Can some of the explanation for the P-38's greater success in the Pacific be attributed to poorer Japanese pilots?

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Oh I'm hip to that difference. We also have to consider low and high speed turning, and instantaneous vs. continuous... but P-38 does have this advantage that it can ride a stall well
 
Wild_Bill_Kelso said:
The P-38K looks even better but was that an actual variant?
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The K would have been the ultimate P-38 but the production line would have had to been halted


With the P-38K, was the P-51 and F4U even necessary?

A five (5) gun (.50 caliber) armed P-38K with drop tanks would have made a very dangerous long-range escort / patrol fighter in every theatre of operation. Why this didn't happen is beyond me. ( The following comes from: Whatever Happened To The P-38K ? ) The Story Of The Best Performing...
ww2aircraft.net
 
Your last paragraph sparked a thought.. Imagine the Luftwaffe intercepting incoming Betty Bombers escorted by Zeros..
Thinking it through, once the Germans adjusted to the speed of the Japanese planes and lack of "the bomber-box" defense, I believe their extensive use of cannons and mine ammo would make quick work out of the flammable planes of the Rising Sun.
 
Back-tracking just a little bit, let's review why Japanese pilots became less effective on average as the war progressed.

We know that the best Japanese pilots were every bit as skilled as the best American pilots, and were likely superior at the very beginning of the war. But the Japanese system was not as good as the American system, for a variety of cultural reasons. To list just a few of them:

The American system placed a high value of the life of a pilot, and therefore much energy was spent recovering pilots who survived being shot down. Warships would return to the scene of a battle to search for and recover pilots who had ditched their planes, and submarines were routinely stationed along the flight path of returning bombers to pick up pilots who needed a ride home. The Japanese code (I want to say "Samurai" code, but it probably goes deeper than that) honored a warrior who gave his life in battle, and a pilot who had been shot down may not even have wanted to be rescued. As a result, more American pilots lived to fight another day.

The American way of thinking resulted in pilots serving a "tour of duty" and then returning home. The Japanese system kept their pilots in combat indefinitely. This gave American pilots a much better chance of not dying in combat, which at a very minimum was good for morale.

Japanese access to oil was restricted, so pilot training was done with less fuel spent (i.e., fewer hours of training). The longer the war went on, the fewer flight hours each new pilot had accumulated.

The best of the returning American pilots were asked to be flight instructors, thus imparting their hard-won experience to subsequent new pilots. The Japanese had no such system (to my knowledge). Therefore newly-trained American pilots started off with a large advantage over newly-trained Japanese pilots.

The question is, at what point did the clear weaknesses of the Japanese system begin to be obvious? I want to put that point at or near the end of the Guadalcanal campaign, but I am plagued by doubt. Could it be that when Japan had not clearly won the war by the six-month mark and Yamamoto was no longer able to "run wild," Japanese air power was already beginning to feel the pinch?

I'm hoping that the many well-informed veteran members of this forum can further my education on this matter.
 
Passenger_57 said:
Off topic I know, but I always found McGuire's MOH citation strange. Instead of a single event it was for his whole Pacific Career.
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Not strange. Bong's is similar;

"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action above and beyond the call of duty in the Southwest Pacific area from October 10, to November 15, 1944. Though assigned to duty as gunnery instructor and neither required nor expected to perform combat duty, Maj. Bong voluntarily and at his own urgent request engaged in repeated combat missions, including unusually hazardous sorties over Balikpapan, Borneo, and in the Leyte area of the Philippines. His aggressiveness and daring resulted in his shooting down 8 enemy airplanes during this period."
 
Even worse it was family day with the families of the crew on the ground watching. His co-pilot was a squadron cmdr who told his pilots to never fly with the LTC Pilot so he flew as co-pilot. There was also a retiring Col onboard for his final flight before his retirement. His whole family was on the ground waiting for his last flight wet down ceremony.

Did any of the numerous senior officers who had done nothing about his previous incidents go down in flames?
 
This is not quite true.

Japanese pilots with high combat time were sent back to do flight school duty as part of an R&R break. Especually ones that had been injured. This practice continued until the war situation became dire in late '44/early '45 where the experienced pilots were kept at command level.

This is a rather complex problem, but the short answer is, again, not really true.

The IJA never intended to be operating in the Pacific Ocean region (this was supposed to belong to the IJN) and never developed a sea rescue program.
The IJN did attempt pilot rescue where possible, but never put a dedicated system in place (poor planning or didn't think it nessecity before the war started in earnest), but as the war drug on, they simply did not have the resources.

My Uncle's sub rescued downed Japanese crews who gladly came aboard save for one or two, who preferred to swim away and drown or drew a weapon on the sub and were shot in return.
 
