Channel Dash
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SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I have that channel bookmarked. Good stuff!
Good one!
Thumpalumpacus
Major
Why in the world did they only have six Stringbags available?
That was just the one squadron, 825 Naval Air Sqn based at RNAS Lee-on-Solent but moved to RAF Manston, Kent specifically in support of Operation Fuller. RAF Coastal Command Beauforts were available in larger numbers for the torpedo dropper role, which was CC's job, defending the British coast, whereas 826 NAS was a naval unit whose role was carrier offense, as the narrator stated, the unit had torpedoed the Bismarck and disabled its rudder.
How the unit came to be involved at all stems from the fact that the squadron was embarked aboard HMS Ark Royal when it was sunk, with the survivors being sent to Gibraltar and the unit disbanded. It was reformed at Lee-on-Solent in January 1942 and had been receiving its first Swordfish, just in time to be counted for Fuller.
The British have this weird thing where traditional navy roles for land based aircraft, such as maritime patrol and submarine hunting are done by air force aircraft, not the navy. Virtually all Commonwealth air forces follow the RAF's pattern, the RAAF, the RNZAF, the RCAF, even the Indian and South African Air Forces, and other nations as well, who based their operations loosely on the RAF structure. This stems from the creation of the RAF in 1918. The RNAS traditionally carried out these roles and more, and they were absorbed into the RAF. It explains the dire state of the FAA's fighter situation going into WW2, as well, because even aircraft aboard British carriers in the between-the-wars were RAF, not navy operated and crewed.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
So why weren't more air assets assigned to guard the Channel, knowing that three heavy ships were in Brest and likely wanting to get home? Where were the Beauforts when Cerberus happened? Where were those Beauforts when the Ugly Sisters made their breakout?
There were Beauforts making torpedo attacks during Cerberus. On 12 February the Beauforts were delayed by weather and missed their escorting Spitfires because of low cloud, but attacked anyways and scored no hits. There was some confusion surrounding the aircraft and when they were to arrive and meet their escort, with aircraft heading off for the attack and a few landing at Manston. Throughout the day, Beauforts from a couple of different squadrons made contact with the ships and attacked, none scoring hits.
The whole thing was a bit of a balls-up and not just because of the weather. The lack of communication and haste in preparation on the day meant that it was gonna be lucky if the British did damage the ships, but the actual number of aircraft and number of sorties flown was not small overall, just badly co-ordinated, and throw in bad weather and it was a mess.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
The Beaufort ops look like a good cock-up too. I should think that piece of waterway ought to have better patrol protocols?
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
The RN did scatter a mine or two about.
You'd reckon, eh. The fact was the British had a considerable number of assets available in MTBs and aircraft that could have done some real damage to the German ships, but knee-jerk planning on the day and terrible co-ordination meant it was all for nought. Bomber Command attacks proved that it was a lot harder to sink a fast moving naval vessel from the air, and the poor visibility didn't help. It really was a situation where the Germans took advantage of the conditions and chose the right moment to act. The worst thing for the British was they had planned for that very event taking place, which was insightful of them, but they messed it up.
It was to no useful end for the Germans, though. BC attacks against the Gneisenau in drydock meant it never sailed again. It was in the process of having its 11-inch gun turrets replaced with 15-inch ones of the same pattern as the Bismarck and Tirpitz and her turrets were relocated to Norway. One still survives.
Austrått Fort - Wikipedia
There is also a well referenced Wiki article that may be of interest.
en.m.wikipedia.org
With regard to the number of Beauforts available the numbers were low in Feb 1942, c30. Although ordered pre-war it only began to reach the squadrons in early 1940. By the end of 1941 there were only 4 squadrons in the RAF. Plans to equip another 2 in Britain and 2 in Singapore had to be cancelled due to shortages of aircraft and delays in getting Australian production up and running.
Those 4 Britain based squadrons had to cover everything from Norway (where Tirpitz was lurking) to the Bay of Biscay, often operating in detachments away from their main bases. At the time of the Channel Dash one squadron, 22, had been withdrawn from the frontline to reinforce the Far East. Its groundcrews embarked only 3 days after Operation Cerberus. A second, 217, left a few months later, with the others ending up in the Med as 1942 wore on. 42 squadron was transferred south during Cerberus but due to the weather ended up at a different base from that intended which caused a number of problems.
Such was the shortage of torpedo bombers in the RAF at this time, that Wellington squadrons converted to the role in the Med and two Bomber Command Hampden squadrons were transferred to Coastal Command and converted to the TB role in Britain over the coming months to replace Beaufort squadrons sent overseas.
