Churchill agrees to RAF reinforcements to Malaya. What to send?

[EwenS]

With this in mind, I'm surprised the British government released the Blenheims, Hudsons and Buffaloes for Malaya. All three would have been better off serving in North Africa and the Med. If delivery was feasible, sixty operational Buffaloes along with nearly as many spares would have been very welcome and more impactful at Malta in early 1941. Perhaps HMS Formidable or Illustrious are not crippled by Axis bombers. Buffaloes will struggle against the Bf 109, but against Italian fighters, Stukas and twin/triple engine level bombers the Buffalo will do fine over Malta. The Blenheim fighter variant could have a turkey shoot against any unescorted Stukas.

As for Malaya, the Vilderbeests, Sharks and a trio of PBYs can be reinforced by a squadron of Gladiators. I'd then tell Percival upon his assignment in April 1941 that he's not getting any aircraft nor any significant naval support (forget Force Z), and that his army must destroy any airfields and prepare for a siege simultaneously from landward and seaward. When the Japanese took Singapore they apparently found tons of ready mix concrete in storage, intended but never used for defensive works. Hopefully with no RAF or RN assistance expected someone in Britain will send some light tanks, mortars, etc. as well as have a plan if the IJA invades to evacuate non-essential personnel.

I'd expect Australian PMs Menzies, Fadden and Curtin will refuse to send any Australian troops to Malaya with this level of neglect, so it's just Indians, Poms and Malays. Furthermore, with Malaya and Hong Kong along with the British Pacific territories (Solomons, etc.) at best lightly defended by Britain; Australia may refuse to send any troops to North Africa. They'll need those boys at home when the Japanese storm across the Pacific.

Now now. No need to throw the toys out of the pram.

But perhaps you can see that their are no easy answers for the British High Command. And the FE cannot be looked at in isolation when Britain is, or has the prospect of, fighting alone across half the planet with limited resources.

But there was a change of policy in 1941. The Middle East then took priority over the Far East. The concern being that lose Cairo & the Suez Canal, the next loss is the Persian Gulf oilfields, whose oil sustained the Far East theatre in WW2. Does Turkey join the Axis? Does USSR after June 1941 collapse? Both the latter prospects threaten the Gulf.

But to deal with some of your specific queries.
Blenheims - 3 squadrons. 27 had been in India pre war. It received Blenheim If in Nov 1940 (surplus to requirements at home) and moved to Malaya Feb 1941. 34 & 62 were already Blenheim I equipped when they left the UK for Singapore in Aug 1939. 34 converted to Blenheim IV in Nov 1941. These 3 squadrons had 39 aircraft plus 15 reserves. Add to that 8 more Blenheim I of 60 squadron from Burma caught at an armament practice camp.

So these kind of numbers are not going to cause a siesmic shift in the fortunes of the Middle East. Most of the Blenheim squadrons in the Middle East got Blenheim IV during 1941.

Hudsons - the Hudson II belonged to 1 & 8 squadrons RAAF. 24 +7 reserves. The Australians had, via the Air Ministry to benefit from bulk buying prices, bought 100 for the RAAF in 1938/39.

So not the RAFs to do what they want with. Will Australia agree to weaken its defences in favour of ME?

Buffalo - as has been explained before the Buffalo purchase was a rush job to provide a fighter for regions where aircraft with European levels of performance would not be expected to be met ie the Far East. The choice was Buffalo or P-35. The former won because it was thought Brewster could deliver quickly. Order placed spring 1940. 167 delivered direct to Singapre Feb-Aug 1941. Other 3 to Britain for trials.

 

[EwenS]

More information on RAF ME strength in Nov 1941 around the time of Operation Crusader. From Sudan through Egypt, Iraq, Iran and Yemen.

Wellesley - Total 19 of which 15 serviceable.
Vincent - 20 of which 17 serviceable
Gladiator - 8
Audax - 20
Bombay - 20 of which 14 serviceable

Royal Air Force Strength in November 1941

Background The question of Commonwealth air strength at the start of Operation CRUSADER has been the subject of some debate, with figures ranging from 600 to 1,000 planes being available to Air Mar…

rommelsriposte.com

An indication if changing RAF priorities in 1941 - Martin Baltimore were originally intended for the Far East. Instead it was decided to keep them in the ME. It was Dec 41/Jan 42 when the began to arrive.

