Churchill agrees to RAF reinforcements to Malaya. What to send?

[Zippythehog]

Mohawks and Warhawks, from the French orders? And Marylands and Bostons, also from French contracts?
Sorry if I am late to the party. I don't know much about the debate but it seems material might not be the limitation? Perhaps I'm in error, but I would expect trained crews to be the pinchpoint.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Strip Fighter Command to the bones and ship them off to Malaya. I think Britain was pretty safe in 1940

In hindsight I don't think sending four hundred Spitfires from Britain to Malaya would have put the former at any greater risk.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Mohawks and Warhawks, from the French orders? And Marylands and Bostons, also from French contracts?
Sorry if I am late to the party. I don't know much about the debate but it seems material might not be the limitation? Perhaps I'm in error, but I would expect trained crews to be the pinchpoint.

Mohawks, the name given to the Curtis P-36, could have been used in Malaya, they were no longer first line aircraft in the European theatre, and the Dutch East Indies had some, which were useful. The Warhawk, a name the US gave to the P40, was a successor, and probably too modern to be sent to a peaceful backwater like Malaya, until the fighting started.

But really, what we are talking about is improving the British air defence of Malaya & Singapore, of which fighter aircraft is just one factor. Given that they had the time, money and want to do it, in a good air defence system, the Buffalo would have sufficed for a while.

As you point out, trained aircrew was also a vital ingredient in any good air defence.

 

[EwenS]

In hindsight I don't think sending four hundred Spitfires from Britain to Malaya would have put the former at any greater risk.

Perhaps you might like to reassess that statement in light of this study and especially the table on page 23 of the .pdf which shows Fighter Command aircraft and pilot strength in 1941/42. In particular note that the total number of Spitfires available to Fighter Command in the Spring of 1941 was only around 400!

https://bjmh.gold.ac.uk/article/download/1558/1671/

 

[buffnut453]

The shopping list of things that needed fixing in Malaya is huge and goes way beyond just aircraft.

Let's start with the airfields, none of which were all-weather. At Sungei Patani, for example, the flooding was so bad that aircraft couldn't be dispersed around the airfield.

Then there were communication challenge. There was one...repeat ONE...telephone line from northern Malaya back to Singapore that was used by both civilians and the military. This impacts the ability to implement a robust air warning and control system....and that's before we get into the lack of radars, absence of any Observer Corps equivalent etc.

We've already touched on the personnel issue at the HQs but this extends elsewhere. For example, 151 MU was massively overstretched to cover the spread of aircraft types. A separate organization, 153 MU, was established just to repair engines but it was limited in capacity.

Then there's the total absence of AAA to defend any of the airfields in Malaya, Singapore and Burma.

I could go on....but you get the picture. Just sending aircraft isn't going to make Malaya any more defensible. Most of the RAF's assets in northern Malaya were destroyed on the ground early in the fight. Putting more aircraft there without adequate early warning or airfield defences simply means you're going to lose more aircraft on the ground. And I dread to think how the narrow-track undercarriage of the Spitfire would perform on monsoon-sodden grass airfields.

 

[Sons of Anzac]

For the obvious delay in getting radar install an observor corps equivalent based on the east coast and northern borders and strategically along the Malay interior. Pull the aircraft back from the eastern coast airfields and wreck the fields.

Matador plans should never have been entertained, they neither had the resources or indeed the political inclination to undertake a pre-emptive attack on southern Thailand. The Jitra line should have been completed and troops remain and train there.

Extra aircraft - use the bonus of the French orders being diverted to GB- 50 x Chesapeake (Vindicator) dive bombers, 150 x Mohawk fighters plus 150 x Battles (modified in the interim to attack with radial engine, self sealing tanks, light armour, 2 x crew instead of 3 and extra m.gs. I'd also send the remaining B17C's that the RAF didnt really want to Malaya to be the only long range force capable of hitting southern French Indo-China- I think there were 16 left.

And yes in the remaining time build up stores, workshops and the specialised staff to do the work. Australia & NZ offered to help with manpower. Due to British and unfortunately Australian political games we had no aircraft industry at that stage to help with the numbers.

 

[ThomasP]

To be fair, it was not just due to political games. The population of Australia and New Zealand at the time was only 7,000,000 and 1,600,000 respectively in 1940. That is not enough for any significantly large and sophisticated aircraft production industry to be economical. The Australians, for example, had to reduce the size of there military during the war to allow continued production of the various goods needed for day-to-day life and the war material manufacturing effort.