In early 1942, Coastal Command was not the organisation that it became later in the war. Its main General Reconnaissance equipment, in addition to the Beauforts, around this time was about 12 Hudson squadrons, plus a couple with Whitleys, 6 flying boat squadrons, 6 Beaufighters/Blenheim fighter units. There was only a single Liberator squadron (<10 aircraft) and the Fortress had only just begun to arrive under Lend Lease. With that it had to cover the whole North Atlantic area from Iceland to the Spanish border together with the North Sea. It also had a multitude of roles. Convoy protection against both U-boats and Luftwaffe aircraft, striking German coastal shipping, as well as providing recce against a breakout of the big German ships from Brest. So it was necessarily spread thin and had to move unit detachments around frequently.
And it should be remembered that ASV Radar was still in its infancy. ASV.II had entered service in the latter part of 1940 but using it was still a black art, and would remain so for some time, and its performance, and especially detection ranges, could vary widely depending on a variety of factors including the skill of individual operators and that of the maintenance technicians. But when the weather was bad, as in Feb 1942, it was better than the Mk.I eyeball.
The use of Bomber Command aircraft to engage in level bombing of ships at sea was doomed to failure. It was a tactic practiced by all major combatant nations in the first half of WW2 but it rarely produced any results. When hits were achieved they were likely to be few in number and of little effect to large armoured warships. In the absence of sufficient trained TB crews, there really was no alternative however.
Coastal craft like the MTBs achieved little success against large warships in WW2, particularly in daylight against ships well escorted and free to manoeuvre. Italian successes against British cruisers during Operation Pedestal were at night against ships whose ability to manoeuvre was limited by minefields. In the Battle of Surigao Strait in Oct 1944, the USN deployed 39 PT boats at night against the Japanese Fleet and scored zero hits.
So yes, Cerberus was a severe embarrassment to Britain. A lot of mistakes were made. And not for the first or last time during operations in the Channel. But nothing should detract from the fact that the Germans carried out a bold move which they planned exceedingly well and executed brilliantly using all the assets at their disposal.
Channel Dash - Wikipedia
With regard to the number of Beauforts available the numbers were low in Feb 1942, c30. Although ordered pre-war it only began to reach the squadrons in early 1940. By the end of 1941 there were only 4 squadrons in the RAF. Plans to equip another 2 in Britain and 2 in Singapore had to be cancelled due to shortages of aircraft and delays in getting Australian production up and running.
Those 4 Britain based squadrons had to cover everything from Norway (where Tirpitz was lurking) to the Bay of Biscay, often operating in detachments away from their main bases. At the time of the Channel Dash one squadron, 22, had been withdrawn from the frontline to reinforce the Far East. Its groundcrews embarked only 3 days after Operation Cerberus. A second, 217, left a few months later, with the others ending up in the Med as 1942 wore on. 42 squadron was transferred south during Cerberus but due to the weather ended up at a different base from that intended which caused a number of problems.
Such was the shortage of torpedo bombers in the RAF at this time, that Wellington squadrons converted to the role in the Med and two Bomber Command Hampden squadrons were transferred to Coastal Command and converted to the TB role in Britain over the coming months to replace Beaufort squadrons sent overseas.
In early 1942, Coastal Command was not the organisation that it became later in the war. Its main General Reconnaissance equipment, in addition to the Beauforts, around this time was about 12 Hudson squadrons, plus a couple with Whitleys, 6 flying boat squadrons, 6 Beaufighters/Blenheim fighter units. There was only a single Liberator squadron (<10 aircraft) and the Fortress had only just begun to arrive under Lend Lease. With that it had to cover the whole North Atlantic area from Iceland to the Spanish border together with the North Sea. It also had a multitude of roles. Convoy protection against both U-boats and Luftwaffe aircraft, striking German coastal shipping, as well as providing recce against a breakout of the big German ships from Brest. So it was necessarily spread thin and had to move unit detachments around frequently.
And it should be remembered that ASV Radar was still in its infancy. ASV.II had entered service in the latter part of 1940 but using it was still a black art, and would remain so for some time, and its performance, and especially detection ranges, could vary widely depending on a variety of factors including the skill of individual operators and that of the maintenance technicians. But when the weather was bad, as in Feb 1942, it was better than the Mk.I eyeball.
The use of Bomber Command aircraft to engage in level bombing of ships at sea was doomed to failure. It was a tactic practiced by all major combatant nations in the first half of WW2 but it rarely produced any results. When hits were achieved they were likely to be few in number and of little effect to large armoured warships. In the absence of sufficient trained TB crews, there really was no alternative however.
Coastal craft like the MTBs achieved little success against large warships in WW2, particularly in daylight against ships well escorted and free to manoeuvre. Italian successes against British cruisers during Operation Pedestal were at night against ships whose ability to manoeuvre was limited by minefields. In the Battle of Surigao Strait in Oct 1944, the USN deployed 39 PT boats at night against the Japanese Fleet and scored zero hits.
So yes, Cerberus was a severe embarrassment to Britain. A lot of mistakes were made. And not for the first or last time during operations in the Channel. But nothing should detract from the fact that the Germans carried out a bold move which they planned exceedingly well and executed brilliantly using all the assets at their disposal.
