Admiral Beez
Major
Can't that be more easily accomplished by skipping the Battle entirely and making more Blenheims? If Fairey has the capacity to spare, let's have them producing more Swordfish and get moving on the Albacore.
Build an improved Gloster F5/34
- Thread starter fastmongrel
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Fairey had 2 factories.
The principal one at Hayes built Swordfish until the end of 1939 when production moved on to the Albacore as soon as it was ready for production. It was producing more than enough Swordfish for the pre-war and early war FAA.
In late 1939 The Admiralty sought a second source for Albacore production and that second source was Blackburn. For various reasons, including the availability of the Swordfish jigs from Fairey Hayes and its use of less in the way of strategic materials, the contract was switched from Albacore to Swordfish. But Blackburn only produced its first Swordfish in Dec 1940.
The second Fairey factory, a shadow factory at Heaton Chapel, Stockport, was acquired in 1935. It produced the 14 production Hendon bombers before switching to Battles in mid 1937. About half the Battles were built there. In 1940 it started on production of Fulmars and after further expansion into adjoining factory space added Beaufighter and Halifax production. Then in 1942 Barracudas.
Admiral Beez
Major
One benefit of a twin engined Battle is it likely cancels out the Fairey P.4/34 and Fulmar, giving a sliver of light to a better fighter, ideally single seat for the FAA. Fairey refused to make a Sea Spitfire, claiming his Fulmar would be delayed. No Fulmar…. No excuses?
I doubt it.
The Battle was produced to Spec P.27/32 for a Hawker Hart/Hind replacement.
Spec P.4/34 for a light bomber that led to the Henley and Fairey P.4/34 was entirely separate from the Spec that produced the Battle. About the only things those two Fairey products had in common was the same general layout and Merlin power by virtue of having been designed by the same person. The Fairey P.4/34 was a smaller aircraft (47ft wingspan, 40ft length, 500lb bombload) v Battle (54ft wingspan 42ft length, up to 1,500lb bombload) with a different undercarriage layout.
Cancelling the historical Battle does not automatically lead to no Spec P.4/34 and hence no Fulmar. It is of course possible that without the influence of the Battle design philosophy at all, Lobelle might have chosen a different design layout for the Fairey P.4/34.
Incidentally, the Blenheim was derived from the civilian Bristol Type 142 "Britain First" produced in response to a 1934 challenge from Lord Rothermere for "the fastest commercial aircraft in Europe, if not the world". Because it proved faster than the RAF fighters of the day when it first flew in 1935, Spec B.28/35 was drawn up for a militarised version, the Type 142M, that became the Blenheim. It entered service at the same time as the Battle.
So the Blenheim's military origins are a full 3 years after that of the Battle at a time of rapid aircraft development and the beginnings of rearmament from 1934.
wuzak
Captain
If 1,700hp is the goal you could use a single Vulture. Detuned to 1,700hp and limiting rpm to around 2,800rpm, it should be more reliable than experienced on the Manchester.
When considering moving all these contracts around it is best not to lose sight of who owned what in the British aviation industry in the 1930s. At the end of the day they were commercial entities interested in generating profits and retaining as much as possible for themselves, if not within the individual companies themselves, then certainly within their parent groups. Once war comes, Govt, via the Ministry of Aircraft Production was able to exercise much greater control over which company built what and in what factory.
Hawker Siddeley Aviation formed in 1935 from the merger of Hawker, which had acquired Gloster in 1934, with Armstrong Whitworth Holdings which already owned Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft and Armstrong Siddeley, the engine company, as well as Avro. So Gloster was the obvious candidate as a second production source for the Hurricane when production needed ramped up in 1939.
Post merger will Hawker Siddeley, the parent, want to be building 2 aircraft in competition with each other?
Vickers-Armstrongs, the engineering company, owned Vickers (Aircraft) Ltd (manufacturers of the Wellington) and Supermarine Aviation Works (Vickers) Ltd (of Spitfire fame).
And then you have individual designers falling out with employers and moving to other companies. So Lobelle left Fairey in early 1940, having been sidelined a couple of months earlier, to go to R Malcolm Company, later ML Aviation. And Petter moving from Westland to English Electric in 1944.