 

[buffnut453]

For the obvious delay in getting radar install an observor corps equivalent based on the east coast and northern borders and strategically along the Malay interior. Pull the aircraft back from the eastern coast airfields and wreck the fields.

Matador plans should never have been entertained, they neither had the resources or indeed the political inclination to undertake a pre-emptive attack on southern Thailand. The Jitra line should have been completed and troops remain and train there.

Extra aircraft - use the bonus of the French orders being diverted to GB- 50 x Chesapeake (Vindicator) dive bombers, 150 x Mohawk fighters plus 150 x Battles (modified in the interim to attack with radial engine, self sealing tanks, light armour, 2 x crew instead of 3 and extra m.gs. I'd also send the remaining B17C's that the RAF didnt really want to Malaya to be the only long range force capable of hitting southern French Indo-China- I think there were 16 left.

And yes in the remaining time build up stores, workshops and the specialised staff to do the work. Australia & NZ offered to help with manpower. Due to British and unfortunately Australian political games we had no aircraft industry at that stage to help with the numbers.

Ok....so you want to destroy the east coast airfields in northern Malaya but, at the same time, you want to increase the air order of battle by 350 single-engine fighters and bombers, and perhaps 16x B-17s? Where are you going to put all those airframes, particularly given the propensity of several of the airfields to flood during heavy rain?

Bear in mind that 350 airframes is twice the total number of aircraft in Malaya, Singapore and Burma in December 1941. This means you're trying to accommodate and maintain a force that's 3 times larger than was present at the time...and the support resources struggled with just the existing force structure.

 

[EwenS]

I'd also send the remaining B17C's that the RAF didnt really want to Malaya to be the only long range force capable of hitting southern French Indo-China- I think there were 16 left.

Just when do you intend making this deployment?

The deal to purchase those 20 B-17C was only concluded in Jan 1941 with the initial RAF crews trained in the USA before delivering them to Britain between May and July. They were intended for service trials with high altitude daylight operations. All went to 90 squadron which was formed specially to operate them in May 1941. They flew operations from Britain between 8 July and 24 September 1941 with 8 being lost through enemy action or w/o in accidents.

On 17 Sept AOC ME requested their services. The Chief of the Air Staff, Portal, has been described as candid as he noted "maintenance difficulties [are] likely to be a limiting factor". But 4 were sent for "a period of experimental trial" and "the value will be mainly in harassing operations for moral affect, but material results will be largely fortuitous. Both are likely to be small for the effort involved." They arrived in Egypt 28 Oct-1 Nov 1941.

Those 4 aircraft spent most of their time in the ME running altitude and fuel consumption trials as the initial operation demonstrated that figures from Britain were optimistic. It took double the length of time to reach 25,000ft (2hrs 42mins in ME) with engines over max temps allowed. One aircraft was lost on the first mission and another in Jan 1942 from engine failure.

The Detachment was dogged by mechanical problems throughout its stay in the ME. After flying a final operation on 9 March 1942, the ME trials were ended on 9 April. On 15 April instructions were issued to send the 2 survivors to India where no operational use was made of them. They were turned over to the USAAF in India in Sept 1942.

As for the 8 aircraft left in Britain, in Nov 1941 Bomber Command considered switching them to a night role but that left the problem of flame damping of the exhausts.

With the expectation in late 1941 of Fortress II (B-17E) arriving from early 1942 and the decision to allocate them to Coastal Command, on 27 Jan 1942 all remaining Fortress I and key maintenance personnel were transferred from Bomber to Coastal Command. 7 of the surviving 8 served with CC squadrons during 1942.

So the best that can be expected from your proposed use of these Fortress I in Malaya is a dozen aircraft arriving in early Nov 1941, untried in tropical conditions and short of spares and maintenance backup. The experience of trials and operations in the ME does not bode well for prospective operations over Malaya.

