Churchill agrees to RAF reinforcements to Malaya. What to send? (1 Viewer)

[XBe02Drvr]

What I'm looking for is to break the revolving door of commanders in Malaya. Instead let's an established general staff from 1938-42. Maybe that's Dobie.

And what I'm looking for is a commander who could foresee and counter the tactical and strategic brilliance of Gen Yamashita and Col Tsuji. Anything less is simply rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic, no matter how much kit you dedicate to the task. Even the latest and greatest Spits came up short against A6Ms and Ki43s when they met.

 

[buffnut453]

Not so much hindsight. I don't know that Dobie wasn't a fine commander in Malaya. What I'm looking for is to break the revolving door of commanders in Malaya. Instead let's an established general staff from 1938-42. Maybe that's Dobie.

The "revolving door" as you put it is simply the military posting system. Officers still change posts every 2-2.5 years. Are you now trying to entirely change the way the British military operates?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Are you now trying to entirely change the way the British military operates?

Might as well try to shift Gibraltar Rock.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Are you now trying to entirely change the way the British military operates?

I'm trying to consider if not having an entirely new general staff arrive in 1941 but instead one that's had some years of working together might make a difference. How can we make that happen within SOPs?

So, 24-30 months before Dec 1941 our general staff arrive. There are no guarantees, but can having the longer time working together be beneficial in Malaya's defence?

 

[EwenS]

Not so much hindsight. I don't know that Dobie wasn't a fine commander in Malaya. What I'm looking for is to break the revolving door of commanders in Malaya. Instead let's an established general staff from 1938-42. Maybe that's Dobie.

The Wiki article on Dobie has a couple of quotes from his correspondence with the War Office about the defence of Singapore going back to 1936. At that time Percival was his Chief of Staff. They both clearly recognised where the danger to Singapore and its naval base would come from in the event of Japanese aggression.

• I can't help feeling that the security of the Fortress might be better served by having a stronger force in being outside it … I consequently feel that the answers to the possible threat (of Japanese landing and establishing an advanced base on the mainland) is primarily to be found in suitable mobile forces in being in the Malay Peninsula … – Dobbie's letter as GOC (Malaya), to the War Office on 17 March 1936.

Dobbie's hypothesis regarding the capture of Singapore

In 1936, Dobbie, then General Officer Commanding (Malaya) stationed in Singapore, made an inquiry to find out if more forces were required on mainland Malaya to prevent the Japanese landing and capturing forward bases to attack Singapore. Percival, then his Chief Staff Officer, was assigned the task of drawing up a tactical appreciation on how the Japanese were most likely to attack. Percival's report in late 1937 did confirm that north Malaya could serve as a base for the conquest of Singapore and Borneo.[36] Both Dobbie and Percival made it clear that Singapore could no longer be seen as a self-contained naval base, and that its survival rested on the defence of mainland Malaya. So in May 1938, Dobbie wrote to the Chief of Staff:

"It is an attack from the northward that I regard as the greatest potential danger to the Fortress (Singapore). Such an attack could be carried out in the northeast monsoon. The jungle is not in most places, impassable for infantry."[37]
War Office Doc Number W106/2441

So it seems that there were a lot of minds that needed changing back in London at the War Office as well as amongst the political establishment in Malaya & Singapore itself that wasn't prepared to cough up the necessary monies to carry out the defence that Dobie envisaged as far back as 1936.

Against that kind of background and then a war forcing difficult choices to be made about the allocation of resources around the world, it is difficult to see just who you would appoint to achieve your aims.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Going this far back to bring about a better defence of Malaya/Singapore is dealing with the current plan at that time, namely the Singapore strategy head on! You won't need a strong defence, the royal Navy will protect you!

 

[Admiral Beez]

Going this far back to bring about a better defence of Malaya/Singapore is dealing with the current plan at that time, namely the Singapore strategy head on! You won't need a strong defence, the royal Navy will protect you!

Well, by winter 1939 it will be clear that the Royal Navy is not coming. In early 1940 nearly the entirety of the RN in Malaya had been withdrawn to waters closer to home, including the submarine flotillas, cruisers and destroyers, and even the monitor HMS Terror. If we have steady command from 1939 to 1942, our Malaya Command's general staff will have no notion that the RN will protect them.

Though I do wonder what our local Admiral in command at Malaya will be doing from 1939-1941. I'd like to think he's trying to get some patrol boats or MTGBs whipped up from someplace. Could India or Oz contrive such vessels?

 

[Shortround6]

patrol boats or MTGBs

Not the same thing.

Patrol boats are practically anything that will float, with a gun (even machine gun) and run the gamut from 30-40 ft converted fishing boats/power cruisers to several hundred ft converted fishing "boats"/commercial vessels (and few yachts).
Motor torpedo gun boats don't really exist in 1939-40-41.
You had Motor torpedo boats and motor gun boats.
They swapped the torpedo tubes for guns. It took a while to accept the loss of performance (speed) that mounting both would entail.

Two major problems with sourcing even small craft from India or Oz.
No radar, so you need a lot of them in bad weather.
No engines. You want 30kt speed (let alone 40 kts) you need aircraft engines, big ones.

You might get something like this.

with a coupe of small diesels or even gas engines but you are around 10kts and in 1941 you don't get the 20mm gun on the stern. You get a 1pdr or 3 pdr leftover from before WW 1.
Marine gas engines were usually large and heavy in order to be robust. Trying to power 70ft boats with a couple of Ford V-8 car engines was not going to work well.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Well, by winter 1939 it will be clear that the Royal Navy is not coming. In early 1940 nearly the entirety of the RN in Malaya had been withdrawn to waters closer to home, including the submarine flotillas, cruisers and destroyers, and even the monitor HMS Terror.

