Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
^^^ This
Was going to bring up these issues in a similar post but Buff worded it better than I could.
Churchill agrees to RAF reinforcements to Malaya. What to send?
- Thread starter Admiral Beez
- Start date
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^^^ This
Was going to bring up these issues in a similar post but Buff worded it better than I could.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
except the US types did not use (or were not supplied) with British radios, british oxygen equipment and a number of other little details the Air Ministry thought were essential.
Many British companies "partnered" with American companies to assemble and modify the American aircraft for British use. Like it was either Westland or Blackburn that partnered with Grumman?
In some cases there were over 100 modifications made (perhaps as trivial as changing labels/signs ?) but in 1940 sometimes it was fitting some sort of protection to the fuel tanks.
- Thread starter
- #23
Admiral Beez
Major
The 200 Hurricanes could have been procured from CC&F in Canada, shipment from Vancouver.
Thoughts on the Hawker Henley? I like its internal centre-line bomb bay, rather novel for a single engined bomber of the time.
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Being an Aussie, I am finding this thread most interesting. I have pulled out my copy of Churchill's 'The Second World War, Book lll' just to gain an understanding of Churchill's thinking at the time. His main concern appeared certainly to be with the Middle East, Africa and India region(s).
His immediate concern certainly was not for the Malayan Peninsular. A message, written by Churchill on the 11th August, addressed to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand gave a very good indication of Churchill's thoughts at the time. It appears that he felt that on-going U.K. negotiations with Japan and the threat of the large U.S. Pacific fleet in the area, 'must be a grave preoccupation to the Japanese Admiralty', was enough response.
He also suggests that English forces could, 'defend Singapore, which if attacked- -which is highly unlikely—ought to stand a long siege'. He then goes into deployment of naval and army forces if required. The only reference that he makes to air forces is in relation to the home front, and, maybe you could read into his message, the North Africa and the Middle East. No doubt that Dill would have read this message a day after his own writing to Churchill. It must have read as a slap in Dill's face.
Unfortunately, Australia at the time was saddled with hierarchy that only toed the line to anything British. We had no Air Force to speak of at the time. Despite some very clear-thinking RAAF and industrial leaders in our fledgling aviation manufacturing industry who were also hampered by this mentality. As was RAAF flight crew training. Our immediate response to become involved in the Empire Training Scheme whose primary function was to provide air crew for the European theatre was another example. The battle for Darwin proved this. It was only a changed hierarchy that was beginning to remedy the problem. Firstly, the allowance to import certain P&W radial aero engines and then U.S. aircraft that could handle Australia conditions far better than the English aircraft. (This is by no means a slight on the U.K. machines).
His immediate concern certainly was not for the Malayan Peninsular. A message, written by Churchill on the 11th August, addressed to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand gave a very good indication of Churchill's thoughts at the time. It appears that he felt that on-going U.K. negotiations with Japan and the threat of the large U.S. Pacific fleet in the area, 'must be a grave preoccupation to the Japanese Admiralty', was enough response.
He also suggests that English forces could, 'defend Singapore, which if attacked- -which is highly unlikely—ought to stand a long siege'. He then goes into deployment of naval and army forces if required. The only reference that he makes to air forces is in relation to the home front, and, maybe you could read into his message, the North Africa and the Middle East. No doubt that Dill would have read this message a day after his own writing to Churchill. It must have read as a slap in Dill's face.
Unfortunately, Australia at the time was saddled with hierarchy that only toed the line to anything British. We had no Air Force to speak of at the time. Despite some very clear-thinking RAAF and industrial leaders in our fledgling aviation manufacturing industry who were also hampered by this mentality. As was RAAF flight crew training. Our immediate response to become involved in the Empire Training Scheme whose primary function was to provide air crew for the European theatre was another example. The battle for Darwin proved this. It was only a changed hierarchy that was beginning to remedy the problem. Firstly, the allowance to import certain P&W radial aero engines and then U.S. aircraft that could handle Australia conditions far better than the English aircraft. (This is by no means a slight on the U.K. machines).
ThomasP
Chief Master Sergeant
Hey guys,
A couple of interesting sources I ran across that include the thinking and justification relative to UK deployment and support of forces to Australia and Malaya, along with some Australian views on why and how well it was done. I found the late-interwar and early-WWII sections particularly interesting relative to this thread.
(http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:4453/SOURCE01)
(http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/APDC/media/PDF-Files/Historical Publications/HIST02-Power-Plus-Attitude-Ideas,-Strategy-and-Doctrine-in-the-Royal-Australian-Air-Force,-1921-1991.pdf)
A couple of interesting sources I ran across that include the thinking and justification relative to UK deployment and support of forces to Australia and Malaya, along with some Australian views on why and how well it was done. I found the late-interwar and early-WWII sections particularly interesting relative to this thread.