 

[EwenS]

Extra aircraft - use the bonus of the French orders being diverted to GB- 50 x Chesapeake (Vindicator) dive bombers,

48 (2 were lost at sea en route to the UK in June 1941) which only began to arrive in Britain in April 1941 (in line with the French contract that Britain took over in June 1940) and whose delivery and assembly lasted until Nov 1941. By the time you ship them to Malaya instead, allow for reserves and formation of new squadrons (where are the crews coming from?) you might get 2 partially trained squadrons of an already obsolete type at the end of a long supply chain in service before the Japanese invasion. And these were IIRC, the last of the type to be built, with the USN already retiring them to a training role as the SBD became available in numbers.

150 x Mohawk fighters

The only homogeneous group of Mohawks were the 204 ex French Mohawk IV. Less 16 to Portugal (got to keep them sweet in case they start providing bases for U-boats in the Azores). Less some (6?) found to be too damaged when removed from packing cases in Britain.

In spring 1941 the eventual allocation was

c70 to the SAAF, who used some against the Italians in East Africa in mid-late 1941, and for training (until then their most modern fighter had been the Hawker Fury). By early 1942 that allowed 3 more trained SAAF fighter squadrons to deploy to the ME and convert to the Tomahawk IIB ready for combat.

Balance were supposed to go to ME but about 90 ended up in India. 5 squadron began receiving them in Dec 1941 as replacements for Audax converted as single seat fighters. By May 1942 that unit was one of the few fighter units in NE India. 146 Sqdn got a few in March /April 1942 again to augment Audax, before losing them to 5 Sqdn. The final unit to receive them, 155 Sqdn, formed in April 1942 but had to wait until Aug before sufficient aircraft were available after being suitably modified.

And remember 150 or however many aircraft does not mean 150 on the front line. You get maybe 50% on the front line with the remainder at MUs as attrition replacements for operational, and non operational, losses. Look at the Buffalo. 167 delivered to Singapore. They equipped 5 squadrons there or in Burma (UE 16 each) total 80. As for the rest, a few losses in training with the rest as reserves for future losses.

So you are happy to sacrifice the Middle East and Eastern India to prop up Malaya? As I've said before there were no easy decisions to be made. More for Malaya means less elsewhere.

plus 150 x Battles (modified in the interim to attack with radial engine, self sealing tanks, light armour, 2 x crew instead of 3 and extra m.gs.

That proposal has to be a pre-1939 project. You don't simply swap out an inline Merlin for a new radial (Source?) without a development programme.

 

[buffnut453]

And remember 150 or however many aircraft does not mean 150 on the front line. You get maybe 50% on the front line with the remainder at MUs as attrition replacements for operational, and non operational, losses. Look at the Buffalo. 167 delivered to Singapore. They equipped 5 squadrons there or in Burma (UE 16 each) total 80. As for the rest, a few losses in training with the rest as reserves for future losses.

This comes back to my question about space on available airfields. Far East Command struggled to find space for even 167 Buffalos. Steps were taken to increase the number of airframes assigned to squadrons. For example, 67 Sqn had 100% airframe redundancy in Burma while 453 Sqn had considerably more airframes than the establishment 12 IE and 4 IR. However, there were still challenges storing the attrition replacements, with Buffalo airframes being farmed out across Seletar, Sembawang, and even Tengah.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Excluding Singapore, Malaya should have built three main airbases, with hardened well drained runways, good shelter, AA, etc. perhaps along the below railways and roads.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

So you are happy to sacrifice the Middle East and Eastern India to prop up Malaya? As I've said before there were no easy decisions to be made. More for Malaya means less elsewhere.

And the fact is that this hypothetical loss of the Middle East immediately threatened the British standing in the Far East, for want of (relatively more) efficient sea communications.

 

[EwenS]

Excluding Singapore, Malaya should have built three main airbases, with hardened well drained runways, good shelter, AA, etc. perhaps along the below railways and roads.

View attachment 692567

There was a very good reason for airfields being built where they were which doesn't appear on your map - geography. And it also explains the route of the Japanese advance in 1941/42. The centre of the Malayan peninsula is jungle covered hill and mountain. There are many peaks rising to over 6,000ft with some over 7,000ft hiding steep ravines with fast flowing rivers and streams. See here.

There is an article here about railway construction in Malaya, including a bit about the difficulties of building the line north from Gemas to Tumpat (near Kota Bharu). It took over 15 years to complete. Note the comments about it passing through "virgin jungle" and most of the local development being restricted to areas close to the rivers. Then add the rainfall in the area. Not wonderful for building airfields.

