captured Zekes before June 1942

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KraziKanuK said:
Non Christian societies. Not sure what the holy day, if they have one, for the Japanese.

McNamara, absolutely agree. :D

Oh, but the whole world (1941) is christian, right? :rolleyes:

McNamara - I can't believe he hasn't blown his brains out yet! Denial is an amazing self help tool when you're responsible for the deaths of 56,000 soldiers! :rolleyes:
 
Mark Clark, Commander of US 5th Army, was quite good at denying that he had ever made a mistake. Even with the benefit of hindsight he refuses to admit that the failure of the Italian campaign was his, and his alone.

I am sorry, I had to throw that in there. After all, the discussion (which is good) has skirted on the trails of denial by seniors.
 
Westmoreland, who commanded American military operations in the Vietnam War from 1964 to 1968, allegedlly justified the horror of Vietnam and Cambodia by saying this:


"We didn't really lose that war. We bought time for the ASEAN nations to hold out against the communists."

That was basically it. Straight from the Source.

The ASEAN nations---the Association of Southeast Asian Nations---were Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia.

They were a huge prize, with enormous population, resources and strategic value. The domino theory by which the US command operated said we were in Vietnam to prevent them from being overrun by the Chinese, Soviets and other communist forces, seen and unseen.

Throughout the Vietnam era, Thailand and Malaysia swung back and forth between nasty dictatorship and faltering thrusts at democracy.

But in 1963 Singapore fell to a brutal totalitarian dictator named Lee Kwan Yew, who turned the former British city-state into an Orwellian nightmare. Ferdinand Marcos ran The Philippines (which the US first conquered in 1903) with an iron fist. And in 1965, the CIA helped kill as many as three million people to give Indonesia to Suharto, a brutal kleptocrat who stole billions from the world's fifth-largest nation while killing or imprisoning all who opposed him.

Were these the model citizens in whose name William Westmoreland claimed victory for American democracy, at the cost of so many lives and so much treasure?

http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0721-20.htm
 
Smokey said:
Westmoreland, who commanded American military operations in the Vietnam War from 1964 to 1968, allegedlly justified the horror of Vietnam and Cambodia by saying this:


"We didn't really lose that war. We bought time for the ASEAN nations to hold out against the communists."

That was basically it. Straight from the Source.

The ASEAN nations---the Association of Southeast Asian Nations---were Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia.

They were a huge prize, with enormous population, resources and strategic value. The domino theory by which the US command operated said we were in Vietnam to prevent them from being overrun by the Chinese, Soviets and other communist forces, seen and unseen.

Throughout the Vietnam era, Thailand and Malaysia swung back and forth between nasty dictatorship and faltering thrusts at democracy.

But in 1963 Singapore fell to a brutal totalitarian dictator named Lee Kwan Yew, who turned the former British city-state into an Orwellian nightmare. Ferdinand Marcos ran The Philippines (which the US first conquered in 1903) with an iron fist. And in 1965, the CIA helped kill as many as three million people to give Indonesia to Suharto, a brutal kleptocrat who stole billions from the world's fifth-largest nation while killing or imprisoning all who opposed him.

Were these the model citizens in whose name William Westmoreland claimed victory for American democracy, at the cost of so many lives and so much treasure?

http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0721-20.htm

Ah - but remember Westmoreland was a military man speaking in terms of a politician - in his last years he was disgusted with the line he had to tote and wanted more to invade North Viet Nam to totally surpress the communist insurgency in the South, something a military man would want to do since he is trained for one thing.....

What was missing in US intelligence at the time was the fact that the struggle in Viet Nam was more national than regional as we seen after the Viet Nam War, Viet Nam had more contempt for their Chinese "Comrades" and they did for the US.

Militarily - we didn't loose the war, but our actions there were a shameful mixture of political ignorance, mixed with contempt and self righteousness and it starts with Kennedy and ends with Nixon who in the 11th hour and in an election year decided to end the Viet Nam debacle....