(http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:4453/SOURCE01)
(http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/APDC/media/PDF-Files/Historical Publications/HIST02-Power-Plus-Attitude-Ideas,-Strategy-and-Doctrine-in-the-Royal-Australian-Air-Force,-1921-1991.pdf)
Kevin J
Banned
You have just got to admire the Japanese for their faulty logic. So, they take on the World's 2 Global Superpowers, UK and USA, in a preemptive strike, seize their territory and oil, murder their citizens, subjects, nurses and Pows and then expect them to negotiate a peace settlement after 6 to 9 months where they keep everything.
- Thread starter
- #27
Admiral Beez
Major
It's too bad Australia wasn't given full command and control over Malayan defence, starting with the beginning of the Singapore naval base in 1929/30.
Kevin J
Banned
Command should have been given to the Royal Navy, so no surrender and fight to the last ditch, and admirals who surrender Island fortresses get hung from the yard arm.
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
I'm no expert but according to Wiki (I know):
"Accordingly, the Henley, which in line with RAF policy had not been fitted with dive brakes; bomb crutches; or specialized bomb sights and thus limited to attack angles of no greater than 70° (and consequently far less accurate than specialized German dive bombers of the same period, notably the Ju 87 Stuka, fitted with all of the foregoing and a semi-automatic bomb release and dive termination system and thus capable of near-vertical dives of pin-point accuracy)"
So if true what would the Henley's mission be then? Not being snarky (for a change) but Midway proved glide bombing attacks were a non-starter vis a vis a reasonable AAA/Interceptor defense. Sometimes what might seem like a good idea for us may be nothing more that giving, in this case, the Japanese, more targets to shoot at. Not to mention maintenance and the extra strain on the supply pipeline for another aircraft type new to the theater.
P.S. These are questions from me not statements of fact btw.
- Thread starter
- #30
Admiral Beez
Major
I wonder why the RAF never saw the need for a dive bomber for army CAS. But then again, outside of naval ops, we don't see many true dive bombers.
In 1941 when the Skuas were being withdrawn from FAA service they should have been sent to Singapore. Did the RAF and British army like the Vultee A-31 Vengeance?
buffnut453
Captain
Those who flew the Vengeance really liked it. I corresponded briefly with AVM Arthur Gill who flew with 84 Sqn and he loved the Vengeance for it's accuracy. He recalled several messages of gratitude from the Army for the work done by the Vengeance squadrons.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,161
- Jun 25, 2013
This was not quite unprecedented. See "imperialism." Germany's 1917 peace proposals for the Western Front were even more brazen: keep everything even though, by this time, Germany had no chance of victory.
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Hi,
In addition to those points there is also a need for additional ground personnel to support any increase in the number of air squadrons present. As I recall from "Bloody Shambles" or "Buffaloes over Singapore" the RAF and commonwealth forces were very short handed at the bases that they historically did have. In particular I seem tio rec ll reading that many of the airfields had very limited AA defenses around them and were frequently short handed of the manual labor required to repair damage etc.
Pat
In addition to those points there is also a need for additional ground personnel to support any increase in the number of air squadrons present. As I recall from "Bloody Shambles" or "Buffaloes over Singapore" the RAF and commonwealth forces were very short handed at the bases that they historically did have. In particular I seem tio rec ll reading that many of the airfields had very limited AA defenses around them and were frequently short handed of the manual labor required to repair damage etc.
Pat
- Thread starter
- #34
Admiral Beez
Major
Unless the additional squadrons I suggest are sent a lot of the airfields should have been closed.
Kevin J
Banned
Unless there's radar coverage or an Observer Corps at Penang and Kota Bharu, there's no point in having any squadrons North of Kuala Lumper.
Thanks Tom, for your two excellent downloads. They contain so much interesting reading and knowledgeable information. I guess that I got away from the original thread with a very sweeping statement re Australia's situation at the time of the fall of Singapore.
The 'Australian story' is an interesting one, also a complex one.
After a very quick (and not a thorough) browse through the two downloads they seem to cover a lot of the political and armed forces history but not much mention is made of the aircraft employed by Australia during WW ll and only one squadron is covered.
Of bombers we operated 69 Douglas A20 Bostons, 56 North American B25 Mitchells and 287 Consolidated B24 Liberators. With fighters our most used fighter was the Curtiss P-40 Kittyhawk/Tomahawk with 848 examples. Australian pilots also operated many Supermarine Spitfires of various Mk's both in the Australia, South Pacific and Europe. Plus, a number of North American Mustangs of various Mk's in Europe and here. The Mustang became our stable fighter only after WW ll, through to the late 1950's. Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation built 200 of them either assembled here or manufactured here at Fishermen's Bend in Melbourne.
Stewart Wilson books, 'The Spitfire, Mustang and Kittyhawk in Australian Service' and his 'Boston, Mitchell and Liberator in Australian Service are both excellent for a quick easy reference to these types.