The Development of Malaya - Railway Wonders of the World

The story of the system that serves the Federated Malay States, the Straits Settlements, and the Unfederated States of Johore, Kelantan, Kedah, and Perlis. The Federal Railway Administration possesses 946 miles of track of one-metre gauge. There are also 121 miles of track in the Johore State...

www.railwaywondersoftheworld.com

Postwar it was the helicopter that came into its own during Operation Firedog (the Malayan Emergency 1948-60) in penetrating these central areas.

Edit:- and note how many of the airfields on the west coast were built along the available railway system.

 

[Admiral Beez]

There was a very good reason for airfields being built where they were which doesn't appear on your map - geography. And it also explains the route of the Japanese advance in 1941/42. The centre of the Malayan peninsula is jungle covered hill and mountain. There are many peaks rising to over 6,000ft with some over 7,000ft hiding steep ravines with fast flowing rivers and streams. See here.



View attachment 692600
There is an article here about railway construction in Malaya, including a bit about the difficulties of building the line north from Gemas to Tumpat (near Kota Bharu). It took over 15 years to complete. Note the comments about it passing through "virgin jungle" and most of the local development being restricted to areas close to the rivers. Then add the rainfall in the area. Not wonderful for building airfields.

The Development of Malaya - Railway Wonders of the World

The story of the system that serves the Federated Malay States, the Straits Settlements, and the Unfederated States of Johore, Kelantan, Kedah, and Perlis. The Federal Railway Administration possesses 946 miles of track of one-metre gauge. There are also 121 miles of track in the Johore State...

www.railwaywondersoftheworld.com

Postwar it was the helicopter that came into its own during Operation Firedog (the Malayan Emergency 1948-60) in penetrating these central areas.

Edit:- and note how many of the airfields on the west coast were built along the available railway system.

Good info. Imagine putting a radar station on those 6,000 ft peaks…. impossible and impracticable I know.

Pick three of the above airfields, build hardened runways with good drainage, with proper covered hangar/warehouse space for maintenance and spare aircraft, and AA and ground defences. Destroy or never build the others to begin with. Achieve this by consolidating the budget, manpower and resources from all the other airfields into three air bases. With only 160 odd active aircraft you don't need more than the Singapore airbases plus three large, all-weather and we'll-defended ones in Malaya.

The longer time, fuel use and distances between alert to aircraft arrival will be an issue to deal with. Perhaps an observer corp or improved colony-wide communications.

 

[Shortround6]

For Malaya, using hindsight, the most effective thing they could have done was increase the supply of 3in mortars and ammunition. In fact locally source them in theater if possible.

The mortars and ammunition are the cheapest support weapons you can make. The mortar bombs can be made super cheap at a reduced level of effectiveness.

Using hindsight we know that if the Japanese had been delayed 1-2 weeks in the advance down the peninsula and/or delayed in final assault the Japanese would have been forced to surrender or face starvation. It would have taken weeks if not a few months for the Japanese to transport a fresh force of troops to renew the assault.

This is not an air based solution

However production by Australian, Indian, Malaysian, New Zealand companies (not all nations needed) were certainly possible from a manufacturing standpoint of the basic equipment and propellent for charges. Depending on how crude of a fuse one is willing to accept and what one is willing to use for a shell filler local ammo is more than possible.

 

[EwenS]

Good info. Imagine putting a radar station on those 6,000 ft peaks…. impossible and impracticable I know.

Pick three of the above airfields, build hardened runways with good drainage, with proper covered hangar/warehouse space for maintenance and spare aircraft, and AA and ground defences. Destroy or never build the others to begin with. Achieve this by consolidating the budget, manpower and resources from all the other airfields into three air bases. With only 160 odd active aircraft you don't need more than the Singapore airbases plus three large, all-weather and we'll-defended ones in Malaya.

The longer time, fuel use and distances between alert to aircraft arrival will be an issue to deal with. Perhaps an observer corp or improved colony-wide communications.

But just how badly affected by rain were these northern airfields?

At Kota Bharu the Japanese landing force anchored just before midnight and the first troops landed just after 0200 8th Dec. The first Hudson strike, of several in those first few hours, of 7 aircraft took off at 0208. The Buffalo det was airborne at 0630.

At Gong Kedah the Vildebeests took off just after 0600 but ran into heavy rain offshore splitting them up.