Going over the engine specs a few things come to mind. From the numbers it would appear that the F and G were not that much better than the E at altitudes in the mid 20s and while better than anything else available in 1942 to the Americans operations in support of B-17s from England may have been lacking (hindsight).

The Numbers I gave from the 1944 manual are the 1944 numbers.

Numbers for the P-38F bounced around quite a bit in 1942, for instance the numbers I gave
P-38F
take-off..........................1240hp/3000rpm/44.5in...................21,000ft *
Em MAX.........................not possible.....................................................
Military power. ..........1325hp/3000rpm/47in......................15,000ft
max cont........................1000hp/2600rpm/38in.....................27,000ft

as off March 13th 1942 were actually
take-off..........................1150hp/3000rpm/41.5in..................
Military power. ..........1150hp/3000rpm/41.5in................25,000ft
max cont.......................1000hp/2600rpm/--in.....................25,000ft

But by Oct 23, 1942 they had been upgraded to
take-off..........................1325hp/3000rpm/47.5in..................SL-4,000ft
Military power. ..........1240hp/3000rpm/--in.....................4,000ft to 25,000
max cont.......................1000hp/2600rpm/--in.....................27,000ft

The engine could make 1325hp but the intercoolers were having trouble handling the airflow.
It was taking a long to get approvals for the higher power settings and the 8th Fighter Command started using their own ratings.
Military power............1300hp/3000rpm/47in..................SL-20,000ft after 8-15-42
Military power. ..........1250hp/3000rpm/45in..................15,000ft to 25,000 after 8-23-42 (one week later?)
WER................................1450hp/3000rpm/52in...................under 11,000ft Proposed by 8th FC
Claimed that in 2 months of operating at those settings there were no engine failures.

Allison had pushed for higher WER for the P-39, P-40 and P-51 engines in 1942. However Allison recommended NOT establishing WER for the any P-38s before the "H" model.

I have no idea when the Army decided to use 1425hp military rating instead of the 1325hp rating for the P-38Gs. But Allison claimed the P-38Gs were good for 1325hp to 25,000ft.
Something to remember here. the engine superchargers changed several times and turbos changed 3 times.

YP-38-P-38E..........................6.44 S/C.......................B-2 turbo
P-38F........................................7.48 S/C......................B-2 turbo
P-38G.......................................7.48 S/C......................B-13 turbo
P-38H-1..................................8.10 S/C......................B-13 turbo
P-38H-5-P-38L....................8.10 S/C......................B-33 turbo

So you had 5 combinations plus the change in intercoolers on the Js plus the change in the radiators on H versions.

In the Pacific the Japanese were always behind the curve compared to the P-38. At any given time the P-38 had an altitude advantage over the Japanese (unlike the P-39s and P-40s).
in the Med things may have been closer, the Italians either had no hope (granted a few P-38s may have been shot down by MC 200s or?) or had very few fighters in 1943 that had any hope. Germans were the best opposition but the Med was not usually a 20,000ft plus area. The Germans and Italians were trying to shoot down allied aircraft operating at lower altitudes the B-17s/B-24s (or the B-24s were operating at lower altitudes anyway). The different forces may have gone into battle at over 20,000ft trying to get the bounce but the battle didn't often stay there (or return?)

In Europe the P-38Fs (and some Es) left before operations got going and went to North Africa. The P-38s didn't return to Europe (not counting Italy) until Hs and the Js. H and Js were built at the same time, not sequentially as the supplier for the intercoolers could not keep up for a number of months.
 
I have in recent years come to question the usual story about Japanese lack of oil being a problem for them. It certainly became a problem from late 1943 when the Allies began to target their tanker traffic with both air and submarine attacks. But much less so before that.

The Japanese moved at least part, probably the advanced part, of their training activities to the Singapore area and the DEI where the oil (incl the vital aviation fuel) was produced. That would have continued until early 1945 when the DEI became cut off from the Japanese homeland. In early 1944 they moved a large part of their main fleet down to the Singapore area to be near those oil supplies.

They also carried out a major reorganisation of their naval aviation as of Feb 1944. Aircraft and carriers were from that point separated i.e. a move towards a western model. But each air group was spread across several carriers.

So between Dec 1943 and March 1944 Air Group 601 was formed and posted to 1st Carrier Division (Taiho, Shokaku & Zuikaku). It comprised 81 Zeros, 81 Suisei dive bombers, 54 Tenzan torpedo bombers and 9 carrier recce aircraft.

The aircrew in 601 were a mix (I have no details of how the numbers broke down). Aircrew came from various homeland air groups, or straight from flight training and even some from seaplane units, plus survivors from Rabaul & the Marshall Islands campaigns. While all the aircraft were transported south on the carriers only part of the aircrews went with them. The others were flown to Singapore via Formosa. At this stage the carriers were very much non-operational, acting simply as transports.

