Chemical warfare in ww1 (1 Viewer)

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Historian/military theorist BH Liddell-Hart was gassed. I remember him writing that he didn't understand why people thought being injured by gas was any more horrifying than being torn up by shell fragments.

I'm not defending gas, but WWI was mass-production homicide.
 
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Historian/military theorist BH Liddell-Hart was gassed. I remember him writing that he didn't understand why people thought being injured by gas was any more horrifying than being torn up by shell fragments.

I once expressed that view (and Liddell Hart was not the only one to share it) in the context of the Iran-Iraq war. To say the reaction was hostile would be something of an understatement :)
Cheers
Steve
 
I once expressed that view (and Liddell Hart was not the only one to share it) in the context of the Iran-Iraq war. To say the reaction was hostile would be something of an understatement :)
Cheers
Steve

Considering that many weapons, such as anti-personnel land mines, were designed to maim (the nazis may have fielded land mines specifically to castrate soldiers....), the attitude against gas is far too narrow. To some extent it's been expanded to include cluster bombs and land mines. "Humane weapon" is an oxymoron.
 
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One could argue that all war is hell but Chemical weapons are just not cricket.
A gentleman can dual with a sword or a pistol but not with a spoonful of VX.
I don't know Liddel-Harts full story but he has a point that gas wasn't as bigger killer or a bigger threat than artillery.
 
Chemical warfare is reasonably well documented. Its the biological strand of this form of combat that is worrying, and we still have an incomplete picture as to how far advanced the development of biological weaponary has progressed

The use of biological agents is not a new concept, and history is filled with examples of their use.

Modern times: Biological warfare reached sophistication during the 1900s.
  • During World War I, the German Army developed anthrax, glanders, cholera, and a wheat fungus specifically for use as biological weapons. They allegedly spread plague in St. Petersburg, Russia, infected mules with glanders in Mesopotamia, and attempted to do the same with the horses of the French Cavalry.
  • The Geneva Protocol of 1925 was signed by 108 nations. This was the first multilateral agreement that extended prohibition of chemical agents to biological agents. Unfortunately, no method for verification of compliance was addressed.
  • During World War II, Japanese forces operated a secret biological warfare research facility (Unit 731) in Manchuria that carried out human experiments on prisoners. They exposed more than 3,000 victims to plague, anthrax, syphilis, and other agents in an attempt to develop and observe the disease. Some victims were executed or died from their infections. Autopsies were also performed for greater understanding of the effects on the human body.
  • In 1942, the United States formed the War Research Service. Anthrax and botulinum toxin initially were investigated for use as weapons. Sufficient quantities of botulinum toxin and anthrax were stockpiled by June 1944 to allow unlimited retaliation if the German forces first used biological agents. The British also tested anthrax bombs on Gruinard Island off the northwest coast of Scotland in 1942 and 1943 and then prepared and stockpiled anthrax-laced cattle cakes for the same reason.
  • The United States continued research on various offensive biological weapons during the 1950s and 1960s. From 1951-1954, harmless organisms were released off both coasts of the United States to demonstrate the vulnerability of American cities to biological attacks. This weakness was tested again in 1966 when a test substance was released in the New York City subway system.
  • During the Vietnam War, Viet Cong guerrillas used needle-sharp punji sticks dipped in feces to cause severe infections after an enemy soldier had been stabbed.
  • In 1979, an accidental release of anthrax from a weapons facility in Sverdlovsk, USSR, killed at least 66 people. The Russian government claimed these deaths were due to infected meat and maintained this position until 1992, when Russian President Boris Yeltsin finally admitted to the accident.
 
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Some of the gases( mustard gas, maybe chlorine too) could even soak into the soil and get you days later, when you disturbed the soil, or laid down on it.

The men in the trenches very much feared gas, there were several false gas alerts from men sighting early morning fog and thinking it was gas.
 
Chlorine is quite volatile and therefore not likely to be persistent, except in some special circumstances. Mustard gas and several of the non lethal lachrymogens were more persistent.
Obviously saturating an area in which you hoped to quickly establish your own troops with a persistent agent is not a good idea.
The British were exceptional at counter battery fire (much better than the Germans ever were) and tended to use the most persistent agents for this, as the positions were unlikely to be occupied quickly, if at all.
For example, for fighting in trenches, the British developed grenades filled with phosgene, KSK (Ethyl Iodoacetate) and KJ (Stannic Chloride) which were found to be more effective than either the high explosive grenades or the white phosphorous P-bomb for clearing underground bunkers and strongholds.The German masks were ineffective against KJ. It wasn't lethal, but like highly irritating.
Phosgene only gave the defenders a few seconds to get on their masks before inhaling a lethal dose, if the KJ forced them to remove the mask they would die. It is not difficult to understand why an Australian journalist reported Germans rushing from a dug out, hands up to surrender as soon as a KSK or KJ grenade exploded, despite already having their masks on.
A bunker cleared in this way was not inhabitable for at least 12 hours, both KSK and KJ were persistent and even the normally volatile phosgene would persist in such confined spaces. One report stated that after fourteen hours it was impossible to remain in a dug out cleared this way "for more than a few seconds". This implies that the lethal phosgene had dispersed, but the other irritants had not.
Cheers
Steve
 