And finally there is the shadow factory programme to consider. So the second manufacturer of the Battle was Austin Aircraft Ltd from 1938 in a new shadow factory at Longbridge (I'm not clear about the contractual arrangements between Fairey, Austin and the Govt for these aircraft). It subsequently went on to build 300 Hurricanes from Oct 1940 plus Stirling and Lancaster aircraft as well as parts for Beaufighters and Master trainers as well as final assembly of Airspeed Horsa gliders.
Hawker Siddeley Aviation formed in 1935 from the merger of Hawker, which had acquired Gloster in 1934, with Armstrong Whitworth Holdings which already owned Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft and Armstrong Siddeley, the engine company, as well as Avro. So Gloster was the obvious candidate as a second production source for the Hurricane when production needed ramped up in 1939.
Post merger will Hawker Siddeley, the parent, want to be building 2 aircraft in competition with each other?
Vickers-Armstrongs, the engineering company, owned Vickers (Aircraft) Ltd (manufacturers of the Wellington) and Supermarine Aviation Works (Vickers) Ltd (of Spitfire fame).
And then you have individual designers falling out with employers and moving to other companies. So Lobelle left Fairey in early 1940, having been sidelined a couple of months earlier, to go to R Malcolm Company, later ML Aviation. And Petter moving from Westland to English Electric in 1944.
And finally there is the shadow factory programme to consider. So the second manufacturer of the Battle was Austin Aircraft Ltd from 1938 in a new shadow factory at Longbridge (I'm not clear about the contractual arrangements between Fairey, Austin and the Govt for these aircraft). It subsequently went on to build 300 Hurricanes from Oct 1940 plus Stirling and Lancaster aircraft as well as parts for Beaufighters and Master trainers as well as final assembly of Airspeed Horsa gliders.
yulzari
Staff Sergeant
My goal was not to make better Battles but merely to release Merlins for any improved Gloster F5/34. But those Merlins would still be better off in more Hurricanes or Spitfires. The Vulture was too late for this task.
Shortround6
Major General
Thank you.
I am not much a Battle fan but the alternatives often mean the RAF going to war with hundreds of Hart/Hinds in 1st line squadrons.
Which also means a lower standard of trained maintenance personal in the early years. At least the "erks" got to maintain aircraft with two speed props, flaps, retractable landing gear, brakes and so on, unlike the Hart/Hind mechanics.
Few people want to come up with replacement aircraft for the roughly 1100 aircraft shipped to Canada and Australia for the Empire training scheme. Maybe they can scrape by with a few hundred less but stopping Battle production over 1000 short of historical numbers is going to need hundreds of additional trainers of some sort or you start running low (or lower) on pilots and aircrew (and erks) in late 1940-41 and later.
Perhaps the RAF could have made better use of the Battle in 1940 in combat but that required changes in doctrine, tactics and training in addition to some hardware.
If you don't change the doctrine, tactics and training for the Battle of France it doesn't matter what kind of aircraft (hardware) the squadrons have. The results would be much the same.
Admiral Beez
Major
Skip the Battle, Henley, Fulmar and Defiant. That'll free up four thousand Merlins for use in more Spitfires, Hurricanes, early Mosquitos and Lancasters, and whatever fighter the FAA can come up with…. Assuming it's not a Fulmar. Otherwise, make more Fulmars.
yulzari
Staff Sergeant
Does make me wonder how Fulmars instead of Battles would have got on in the BoF as dive bombers that could defend themselves?
Admiral Beez
Major
Until the Vultee Vengeance the RAF seemed to have no interest in dive bombers.
Even in spring 1941, after the Vengeance was ordered, the RAF had no interest in dive-bombers. AM Slessor:-
"....we don't want aircraft skidding around over Kent looking for enemy tanks, that is the job of the anti-tank gun."
Vindicators for the FAA and the initial Bermuda order came from French contracts taken over on the fall of France. It was Beaverbrook, as Minister of Aircraft Production from May 1940 that forced the dive bomber on the RAF. Further Bermuda orders were placed and an order for the Vengeance in June 1940 with the contract signed 3 July.
Design of the Vengeace had begun in early 1940 as a result of negotiations with the French for 300 to be delivered Oct 1940-Sept 1941, but no contract with them had been signed before the Armistice.