Well by that late date, it was recognised by the British High Command, namely Churchill and the CoS, that no fleet was going to Singapore in her time of need, fast. They extended the "Period before relief" to 180 days, or six months, and gave the RAF the job of defending the place until the fleet arrives. Which was partly why they got into such an unholy mess about building airfields in locations that were hard to defend. 582 aircraft was considered essential to defend Malaya and Burma, they had 164 first line by 7 December 41.

Though I do wonder what our local Admiral in command at Malaya will be doing from 1939-1941. I'd like to think he's trying to get some patrol boats or MTGBs whipped up from someplace. Could India or Oz contrive such vessels?

Quite a number of the Straits Steamship company of Singapore were requisitioned by the Royal Navy to be used as local patrol craft, freeing warships for the real war, while both Singapore and Hong Kong naval bases continued with a full workload for ship repair, refitting and some small ship building.

 

[EwenS]

Not everything was withdrawn from the China Station as quickly as suggested by AB. And some of them only went as far as the IO where the threat was German raiders.

The modern heavy cruisers & Liverpool were, but were replaced by 3/4 old D class. There was still a local flotilla of destroyers (old S/T classes from WW1) mostly based at Hong Kong. The 2nd MTB Flotilla remained at Hong Kong throughout the period with all these craft lost in Dec 1941 during the Japanese invasion. The 4th Sub Flotilla wasn't pulled out of Hong Kong until war with Italy was on the verge of starting around May 1940. The Yangtse & West River Flotillas of gunboats remained patrolling Chinese waters and maintaining a British presence.

 

[Shortround6]

The type of MTBs at Singapore in 1941.

60ft long and just under 14ft wide. 18 tons with 960 imp gallons of fuel for their 3 Napier Lion engines. two quad mount Lewis guns.
I don't know if they ever got torpedo tubes that fired over the bow or if they carried the stern racks and the torpedoes were dropped down the troughs and over the stern to the end of their days, in any case, 18in torpedoes.

Getting wooden hulls was easy, getting light weight/strong hulls was not easy. Getting 500-600hp engines (even two per boat) was very far from easy.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Which was partly why they got into such an unholy mess about building airfields in locations that were hard to defend.

I imagine Air Vice Marshall Pulford, having arrived in May 1941 to take up his command as C/O RAF must have wondered why he had rough strip airfields all across the territory but only a few aircraft and few resources for their maintenance or defence. Just maybe, having the new RAF C/O and overall CNC Malaya arrive in 1939 rather than 1941 might help produce a more sensible dispersion of airfields, for example.

 

[pinehilljoe]

If William Slim had been brought up through the ranks earlier, could he have put up a better defense? Probably impossible to rise in a peace time army.

 

[Peter Gunn]

Admittedly I was always rather surprised at how things went in Malaya (and elsewhere) the first few months of the war. But as General Pickett said when asked why his charge at Gettysburg failed, his response was "I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it".

Same same here, it seems the southwest Pacific was little more than an afterthought for the British government, and who can blame them? I mean, there was the whole Hitler kefluffle that was garnering most of their attention after all.

As I got older and read more, you realize how good a strategy the Japanese generals had and the ballsy moves they made, they gambled big and won big. So for the fall of Malaya I'd say the Japanese had something to do with it.

 

[pinehilljoe]

The Wiki article on Dobie has a couple of quotes from his correspondence with the War Office about the defence of Singapore going back to 1936. At that time Percival was his Chief of Staff. They both clearly recognised where the danger to Singapore and its naval base would come from in the event of Japanese aggression.

• I can't help feeling that the security of the Fortress might be better served by having a stronger force in being outside it … I consequently feel that the answers to the possible threat (of Japanese landing and establishing an advanced base on the mainland) is primarily to be found in suitable mobile forces in being in the Malay Peninsula … – Dobbie's letter as GOC (Malaya), to the War Office on 17 March 1936.

Dobbie's hypothesis regarding the capture of Singapore

In 1936, Dobbie, then General Officer Commanding (Malaya) stationed in Singapore, made an inquiry to find out if more forces were required on mainland Malaya to prevent the Japanese landing and capturing forward bases to attack Singapore. Percival, then his Chief Staff Officer, was assigned the task of drawing up a tactical appreciation on how the Japanese were most likely to attack. Percival's report in late 1937 did confirm that north Malaya could serve as a base for the conquest of Singapore and Borneo.[36] Both Dobbie and Percival made it clear that Singapore could no longer be seen as a self-contained naval base, and that its survival rested on the defence of mainland Malaya. So in May 1938, Dobbie wrote to the Chief of Staff:

"It is an attack from the northward that I regard as the greatest potential danger to the Fortress (Singapore). Such an attack could be carried out in the northeast monsoon. The jungle is not in most places, impassable for infantry."[37]
War Office Doc Number W106/2441

So it seems that there were a lot of minds that needed changing back in London at the War Office as well as amongst the political establishment in Malaya & Singapore itself that wasn't prepared to cough up the necessary monies to carry out the defence that Dobie envisaged as far back as 1936.

Against that kind of background and then a war forcing difficult choices to be made about the allocation of resources around the world, it is difficult to see just who you would appoint to achieve your aims.

Similar to the Wargames in the 30s that showed Pearl Harbor's vulnerability. In Pear Harbor's case the easiest defense was to leave the Fleet in San Diego and Long Beach.