Canberra (not) in Korea

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Dimlee

Tech Sergeant
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Feb 18, 2018
Was English Electric Canberra ever considered for the Korean War?
And if it was, why not deployed there?

Wikipedia:
"In May 1951, the Canberra entered RAF squadron service, No. 101 Squadron being the first to receive the type. In a testament to the aircraft's benign handling characteristics, the transition programme for the Canberra consisted of only 20 hours in the Gloster Meteor and three hours in a dual-control Canberra trainer ".
The transition program is short, Meteor pilots with combat service are available and there is demand for a fast bomber with the bomb load higher than of jet fighter bombers used through the war.
Wiki again:
"The production of the Canberra was accelerated as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War, orders for the aircraft increased and outpaced production capacity, as the aircraft was designated as a "super priority". A further five squadrons were able to be equipped with the Canberra by the end of 1952; however, production in the 1951–52 period had only been half of the level planned, due to shortages in skilled manpower, material, and suitable machine tools. "

I assume that European needs are of top priority and if (allegedly) just half of the units are equipped by the end of 1952, there is little chance to equip all units in Europe until the Armistice in July 1953.
Or were there other reasons to keep Canberra out of the Korean War?
 
Was English Electric Canberra ever considered for the Korean War?
And if it was, why not deployed there?

Wikipedia:
"In May 1951, the Canberra entered RAF squadron service, No. 101 Squadron being the first to receive the type. In a testament to the aircraft's benign handling characteristics, the transition programme for the Canberra consisted of only 20 hours in the Gloster Meteor and three hours in a dual-control Canberra trainer ".
The transition program is short, Meteor pilots with combat service are available and there is demand for a fast bomber with the bomb load higher than of jet fighter bombers used through the war.
Wiki again:
"The production of the Canberra was accelerated as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War, orders for the aircraft increased and outpaced production capacity, as the aircraft was designated as a "super priority". A further five squadrons were able to be equipped with the Canberra by the end of 1952; however, production in the 1951–52 period had only been half of the level planned, due to shortages in skilled manpower, material, and suitable machine tools. "

I assume that European needs are of top priority and if (allegedly) just half of the units are equipped by the end of 1952, there is little chance to equip all units in Europe until the Armistice in July 1953.
Or were there other reasons to keep Canberra out of the Korean War?
There were very few land based planes deployed by commonwealth forces in Korea. According to wiki The only front-line unit from a Commonwealth air force to serve under BCFK was Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) No. 77 Squadron, which initially flew P-51 Mustang fighters and later converted to Gloster Meteor jets. British and Canadian aircrews also served with the RAAF. The only Royal Air Force contribution was a wing of Short Sunderland flying boats based at Iwakuni in Japan. British Commonwealth Forces Korea - Wikipedia
 
There were very few land based planes deployed by commonwealth forces in Korea. According to wiki The only front-line unit from a Commonwealth air force to serve under BCFK was Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) No. 77 Squadron, which initially flew P-51 Mustang fighters and later converted to Gloster Meteor jets. British and Canadian aircrews also served with the RAAF. The only Royal Air Force contribution was a wing of Short Sunderland flying boats based at Iwakuni in Japan. British Commonwealth Forces Korea - Wikipedia

You are right, thanks for this reminder.
So we can assume that besides the production and other issues on the UK side, there are political and bureaucratic obstacles as well.
Unless RAF dedicated squadron goes to Korea, RAAF (subject Canberras are available) should find/train enough crews from the domestic pool. Withdrawing No.77 Squadron from the frontline service is not desirable and does not resolve the manning problem anyway, since Canberra needs 3 men to operate.
Still, it would be interesting to know if Canberra was planned for Korea deployment, within RAF or Commonwealth Forces, at all.
 
I believe the Royal Navy supplied a carrier and Sea Furies which carried D-day style stripes so the the yanks wouldn't shoot them.
 
Deploying a new jet for its first missions on the other side of the world is a big ask. If the Canberra was considered at all it would have been by the RAF using USA facilities to assist US operations and so even if it did happen, officially it wouldn't have, unless one was lost.
 