Beaverbrook's successor wrote
"We ordered in the United States as you know because prior to July 1940 no one at the Air Ministry had included dive-bombers in their requisitions, nor had anyone ordered even a prototype. So we had none of the stocks and the quickest way of getting them was in the USA."
Beaverbrook's biographer recorded the behind the scenes in fighting as follows:-
"Beaverbrook also wished to meet the needs of the Army. In July 1940 he placed a large order for dive bombers in Canada and the United States. Eden (then Secretary of State for War) was enthusiastic. The Air Ministry protested and refused to supply or train pilots."
So the order for the Vengeance was placed over the heads of the RAF, who then had to find a use for it. The RAF didn't want them in Europe so they were sent to India where there was a desperate need for aircraft, any aircraft. The first deliveries were received in Aug/Sept 1942 with the first operations in Oct in defence of Ceylon.
In the end, and after all their teething problems were worked out, they came to be highly regarded by the RAF, IAF and RAAF personnel flying them and the ground troops they supported. But they were withdrawn from the front line squadrons in India between Feb 1944 and Jan 1945 because no one in the Air Forces hierarchy wanted anything to do with dive bombing. The IAF units transitioned to Hurricanes and Spitfires, the RAF squadrons to Mosquitos and the RAAF to Liberators.
I recommend "Vengeance! The Vultee Vengeance Dive Bomber" by Peter C Smith for the history of this aircraft.
Last edited:
Shortround6
Major General
This over looks the factor of time.
You are are not going to get Merlin XX engines in 1941-42 by stopping production of Battles and Henley's in 1938-1939.
Trying to build Mosquitos and Lancaster's in 1939-40 using Merlin X engines gets you rather reduced performance aircraft.
Trying to build Mosquitos and Lancasters in 1938-39 using Merlin II, III, IV and V engines gets total crap for aircraft.
The Battle was equipping (or in the process of equipping) about 10 squadrons as of Jan 1938. It equipped at least 15 squadrons as of Sept 1939.
In Jan of 1938 Hawker Harts/Hinds were in service with about 20 squadrons of RAF light bombers. Had war broken out during 1938 or early 1939 the idea of using large numbers of Hawker biplanes is the stuff of nightmares.
Gloster built the Henley's not Hawker. They started in 1939 and finished in mid 1940 so there is some some for improvement, an extra 200 Hurricane Is ?
First production Fulmar was Jan 1940. 1st issue was May of 1940.
They had completed about 50 Defiants by Jan of 1940. This shows part of the problem with production planning. At that point they had 513 (?) on order ( the 50? completed, the just under 40 of the rest of the original order (April 1937) , the order for 202 placed in Feb 1938, another order for 161 placed in May of 1938 and in Dec of 1939 another order was placed.
The problem with this is that things like landing gear and brakes and structural components were ordered from subcontractors soon after the main factory receives the order for delivery months down the road. Unless somebody is willing to take the responsibility for (and agree to pay for) all the work done on these parts it is very difficult to "stop" production.
You also wind up with the problem that if you decide you want 500 more Hurricanes in Jan of 1940 and you will just cancel 500 Defiants it may solve the engine problem. However you have no landing gear or brakes or flap actuators or other bits and pieces on order to install in Hurricane "shells" even if Hurricanes were built out of a higher percentage of steel tubing and strip than some other aircraft.
You may very well wind up with your extra 500 Hurricanes but they won't show up until after the 500 Defiants would have shown up.
Shortround6
Major General
Which pretty much sums up the whole ground support idea on a wider scope and it also sums up some of the opposition to CC.
we don't want aircraft skidding around over Kent looking for enemy artillery, that is the job of the army artillery.
we don't want aircraft skidding around over Kent looking for enemy supply depots/convoys, that is the job of the Army long range artillery.
we don't want aircraft skidding around over the ocean looking for enemy U-boats, that is the job of the Royal Navy.
Until the RAF changed it's attitude about it's mission, doctrine, tactics then handing them a bunch of different aircraft was not really going to change much (squadron and group commanders can only do so much)
yulzari
Staff Sergeant
It always amazes me how the RAF and makers like Nuffield could tell the government, in a time of war, that no, we will do what we want. Heads should have rolled. Lord Nuffield for one enjoying a more healthy life as a Private in the Pioneer Corps and certain very senior RAF officers posted to Iceland and Nigeria.