 

[EwenS]

There's a lot to unpick here, not least the rather binary "all or nothing" approach you seem to advocate which is never a reality when there are competing priorities.

Your proposal to send nothing to Malaya means that the UK must abandon its attempts to deter Japanese aggression. That will only accelerate the onset of war in the Far East, which the UK was desperately keen to avoid. London was walking a tightrope between trying to provide adequate deterrence while not significantly impacting its ability to operate in current war theatres. That they failed does not mean that the policy was wrong, or even that the policy was badly applied.

Your comment about Percival is merging two distinct roles and responsibilities. Percival was GOC Malaya responsible for Army forces. Brooke-Popham was CinC Far East, theoretically responsible for the joint forces in the theatre although the RN maintained a separate chain of command for its assets (a key failing, IMHO).

As CinC Far East, Brooke-Popham was responsible for defence in that theatre. It was his job to evaluate the situation and request the forces he felt necessary to accomplish the tasks assigned to him by London. It was NEVER London's job to tell any theatre CinC how to do his business. The man on the ground understands best his local situation and has the professional knowledge to prepare his forces accordingly. Brooke-Popham developed a solid estimate of the required forces but London was only willing to achieve that force structure in mid-1942. No military command EVER has enough forces...they ALWAYS want more, so the typical approach is to muddle through with whatever forces you have on-hand, which is exactly what Brooke-Popham did.

As to "prepare for a siege simultaneously from landward and seaward," that's exactly the scenario that Percival and Brooke-Popham were striving to do. The problem is that the threat for either scenario simply wasn't there in April 1941. As E EwenS pointed out, there were relatively few Japanese forces in FIC before July 1941, certainly not enough to pose a threat to Malaya. Even after July 1941, there still wasn't a large invasion force in FIC. The actual invasion forces that assaulted Thailand and Northern Malaya in December 1941 came from Formosa. The lack of a clear and present threat led London to think they had more time to deliver the requested reinforcements for Far East Command. The Japanese simply moved faster than anyone expected, showing remarkable operational flexibility to accomplish a large-scale amphibious assault at a range never before seen in warfare.

None of the above suggests that the Brits got things right. There were many mistakes, not least inadequate preparation of landward defences. However, again London played a role in that. In 1941, Malaya's primary job was producing rubber and tin for the British war effort. That work was accomplished by commercial companies which had a loud voice in London dissuading the military from any actions that would hurt production (e.g. building defences in Malaya would be "demoralizing" for the civilians; conscripting locals would take them away from the tin mines and rubber plantations, reducing production of these war-critical commodities).

One of the common issues identified by Percival and Brooke-Popham was the lack of an adequate staff in the headquarters to organize and manage defensive preparations. This may seem like deflecting blame but I can tell you from personal experience that having a sufficiently-sized and qualified/experienced headquarters staff is crucial to getting ANYTHING done in the military. It's the headquarters that levies training requirements on subordinate units. If the headquarters staff is under-resourced or lacking in experience (both of which were true in Singapore), then you won't get adequate direction down to the units. This lack of HQ staff was another shortfall that could and should have been rectified sooner, indeed it was probably easier to fix that than bring in droves of additional aircraft, guns etc.

Another issue not so far mentioned was the War Office insisting on rates of pay for local workers far below the local rate for the job. Hence an inability to recruit the necessary labour to build airfields, defences etc.

And the terrain and general lack of infrastructure in the country were also factors hindering defensive preparations. There is an article here about the difficulties of setting up the radar network once the equipment began to show up in early 1941 which illustrate the problem. Malaya was not Britain. (Page 15 of the .pdf onwards)

https://www.malayanvolunteersgroup.org.uk/uploads/1/0/7/3/107387685/mvg_newsletter_edition_47.pdf

 

[buffnut453]

Another issue not so far mentioned was the War Office insisting on rates of pay for local workers far below the local rate for the job. Hence an inability to recruit the necessary labour to build airfields, defences etc.

