Churchill agrees to RAF reinforcements to Malaya. What to send?

[Shortround6]

I stand corrected twice. My mistake. In my defense, what do you call a ship that large with guns that small? Battle cruiser? Pocket battleship? Battleship? Under gunned? Not well endowed? Like Bruce/Caitlyn Jenner putting a label on it can get confusing.....

Most people call them battlecruisers. They were not full fledged battleships but unlike most battle cruisers (or more correctly English battlecruisers) they sacrificed armamnet for speed and not protection. However this was sort of German trend, in WW I their battlecruisers were always a step behind the British in gun size/power. On the other hand they were always better protected than their British counterparts.

 

[Admiral Beez]

We got off on the Bismarck tangent because I....

So why not do the right thing and bring it back on topic?

Not that a What'If fantasy thread about a Deutschland or Admiral Hipper class being stuck in Japan until Malaya Campaign hostilities commence in Dec 41 wouldn't be fun.... in the what if forum.

 

[Admiral Beez]

200 x Fairey Battles
200 x H. Hurricanes
100 x Skuas/Rocs

This photo made me think of this old thread. Can we swap out sixty Battles for torpedo-capable Wellesleys to replace the Vilderbeests? Its 1,200 mile range will make it a good recon bird along the FIC coast.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

If we're considering upgrading the torpedo attack assets, Its a very different aircraft, and not a straight swap. On paper we have a better load and speed, as well as range, but there were advantages the Vildebeest had that are lost with the Wellesley. Taking the example of the Bristol Beaufort, which replaced the Vildebeest in squadron service, the crews had to learn an new attack run, the Beaufort, and I'm presuming, the Wellesley, would need a much longer run in, flying in a straight line before they can launch their torpedo. So time would have to be given to re-train crews on the Wellesley, coming from the Vildebeest.

There is also the matter of how many Wellesley's are available to transfer. 177 were built, if I can trust Wikipedia, about 7 of whom were trial or modifications, so lets play with 170 aircraft for operational use. I don't know their accident rate, but they were entering service from Jan 1937, last one built in March 1938. But by September 1939, none were in use in home units, only serving in the Middle East and North/East Africa. They did good work in the East African campaign, 1940-41, and then the last few being used as maritime aircraft over the Red Sea in 1942, with RAF 47 Sqn.

So I'm going to guess, that they were hard pressed to keep them flying, conditions in these areas not being particularly kind to engines, and I'm assuming by now there's an element of cannibalising aircraft to keep others flying. Logistically, it would seem to make sense to me that you keep all these aircraft in one theatre, giving you a straight choice of moving them from an war zone, the East African campaign, where they're taking an active role, to the peaceful backwater of Singapore. I couldn't give a good answer to why we would do that. I think the RAF probably did as well as they could, in getting their money's worth out of the Wellesley, employing them as they did.

 

[Shortround6]

From a 1938 edition of Janes, take of it as you will because a lot of the "new" stuff did not have performance published.

Once again, be very carful comparing speeds at different altitudes.

For the Wellesley we are given

sea level......................178mph
1000 m........................188mph
2000 m........................198mph
3000 m........................199mph
4000 m........................209mph
5000 m........................220mph
6000 m........................228mph
7000 m........................226mph.

Initial climb rate 1200fpm
Climb to 2,000 m (6,560ft) 2.7 minutes (something seems a little off)
Climb to 4000 m (13,120ft) 11.4 minutes

Fuel was supposed to be 425imp gallons.

You cannot fill the tanks and carry either a torpedo or the rated 2000lb bomb load Without going into overload condition.

 

[EwenS]

Having read through this thread it is clear that there is a lack of appreciation for the distances involved and the timing of certain events. The occupation of FIC is being looked at as a single event. It wasn't.

FIC was occupied in two stages:-
Tonkin in the northern part. Object to cut of the Chinese from the port of Haiphong (Hanoi). Hanoi to Singapore is 1,370 miles as the crow flies. Date - Sept 1940. This was a piece of opportunism given what was going on in Europe.

In Dec 1940 the French signed a new agreement amongst the terms of which was one allowing the Japanese to move 40,000 troops in southern FIC. But the Japanese did nothing with this for fear of upsetting relations with Britain and the USA.

At the end of July 1941 140,000 Japanese troops moved into southern FIC as a precursor to moves into the DEI. Saigon (now Ho Chi Min City) is only 690 miles from Singapore.