On a different tack, the RAF could have had Fulmars had they not insisted upon the Battle as a tiny strategic short range level bomber. There was nothing in the Fulmar design that could not have been done in a Battle time scale instead.
But we digress far from the OP, for which I apologise.
On a different tack, the RAF could have had Fulmars had they not insisted upon the Battle as a tiny strategic short range level bomber. There was nothing in the Fulmar design that could not have been done in a Battle time scale instead.
But we digress far from the OP, for which I apologise.
Lancaster will be just fine with Merlin Xs. We can look at Halifax I, on these engines it was supposed to carry 3 times more than Wellington III (Hercules engines).
Mosquito with Merlin X is still a far, far better suggestion than any Blenheim, Beaufort or a pair of Battles.
Shortround6
Major General
If you actually get either the Lancaster or Mosquito as they were built with the later engines.
Please remember that the Mosquito as built (first 10 bombers) carried a 1000lb bomb load and that was in late 1941. It only got the 2000lb load when they cut down the length of the bomb fins and by that time they had the Merlin 21 engines that were running at higher boost than even the 1940 Merlin XX engines.
Figure about 200hp less per engine for Merlin X engines even running on 100 octane fuel, also figure in about 2000ft less altitude. If you are running 87 octane fuel you could be down well over 300hp per engine.
Yes it is still better than an Blenheim/Beaufort or single Battle (Battle never got a Merlin X engine) but it is not quite the game changer that having Merlin 21s with 14/16lb boost engines in 1940/41 would be.
For 9 months in 1942 there was ONE Mosquito bomber squadron.
As far as the Halifax comparison goes please compare the Halifax I with the Halifax II http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/Halifax/Halifax_II_ADS.jpg
Also note a few detail changes,
Halifax I did not have a dorsal turret (it did have a lower turret and guns out each side)
The Halifax II needed 200yds less take-off distance while weighing 1000lbs more.
The Halifax II had 3,000ft more ceiling at max weight.
As the war went on the British built more and larger airfields.
Operating lower let the AA guns have more time to shoot at the attackers.
Also note that at the time the Halifax I card was issued there were two squadrons equipped with Halifax's.
Also note that the RAF tried to use Halifax's for daylight bombing due to their heavy armament.
It took one six plane raid and one 15 plane raid to knock that idea back out of the RAF.
And again, until doctrine, tactics and training are changed then changing the aircraft are not going to change the results. 60 four engine bombers bombing the wrong city (or country) is not going to bring any better results than 180 twin bombers bombing the wrong target/s in 1940-41.
The changes in results that started happening in 1942 were a result of lessons learned, not really changes in the aircraft although they helped.
One wonders what might have been left out of early aircraft (bombs, fuel, guns, protection) to try to get the performance up to later more powerful versions.
Cutting down the fins is probably the easiest & fastest change to implement.
Better start making these "Mosquitoes minus" ASAP.
German fighters of 1939-40 are also much, much slower than what was case in 1942, talk 50 mph deficit (greater for the Bf 110s). Bf 109E also has no endurance chasing the actually fast bombers.
Battle with Merlin X will still be well under 300 mph.
A slow bomber operating without escort is a no-no. Night operations are something else.
Service ceiling at max weight of Halifax I was at 18000 ft. Compares well with with Whitley V (same engine) at 17600, that of Whitley VIII at 16000 ft, or Wellington I at 15000 ft. Yes, Wellington III is better (19500), but it carries 3 times less the bombs' weight.
Results (or non-results) will probably be similar.
A fleet of 60 4-engined bombers will require 240 engines and props (minimum), vs. 360 engines and props required by 180 2-engined bombers. Also less crew: 7 x 60 = 420 vs. 180 x 5.5 (= depending on the heavy bomber in case)= 990. Crucially, much less pilots and navigators, just a 3rd of what the 2-engined fleet will require. Also less bomb sights, guns and turrets.
On the Battle and Blenheim I, there was almost nothing to remove - there was no protection, a pair of guns was present, meager bomb load, not much of fuel. What was there were the too big and too draggy airframes - these can't be dealt with nip & tuck. Engine power vs. what was required from it was laughable.
Later Blenheims gained protection, fuel and firepower, performance went from bad to appalling.
