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I wonder if the lack of any success on the part of the IJNAS bombers will give Phillips an underestimation of the risk of air power. He might thus stick around. But yes, I think the Admiralty might order Phillips to do as you suggest and fall back on Ceylon to await HMS Indomitable and further reinforcements. Those left on the ground and in the air in Malaya won't be too pleased with the navy as it sails away.Singapore for refueling and then either Ceylon or Darwin, away from Japanese land-based air until I have secured air superiority.
I wonder if the lack of any success on the part of the IJNAS bombers will give Phillips an underestimation of the risk of air power. He might thus stick around. But yes, I think the Admiralty might order Phillips to do as you suggest and fall back on Ceylon to await HMS Indomitable and further reinforcements. Those left on the ground and in the air in Malaya won't be too pleased with the navy as it sails away.
The Nells and Bettys never again had such success, being torn apart by CAPs every time they attempted to attack large allied warships.
Except by the time Force Z was intercepted by the Japanese aircraft strike force on 10th Dec, it was on its way back to Singapore.In the spirit of "what ifs", I can imagine the 10 Buffalos maybe not shooting down the majority of the attackers but driving them off and rendering their attacks unsuccessful. Covering the invasion convoy was Admiral Ozawa's force of 4 heavy cruisers and 4 destroyers. This force alone would have been sufficient at least to defend the invasion fleet. If not, Admiral Kondo had the battleships KONGO and HARUNA the heavy cruisers ATAGO (flag Vice-Admiral Kondo) and TAKAO and 10 destroyers.
It seems very unlikely that had the Japanese not scored a lucky and skillful air attack on Force Z, then Force Z may have been able to get some licks in, but it likely would have been overwhelmed by superior Japanese air and naval forces overall.
Phillips and the six ships of Force Z make it intact to join the cruiser HMS Mauritius (then in drydock) and other light craft then at Singapore. Now that the Japanese are landed in Malaya there's no real need for battleships.The presence of air cover would not have made any difference to Phillips plan of withdrawal to Singapore. It might only have changed his ability to get there.
Now that the Japanese are landed in Malaya there's no real need for battleships.
Phillips and the six ships of Force Z make it intact to join the cruiser HMS Mauritius (then in drydock) and other light craft then at Singapore. Now that the Japanese are landed in Malaya there's no real need for battleships.
My suggestion, the whole fleet sails for Bombay to await the sailing of BM9A, the first reinforcement convoy, but convoy or not, Force Z stays put until HMS Indomitable arrives in January.
Retreating to Ceylon or Bombay retains a fleet-in-being. Putting them alongside the isthmus for shore bombardment only offers them up to further aerial attacks at a point in time when the RAF simply cannot offer air cover.
Don't recall reading about this previously. So how early in the campaign? Historically thoughts of it only started in March / April, IIRC, after the Germans asked for an IO anti-shipping campaign.The other factor is the mindset of Far East Command. Even early in the campaign, they were receiving reports of the IJN setting up a submarine base in Penang. There's no way you're going to park 2 capital ships, with a weak defending screen of destroyers, west of Malaya if you think there's a submarine threat.
But the IJNAF didn't have any assets in Malaya. The INAF's forces were all in southern French Indochina (it was IJNAF bombers that attacked Singapore on 8 Dec 1941) and, while they could undoubtedly reach the Malacca Strait, maintaining any kind of search presence there would have been challenging. Also, in December 1941 the RAF and the ML-KNIL could combine to defend the Malacca Straits.
The presence of Force Z would likely have required the IJNAF to move from southern French Indochina to Thailand or northern Malaya. The problem was where to put the aircraft. The IJAAF was already using almost all the available airfields...and we know how well the IJA and IJN got along, so sharing an airfield would be extremely unlikely.
Operating Force Z west of Malaya would be far from perfect but, IMHO, it's not a foregone conclusion that it was impossible. Even a brief sortie to take out bridges along the west coast road and generally disrupt Japanese vehicle movement would have helped.