And initially the Viet Nam Vet was to take the blame.....Sad
 
In a simple attempt to rein this back on to topic a little bit, I would make the following observations:

There are essentially two issues raised, first, why was information on the performance of the A6M2 disregarded and, second, that the A6M2 recovered from China is somewhat ignored as an evaluated intelligence source.

Addressing the first issue: The performance of the A6M2 was reported by Claire Chennault directly to General Marshall, in person, during the winter of 1940 – 1941. Chennault was then an aviation advisor to the Nationalist Chinese with no particular military rank. It was only later that he assumed the rank of Colonel in the CAF. Marshall forwarded the gist of the report to HQ USAAC.

You have to bear in mind the times. While the USN perceived the Japanese as their primary threat, most eyes in the War Dept were on Europe. There were relatively few, if any, USAAC observers to the Sino-Japanese war, especially in comparison to what was in England. The US Army, including the USAAC, knew The War was going to be in Europe. It was information on the Germans in which they were interested. Another factor working against serious contemplation and distribution of Chennault's report was that in USAAC command circles, heavily strategic bomber oriented, Chennault was perceived as somewhat of a looney-tune, widely believed to have been forced out of the Air Corps for his stubborn opposition to the "Bombers are All" mentality. It is an unfortunate truism in military circles that the aura of those with whom one associates or supports rubs off and can have either fortunate or unfortunate outcomes on one's career, depending on how one is perceived. So, who wants to promote Chennault's report?

While his report was pretty much on target regarding the maneuverability of the A6M2 it was wildly off in terms of speed. Chennault's report was not, say again, not, based on any flight evaluation of any captured A6M2. It was based on the observations of those Chinese pilots who managed to survive their encounters. The A6M2's extraordinary performance reports were about what one would expect operating against the comparatively low speed fighter aircraft such as the Chinese were then operating (I-15s and I-16s); this was the A6M2's forte.

At the about the same time, the US Naval Attaché for Air to the Nationalist Chinese, Major Frank McHugh, USMC, forwarded a report drawn also from Chinese sources and from examination of wreckage to the Navy's BuAer. The Navy's McHugh/BuAer report, playing to the Navy's interest in things Japanese, was distributed down to the squadron level. In USN fighter squadron circles this report was read with interest and in some cases acted upon. Lieut. Comdr John S. Thach developed his famous Beam Defense as a response to this report. Thach tested his theory in the summer of 1941 by having one 4-plane division play victim to another 4-plane division playing the role of the attacking Japanese. The victim division was not permitted to exceed 50% throttle and was restricted to the beam defense tactic as a counter to simulated attacks, whereas the attacking division was free to maneuver at will and at whatever speed seemed appropriate. Thach led the victims, the attackers were led by Lieut. Edward O'Hare. The test was a resounding success. O'Hare reported that every attack he executed could not be completed without flying into the guns of two of the victims maneuvering through the beam defense weave. McHugh also gave a copy of his A6M2 report to Chennault. My father once told me he read a copy while aboard USS Yorktown (CV-5) in VF-42 while on Atlantic Neutrality Patrol in the summer of 1941.

And now regarding the second issue. Both of the articles linked are well done, with typically, having some long term and happy exposure to both Mr. Shapiro and Mr. Lansdale over the years, meticulous research:

Summarizing the information in both articles provided: The A6M2 recovered by the Chinese sometime after 1 December 1941 (remember, Pearl Harbor was on 7 December) was one of two A6M2s on a ferry flight that made emergency landings on a beach on the Luichow Peninsula, opposite Hainan Island on 1 December. According to reports, one made a successful landing, but the landing gear on the other collapsed. Further, the accounts indicate that the plane with the collapsed gear was cut up destroyed to prevent its discovery by the Japanese. The plane that landed successfully (#3372) was removed from the beach. It was evidently taken apart with somewhat more care and removed from the scene. After some two months it arrived at Liuchow, about 275 miles from the landing site. I presume this means sometime in February 1942. Reportedly, #3372 was reassembled by the end of summer, which of course, could mean anything from mid-August to mid-September, depending on one's point of view. Then, George Neumann was called in by Chennault sometime in October 1942 and was sent to Luichow from Kweilin (about 100 miles) to get the aircraft it flying order. Quoted in Jim Lansdale's excellent article, Neumann reported "The Zero had been put together by the Chinese and I began to check up on it and made certain changes of adjustment (engine timing) and other slight repairs. After a week of testing and running the engine for hours, we called up Colonel Alison to come down and take the plane back to Kweilin." [j-aircraft.com/research/WarPrizes.htm]

So, even if Neumann had been instantly transported to Liuchow on 1 October 1942 and was able to accomplish the above in the week time period stated, the earliest #3372 could have been ready for flight would be 8 October 1942. John Alison was the first US pilot to fly #3372 in a ferry flight from Luichow to Kweilin sometime in October 1942, a little over 10 months after the plane was originally captured.

I won't recount the rest of the information in the article regarding subsequent flights, another crash, which pilots flew the plane in China, or its eventual transport to the US in early 1943. From an intelligence standpoint this same airplane somewhat muddied the waters for a short time. During its reconstruction by the Chinese it was discovered that the side panels immediately aft of the firewall were missing. The Chinese manufactured new panels with cooling louvers. Somehow it was not passed along that these panels were expedients and observers were led to believe that this was, perhaps, a "different" type or mark of A6M2. This issue was later clarified and as far as I know the louvered panels remained in place (at least they show up in photos later taken in the US).

Now, let us look at the A6M2 recovered from the Aleutians. This airplane, #4593, built in February 1942, piloted by PO Koga, was involved in the attack on Dutch Harbor on 3 June 1942 and suffered damage to an oil line. Koga attempted a wheels-down landing on Atukan Island into what he evidently perceived to be a meadow, but turned out to be a bog. The landing gear sank, causing the plane to flip on its back, killing Koga. Against standing orders, Koga's wingman did not attempt to destroy the airplane, as he feared Koga might have survived. He returned to his carrier and reported the crash and its location. OBE, the Japanese never got around to doing anything about Koga or his airplane.

Koga's A6M2 became the first recovered and evaluated A6M2. The crash site was discovered by the crew of a PBY, piloted by Lieut. William Theis, on 10 July 1942, while on routine patrol. The plane was recovered, loaded aboard USS St Mihiel, then shipped to, and restored by US Navy personnel at North Island NAS, San Diego, California. The airplane arrived in San Diego from Alaska on 12 August 1942. A6M2 #4593 first flew with a US pilot (Lieut. Comdr. Eddie Sanders) on 20 September 1942 (which, of course, was somewhat before an initial, sometime in October 1942, flight for #3372 in China). Sander's initial evaluation report is dated 29 September 1942. Subsequent reports comparing this A6M2's performance with various USN and USAAF fighters were dated November 1942 (Technical Aviation Intelligence Brief #3 - 4 November 1942) and in December 1942 (Informational Intelligence Summary No. 85 - Distribution: SQUADRONS – December 1942).

The USN, in fact, was aware of the existence of #3372. There is existant a message form sent to ComSWPac requesting assistance in obtaining the port side folding wingtip of that plane to replace the wingtip of #4593, which was severely dished on the underside. Evidently, nothing came of that request as #3372, as we know, eventually took to the air in China. Further, the port wing tip for #4593, which you can find at the Navy Museum in Washington, DC, were you to be able to examine it closely, would clearly evidence both the original Japanese duraluminum, in both the inside ribs and the upper surface, and the replacement US aluminum on at least one inside rib portion and the undersurface.

From a personal standpoint, I had ample opportunity for such an examination as we carried that wingtip around as one of our household effects from 1945 to 1983 when my father finally donated it to the museum. In the 1960's when as a young fellow I had a great interest in model aircraft, that wingtip provided the correct interior color for my A6M2 models.