Strictly speaking, Allied support during the Korean War was a United Nations-sanctioned operation, but it was up to the countries involved as to what they would send. 16 countries sent support in various guises, as diverse as Ethiopea, Greece, Colombia and New Zealand. Given how new they were into service, sending Canberras would have been risky to say the least. The RAF was still working out jet bomber tactics in the nuclear age. An example was the use of Vickers Valiants during the Suez Crisis; these sophisticated four-engined nuclear bombers carried out bombing raids that differed little in terms of process to what Bomber Command were flying in the early years of World War Two - their H2S bombing radar was not yet ready and so they had to bomb visually through the glass.
 
there are political and bureaucratic obstacles as well.

I'm slowly working my way through Max Hastings' re-released book on the Korean War and there are a few themes he keeps bringing up early in the book.
There was some thought at the time that this (the South Korean invasion) was a diversion by the communists who were expected to hit hard somewhere else in the World. As a result there was not the desire to go in with everything they had in what was described as a "police action" and expected to be over by late 1950. I guess this is why SAC were never going to employ the B-47. I'm therefore assuming for the same reason the Brits were not gonna send in what was for them a new, very advanced light bomber that was just coming into service. He also iterates there was some understandable reluctance by the British it invest in the war so soon after WW2.
In the chapter on the Air War he keeps stating that by the end of 1950 the allied air forces were running out of strategic targets.

Scan0502.jpg
 
Deploying a new jet for its first missions on the other side of the world is a big ask.

I think you sum it up nicely pbehn. So new, so advanced, so secret - do you really want at such an early development, to risk it ending up in a Communist rice paddy...

Scan0503.jpg
 
I'm slowly working my way through Max Hastings' re-released book on the Korean War and there are a few themes he keeps bringing up early in the book.
There was some thought at the time that this (the South Korean invasion) was a diversion by the communists who were expected to hit hard somewhere else in the World. As a result there was not the desire to go in with everything they had in what was described as a "police action" and expected to be over by late 1950. I guess this is why SAC were never going to employ the B-47. I'm therefore assuming for the same reason the Brits were not gonna send in what was for them a new, very advanced light bomber that was just coming into service. He also iterates there was some understandable reluctance by the British it invest in the war so soon after WW2.
In the chapter on the Air War he keeps stating that by the end of 1950 the allied air forces were running out of strategic targets.

View attachment 617435

This book, I assume.
https://amzn.to/2O19pKT
One of my latest on this subject: https://amzn.to/3u6eQrj. I learned a lot about British/Commonwealth participation.
Yes, the fear of a more powerful strike elsewhere was common and was justified.

Strategic targets were replaced with new tactical targets after the Chinese invasion. So, there was a job for Canberra in theory.

USSR kept Il-28 out of the conflict as well but allegedly deployed 2 squadrons from the 132nd BAD in China.
 
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There were very few land based planes deployed by commonwealth forces in Korea. According to wiki The only front-line unit from a Commonwealth air force to serve under BCFK was Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) No. 77 Squadron, which initially flew P-51 Mustang fighters and later converted to Gloster Meteor jets. British and Canadian aircrews also served with the RAAF. The only Royal Air Force contribution was a wing of Short Sunderland flying boats based at Iwakuni in Japan. British Commonwealth Forces Korea - Wikipedia
I believe the Royal Navy supplied a carrier and Sea Furies .....

In September 1951 HMAS SYDNEY, under the command of Captain David H. Harries RAN, relieved HMS GLORY as the carrier representative of the British naval forces in the Korean theatre. It was an historic occasion, being the first time that any Dominion carrier had gone into action.

Squadrons embarked at the time were numbers 805 (Sea Furies), 808 (Sea Furies) and 817 (Fireflies). In addition the United States Navy had loaned SYDNEY a helicopter and crew members.

