Chemical warfare in ww1

[stona]

Does the use of phosphorus constitute chemical warfare?

Today? Against military targets? Morally, for most people, yes. Legally a very grey area.

In 1982 the British maintained that white phosphorous was used to produce smoke screens, which is perfectly allowable and an intended use. I believe this story was blown in 2005.

Does that allow a WP grenade to be thrown or fired into a mortar pit or at a machine gun crew? Can it be used to force men from a house or bunker? There are no referees on real battlefields.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Robert Porter]

The US used phosphorus heavily in Korea and Vietnam, ostensibly as a defoliant as well as an antipersonnel weapon, and even as markers. There was a lot of discussion over the pro's and con's of the use but I would say today, especially against civilian populations it would not be accepted.

 

[stona]

The US 'Shake 'n' Bake' tactic?
We're not supposed to do it......but.....

A 2005 article from the US Artillery's Field Artillery Magazine reviewed a November 2004 operation ih Fallujah thus.

"WP proved to be an effective and versatile munition. We used it for screening missions at two breeches and, later in the fight, as a potent psychological weapon against the insurgents in trench lines and spider holes where we could not get effects on them with HE [High Explosive]. We fired "shake and bake" missions at the insurgents, using WP to flush them out and HE to take them out,"

There's nothing new here. I personally know an ex Britsh serviceman who was trained to 'FISH'* using WP grenades.

*'Fight In Someone's House'

Colonel Tim Collins admitted (coincidentally in 2005) to training his men prior to operations in Iraq in 2003 in such tactics.

"The star of the show was the new grenade which had only been on issue since the previous summer. It absolutely trashed the inside of the room it was put into.
I directed the men to use them where possible with white phosphorus, as the noxious smoke and heat had the effect of drawing out any enemy from cover, while the fragmentation grenade would shred them."

Cheers

Steve

 

[The Basket]

A few points.
Since the invasion beaches were unknown and flying Lysanders at low altitude and low speed would be suicidal over a defended area then the use of chemical weapons would be difficult to bring to the enemy.
Also once off the beaches then you're fighting in civilian areas where your going to gas your own population. Plus of course the danger of Jerry using his stocks of gas.

 

[Robert Porter]

I think just like the Normandy landings, unless you can repel an invasion very decisively and quickly the difficulties in winning against the invader with any weapons, mount very quickly. But I truly cannot see the British command allowing the use of gas or chemical weapons where their own civilian population, gas masks or not, would be potentially affected.

 

[parsifal]

The use of white phosphorous as a weapon against human targets is contested. The 1999 "rules of war" outlaw its use, along with other incendiary weaponary, especially on civilian. This has been more or less the accepted convention since the 70's. This did not stop the Iraqi forces using WP against his their Kurdish minorities in the 1980's and again against Kuwaiti civilians during the 1991 invasion. It also dod not stop certain USMC formations using them in the opening stages of the invasion of Iraq in 2004, during the siege of Fallujah.


Within the U.S. Army, there appears to be conflicting advice on the use of white phosphorus against humans. According to the field manual on the Rule of Land Warfare, "The use of weapons which employ fire, such as tracer ammunition, flamethrowers, napalm and other incendiary agents, against targets requiring their use is not violative of international law (it is problematic how they reach that conclusion)" . Conversely, the 1999 ST 100-3 "Battle Book", (a student text published by the U.S. Command and General Staff College), states that "It is against the law of land warfare to employ WP against personnel targets." At the same time, other field manuals discuss the use of white phosphorus against personnel. The US armed forces are allover the place on this issue


Though white phosphorus is still used in modern armed conflict, its use in incendiary weapons is regulated by international humanitarian law, generally prohibited against fully civilian targets.

 

[stona]

The RAF accepted the risk of flying low over beachheads. The air defence over the landings was unlikely to have been effective or organised. None of the forces took much light flak with them, they were dependent in the early stages on very limited light naval forces or, as the planning envisaged complete local air superiority, the Luftwaffe.
I have the figures for the planned light flak which the various invasion fleets intended to take with them, either on the barges or rafts etc. at home (where I am not for the next couple of days). It was not substantial.

There were plans to contaminate the ground behind any withdrawal. Any civilians who were not evacuated (many left the south coast and east coasts of their own accord in the summer of 1940) may have been affected. They may have been affected by any other weapons used. Staying indoors and wearing a respirator gave better protection from gas than HE. In 1940 gas would have been just another weapon to endanger any civilians caught up in the fighting.

The possibility of retaliation by the Germans 'against our industry and civilian population' as Dill put it, was acknowledged, but considered worth the risk. The British were not aware of the German development of what we now call nerve agents, but this was not relevant militarily in 1940 anyway.