Japanese invasion of French Indochina - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

So for 8 months between Dec 1940 and July 1941 the Japanese were happy to sit on their hands and do nothing.

And as for the argument I've seen that "you can't be a little bit occupied" there is plenty of historical evidence to the contrary. China between 1930 & 1945, France 1940-42, USSR 1941-44, all the way down to Ukraine today.

While the French were weakened after June 1940, they weren't prepared to simply roll over and let all comers chip away at their colony. Witness the Franco Thai War of late1940 to early 1941. But despite a ceasefire being brokered by the Japanese at the end of Jan 1941, it was May before the French were forced to sign a peace treaty, losing only 25% of the territory that had initially been occupied.

Franco-Thai War - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

So what we have between June 1940 and Dec 1941 is an escalating threat, at a time when Britain has pressing needs in Europe and North Africa. But it is only in July 1941 that it becomes a real threat to Malaya when the distance that Japanese aircraft have to fly is halved.

The first of 140 Tomahawk I, without armour and self sealing tanks and many with French instrumentation arrived in Britain in Sept 1940 and were quickly deemed suitable only for training. It was March 1941 before improved versions stared coming off the US production line. The first squadron to receive Tomahawk IIB in the Middle East was the newly formed 250 squadron in Palestine in April 1941 (remember war in Syria from May) followed by 112 in Egypt at the end of June 1941 replacing Gladiators then a couple of new SAAF squadrons before the end of the year.

The first of 100 Tomahawks for the AVG arrived in Burma in June 1941. That unit was still in training in Dec 1941.

Using Wellingtons as TB wasn't even thought of in the Med until the end of 1941. Hampdens was April 1942 with the TB conversion taking until July. In both cases it was an emergency measure due to a shortage of Beauforts coming off the production line (two additional Beaufort squadrons had begun to equip in Britain in late 1941 but had their few allocated aircraft taken away before the end of the year). Hampdens became TB because 2 of the then 4 U.K. based Beaufort squadrons (22 & 217) were earmarked for the Far East in Jan 1942, as replacements for the two Vildebeest squadrons that should have been equipped with the 90 Beauforts planned for the RAF from Australian production.

So if you want Hampdens then first there has to be a realisation that there will not be enough Beauforts to meet all needs at home and abroad by the latter part of 1941 and then Bomber Command has to be persuaded / ordered to give them up to fill that gap. So that all has to happen in the first half of 1941 for an aircraft that had only entered service in the previous 12 months.

As for the Wellesley, by mid-1941 there seems to have been just enough airframes for that 1 squadron to continue with them into late 1942 when Beauforts began to arrive, but not enough for the whole squadron, plus a few being used for communication duties around the Middle East.

And if you take these aircraft for the Far East how do you plug the gaps elsewhere?

Why do you prioritise the Far East as against those areas where there is an actual shooting war going on?

 

[Admiral Beez]

Hampdens became TB because 2 of the then 4 U.K. based Beaufort squadrons (22 & 217) were earmarked for the Far East in Jan 1942, as replacements for the two Vildebeest squadrons that should have been equipped with the 90 Beauforts planned for the RAF from Australian production.

We can't send vital Beauforts into a non-war zone, and Hampdens are not available. What TB was available to reinforce the Vilderbeests? Were there more Vilderbeests elsewhere that could be sent? We can't take FAA Albacores and Swordfish, but what about Blackburn Sharks or older types?

 

[Shortround6]

Were there more Vilderbeests elsewhere that could be sent?

Vickers Vildebeest - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Not unless you re-convert some Vickers Vincents. And since even the newest were 5 years old you are using old, already used tape to hold your bandage on.

We can't take FAA Albacores and Swordfish, but what about Blackburn Sharks or older types?

Well, if we sneak over to Vickers (or Handley Page ) and steal some Pegasus engines to replace the Tiger engines on the Sharks you might have something.
Don't think your overall force will be any better.
The Tiger engines seem to be a pretty poor piece of equipment.

 

[Admiral Beez]

What a mess, resulting from interwar neglect of the RAF overall, and especially maritime strike. With the RAF not giving a fig to torpedo strike, why did they bother with the prototype Handley Page H.P.47?

Handley Page H.P.47 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Why Malaya Command built a dozen airfields with no aircraft IDK.