And the terrain and general lack of infrastructure in the country were also factors hindering defensive preparations. There is an article here about the difficulties of setting up the radar network once the equipment began to show up in early 1941 which illustrate the problem. Malaya was not Britain. (Page 15 of the .pdf onwards)

https://www.malayanvolunteersgroup.org.uk/uploads/1/0/7/3/107387685/mvg_newsletter_edition_47.pdf

Entirely agree. A number of years ago, I went through a number of surviving files from Singapore. One of them related to the challenges of setting up the radar sites. There's a rather depressing minute at the front of one file dated around December 1941 which, paraphrasing, said "At this rate, we should just leave the radar equipment to the Japanese and let them set it up for us." Clearly, the amount of time it took to get the radar sites established, coupled with the speed of the Japanese advance, were causing considerable frustration.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

December in Malaya is monsoon/cyclone/typhoon season, the Japanese invasion was considered rather like trying to run Operation Overlord at the same time of the year. As a result there was the possibility the approaching force was to occupy Thailand to set up post monsoon operations.

When it comes to the RAF in Malaya what was it going to attack? As far as I am aware the invasion forces were put ashore with a see you in Singapore farewell then the ships left, expecting the troops to largely live off the land and captured supplies. RAF air support for the army was still being worked out and was much more complicated in jungles. At the very least the army had to stop replacing the partially trained Indian troops with new recruits, moving the more experienced people to other theatres. Plus have a few tanks to at least allow the troops to familiarise themselves.

Singapore's population is given as 557,000 in 225 square miles (Malta 242,000 in 122 square miles), then add the military, its approaches at least require holding or a neutral Sumatra. Its water supply requires holding parts of Malaya. Unless there is enough air and naval power present holding much of Malaya is not possible as landings can take place behind any defence line.

 

[Macandy]

The planes weren't the main issue, it was the materiel flying them.
The Far East was seen as a backwoods posting in the RAF where people either went for the party scene, or you sent the piss poor pilots you couldn't find a use for at home.
There were exceptions, but the RAF in the Far East in 1941 was a very poor thing.

 

[Admiral Beez]

There's a lot to unpick here, not least the rather binary "all or nothing" approach you seem to advocate which is never a reality when there are competing priorities.

In the early 1900s Britain was seeing an increasingly belligerent and powerful Germany. To counter this Britain partook the "all or nothing" approach of stripping its overseas bases of pretty much all battleships, cruisers and destroyers, leaving almost nothing of fighting value outside of the North Atlantic and Med. To accomplish this whilst keeping its Asian empire safe, Britain came to an agreement with Japan.

This is where Britain failed to match up its diplomacy with its military capability. The "all or nothing" approach can work if you're smart about it. Britain should have come to an agreement with Japan once German-targeted rearmament was underway in Britain. Instead Britain continued to antagonize Japan through its support of US sanctions whilst simultaneously neglecting to prepare for the inevitable military response that antagonism will provoke. Australia recognized this, pressing Britain to recognize Manchukuo in 1937. If Britain was unable to defend the eastern empire then it must protect it diplomatically, or lose it.

Avoid war with Japan, and nothing more than a small garrison and distant naval repair and replenishment group is needed at Malaya.

 

[EwenS]

The planes weren't the main issue, it was the materiel flying them.
The Far East was seen as a backwoods posting in the RAF where people either went for the party scene, or you sent the piss poor pilots you couldn't find a use for at home.
There were exceptions, but the RAF in the Far East in 1941 was a very poor thing.

That is not a fair characterisation of the aircrew in Malaya in 1941. It was a question of most being straight out of the training system. Best illustrated with the Buffalo units where all had been newly formed in theatre from March 1941.

In the first 2 squadrons (67 & 243) only the COs and flight commanders had experience, including in the UK during the BoB and the ME. A handful of others were transferred in from other non-fighter units in Malaya. The rest of the pilots in the first two squadrons came from direct from training units in New Zealand. Very few had even flown an aircraft with a retractable undercart. 453 was a brand new squadron formed in the UK immediately prior to being sent East in July 1941, and 488 in New Zealand in Sept again with a lot of newly trained pilots.

The RAAF squadrons were the product of the expansion of that force at the beginning of WW2. So again a lack of experience amongst the personnel.

 

[EwenS]

In the early 1900s Britain was seeing an increasingly belligerent and powerful Germany navy and army. To counter this Britain partook the "all or nothing" approach of stripping its overseas bases of pretty much all battleships, cruisers and destroyers, leaving almost nothing of fighting value outside of the North Atlantic and Med. To accomplish this whilst keeping its Asian empire safe, Britain came to an agreement with Japan.