Hi,
I think that the point that I am trying to make is that, any additional aircraft sent would only be the "point of the spear" and that there would be a very large logistics and support tail required to support these additional aircraft. Not only would this include additional physical bodies at the airfields to support and maintain the field, the aircraft, and provide ground and AA defenses, but it would also include the additional personnel required to house, feed and maintain the support facilities in addition to the aircraft.
In addition there is also the need for addition M.U. units and depot/repair facilities, as noted by BUFFNUT453, but also additional Petroleum, Oil and Lubrication stores and replenishment for the additional aircraft.
Overall I'm not trying to say that these issues would make an increase in defenses impossible, but rather I'm just trying to note that they would also need to be taken into consideration.
Additionally, any additional aircraft squadrons in theatre would result in more shipping being needed to ship fuel, munitions and such into port, which once the war begins would likely result in the need for additional RN and Commonwealth naval support in the area as well, etc.
I think that the point that I am trying to make is that, any additional aircraft sent would only be the "point of the spear" and that there would be a very large logistics and support tail required to support these additional aircraft. Not only would this include additional physical bodies at the airfields to support and maintain the field, the aircraft, and provide ground and AA defenses, but it would also include the additional personnel required to house, feed and maintain the support facilities in addition to the aircraft.
In addition there is also the need for addition M.U. units and depot/repair facilities, as noted by BUFFNUT453, but also additional Petroleum, Oil and Lubrication stores and replenishment for the additional aircraft.
Overall I'm not trying to say that these issues would make an increase in defenses impossible, but rather I'm just trying to note that they would also need to be taken into consideration.
Additionally, any additional aircraft squadrons in theatre would result in more shipping being needed to ship fuel, munitions and such into port, which once the war begins would likely result in the need for additional RN and Commonwealth naval support in the area as well, etc.
German then Italian then Japanese forces had to be attacked in that order of course. The failing at Singapore to not hold out longer and surrender too early really has perplexed me for so long. The gew Buffalos and other aircraft that attacked the Japanese landings and beacheads on the Gulf of Siam were truly admirable. I have often wondered if the Prince of Wales had been left behind in Singapore. It could have been used as rearward fire support to protect the northern approach to Singapore and added to the AA defense of Singapore
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,161
- Jun 25, 2013
There was a lot wrong, in retrospect, with the way the Commonwealth forces were handled in Malaya, and there was a lot right with how the Japanese forces were managed. Certainly, the Commonwealth did not have their first leadership team in charge. I suspect there is quite a bit the Commonwealth forces could have done to make it much harder for Japan to capture Malaya and Singapore, even with fairly minimal increases in equipment: a few dozen tanks, even light tanks, some AT guns, and some more artillery. Given how ineffectively the aircraft deployed were managed, I wonder whether adding a few dozen aircraft would have had a significant positive effect.
yulzari
Tech Sergeant
Whilst a 1945 trained army with 1841 weapons could have been a bad thing for the Japanese the Japanese army was at it's most vulnerable at sea approaching Malaya. Anything that can strike the troopships before they land their troops and/or return for more will have more impact that the same resources deployed on land. It may be cool to picture carriers steaming to launch decisive air strikes but this is not the deep Pacific. It is a (very large) coastline open only to the east. Land based maritime strike is a better choice. What carriers can do is appear with a air strike capacity where land based aeroplanes cannot. A squadron of Bostons for example, will deliver far more bang than a carrier squadron and has the fuel and bombs to maintain action over weeks without steaming away to refuel and rearm in a port days away. In 1941 one might have (War Cabinet willing)
Wellingtons
Hampdens
Blenheims
Bostons
Battles
Henleys
Hudsons
Beauforts
All of which need fighter cover. It is said that bombs let in air but torpedos let in water which is a correct view of attacking warships with armour and damage control. But troopships are unarmoured and vulnerable to fires and damage control is hard. To strike at the naval vessels torpedos are the answer but bombs at low level by trained aircrew will do very nicely for the troopships. If you want torpedoes then you have to look at the spare FAA resources additionally to the above to whit
Albacore
Swordfish
Shark
Vildebeest
These will not live in a defended environment no matter how brave the crews but can operate at night by moonlight or flares.
Not normally mentioned when defending Malaya is spoken of is that Burma was being invaded at more or less the same time by land across northern Thailand eve if you hold Malaya.
Wellingtons
Hampdens
Blenheims
Bostons
Battles
Henleys
Hudsons
Beauforts
All of which need fighter cover. It is said that bombs let in air but torpedos let in water which is a correct view of attacking warships with armour and damage control. But troopships are unarmoured and vulnerable to fires and damage control is hard. To strike at the naval vessels torpedos are the answer but bombs at low level by trained aircrew will do very nicely for the troopships. If you want torpedoes then you have to look at the spare FAA resources additionally to the above to whit
Albacore
Swordfish
Shark
Vildebeest
These will not live in a defended environment no matter how brave the crews but can operate at night by moonlight or flares.
Not normally mentioned when defending Malaya is spoken of is that Burma was being invaded at more or less the same time by land across northern Thailand eve if you hold Malaya.