But their intensive training to bring them up to combat readiness only began in April and is supposed to have been completed in mid-May before, in mid-June, the A-Go Operation was begun leading to the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

Air Group 652 assigned to the 2nd Carrier Division in 1944 (Junyo, Hiyo & Ryuho) was formed in March around a core of pilots who had survived the battles around Rabaul and Truk in the preceding months. As far as the fighter pilots were concerned, the majority had come from carrier attack and bomber units and almost none had battle experience. They trained, as a group, in Japan itself. Again only 2 months or so were allowed. One piece of training that they lacked was deck landing experience.

Air Group 653 assigned to the 3rd Carrier Division (Chitose, Chiyoda & Zuiho) was formed in Feb 1944. It's level of training was considered the lowest, the majority of its pilots were new, its officer strength coming from those who graduated in Sept 1943 & Jan 1944. The carriers sailed for the base at Tawi Tawi in mid-May.

Add to that and just to make things more difficult, the fighter elements of 652 & 653 had also gained a new fighter bomber role that they were required to train for.

So by the beginning of 1944 the damage was done. There was a core of experience in the units at that point but they were probably tired from previous campaigns. The Japanese were not investing, or was it able to invest, so much time in training each air group, before deploying them into action.

Just by way of comparison, the Corsair squadrons formed by the FAA around the period Jun-Oct 1943 generally only had the C.O., Senior Pilot and a couple of flight commanders with previous combat experience and the other 6-8 pilots being straight from flying schools (and probably with longer in the cockpit than the average Japanese pilot at a similar stage in his career). But they did not begin to see operational service until Feb-April 1944. That is 3-4 times longer to work up as a formation compared to the Japanese navy pilots.

It is also worth looking at the time the carriers had to work up in this period. Taiho completed in March 1944 and was thrown into combat in June. Chitose & Chiyoda only completed their carrier conversions Dec 1943 / Jan 1944. The other carriers available to the Japanese at the beginning of 1944 had by then 1-3 years of experience under their belts.

The average time for an Essex class carrier to go from completion in the yard to front line at Pearl Harbour was 6 months, with a complete air group aboard from very early in that process, albeit not necessarily the air group they entered combat with.

I haven't looked at the IJAAF but I do recall that when the FAA met their fighters during Operation Meridian against the refineries in Sumatra in Jan 1945, they encountered a number of very well trained fighter pilots. ISTR comments about them being instructors at units based there.
 

About the boosted P-38 ailerons.

The hydraulic boost meant that the P-38 pilot could turn the wheel rapidly and get full deflection right away with wheel movement whereas, before boosted ailerons, he could use all his strength and not get full aileron travel. The aileron itself goes rapidly into full deflection under boost.

But, the engines are mounted off the centerline and have some inertia, so the airframe itself starts to roll right away, but takes some degrees of movement before getting fully up to max rotational roll speed. I have heard several people who should know say it takes about 45° - 60° of movement before the P-38 was really rolling, depending on airspeed ... faster takes less time as more air is being deflected. Also, once rolling at full speed, if you center the wheel, it takes some degrees of movement before the roll stops. I have heard about 5° - 15°, depending in airspeed, but can't say for sure as I am not a P-38 pilot.

As it happens, we have two flyable P-38's at Chino, CA. One is a P-38J-20 without aileron boost (Planes of Fame) and the other is a P-38L (Allied Fighters) with boost. Several of the Planes of Fame pilots have flown both and have remarked on the difference between them in roll. They aren't flying in combat, but they all do overhead breaks for landing and generally put in almost full aileron for the break. Naturally, the overhead break isn't "at speed" since they are in the landing pattern. When slow, there is little to choose between them. When fast, it's a different story. When fast, a boost system doubles (or more) the roll rate.
 
Most of this I agree with but you went off the rails here:

Shortround6 said:
in the Med things may have been closer, the Italians either had no hope (granted a few P-38s may have been shot down by MC 200s or?) or had very few fighters in 1943 that had any hope.
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MC 202 was well matched against a P-38F, G or H (which were in Theater at that time) especially at 20k' + altitude and there were plenty of them (up to several dozen in individual battles - sometimes more MC 202 than there were Bf 109s avalaible) and there were also small numbers of MC 205 available by April 1943 and these definitely compared very well to P-38s. I can look up some specific encounters from MAW.


Again, this is incorrect. By 1943 for sure there were plenty of Spitfire Mk Vs, P-40F/L and a litle later a few Spitfire Mk IX, in addition to the P-38s. All of these Allied fighters were routinely flying at or around 20k' for high cover, and Axis fighters, in particular Bf 109s and MC 202s / 205s were routinely, by doctrine, flying at 20-25k ft by this time, so as to have an initial advantage in attacks. Both the US and British fighter units practiced turning into attacks from above as formal doctrine, to counter this.