This is where Britain failed to match up its diplomacy with its military capability. The "all or nothing" approach can work if you're smart about it. Britain should have come to an agreement with Japan once German-targeted rearmament was underway in Britain. Instead Britain continued to antagonize Japan through its support of US sanctions whilst simultaneously neglecting to prepare for the inevitable military response that antagonism will provoke. Australia recognized this, pressing Britain to recognize Manchukuo in 1937. If Britain was unable to defend the eastern empire then it must protect it diplomatically, or lose it.

Avoid war with Japan, and nothing more than a small garrison and distant naval repair and replenishment group is needed at Malaya.

That ship sailed in 1921 with the ending of the Anglo Japanese Alliance and keeping the US onside at the Washington Conference. Hence the development of Singapore Naval Base.

To have pursued such a policy in the 1930s means accepting the Japanese invasion of China from 1930 and dooming the League of Nations even earlier than historical. It is just not going to happen.

 

[Shortround6]

In the early 1900s Britain was seeing an increasingly belligerent and powerful Germany navy and army. To counter this Britain partook the "all or nothing" approach of stripping its overseas bases of pretty much all battleships, cruisers and destroyers, leaving almost nothing of fighting value outside of the North Atlantic and Med. To accomplish this whilst keeping its Asian empire safe, Britain came to an agreement with Japan.

OK, now aside from German units on Asian stations who were the British going to fight?

Japan and the US are the only two countries Pre WWI that could stand up to more than a a single cruiser in Asia.

And the Japanese were friendly with Britain even outside the "agreement". Britain was the source of Knowledge for Japanese ships with the Japanese learning fast Pre and early WW I.
Pre WW I, Both the Japanese and American Navy were small in relation to Britain. Both were building fast, several Battleships per year which meant doubling (or more) their battleship numbers in the four years of the war and having even more building.

 

[buffnut453]

In the early 1900s Britain was seeing an increasingly belligerent and powerful Germany. To counter this Britain partook the "all or nothing" approach of stripping its overseas bases of pretty much all battleships, cruisers and destroyers, leaving almost nothing of fighting value outside of the North Atlantic and Med. To accomplish this whilst keeping its Asian empire safe, Britain came to an agreement with Japan.

This is where Britain failed to match up its diplomacy with its military capability. The "all or nothing" approach can work if you're smart about it. Britain should have come to an agreement with Japan once German-targeted rearmament was underway in Britain. Instead Britain continued to antagonize Japan through its support of US sanctions whilst simultaneously neglecting to prepare for the inevitable military response that antagonism will provoke. Australia recognized this, pressing Britain to recognize Manchukuo in 1937. If Britain was unable to defend the eastern empire then it must protect it diplomatically, or lose it.

Avoid war with Japan, and nothing more than a small garrison and distant naval repair and replenishment group is needed at Malaya.

You can't negotiate or appease an aggressor that's intent on warfare...and Japan was clearly on that path as early as 1931. The problem for Britain is that it was bankrupt after the Great War so it tried to cling on as long as possible to its overseas empire.

Per your comment "If Britain was unable to defend the eastern empire then it must protect it diplomatically, or lose it," that's exactly what happened. It just took 40 years after the Great War for that fact to be understood, while also recognizing that merely defending the empire probably still would not have been enough to retain it.

 

[buffnut453]

The planes weren't the main issue, it was the materiel flying them.
The Far East was seen as a backwoods posting in the RAF where people either went for the party scene, or you sent the piss poor pilots you couldn't find a use for at home.
There were exceptions, but the RAF in the Far East in 1941 was a very poor thing.

As E EwenS has pointed out, this is a gross mischaracterization of the situation. Almost all the Buffalo pilots were straight out of training. That doesn't mean they're "piss poor," it just means they're lacking in experience.

Look at the two Vildebeest squadrons. They were both based in Singapore long before WW2 broke out. They were manned by experienced, well-trained personnel who showed no lack of courage or dedication when called upon to fight. The same goes for the Blenheim squadrons which were also in the Far East prior to 1939. These squadrons were not "milked" of experienced crews to be replaced by deadbeats. Apart from the usual posting process, most of the personnel remained in-theatre.