Is chemical warfare treated same as guns and grenades?
In Soviet doctrine yes.
Western doctrine no.
Having to wear gas masks and full NBC suits is extremely tiring and degrades even the best troops.
 
did a bit of NBC training back in the late 70's. Our NBC suits were far superior to the rubber sweat suits issued to the eastern bloc nations. the problem for the west isn't habitability, it the number of suits required. as I recall, the suit had to be changed every 6hours or so. Relied on activated carbon as a primary defence. also constant injections of a substance called atropin.

We were led to believe all this was an effective NBC defence, but were dismayed to learn that in the whole of the RAN we possessed a stock of some 3000 of these suits and enough atropin to last about 8 hours. For a force of some 16000 at the time. and we were equipped to similar scales as the USN at the time.

The Soviet rubber suits were much longer lasting but a man in a rubber suit might last 2 hours before collapsing from exhaustion. soviet AFVs were not NBC resistant like our vehicles, so I doubt they were much better than us really.
 
In the early 80's the suites we used in the Air Force for NBC were rated at 48 hours of endurance. Changing the filter packs could extend that another 24 hours. However a single snag or tear in the suite rendered them useless. The endurance figures were for biological and chemical use. Radiation endurance was measured in minutes. The filters would remove heavy particles but actual environmental radiation would penetrate the suite rather quickly. Having worn them I can honestly say their endurance would exceed that of the person wearing them. They got hot fast! And even with the water pass through you are going to dehydrate and overheat quickly. Mostly they were meant to allow you to escape from a contaminated area not for fighting within.
 
'Chemical Soldiers: Gas Warfare in World War One' by Donald Richter is a good source for the efforts made to protect soldiers from the various chemical agents in WW1. He devotes more to this than many of the other authors (Prentiss, Spiers, Haber (Ludwig,a different one) and Harrison to name a few).
Various masks were developed but not so much protective clothing as we know it in modern times. It was the introduction of the British 'box repsirator' in 1916/17, which if worn correctly gave good protection against the lethal gases (primarily chlorine and phosgene) that accelerated the German use of mustard gas. Mustard gas doesn't have a strong smell, and initial reaction is not severe, just an irritation of the nose and throat. Many troops did not realise they had been exposed at first, which inevitably increased their exposure before they took any action to protect themselves. The box respirator protected a soldier's respiratory system from the effects of mustard gas, if he got it on in time, The typical woolen uniforms of the day offered no defence against blistering of the skin.
A thick suit, coated with 'oxidised oils and resins' was developed and did offer protection against the vesicant (blistering) effect of mustard gas but according to yet another imaginatively named British report, 'Protection against Dichlorethylsulphide by Means of Special Clothing', it was not practical. The garment was deemed
'...hot and uncomfortable to wear, and for a fully equipped soldier marching and fighting in such clothing would be impossible'.
Nothing of the sort was issued to British or Commonwealth soldiers during WW1, though there may be one or two here familiar with the gas cape, originally issued in WW2. They came in a variety of colours, and were still issued up to the end of the war, despite no chemical agents having been used. They are more like a sort of waterproof mackintosh to look at than a modern suit.

One of he iconic images of WW1 is the lines of blinded soldiers, hand on the shoulder of the man in front, being led to or from aid stations. It is important to remember that for the vast majority of these men the blindness was temporary, their eyes and sight usually recovered in a mater of days.

Cheers

Steve
 
The US had a large cargo ship loaded with chemical munitions bombed in harbor shortly after the invasion of southern Italy. The expectation was that the Germans would use gas on Allied troops, which wasn't too surprising considering that a) they were using gas on civilians, albeit for mass murder of civilian prisoners and b) Germany had initiated gas warfare in WW1. What is surprising is that the Germans didn't use gas in WW2.
 
In the early 80's the suites we used in the Air Force for NBC were rated at 48 hours of endurance. Changing the filter packs could extend that another 24 hours. However a single snag or tear in the suite rendered them useless. The endurance figures were for biological and chemical use. Radiation endurance was measured in minutes. The filters would remove heavy particles but actual environmental radiation would penetrate the suite rather quickly. Having worn them I can honestly say their endurance would exceed that of the person wearing them. They got hot fast! And even with the water pass through you are going to dehydrate and overheat quickly. Mostly they were meant to allow you to escape from a contaminated area not for fighting within.

That is exactly how ours were. 48-72 hours of useful protection.
 