 

[Shortround6]

I have read of a trial of a Blenheim carrying a torpedo for a trial, and it didn't go into anymore detail than that.
Apparently it was a failure? but what was wrong was not stated. Unfortunately with the Beaufort and Botha both on order there wasn't a lot of interest in alternatives (?)
even short term ones. Which leaves two problems.
1. the two planned aircraft showed up late, in small numbers, and/or weren't even good aircraft.
2. The British didn't have enough torpedoes in the early years actually arm very many planes which renders the question rather moot.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I have read of a trial of a Blenheim carrying a torpedo for a trial, and it didn't go into anymore detail than that.

Is this a Blenheim or Beaufort? The file caption says Blenheim.

 

[Shortround6]

That is a Beaufort.

 

[EwenS]

I have read of a trial of a Blenheim carrying a torpedo for a trial, and it didn't go into anymore detail than that.
Apparently it was a failure? but what was wrong was not stated. Unfortunately with the Beaufort and Botha both on order there wasn't a lot of interest in alternatives (?)
even short term ones. Which leaves two problems.
1. the two planned aircraft showed up late, in small numbers, and/or weren't even good aircraft.
2. The British didn't have enough torpedoes in the early years actually arm very many planes which renders the question rather moot.

Problem with the Blenheim is its load carrying ability - 1,200-1,320lb depending on the source. The 18" Mk.XII torpedo designed in 1935 and introduced to service in 1937 weighed 1,548lb. Add to that the need to carry it fully externally which can't have done much for its performance.

 

[EwenS]

What a mess, resulting from interwar neglect of the RAF overall, and especially maritime strike. With the RAF not giving a fig to torpedo strike, why did they bother with the prototype Handley Page H.P.47?

View attachment 691198

Handley Page H.P.47 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Well at least part the problem starts with the division of responsibilities in pre-war planning between the RN and RAF.

Anti-shipping as opposed to general sea recce or AS protection of merchant shipping, was looked on as part of the intended blockade on Germany. And historically blockade was a navy responsibility. The main airborne anti-shipping weapon was then the air launched torpedo. But as with so much pre-war planning it went out the window early doors. So most likely the RAF saw little need to devote much in the way of resources to torpedo bombing. Every pound spent on that is one less pound on bombers to bomb Germany into submission.

So although the Beaufort/Botha combo were ordered off the drawing board in 1936 they were designed to fulfill all the roles in Coastal Command with torpedo bombing being just one relatively small part.

As for the HP47 and its timing, the Vildebeest was to fulfill a 1925 Spec, flew in 1928 and entered service in Oct 1932. The HP47 was to a 1931 Spec and flew in 1934. Clearly the RAF was looking to a successor mainly for the Vincent but also the Vildebeest for overseas use. But other than being 20mph faster it seems to offer little advantage.

Why Malaya Command built a dozen airfields with no aircraft IDK.

Chicken and egg again.

Aircraft were promised. Airfields take a long time to build, particularly to cope with the weather conditions in Malaya (lots of drainage required). So if don't build the airfields where do you put the aircraft if they turn up? Only hindsight tells you they weren't required.

 

[buffnut453]

Chicken and egg again.

Aircraft were promised. Airfields take a long time to build, particularly to cope with the weather conditions in Malaya (lots of drainage required). So if don't build the airfields where do you put the aircraft if they turn up? Only hindsight tells you they weren't required.

A key aspect of interwar UK defence doctrine was the use of aircraft for rapid deployment worldwide to deal with crises. Many of the airfields were built to enable rapid air reinforcement from the UK via Gibraltar, Africa and/or the Middle East, India, and Burma. Aircraft were seen as a cheap alternative to maintaining a large standing army or naval force in the far-flung corners of the Empire.

Also, having more airfields than you need allows for dispersal of forces, which adds operational flexibility and (theoretically) dilutes an adversary's ability to take out a complete force in one or two raids.

 

[EwenS]

One of the problems you have with trying to use pre-war aircraft to plug gaps in the Far East in 1941 are the low numbers that were built in the first place. Just a few of those mentioned (and maybe one or two others).