There may well have been some "poor" people in the headquarters, which does connect to my earlier point about lack of enough adequately-experienced staff officers. Staff officers are a much-maligned breed but they are critical to the functioning of any military.

Finally, as to your "party scene" comment, bear in mind that Britain had been at war for 2 years by September 1941. Any officer coming from the UK to Singapore would be confronted with a different world. No night-time blackouts, food in plentiful supply, servants to wait on you hand-and-foot. It would be an amazing person not to get distracted by that after 2 years of rationing, bombing raids, ARP wardens ensuring the blackout was secure etc etc.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Far East was seen as a backwoods posting in the RAF where people either went for the party scene, or you sent the piss poor pilots you couldn't find a use for at home.

Not fair to the pilots, but I can't help but think it was a posting for administrative near-retirees and deadwood. Here's Malaya Command's esteemed general officers. Only Heath seems worthy.

• CNC Malaya Command, Lt-Gen. Percival - no combat experience, only home guard and admin work
• Indian III Corps, Lt-Gen. Heath - some combat experience against the Italians, commanded the 5th Indian Division in the Sudan, forced the surrender of the garrison at Massawa in Jan 41.
• Australian 8th Division, Maj-Gen. Bennett - no combat since France, March 1916. Only home guard work since then, until arriving in Malaya in Feb 1941.
• Fortress Singapore, Maj-Gen. Simmons - no combat since France, WW1. A seemingly useless fool, IMO, "An ardent supporter of the concept that defence construction was detrimental to troop morale"
• Malaya Command Reserve, Brig. Paris - no combat since France, WW1, per wiki, "one of the few British commanders that put up a good fight against the Japanese"
• Sarawak Force (SARFOR), Lt-Col. Malet Lane - recently promoted, no apparent combat experience
• RAF Malaya, Air Vice Marshal Conway Pulford, no combat experience. Was commander of No. 26 Training Group RAF until deployment to Malaya in 1941.
• RN Far East, Vice Admiral Phillips. No command combat experience. Was chief of staff at RN HQ in London. Force Z was Phillip's first command.

Has there ever been a collection of more inexperienced, incapable and aged commanders put in charge of such a critically important territory? Malaya produced most of the British Empire's rubber and tin, it was not a backwater for trainees and has-beens.

If we're going to rightfully prioritize aircraft, etc. to combat threatres then at least give Malaya some good commanders.

 

[buffnut453]

Not fair to the pilots, but I can't help but think it was a posting for administrative near-retirees and deadwood. Here's Malaya Command's esteemed general officers. Only Heath seems worthy.

• CNC Malaya Command, Lt-Gen. Percival - no combat experience, only home guard and admin work
• Indian III Corps, Lt-Gen. Heath - some combat experience against the Italians, commanded the 5th Indian Division in the Sudan, forced the surrender of the garrison at Massawa in Jan 41.
• Australian 8th Division, Maj-Gen. Bennett - no combat since France, March 1916. Only home guard work since then, until arriving in Malaya in Feb 1941.
• Fortress Singapore, Maj-Gen. Simmons - no combat since France, WW1. A seemingly useless fool, IMO, "An ardent supporter of the concept that defence construction was detrimental to troop morale"
• Malaya Command Reserve, Brig. Paris - no combat since France, WW1, per wiki, "one of the few British commanders that put up a good fight against the Japanese"
• Sarawak Force (SARFOR), Lt-Col. Malet Lane - recently promoted, no apparent combat experience
• RAF Malaya, Air Vice Marshal Conway Pulford, no combat experience. Was commander of No. 26 Training Group RAF until deployment to Malaya in 1941.
• RN Far East, Vice Admiral Phillips. No command combat experience. Was chief of staff at RN HQ in London. Force Z was Phillip's first command.

Has there ever been a collection of more inexperienced, incapable and aged commanders put in charge of such a critically important territory? Malaya produced most of the British Empire's rubber and tin, it was not a backwater for trainees and has-beens.

If we're going to rightfully prioritize aircraft, etc. to combat threatres then at least give Malaya some good commanders.

Your comments about Percival are complete BS. If he had no combat experience, how on earth did he earn DSO (and Bar) plus MC and Croix de Guerre?