Chemical weapons didn't really work for the Germans in WW1, they never used them as effectively as the British. The British integrated technical weapons such as tanks and gas into their systems in a way the Germans did not.
Everyone remembers the success of German attacks in March 1918 and the gains made against Gough's Fifth Army. These were substantial, but against an over extended defender protecting a strategically unimportant zone. They did cause much consternation, but the situation was stabilised.
When similar tactics (much vaunted by some later historians) were made in April, against the much stronger British defences in Flanders, protecting the Channel ports, the inability of the Germans to master British firepower soon led to their collapse,
Consider the relative* ease with which Rawlinson's Fourth Army subsequently penetrated the Hindenburg Line, the strongest defensive position on the Western Front, and within hours made the position untenable for the Germans. The integrated use of chemical weapons was an important part of this success.
Cheers
Steve
* Nothing was easy, it cost blood and treasure. The slowness of the French (Debeny) is well documented as is the heroic if slightly over enthusiastic participation of the Americans (one day Rawlinson was "full of confidence in the Yankees', the next bemoaning the fact that using such inexperienced troops was "a bit of a lottery".)
Cheers
Steve
 
I think the concept of chemical warfare as a war winning weapon or a battle winning weapon was not proven so it's use would still be controversial as more effort than worth.
 
The 1919 Holland Report does not agree with that conclusion.

"Ample and generous provision must be made for the continuous study of chemical warfare both as regards offence and defence during peace, in order to ensure the future safety of the fighting forces of the Empire."

The use of chemical weapons in WW2 was only ever seriously considered by the British, though its use was anticipated by all sides and it would be naive to think that other nations were not prepared to use them. The RAF trained extensively in 1940 in order to be able to attack any German landings with mustard gas and, lesser known, to attack the German civilian population with phosgene.
The RAF established a committee to deal with the use of chemical weapons in September 1940. At the very first meting the use of phosgene against German civilians was discussed, described as

" ...a very suitable weapon against the German civilian population"

particularly because so few German civilians, in contrast to the British, had gas masks.
By this time the RAF had already developed its 'Gas Plan'. Sixteen squadrons within Bomber Command were designated for dropping chemical ordnance onto, or spraying chemical agents over any invading forces. Until an emergency arose these squadrons would carry out their normal duties. Slessor (then director of RAF Plans) wrote to Brooke.

"It is not present policy that squadrons should stand by to use gas against enemy landings. If the use of gas is authorised after invasion has taken place, an interval of 24 hours will be required to change over from bombing to gas spray."

In fact the five squadrons of Lysanders among the designated sprayers could be ready in six hours. Slessor also confirmed that station commanders and enough pilots were trained in the use of gas. He also wrote that

"...it was feasible for orders for gas spray to be given in the same manner as for the bombing of targets. It is not considered necessary to introduce a special code word for the use of gas, since we are operating in our own country and such orders will have been issued before the aircraft take off."

Initially, as of June 1940, stocks of gas were only sufficient for two days of intensive operations, but production was rapidly increased. By September 27th 350 tons of mustard gas and 45 tons of phosgene were being produced every week and stocks had risen to 13,000 tons. Storage for a 4,000 ton reserve was nearing completion.

Spraying was a preferred method of achieveing high concentrations of gas, but the RAF was well aware that low altitudes gave better results, but also made the aircraft much more vulnerable. Large numbers of 250lb and 30lb bomb cases were avialable, and were filled through the summer of 1940 with mustard gas. This agent was preferred for its persistence, and ability to contaminate the ground, equipment and clothing of the enemy, forcing them to wear respirators. One 30lb mustard gas bomb could 'heavily contaminate' an area of 50 square yards, with 'lighter contamination' spreading over 300 square yards.

There is a common misconception that the British would have been constrained by some kind of moral scruples in their fight for survival. We might ask a survivor from the French Mediterranean Fleet about that. I have seen it argued that men who had seen the effects of gas, or been gassed themselves, in WW1 had a reluctance to use such weapons again. From a British perspective this is palpable nonsense. There was a debate about the morals of the FIRST USE of chemical weapons, but it was won by the pro-use faction, behind who Churchill threw his weight. The pro lobby was led by the CIGS, Sir John Dill, and this is one thing on which he and Churchill did agree. I have no doubt at all that if, by some miracle, a German beachhead had been established on British soil in 1940/41 it would have been attacked with chemical weapons. The landings never happened, and the 'Gas Plan' was never put to the test.

The Army had ten companies trained in the use of gas and substantial stocks. 12,000 x 4.5", 13,000 x 6", 15,000 x 6lb 'ground bombs' all filled with mustard gas along with 1,000 chemical mines, each containing 4 gallons of mustard gas. there were also ten 'Bulk Contamination Vehicles' available, each carrying 130 gallons of gas, designed to contaminate the ground in a withdrawal. 950 WW1 vintage Livens Projectors were resurrected from stores, one of the most effective way of delivering high concentrations of gasses, out to about a mile, developed in WW1, but only effective when dug into a defensive line, like the Royal Military Canal.