So there was actually quite a bit of combat going on at over 20,000 ft.

The Bf 109 and MC 202 both had better performance at that altitude than the Spit V or P-40F, which were the most numerically significant Allied fighters at that point, and the P-38 had various problems at altitude. The big thing for the Axis fighters was that they could fight at ~20k', then climb away to higher altitudes to disengage. Toward the end of 1943 some P-47s were available as well as increasing numbers of Spit IX and some Spit VIII (and improved P-38s) which were much more evenly matched at higher altitudes.

The P-38s however were often being tasked to escort B-24s on long range missions then, usually at altitude, where they did encounter both Bf 109s and MC 202s (and a few MC 205s).
 

Yeah I know Saburo Sakai was working as an instructor for a while after his injury. I think this was more of an ad-hoc basis though rather than a formal policy..

I think the US rotated most combat veteran pilots back (not just the best ones) to work with training units in the States or in some other relatively safe area for a 'tour' before they would be rotated back to combat again. This was mainly to rapidly disseminate lessons learned in the field. They also did this with ground crew and mechanics when possible, which also helped a lot.


Fair point about the IJA, and IJN did indeed rescue some pilots. But as a general policy, they did not emphasize pilot rescue. In many cases either they lacked parchutes or pilots went up without them as a form of bravado or something, and they rarely had dinghy's for surviving water landings. I haven't read many examples of IJN fleet assets being diverted for pilot rescue and they don't seem to have used their seaplanes and flying boats for this very much either. There were some large organized efforts to rescue stranded troops such as near Papua, but efforts to rescue pilots were fairly haphazard and ad-hoc, at least from reading the operational histories.

The US by contrast, and I'd say the Commonwealth as well, put enormous and systematic efforts to rescue pilots. Large numbers of surface ships and submarines were put to this task. This was probably the most significant mission success of the PT boat units in the Solomons (their torpedoes being sadly ineffective) and PBY, PBM, OS2U, PBY4Y, B-17s, B-24s etc., as well as many SBD and TBF etc. were routinely tasked with this duty as were Hudsons, Sunderlands, and even Beaufighters from the commonwealth forces.... and they employed the network of coast watchers and friendly natives to help locate and rescue pilots as well. Even these efforts were not fully successful, and there were some dreadful failures such as with USS Indianapolis, but the overall effect was of far better results in the intense attrition warfare of the period... in the sense that the Allies got a fairly large percentage of downed aircrew (not just pilots) back from the seas and jungles (something like half or more in some periods) whereas for the Japanese the 'save rate' was fairly negligible.
 
GrauGeist said:
Off the top of my head, some of the aces that were assigned to flight school duty were Nishizawa, Shimikawa and Iwamoto.

There's many others, these are just the ones that come to mind.
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yeah I know this was done, there were at least dozens of others. But thousands of Anglo-American-Commonwealth pilots were sent back to home units, sometimes as formal instructors, sometimes just as pilots integrated into newly formed units (but often assigned as flight or squadron leaders etc.) where their experience would inevitably be shared. I'm not saying the Japanese didn't do it but i think the scale of the Anglo-Americans was greater by an order of magnitude. And it payed dividends.

US, Australian and British fighter pilots in the more remote Theaters such as the SW Pacific, China, and the Western Desert / Med were often almost tragically under-trained, with very little training on type. I know for example that both US and Australian air units fighting in Darwin and then into Papua lost more than half of their aircraft just making it up into the battle area, mainly because they were so unfamiliar with the type (and with high performance aircraft in general) they were constantly crashing on takeoffs and landings.

These guys were going up against 'strak' units like Tinian air group and JG. 27 and were suffering accordingly. But this changed very quickly, particularly with the US units. The workup that P-38 pilots got in the pacific in the OTU was part of this. USAAF pilots in particular in early 1942 were very well trained as pilots, but very inexperienced on type and with appropriate tactics (USN were better). By the time USAAF fighter groups made it to MTO just about six months later however, I know that both British and German aces expressed their surprise, even shock at how well trained the pilot were, how familiar they were with their aircraft, and how disciplined they were etc.. I know that US Spitfire and P-40 pilots for example were carefully integrated with experienced British units initially, then after flying a few weeks of combat, experienced US pilots were lent to the other arriving units and so on. This also applied to ground crew who quickly reached such a high level of proficiency that they were able to get captured Axis aircraft flying (and therefore usable as training aids) within weeks or even days.

All that kind of stuff makes a very big difference!
 
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