How many senior (star-ranking) military leaders in mid-1941 had recent combat experience? Precious few, I can tell you. Dowding, Leigh-Mallory, Park...all had virtually no combat experience after the First World War. How many Admirals had WW2 combat experience by 1941?

Your own comments are contradictory about the impact of combat experience since Paris, who also had no combat experience since WW1, put up a good performance.

Combat experience is not necessarily a good indicator of a general's ability to lead and win on the battlefield. Look at Montgomery who had zero combat experience after WW1 (barring suppression of an Arab revolt in Palestine which wasn't actual combat) until May 1940, where he was a division commander. The key difference between Monty and many of his peers is that he was relentless in ensuring his division was adequately trained and prepared so that, when the fighting started his division equipped itself well. Most of the generals (and other leaders) in Malaya in 1941 were in exactly the same position as Monty was in France in 1940. The difference is many of them didn't train their units adequately due, in large part, to the simple fact that many of the soldiers were recent recruits who could barely shoot a rifle whereas Monty had a division of well-trained peacetime soldiers who already understood the tactical drills. Heath's III Indian Corps, for example, had a woeful lack of even basic training for the soldiery, and a lack of decent SNCOs because the pre-war Indian Army units had been milked to support rapid expansion of the force.

Please stop jumping to accepted stereotypes when evaluating these men. Percival was a brave combat veteran who had served as deputy in Singapore in a prior posting. He was the first senior British leader to recognize the vulnerability of a landward attack. He certainly made mistakes, not least in his defence of Singapore itself where he tried to defend everywhere at once, rather than centralizing defence and hitting back wherever the enemy attacked. However, he wasn't some buffoon. He certainly lacked Montgomery's ability to inspire the men but he wasn't an idiot and, at the time of his posting, was probably the best man for the job in the entire British Army.

 

[Shortround6]

It also seems that the infantry was nowhere near fully equipped with heavy weapons.
I could be wrong (very?) on this so would welcome correction.
Granted the Japanese were not well supplied either but if troops (and officers) are trained to fight one way and then their "support" is taken away it makes it hard to change tactics over.
British had very little field artillery?
I don't know what they had for mortars (or ammunition)
Even officers that had WW I experience were used to a lot of artillery. Or any officers that fought in France or NA.

I don't know what the standards of issue were at the time. British had started WW II with two 3in mortars per battalion?

Granted the British were allocating artillery/heavy weapons to the Mid-East/North Africa.

 

[EwenS]

• Sarawak Force (SARFOR), Lt-Col. Malet Lane - recently promoted, no apparent combat experience

Given that he was only commissioned into the Indian Army in Aug 1918 he missed out on WW1 service. But he seems to have had a decent record on the NW frontier between the wars earning an MC.

A Rare Inter-Wars Burma M.C. Group of Seven to Lieutenant Colonel C. M. Lane, Commanding Officer 2/15th Punjab Regiment, Commanding British Troops in Brunei, Sarawak and Borneo; Military Cross, G.V.R., reverse faintly inscribed "22/6/32 Captain C M L

www.christies.com

• RN Far East, Vice Admiral Phillips. No command combat experience. Was chief of staff at RN HQ in London. Force Z was Phillip's first command.

His WW1 career seems to lack detail on the internet. We do know that he served on destroyers in the Med and Far East. However he only achieved the rank of Lt Commander in July 1916. Only at that point might he have been given his own ship to gain "command combat experience".

He did go on to have a number of seagoing commands between the wars. During that period the RN had a glut of officers at the rank of Lt Commander / Commander so promotions were slow and competition fierce. Yet his career continued to move forward.

The Admiralty were not exactly known for promoting officers without the necessary skills.

Tom Spencer Vaughan Phillips - The Dreadnought Project

www.dreadnoughtproject.org

It would be nice if you had spent some time on your own research before posting some of your recent stuff.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Combat experience is not necessarily a good indicator of a general's ability to lead and win on the battlefield. Look at Montgomery who had zero combat experience after WW1 (barring suppression of an Arab revolt in Palestine which wasn't actual combat) until May 1940, where he was a division commander.

Fair points, and I'd forgotten Percival's combat record. I wonder how Monty would have done had he arrived in April 1941. Perhaps, as suggested by the thread, not much better. Had be arrived in April 1940, maybe well.