HP Harrow - 100 all delivered in 1937 and reduced to a transport role by 1939
Bristol Bombay - 51 delivered from March 1939. Virtually all went to Middle East and after some initial night raids were used as transports by a single squadron (plus a flight of 4 in another during 1941. These units were the main air transport units in the Middle East in 1940/41.
Fairey Hendon - 15 built 1936/37
Vickers Vildebeest - 22 Mk.I, 30 Mk.II, 150 Mk.III (15 sold to RNZAF), 18 Mk.IV (12 sold to RNZAF) built 1932-36.
Vickers Vincent - 197 built 1934-36. 60 sold to RNZAF in 1939. 84 still in service with RAF in 1939. Used operationally in East Africa and Iraq in 1940/41.
Vickers Wellesley - 177 built 1936-38.
Blackburn Shark - 238 delivered to FAA 1934-37. By 1939 survivors reduced to second line duties with both RAF and FAA as trainers and target tugs. There was a handful at Singapore in 1941 in the hands of an RAF Anti Aircraft Co-Operation Unit that IIRC may have flown a bombing sortie or two. FAA use as trainers saw them spread from Britain to the Caribbean in 1941.

So figure in attrition, both peacetime and wartime, not to mention general wearing out and plugging the gaps they leave elsewhere, I'm not sure that there are any of these types even worth considering deploying to the Far East in 1941 over what was already there.

 

[Admiral Beez]

And if you take these aircraft for the Far East how do you plug the gaps elsewhere? Why do you prioritise the Far East as against those areas where there is an actual shooting war going on\

With this in mind, I'm surprised the British government released the Blenheims, Hudsons and Buffaloes for Malaya. All three would have been better off serving in North Africa and the Med. If delivery was feasible, sixty operational Buffaloes along with nearly as many spares would have been very welcome and more impactful at Malta in early 1941. Perhaps HMS Formidable or Illustrious are not crippled by Axis bombers. Buffaloes will struggle against the Bf 109, but against Italian fighters, Stukas and twin/triple engine level bombers the Buffalo will do fine over Malta. The Blenheim fighter variant could have a turkey shoot against any unescorted Stukas.

As for Malaya, the Vilderbeests, Sharks and a trio of PBYs can be reinforced by a squadron of Gladiators. I'd then tell Percival upon his assignment in April 1941 that he's not getting any aircraft nor any significant naval support (forget Force Z), and that his army must destroy any airfields and prepare for a siege simultaneously from landward and seaward. When the Japanese took Singapore they apparently found tons of ready mix concrete in storage, intended but never used for defensive works. Hopefully with no RAF or RN assistance expected someone in Britain will send some light tanks, mortars, etc. as well as have a plan if the IJA invades to evacuate non-essential personnel.

I'd expect Australian PMs Menzies, Fadden and Curtin will refuse to send any Australian troops to Malaya with this level of neglect, so it's just Indians, Poms and Malays. Furthermore, with Malaya and Hong Kong along with the British Pacific territories (Solomons, etc.) at best lightly defended by Britain; Australia may refuse to send any troops to North Africa. They'll need those boys at home when the Japanese storm across the Pacific.

 

[EwenS]

Re the Shark. I've dug out my copy of FAA Aircraft 1939-45. It lists 165 as seeing service with the FAA in WW2. At least 13 of these are noted as having undergone conversion to target tugs either before or very early in the war. Some had also passed to the RAF for use in Anti-Aircraft Co-Operation units, including that at Singapore (4 AACU from Aug 1938).

Of those 165 about 20 were written of by the end of 1940 and another 30 by the end of 1941.

In 1939 the FAA, now back under Admiralty control, had to begin building its own training units from scratch. In the 1939-42 period the Shark was used by about 8 second line FAA squadrons for amongst other things, training Observers and TAGs for an expanding FAA, plus deck landing and torpedo training. Using the Shark in these roles meant more Swordfish for the front line squadrons.

So put simply, there were no spare Sharks available in 1941 to send to the Far East as a new TB force.

 

[Admiral Beez]

So put simply, there were no spare Sharks available in 1941 to send to the Far East as a new TB force.

There a RCAF squadron in British Columbia, but I think they may be floatplanes and perhaps not torpedo capable.

So, there's nothing more to send to Malaya. I suggest again then that the Blenheims, Hudsons and Buffaloes were better off in the MTO. If Hong Kong and Burma can be left with a token defence, and PNG/Solomons with none, why not Malaya?

 

[buffnut453]

With this in mind, I'm surprised the British government released the Blenheims, Hudsons and Buffaloes for Malaya. All three would have been better off serving in North Africa and the Med. If delivery was feasible, sixty operational Buffaloes along with nearly as many spares would have been very welcome and more impactful at Malta in early 1941. Perhaps HMS Formidable or Illustrious are not crippled by Axis bombers. Buffaloes will struggle against the Bf 109, but against Italian fighters, Stukas and twin/triple engine level bombers the Buffalo will do fine over Malta. The Blenheim fighter variant could have a turkey shoot against any unescorted Stukas.