The various bombers at Kuantan, Sungei Patani, Alor Star and Tengah were all able to take off at first light to attack the Japanese at Kota Bharu. But like the Vildebeests they rain into heavy rain preventing them finding the enemy.

The problem with waterlogging wasn't so much with the runways as the dispersal areas, forcing concentration of aircraft in the open where they became easy targets so long as they remained on the ground. But aircraft can't stay airborne forever. Maintenance was also carried out in the open (would hangars really have provided more than nice targets with aircraft concentrated in them?). Add to that inadequate air raid warning systems and limited AA defences so what British fighters there were, were caught on the ground as the Japanese began to bomb the airfields. And the Japanese were careful to use smaller bombs to wreck aircraft but leave the facilities as intact as possible for their arrival.

By landing at Singora in Thailand at 0400 8th Dec, the Japanese quickly captured the airfield (also noted as rain sodden) and by first light were flying in Ki27s from 3 Sentais (over 100 aircraft). An airfield at Patani was also quickly captured. Against that the RAF had 14 Buffalos plus a dozen Blenheim If fighters in northern Malaya.

While Kota Bharu fell on 9 Dec, Alor Star in the very north west didn't fall until the 13th. But by then the RAF had been driven out of it and other bases, by the Japanese ability to strike at them regularly and with virtual impunity. Being forced to withdraw from these forward bases then hinders the ability to strike back at the Japanese at Singora even before the airfields in the NW were overrun.

Operations from 8th to 23rd December, 1941

www.britain-at-war.org.uk

Arguably, the airfields in the NE corner were too far forward to be defendable in the first place. But for those in the NW to survive, many, many more fighters plus improved warning systems would have been required.


Rainwater on airfields was a perpetual problem on airfields throughout South East Asia throughout the war during the wet season. This is the all weather airfield at Mingaladon, Burma in 1945 when many lessons had been learned.

In the dry season, dust then became the problem.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Fantastic photos EwanS, love them!

Re the wet and mostly grass airfields that the RAF operated off in Malaya/Singapore, the Japanese weren't any better off regarding the airfields they operated off either!, The airfields in southern Indo-China and on the Kra Isthmus of Thailand also suffered badly from the monsoon season.

 

[EwenS]

Fantastic photos EwanS, love them!

Re the wet and mostly grass airfields that the RAF operated off in Malaya/Singapore, the Japanese weren't any better off regarding the airfields they operated off either!, The airfields in southern Indo-China and on the Kra Isthmus of Thailand also suffered badly from the monsoon season.

Always best to remember that the jungle, and in this case the weather, is neutral. (With apologies to F Spencer Chapman).

 

[buffnut453]

Fantastic photos EwanS, love them!

Re the wet and mostly grass airfields that the RAF operated off in Malaya/Singapore, the Japanese weren't any better off regarding the airfields they operated off either!, The airfields in southern Indo-China and on the Kra Isthmus of Thailand also suffered badly from the monsoon season.

Agreed...but the IJAAF and IJNAF had over 4 years' experience operating from forward operating bases in China. It's one thing to do that in peacetime but it's another entirely to do it under combat conditions. While conditions in Malaya were very different from China, the experience gained by Japanese air and groundcrews would have given them an advantage over their RAF counterparts.

The other factor that must be considered is that the IJAAF, being the attacking force, could operate at the time and place of their choosing whereas the RAF had to respond to those attacks. The lack of early warning forced the Buffalo pilots to maintain standing patrols that were wasteful in terms of airframe hours, and tiring for both pilots and groundcrew. In contrast, the IJAAF could plan where and when to attack, schedule their take-offs and landings accordingly, and hence use the weather to their advantage.

Given the lack of RAF early warning and ground control for the fighters, it's always baffled me as to why the RAF didn't go on the offensive sooner. Strafing attacks by even 4 Buffalos could have caused significant damage at the overcrowded Japanese airfields. However, instead of using fighters to strafe, AHQFE relied on bombing raids which had negligible impact because all the attempts were disrupted. Efforts by the RAF to take the initiative were half-hearted at best, and came far too late in proceedings. I can't help wondering if RAF commanders in the Far East were too wedded to the bomber being the primary attack means...which is strange because even in WW1, aircraft like Sopwith Camels were used to strafe and bomb German trenches, and even to neutralize German anti-tank guns. Perhaps a case of learning the wrong lessons during the inter-War period?