 

[buffnut453]

His WW1 career seems to lack detail on the internet. We do know that he served on destroyers in the Med and Far East. However he only achieved the rank of Lt Commander in July 1916. Only at that point might he have been given his own ship to gain "command combat experience".

He did go on to have a number of seagoing commands between the wars. During that period the RN had a glut of officers at the rank of Lt Commander / Commander so promotions were slow and competition fierce. Yet his career continued to move forward.

The Admiralty were not exactly known for promoting officers without the necessary skills.

Tom Spencer Vaughan Phillips - The Dreadnought Project

www.dreadnoughtproject.org

Re Phillips, I think the most apt criticism is that he was an arrogant mariner. He genuinely believed that a well-handled capital warship in the open ocean could survive against air attack. He was not alone in that trait. By December 1941 there had been precisely 4 RN cruisers sunk by aircraft (plus 1 more scuttled after air attack) and no vessels larger than that, so his misapprehensions about air power's capabilities were, perhaps, understandable.

That Phillips failed to call for air support is a tragedy but, equally, how many RN Admirals in December 1941 had direct experience of integrating the operations of a naval task force with shore-based fighter support? Yes, it was done around the UK where the RAF held air superiority but what about areas where air superiority was contested? Frankly, I can't think of a single instance prior to December 1941.

 

[buffnut453]

Fair points, and I'd forgotten Percival's combat record. I wonder how Monty would have done had he arrived in April 1941. Perhaps, as suggested by the thread, not much better. Had be arrived in April 1940, maybe well.

I suspect Monty would have been rather more bullish in ensuring the forces were better trained. He probably would have paid less heed to the civilian leadership at Singapore...but that lack of diplomacy could equally have resulted in his being fired from the GOC Malaya position. Unfortunately, the structural issues within Far East Command were deep and not likely to be fixed by December 1941.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Re Phillips, I think the most apt criticism is that he was an arrogant mariner. He genuinely believed that a well-handled capital warship in the open ocean could survive against air attack.

I suppose examples like Strasbourg, Scharnhorst, Bismarck and Veneto could influence that thinking.

June 1940, the British launched four strikes against the damaged battlecruiser Scharnhorst (torpedoed by HMS Acasta defending HMS Glorious) as she transited from Norway to Kiel. These consisted of six Swordfish, nine Beauforts, twelve Hudsons and fifteen Skuas. One Skua scored a hit that failed to detonate, with eight Skuas shot down by Luftwaffe Bf 109s. None of the Swordfish, Hudsons or Beauforts scored any hits, being driven off by Luftwaffe fighters and Scharnhorst's AA.

July 1940, HMS Ark Royal launched two separate Swordfish strikes against the battleship Strasbourg as she fled from Mers-el-Kébir to Toulon, with two Swordfish shot down, zero hits scored and Strasbourg arriving unscathed at Toulon.

May 1941, HMS Victorious launched nine Swordfish against Bismarck scoring one hit that caused little damage. Had Lütjens maintained radio silence his ship may have made it to Brest. Had the next attack by HMS Ark Royal's fifteen Swordfish not scored that lucky rudder hit the ship may have still escaped.

Nov 1941, HMS Formidable's Swordfish along with RAF Blenheims launched several strikes on Vittorio Veneto, with all but one failing to score hits. The single Swordfish torpedo hit sheared off a propeller and jammed the rudder, causing severe flooding, forcing the ship to stop for ten minutes, during which a single Blenheim near miss caused minor damage to stern. In short order Veneto was able to up steam and sail at 20 knots for home. Repairs took to Aug 1942, but she lived.

With this in mind, I must give Admiral Phillips his due. And had he given clear location and intention data to RAF Malayan Command, Force Z's experience might have been more like Scharnhorst's in June 1940, with the Buffaloes breaking up the IJNAS' unescorted bomber attacks. That said, if there's any service that knows by Nov 1941 that a modern battleship can be crippled at sea by air attack, it's the Royal Navy and its FAA, as they'd done it at least twice by now.

Interestingly, the British again failed to sink capital ships at sea into 1942. In Feb 1942 Scharnhorst and Gneisenau (and escorting CA, DDs, TBs) sailed up the Channel from Brest to Germany where 450 RAF/FAA aircraft conducted/supported strikes along the route, with both German capital ships arriving unscathed (one struck a mine at destination) and 42 British aircraft destroyed.