My father's log book show that he flew this same airplane (#4593) on 14 September 1944, 19 September, 14 October, 21 October, and 25 October 1944. Number 4593 was destroyed in a taxiway accident in February 1945. My father salvaged the port wingtip and some instruments from a pile of wreckage in a hangar at North Island NAS in late April 1945. As with the wingtip, the instruments also reside in the museum in Washington. In the years in our possession, I remember the recovered manifold pressure gauge often appeared mounted in various automobiles.

So, going back to the two basic issues, why was information on the performance of the A6M2 disregarded and why the A6M2 recovered from China is somewhat ignored as an evaluated intelligence source.

Well, prior to 7 December, what information that was available was not based on any flight evaluation, but rather from combat reports. My theory is that Chennault's report was, if not deliberately suppressed, then, simply ignored, for three reasons, first USAAC establishment politics. Second, it was second and third hand information from foreign folks being bested by some super airplane and, therefore, perhaps somewhat self serving (remember perceptions are important), and, third, this was a report coming from a theater and a war of, frankly, little interest to the mainstream USAAC.

The McHugh report, on the other hand, was distributed and I can cite John Thach on the west coast with VF-3 acting on it and at least one Ensign on the east coast in VF-42 at least reading it. A report on a potential enemy's equipment, from a Naval Attaché in a war zone, distributed, then, down to squadron level, would indicate at least a modicum of interest at BuAer in the A6M2's capabilities.

As far as the Aleutian A6M2 having more notoriety than the Luichow A6M2: I'd observe that performance reports on # 4593 came out before #3372 ever got in the air. That with comparison reports between #4593 and the F4F, F4U, P-38, P-39, and P-51 all coming out before #3372 ever left China, it would tend to indicate that they had a greater impact on the USN and USAAF knowledge of the A6M2 than #3372 and therefore a more prominent place in aviation history.

Regards,

Rich
 
Actually Kennedy sent out a Presedential finding to stop our involvement in South East Asia, It has been suggested that his intention to pull out was a large part of the reason he was assinated.

wmaxt
 
wmaxt said:
Actually Kennedy sent out a Presedential finding to stop our involvement in South East Asia, It has been suggested that his intention to pull out was a large part of the reason he was assinated.

wmaxt

Although I disagree, this would be a great off topic thread - I've got a bunch of info on the Kennedy Assination
 
The first "Zero" fighters were deployed for testing in summer 1940 in limited numbers over China. It is highly unlikely the AVG ever saw an A6M2 "Zero" (or Zeke) before PH. As far as I know there were no captured units tested, only reports from chineese pilots.

Furthermore, the Oscar was probably as formidable as the Zero, but being an IJA plane rather than an IJN plane it is not as famous because it was not a major player in naval battles. The Oscar actually turned better than the Zero. The Zero's real power was its range, not its actual combat performance.

=S=

Lunatic
 
Lunatic said:
The first "Zero" fighters were deployed for testing in summer 1940 in limited numbers over China. It is highly unlikely the AVG ever saw an A6M2 "Zero" (or Zeke) before PH. As far as I know there were no captured units tested, only reports from chineese pilots.

Furthermore, the Oscar was probably as formidable as the Zero, but being an IJA plane rather than an IJN plane it is not as famous because it was not a major player in naval battles. The Oscar actually turned better than the Zero. The Zero's real power was its range, not its actual combat performance.

=S=

Lunatic

And I have to agree with this 100% - The Oscar was capable of performing tremendous aerobatics, especially at speed below 200 mph, although it's armament was puny and suffered from lack of armor...
 
Except no one ever said the AVG recovered #3372, it was recovered by the Chinese . . . there is a difference. And it was the Chinese who put it bact together at Luichow. By the time Chennault got involved in October, there was no AVG; it had been absorbed into the USAAF.

Rich
 

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