It's not that it's impossible, it's that imo it'd be unwise. While the Japanese would have to move forces to cover the western side -- perhaps -- they were, as you point out, already ranging to Singapore. And that means the docks and repair/upkeep facilities for PoW and Repulse were themselves at risk, even as the ships being closer to shore are themselves easier to target.
So we have ships in range of attack, with questionable fighter cover, and their repair facilities also under threat. And we have yet to mention Japanese surface assets that could take action as well.
As for advance basing, again, in Dec 41 the land-based IJN bombers could hit Singapore from FIC already, and while I haven't run any numbers I'd bet that could cover some of the western side of the peninsula too.
Keeping Force Z around just doesn't seem advisable to me. The risk-gain equation doesn't look good. I'd go with Ceylon or Darwin and build a fleet around them. Two battlewagons would probably make DeRuyter's problems a little easier, or the Japanese problems a little harder? Or maybe knowing Zed is in Colombo or Trincomalee, Op C is reconfigured or put off? Force Z added to Somerville's forces, do the Japanese feel so comfortable stretching their legs?
Far too risky for vital fast battleships, especially with few escorts and a rapidly declining RAF cover. But you make a good point for NGFS, and it's too bad that HMS Terror was withdrawn from Singapore in Jan. 1940, where the 15" armed monitor had been stationed since 1934.They'd provide a pretty impressive naval bombardment capability. Given the paucity of British artillery in the theatre, having PoW and Repulse raining down shells on choke points could seriously hurt the Japanese advance and plug an identified capability gap for the Army in Malaya.
The sad fact is that both the Brits and the Americans underestimated Japanese aerial capabilities, both land- and carrier based, at that time.
We're not much better today when we assess the potential combat effectiveness of China, one seemingly beset by poor eyesight and sh#tty kit.No, that is not an urban myth - they really were sending out cables full of that nonsense.
PoW and Repulse ammunition load out is 100% AP for main weapons (Same as the coastal defense guns in Singapore). There's very little solid enough to trigger the fuse, And even when it's triggered, when its 40'+ under surface, its not very effective (issue coastal defense guns had).They'd provide a pretty impressive naval bombardment capability. Given the paucity of British artillery in the theatre, having PoW and Repulse raining down shells on choke points could seriously hurt the Japanese advance and plug an identified capability gap for the Army in Malaya.
Of course, such an idea would require considerable innovation, both from the RN and GHQ Malaya. It would also require establishment of good ship-to-shore comms. Both these factors militate against the viability.
The other factor is the mindset of Far East Command. Even early in the campaign, they were receiving reports of the IJN setting up a submarine base in Penang. There's no way you're going to park 2 capital ships, with a weak defending screen of destroyers, west of Malaya if you think there's a submarine threat.
All in all, this idea is a non-starter...but we are talking "what if" so I thought it worth mentioning.
INAF have to stay in French Indochina - its a logistics thing.But the IJNAF didn't have any assets in Malaya. The INAF's forces were all in southern French Indochina (it was IJNAF bombers that attacked Singapore on 8 Dec 1941) and, while they could undoubtedly reach the Malacca Strait, maintaining any kind of search presence there would have been challenging. Also, in December 1941 the RAF and the ML-KNIL could combine to defend the Malacca Straits.
The presence of Force Z would likely have required the IJNAF to move from southern French Indochina to Thailand or northern Malaya. The problem was where to put the aircraft. The IJAAF was already using almost all the available airfields...and we know how well the IJA and IJN got along, so sharing an airfield would be extremely unlikely.
PoW and Repulse ammunition load out is 100% AP for main weapons (Same as the coastal defense guns in Singapore). There's very little solid enough to trigger the fuse, And even when it's triggered, when its 40'+ under surface, its not very effective (issue coastal defense guns had).