or Tomahawks, the official records are as confused as they can get on that point. The son of one of their test pilots told me about his father being captured there by some local faction and held prisoner until the Anglo-Soviet invasion kicked off and resulted in him being freed again. There seems to be quite a bit of little-known history in the 1940-1942 period when things were chaotic.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The early B-24 type production and allocation had all sorts of changes including the prototype having a serial change. As it turned out the 6 YB-24 from December 1940 became LB-30A, then came the 20 B-24A March to May 1941, which became the LB-30B, then the 1 B-24 in June and the 9 B-24A in June/July 1941, none of these really combat worthy. Next were the 140 LB-30 August 1941 to January 1942, the original French order for 165, less the 26 LB-30A and B plus 1 for AL503 which crashed under test.

Ignoring the prototype there were 36 B-24 types built to end July 1941, then 20 LB-30 in August and 27 in September 1941, with 107 built by end November. The 9 B-24C built December 1941 to February 1942, the B-24D from January 1942.

These are the end results, getting there was more complicated.

Of the 140 LB-30 68 went straight to the RAF, 72 serving at least for a while in the USAAF whose aircraft cards indicate initial, early/mid 1942, deployments were something like 3 Alaska, 21 Britain, 6 Hawaii, 14 Panama, 14 Sumac (South West Pacific), later 6 more were sent to the Pacific as transports, and others to Panama etc. as replacements. Many of the RAF LB-30 were sent to India, while 7 more managed over 50 trans Atlantic flights each, between them they have 692 mentions in the RAF controlled trans Atlantic flight logs.

 

[Sons of Anzac]

It may be of interest to know that the RAF offered their B-17C to the RAAF in September 1940 before their delivery from USA. They didnt see high altitude daylight purpose and limited numbers useful. However the RAAF then under command of RAF ACM Charles Burnett, who was intent on transforming the home based RAAF into a giant EATS training organisation, refused saying the Boeing was too big and resource intensive for the RAAF- a big issue would have been the runways requiring a lot of work. If accepted I wonder what a squadron of B17s at Singapore would have done in the lead up to war breaking out in December 1941 with being able to patrol at high altitude up to IndoChina?

 

[EwenS]

It may be of interest to know that the RAF offered their B-17C to the RAAF in September 1940 before their delivery from USA. They didnt see high altitude daylight purpose and limited numbers useful. However the RAAF then under command of RAF ACM Charles Burnett, who was intent on transforming the home based RAAF into a giant EATS training organisation, refused saying the Boeing was too big and resource intensive for the RAAF- a big issue would have been the runways requiring a lot of work. If accepted I wonder what a squadron of B17s at Singapore would have done in the lead up to war breaking out in December 1941 with being able to patrol at high altitude up to IndoChina?

Probably no better than historical. The Japanese invasion convoys were spotted by a Hudson from 1 RAAF squadron on 6th Dec (Malayan time). They were found again on the 7th by a Catalina from 205 squadron (that was shot down before it could report).

The big problem for recce was the weather, which did affect other recce sorties. Dec is the height of the NE monsoon season, that lasts from Nov to March. Lots of cloud to interfere with seeing anything from altitude a lot of the time.

 

[SplitRz]

The RAF was not interested in high altitude daylight strategic bombing, and trying to do night bombing from the higher altitudes would have yielded even worse results.

The correspondence is dated 5th April. This is even before the invasion of France. The RAF was still bombing by day as well as night at this stage and had not committed to a purely night offensive, so I don't think that's the reason.

The high altitude capabilities of the B-17 and B-24 looked even less attractive to the RAF given their limited experience with those operations.

I'm unsure that's accurate either. NOBODY had experience of high altitude strategic operations at this stage of the war. Its worth noting that when the RAF acquired B17c/Fortress 1, they did try them in this role in July '41- and had serious practical reservations based on that direct experience but that's not relevant to the quoted conversation.

I Think Geoffrey Sinclair's summary is the best guess.

 

[elbmc1969]

between Morgenthau himself, his aide Purvis, and a Mr Pleven who I'm not familiar with

René Pleven was Jean Monnet's assistant.

 

[elbmc1969]

If you don't have it, you should find a copy of John McVickar Haight's "American Aid to France, 1938-1940."
You may be able to get a library copy.