Operations continued until 25 January 1952, SYDNEY's last day of participation in the Korean War. SYDNEY spent 64 days in the operational area (not including passage from Sasebo or Kure) mainly as the British Commonwealth carrier of the west coast patrol, which saw a total of 2,366 sorties flown. The average daily sortie rate was 55.2 per full flying day (21.2 days were taken up with replenishment, passage between the west and east coasts, and bad weather). Ammunition expenditure during the course of SYDNEY's seven patrols totalled 269,249 x 20mm rounds; 6,359 rocket projectiles; and 902 bombs of 1,000-lb and 500-lb weight.
 
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If we look back to WWII, the RAF kept the Meteor from operating beyond Allied lines.
The reasinung was to prevent it from being downed (in the event of contact) behind enemy lines and thus the new technology falling into enemy hands.
The Canberra was new tech, any bugs had yet to be worked out plus the ChiComs were hand in hand with the Soviets - the RAF was not willing to risk it.
 
If we look back to WWII, the RAF kept the Meteor from operating beyond Allied lines.
The reasinung was to prevent it from being downed (in the event of contact) behind enemy lines and thus the new technology falling into enemy hands.
The Canberra was new tech, any bugs had yet to be worked out plus the ChiComs were hand in hand with the Soviets - the RAF was not willing to risk it.
Britain willingly gave the plans for the RR Nene to the Soviets postwar. Stalin was amazed at Britain's decision and quickly had MiG use this engine as the basis for the MiG-15.
 
Sea Fury had a longer range (almost 50% longer) and there were more available to make up for combat casualties.
The North Koreans had the Lavachin La-9 and La-11 plus the Yak-9. The Sea Fury should be able to give these three a challenge. These two look ideally matched.

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Hawker Sea Fury - Wikipedia
  • Maximum speed: 460 mph (740 km/h, 400 kn) at 18,000 ft (5,486 m)
  • Service ceiling: 35,800 ft (10,900 m)
  • Rate of climb: 4,320 ft/min (21.9 m/s)
  • Guns: 4 × 20 mm (.79 in) Hispano Mk V autocannon
Lavochkin La-11 - Wikipedia
  • Maximum speed: 674 km/h (419 mph, 364 kn) at altitude
  • Service ceiling: 10,250 m (33,630 ft)
  • Rate of climb: 12.63[7] m/s (2,486 ft/min)
  • Guns: 3 × 23 mm Nudelman-Suranov NS-23 cannon
Why can't Wikipedia settle on a standard order of UOMs? Km/h first, them Mph first? Make up your mind.
 
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Okay, but the FAA has the Attacker and Vampire. Why send Sea Furies.
The first RN Supermarine Attacker squadron was No 800 Naval Squadron... which got its aircraft in August 1951.
It went out of front-line RN service in 1954 (replaced by the Sea Hawk), and departed from the RNVR in 1957... to be shipped off to equip the newly-formed Pakistani Air Force!

Have you looked at the service record and performance specs of the Attacker?

When compared to USN jet fighters, it only compares favorably to the FJ Fury... not the modified F-86F, the original straight-winged Fury! It is lower in performance than the F2H Banshee and the F9F Panther... both of which suffered badly at the hands of the MiG-15s in Korea!

The Attacker's main achievement in RN service was to provide its pilots and aircraft handlers/maintenance personnel with experience with operating a jet aircraft aboard a carrier.

It most certainly would have been a sitting duck against ANY Soviet jet-fighter that served in Korea... it was of comparable performance with the Mig-9 or the Yak-23!
 
the RAF kept all of their Meteors (including the night-fighter variants) out of the fighting.

Good point.
British officials were disappointed with the Australians and their performance with the Gloster Meteor. The RAF's senior representative in Korea, Air Vice-Marshall Bouchier criticised the RAAF and recommended that the RAF send 12 of "it's very best hand picked jet fighter pilots" to show the Australians how it can be done.
However the RAF's chief, Sir John Slessor demurred, and decided not to get involved in a "rather unpleasant argument" for fear that if the British mission would fail, it would affect RAF Meteor pilots morale back in the UK, not to mention overseas sales of the Meteor.
 
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