Again, beware of presentism. The conventions prohibiting the use of poisonous gasses had been flouted by all sides in WW1, though first use is ascribed to the Germans. In 1940 there were few moral qualms about using such weapons again; there were more qualms about being the first to use them. The British feared the propaganda advantage to the Germans. Britain fought on for time, utterly dependent on increasing American involvement, and anything that jeopardised that was considered risky, but the risk would have been taken in extremis.

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

I think just like the Normandy landings, unless you can repel an invasion very decisively and quickly the difficulties in winning against the invader with any weapons, mount very quickly. But I truly cannot see the British command allowing the use of gas or chemical weapons where their own civilian population, gas masks or not, would be potentially affected.

The plan by the summer of 1940 was to fight delaying action on the beaches, holding the Germans as long as possible and not allowing a substantial lodgement to develop. This is where gas was considered particularly useful. This would then allow mobile forces to be concentrated against the German beachheads. The planned use of gas was limited to these beachheads where relatively few civilians would have been affected.
Compare Sealion and Overlord and look at the lengths the Allies went to in order to prevent any concentration of German forces against their landings. The Germans didn't really have any comparable plan and their reaction was confused and delayed anyway.
At the same time the Royal Navy, who would have seriously dropped the ball by allowing the landings to happen at all, would interdict the re-supply of any forces landed, cutting them off and allowing the Army to deal with them.

By September 1940 Britain was nowhere near as defenceless as some popular mythology would have us believe. The Army had substantially reorganised and rearmed. In August 1940 there was far more than the RAF standing between Hitler and his invasion of Britain. At the beginning of June the British army had 600 field guns, by August 1600, plus another 820 American 75mm guns, which had arrived with another 200,000 rifles, 2,600 'tank machine guns' (?) and 60,000 Thomson sub machine guns. In three months well over a million rifles had been imported from Canada and the US, equipping the LDF/Home Guard. The regular army had over a million SMLE, plus 75,000 in depots, 65,000 under repair and BSA was turning out 2,000 a week. 400 million rounds of .303 ammunition were to hand. By the end of August Home Defence formations were generally at 80% of their establishment. There were 250 medium and heavy guns with these troops compared to just 140 in June. The supply of two pounder anti tank guns had quadrupled, that of the BOYS anti tank rifle and the Bren gun doubled. By early September the army had 1200 British made tanks, 720 in front line service, including 360 infantry and cruiser tanks and 300 light tanks. Transport problems were somewhat alleviated by the requisition of just about every corporations bus fleet. According to Ismay the total strength of the army in Britain, including men from the Dominions was 75,945 officers and 1,758,122 enlisted men. Brooke, in his own front line, could muster 26 Divisions, 2 of them armoured. By mid-September the Home Guard numbered 1.5 million men, average age 35 (not 95 as some seem to believe, I blame Dad's Army) most now properly armed, uniformed and with some training. Some of these units were very good, others not so much. Colonel Watson of the Durham Light Infantry recalled that the Home Guard in the West Country where he was based were
"extremely good. They all wanted to cooperate with us and we got them on a very high footing. My view was that we should not turn them into Grenadier Guardsmen, but should instead exploit their own ingenuity and individuality."
He might have added local knowledge.
Because of the growing strength and confidence, many of the fixed defences were dismantled inland. They were seen not as a bulwark against attackers but as hindrances to the mobility of Home Forces. Work on the inland 'stop lines' ceased and plans for demolishing bridges etc along the main lines of communication suspended. The only place where fixed fortifications continued to be developed was the beaches and surrounding areas.
There may have been an invasion fever, but not an invasion panic. The growing confidence of the British is reflected in the communiques sent back from various embassies to their respective governments, most importantly to Washington. Even the Soviets conceded that any invasion looked like being a far from foregone conclusion.
In June 1940 the British feared what would happen if any force, even a large raid, was mounted on their east coast. By September those that even believed an invasion could be attempted (a diminishing band) were far more confident that it could be dealt with.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Robert Porter]

I often wondered at the tendency to portray England as prostrate and defenseless against invasion in 1940. In my thoughts the Royal Navy was left out of the picture entirely by those claiming an invasion of England was a walk over. If it had been I doubt Hitler would have waited. Plus citizens and troops fighting for their homes and land always tend to be underestimated. You make excellent points thanks for your input!

 

[stona]

In my thoughts the Royal Navy was left out of the picture entirely by those claiming an invasion of England was a walk over.

I haven't even mentioned the Royal Navy. I think it has been covered in various 'Sealion' threads. The KM was totally overmatched by the RN, no contest, not even the Germans thought it was.
The English Channel is not a wide river, it is a sea and a fickle one at that. It would also have been heavily contested by the most powerful navy in the world, operating close to home.