The principal reason they were not used later in the war was that other and more reliable solutions to the military problems in which chemical attacks were deemed effective in WW1 had been developed.

Cheers

Steve
 
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A very brief synopsis of the moral argument over the use of gas.

Sir John Dill argued that the German landings would make an excellent target, whilst acknowledging the potential unfavourable consequences.
"Enemy forces crowded on the beaches, with the confusion inevitable on first landing, would present a splendid target. Gas spray aircraft under such conditions would be likely to have a more widespread and wholesale effect than high explosive. It can. moreover, be applied very rapidly and so is particularly suitable in an operation where we may get very little warning...contamination of obstacles, beaches and defiles by liquid mustard would have a great delaying effect."
He did acknowledge two "grave objections" to the first use of gas. First, undermining of Britain's moral standing which would alienate sympathy for Britain's war effort in the USA, and, second, "invite retaliation against our industry and civil population". Nonetheless Dill's conclusion was
"that the military advantages to be gained are sufficient to justify us in taking this step."

The contrary view was expressed by Dill's own Deputy, Major General Desmond Anderson, who believed first use of chemical weapons would
"throw away the incalculable moral strength we derive from keeping our pledged word for a tactical surprise, which may well produce immediate gains, but will in the long run rebound to our disadvantage. Germany would gain great propaganda advantage from the fact that we had used gas first, not only in America and other neutral states, but in her own country and dependencies as well."
He considered Dill's "dangerous proposal...a departure from our principles and traditions" with the result that "some of us would begin to wonder whether it really mattered which side won."

Others were infuriated by such moral doubts. The Commandant of the Army Staff College at Camberley (Jack Collins) wrote to Dill on 27th June asking him
"to do your utmost to get Cabinet authority to use blister gas spray on any seaborne German force attempting to land on our shores [German troops] will become casualties before they can become dangerous. Those not blinded can be 'written off' for the next four months, which look like being critical for us. [Gas would] give the Boche a setback and he will realise that, at long last, we have taken the gloves off and really mean business."

At this point the decision was effectively made by Churchill.
"Supposing lodgements were affected on our coast, there could be no better points for application of mustard gas than those beaches and lodgements"
Then, crucially
"In my view there would be no need to wait for the enemy to adopt such methods. He will certainly adopt them if he thinks it will pay. Home Defence should be consulted as to whether the prompt drenching of lodgements would not be a great help. Everything should be brought to the highest pitch of readiness, but the question of actual deployment must be settled by the Cabinet."

Any misgivings about first use of chemical weapons in the military were now irrelevant. The moral argument against their use had been lost. The final decision regarding their use now rested with Churchill and the War Cabinet. With the support of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Dill) there can be little doubt what that decision would have been, had landings been made.

Cheers

Steve
 
War winning in the ww1 era not ww2.
I would have moral misgivings about bombing a civilian population with gas. I would have none about using it against an invading force. Screw 'em.
I would consider the bombing of a civilian population a very sticky wicket. And no wonder that no German was tried for war crimes bombing a civilian target. Tu quoque.

I would perhaps take note that Bari in Italy was accidentally exposed to mustard gas and so could be an interesting note to add.

I doubt chemical warfare on its own would win a decisive battle and cheerleaders for the pros of chemical warfare will always over egg the pudding.
 
"I would have moral misgivings about bombing a civilian population with gas. I would have none about using it against an invading force. Screw 'em."

That's just presentism.

Nobody on the British side was claiming chemical warfare would win a decisive battle. They were all officers who were well aware of the way it had been used in WW1. It wasn't in itself decisive in any British WW1 battle (the British only overestimated it's effectiveness once, at Loos) but it did give certain advantages when integrated into an offensive or, as would have been the case in 1940, defensive system. That's why officers like Dill, who had fought WW1, been mentioned in despatches eight times and by early 1918 was Head of Operations at GHQ under Haig, were so keen to use it.

Edit: Though the use of phosgene against Germany's civilian population was mentioned at the first meeting of the Committee developing the gas plan, it's use was never seriously contemplated, at least in this role. All the RAF's chemical bombs and spray tanks were filled, or were to be filled, with mustard gas. It's an indication of how desperate times were that a small relative advantage, the equipping of Britain's civilian population with gas masks far more effectively than had been accomplished in Germany, was considered worth exploiting.

Cheers

Steve
 
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Does the use of phosphorus constitute chemical warfare?
British chemical warfare in Ww2 seems to be a continuation of ww1.
Whereas the Germans had already developed nerve gas. It is certainly interesting that the deployment of gas masks to British civilians is certainly a sign the war Britain was expecting.
 
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