As for Malaya, the Vilderbeests, Sharks and a trio of PBYs can be reinforced by a squadron of Gladiators. I'd then tell Percival upon his assignment in April 1941 that he's not getting any aircraft nor any significant naval support (forget Force Z), and that his army must destroy any airfields and prepare for a siege simultaneously from landward and seaward. When the Japanese took Singapore they apparently found tons of ready mix concrete in storage, intended but never used for defensive works. Hopefully with no RAF or RN assistance expected someone in Britain will send some light tanks, mortars, etc. as well as have a plan if the IJA invades to evacuate non-essential personnel.

I'd expect Australian PMs Menzies, Fadden and Curtin will refuse to send any Australian troops to Malaya with this level of neglect, so it's just Indians, Poms and Malays. Furthermore, with Malaya and Hong Kong along with the British Pacific territories (Solomons, etc.) at best lightly defended by Britain; Australia may refuse to send any troops to North Africa. They'll need those boys at home when the Japanese storm across the Pacific.

There's a lot to unpick here, not least the rather binary "all or nothing" approach you seem to advocate which is never a reality when there are competing priorities.

Your proposal to send nothing to Malaya means that the UK must abandon its attempts to deter Japanese aggression. That will only accelerate the onset of war in the Far East, which the UK was desperately keen to avoid. London was walking a tightrope between trying to provide adequate deterrence while not significantly impacting its ability to operate in current war theatres. That they failed does not mean that the policy was wrong, or even that the policy was badly applied.

Your comment about Percival is merging two distinct roles and responsibilities. Percival was GOC Malaya responsible for Army forces. Brooke-Popham was CinC Far East, theoretically responsible for the joint forces in the theatre although the RN maintained a separate chain of command for its assets (a key failing, IMHO).

As CinC Far East, Brooke-Popham was responsible for defence in that theatre. It was his job to evaluate the situation and request the forces he felt necessary to accomplish the tasks assigned to him by London. It was NEVER London's job to tell any theatre CinC how to do his business. The man on the ground understands best his local situation and has the professional knowledge to prepare his forces accordingly. Brooke-Popham developed a solid estimate of the required forces but London was only willing to achieve that force structure in mid-1942. No military command EVER has enough forces...they ALWAYS want more, so the typical approach is to muddle through with whatever forces you have on-hand, which is exactly what Brooke-Popham did.

As to "prepare for a siege simultaneously from landward and seaward," that's exactly the scenario that Percival and Brooke-Popham were striving to do. The problem is that the threat for either scenario simply wasn't there in April 1941. As E EwenS pointed out, there were relatively few Japanese forces in FIC before July 1941, certainly not enough to pose a threat to Malaya. Even after July 1941, there still wasn't a large invasion force in FIC. The actual invasion forces that assaulted Thailand and Northern Malaya in December 1941 came from Formosa. The lack of a clear and present threat led London to think they had more time to deliver the requested reinforcements for Far East Command. The Japanese simply moved faster than anyone expected, showing remarkable operational flexibility to accomplish a large-scale amphibious assault at a range never before seen in warfare.

None of the above suggests that the Brits got things right. There were many mistakes, not least inadequate preparation of landward defences. However, again London played a role in that. In 1941, Malaya's primary job was producing rubber and tin for the British war effort. That work was accomplished by commercial companies which had a loud voice in London dissuading the military from any actions that would hurt production (e.g. building defences in Malaya would be "demoralizing" for the civilians; conscripting locals would take them away from the tin mines and rubber plantations, reducing production of these war-critical commodities).

One of the common issues identified by Percival and Brooke-Popham was the lack of an adequate staff in the headquarters to organize and manage defensive preparations. This may seem like deflecting blame but I can tell you from personal experience that having a sufficiently-sized and qualified/experienced headquarters staff is crucial to getting ANYTHING done in the military. It's the headquarters that levies training requirements on subordinate units. If the headquarters staff is under-resourced or lacking in experience (both of which were true in Singapore), then you won't get adequate direction down to the units. This lack of HQ staff was another shortfall that could and should have been rectified sooner, indeed it was probably easier to fix that than bring in droves of additional aircraft, guns etc.