Shortround6
Major General
Yes but it requires several things. Technically it was easy to trim the fins, The hard part was convincing the RAF that they actually needed 500lb bombs
In 1940 they made about 4 times the number of 250lbs GP bombs than they did 500lb GP bombs. It 1941 it was roughly equal and production vs actual use may have varied considerably in 1942, The British were also shifting to MC case bombs and 1000lb bombs and incendiaries in 1942.
The Mosquito lite will be more effective than the older light bombers, just don't expect quite the same performance (either speed or load) that the Merlin 21 powered versions had.
Early Mosquitos were used for recon and for nightfighters. The Night fighter role could be done by the Mosquito lite, but here there are two differences, Most of the Luftwaffe flies of to Russia in May/June of 1941 leaving a lack of targets. 2nd it takes until April/May of 1941 for the radar and ground controllers to come together. A 340mph Mosquito light is not going to give much better results than a Beaufighter because the radar and technique needed more work.
You are correct but it shows that unless RAF thinking changed somewhat higher performance aircraft could/would be miss-used.
Planes will burn off some weight and not be operating at max gross over targets, but again, lower the ceiling of the Lancaster by 3,000ft and the speed by 20mph or so. It is better but not a big game changer.
I was actually referring to a Mosquito lite or Lancaster lite. If you need to take-off several thousand pounds lighter due to the less powerful engines what do you leave out of the lower powered Mosquitos and Lancasters that some people want to build?
Especially if you try to backdate them to use Melrin II-V engines out of Battles or Defiants.
They only built about 350 Defiant IIs with Merlin XX engines so there isn't a big pool of engines to use for this scheme.
RR built about 4900 Merlin X engines but these were used to power about 400 Wellington IIs and around 1700 (?) Whitleys so 4200 plus the couple score of Halifax's plus spare engines.
No idea how much trouble to would have been to convert single speed Merlin production to two speed in 1939 and early 1940. However Derby built 312 X engines and Crewe built 4,589 X engines. Ford and Glasgow don't seem to show up until the Merlin XX?
The RAF needed to cancel the Defiant in early 1939, before things got very far. But that means admitting the turret fighter was a mistake. However you do have the Hurricane and Spitfire to take up the slack
Canceling the Battle is a lot harder. You need to start making something, anything, anything at all, really ! to replace the Hawker Harts/Hinds in 1937-38.
Hundreds of Harts/Hinds and cousins were converted to dual control trainers and were still flying in 1939-40 (and later) after being replaced by Battles.
People who want to cancel the Battle production need to have plan for replacing the Hawker biplane bomber fleet.
Now the Battles and Blenheims could have been used more effectively in several rolls than they were, and improved with somewhat minor tweaks (some of which should have been figured out in 1939. Armor trials for protection were being carried out in ranges in 1938). But that required some elements of the RAF change their thinking and that was harder than changing aircraft.
repeating this. The RAF believed that slow bombers could be used for ground attack/interdiction with no escort or the aid of a "fighter sweep" in the general area of and time of bomber attack. Until they got that idea out of their heads close support was going to be a disaster, which can then be used to justify the idea that close support was a waste of resources and the RAF should go back to bombing enemy cities.
Take a Fairey Battle and
1, take out the existing fuel tanks and fit smaller ones with some sort of protection ( horsehide and glue, 4mm sheet steel, something) . There is no reason for 1000 miles of range for a tactical bomber in Europe.
2. Fit 4mm-6mm armor for the rear gunner and pilot. Leave one man on the ground.
3. fit 4mm bathtub to radiator
Some sort of protection from ground fire and or 7.9mm machine gunss
4. Fit two guns in the back or fit single Browning gun with large ammo belt.
5. fit a 2nd forward firing machine gun.
Now for extra difficulty,
6. fit a low altitude supercharger (like a Merlin VIII)
7. convert two speed prop to constant speed.
8, Provide fighter escort
9. Provide fighter escort
10. provide fighter escort
It won't save France but cutting losses by even 50% would have been huge.
Admiral Beez
Major
Too bad. A couple of DB squadrons would have been useful at Ceylon in March 1942 or earlier in Burma and Malaya.
Your quote of AM Slessor reminded me of the commander of Fortress Singapore, Maj-Gen. Simmons a seemingly useless fool who reportedly was "an ardent supporter of the concept that defence construction was detrimental to troop morale"