Unfortunately the mythologising of the BoB has obscured the reality of the military situation in the autumn of 1940 and the true scale of the task facing the Germans. I can't blame 'Dad's Army' for this. The myth making has been going on since 1940, but in more recent history I blame the film 'Battle of Britain' which is great entertainment, but not a documentary, and the 1961 Wood and Dempster book (The Narrow Margin) on which it is largely based.

Cheers

Steve

 

[The Basket]

Phosphorus was discovered in Hamburg by literally taking the urine.
And then Hamburg was bombed with Phosphorus and loss of life was high.
Haber was going to be part of a war trial but didn't happen.

 

[stona]

A relatively neutral appraisal of Germany's chances from General Raymond Lee, US military attache, September 5th 1940.

"On a cold blooded appraisal, one might say that the betting on Britain beating off an invasion in this fall is about 3 to 1, with the odds lengthening every week. There is still a little time for an attempt and I really believe that Hitler will have to try to admit what he can hardly afford to admit: first that invasion is hopeless and second that he is in for a long war. The first means a defeat in this years campaign and the second, an ultimate defeat. The results of this months intensive air attack are remarkably slender. All the railways are running, road circulation is normal, telephone and telegraph services are in order, industrial production undamaged."

I don't know anything about Raymond Lee, but I would struggle to put it any better with nearly 80 years of hindsight.

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

Phosphorus was discovered in Hamburg by literally taking the urine.
And then Hamburg was bombed with Phosphorus and loss of life was high.
Haber was going to be part of a war trial but didn't happen.

A very small percentage of British incendiary bombs dropped contained phosphorous. I can give you the exact figures on Wednesday.

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

Phosphorus was discovered in Hamburg by literally taking the urine.
And then Hamburg was bombed with Phosphorus and loss of life was high.

The British developed the 30lb phosphorus incendiary bomb to ensure against any future shortage of magnesium. It was a 30lb bomb because 250,000 30lb light case bomb bodies, intended for filling with chemical weapons, became available. The filling was 1.5 lbs of phosphorus and six lbs of a rubber-benzol mixture. Mks I-III all used this filling, though with slightly different cases and fusing. The MkIV used a cellulose acetate filling, produced from scrap perspex, due to a shortage of rubber.
3,000,000 of these weapons were dropped by Bomber Command during the war. This may seem a lot, but it must be compared with the 80,000,000 4lb incendiaries, which were filled with various 'pellets' of material but used magnesium as the primary incendiary mechanism, dropped during the same period.

The general opinion of Germans interrogated at the end of the war was that the 30lb incendiary was about as effective as the 4lb incendiary, giving a weight for weight advantage of about 7:1 to the 4lb bomb
In 1944 the Air Ministry Incendiary Panel (you couldn't make it up!) was of the view that weight for weight the 30lb bomb was four times less efficient than the 4lb bomb.

Cheers

Steve

 

[The Basket]

Going back to ww1 and Zeppelin raids. A new use for phosphorus is as an incendiary bullet to burst balloons and ignite hydrogen.
But only against sacs of air. Not people.

 

[tyrodtom]

Only against sacs supporting a aircraft with people in it.

Who would burn to death on the way down, or jump.

 

[The Basket]

The legal points of using incendiary rounds or the Buckingham rounds are fascinating. They were needed against Zeppelins to ignite the hydrogen. Thier use against pilots and air crew was against the rules but they were used all the same.
They fell to thier deaths due to no parachutes. It was believed that it would make men cowards.
The use of incendiary ammunition in Ww2 didn't have the same legal issues it seems.

 

[tyrodtom]

Observation balloon observers on both sides had parachutes, they were expected to abandon the balloon when they were attacked.

The WW1 era Luftwaffe had a different view on parachutes for aircrew than the Allied brass. Udet's life was saved by a parachute in WW1.

I don't know if the Zeppelin crews had parachutes or not. They were so anal about carrying "extra weight " they may have left them behind.

 

[swampyankee]

Does the use of phosphorus constitute chemical warfare?

Possibly; see https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/...ssue1/Reyhan10U.Pa.J.L.&Soc.Change1(2007).pdf and http://www.offiziere.ch/wp-content/uploads/White-Phosphorus-and-the-law-of-war.pdf

The trouble with international law is that it's more analogous to agreements between crime bosses than any kind of domestic law, and if you're big enough it doesn't matter even if you're signatory to a treaty banning something.

 

[stona]

When push comes to shove nobody cares about the legality. The use of the chemical agents used in WW1 was illegal under the 1899 Hague Declaration and the 1907 Hague Convention on Land Warfare.
All it did was make people wary of 'first use', but once one side had done it, Germany in WW1, everybody jumped on the band wagon.

In WW2 the RAF went from not bombing KM ships if tied up at a wharf, for fear of injuring or killing civilian workers, to overtly targeting the civilian population of Germany's cities.
My mother would have said 'needs must when the devil drives.'

Cheers

Steve