Churchill agrees to RAF reinforcements to Malaya. What to send?

[Shortround6]

The chances of the Buffalo's hitting the Japanese airfields were certainly better than trying to strafe the Japanese ground troops in the Jungle or even along the roads.
The Japanese airfields didn't move even though the occupancy might change.

 

[buffnut453]

The chances of the Buffalo's hitting the Japanese airfields were certainly better than trying to strafe the Japanese ground troops in the Jungle or even along the roads.
The Japanese airfields didn't move even though the occupancy might change.

Actually, the Buffalos seem to have done a pretty good job strafing Japanese soldiers on the roads. Tsuji commented how effective the "Hurricanes" were in strafing the Japanese soldiers as they moved along the roads. The problem with his account is that Hurricanes were never used in the strafing role...it was all the poor, much-criticized Buffalo.

How you mistake a Buffalo for a Hurricane is quite beyond me...but the operational records clearly show the Hurricanes were used for air defence only. That only confirms my opinion that persistent raids by Buffalos against Japanese-held airfields would have been effective.

 

[MikeMeech]

But just how badly affected by rain were these northern airfields?

At Kota Bharu the Japanese landing force anchored just before midnight and the first troops landed just after 0200 8th Dec. The first Hudson strike, of several in those first few hours, of 7 aircraft took off at 0208. The Buffalo det was airborne at 0630.

At Gong Kedah the Vildebeests took off just after 0600 but ran into heavy rain offshore splitting them up.

The various bombers at Kuantan, Sungei Patani, Alor Star and Tengah were all able to take off at first light to attack the Japanese at Kota Bharu. But like the Vildebeests they rain into heavy rain preventing them finding the enemy.

The problem with waterlogging wasn't so much with the runways as the dispersal areas, forcing concentration of aircraft in the open where they became easy targets so long as they remained on the ground. But aircraft can't stay airborne forever. Maintenance was also carried out in the open (would hangars really have provided more than nice targets with aircraft concentrated in them?). Add to that inadequate air raid warning systems and limited AA defences so what British fighters there were, were caught on the ground as the Japanese began to bomb the airfields. And the Japanese were careful to use smaller bombs to wreck aircraft but leave the facilities as intact as possible for their arrival.

By landing at Singora in Thailand at 0400 8th Dec, the Japanese quickly captured the airfield (also noted as rain sodden) and by first light were flying in Ki27s from 3 Sentais (over 100 aircraft). An airfield at Patani was also quickly captured. Against that the RAF had 14 Buffalos plus a dozen Blenheim If fighters in northern Malaya.

While Kota Bharu fell on 9 Dec, Alor Star in the very north west didn't fall until the 13th. But by then the RAF had been driven out of it and other bases, by the Japanese ability to strike at them regularly and with virtual impunity. Being forced to withdraw from these forward bases then hinders the ability to strike back at the Japanese at Singora even before the airfields in the NW were overrun.

Operations from 8th to 23rd December, 1941

www.britain-at-war.org.uk

Arguably, the airfields in the NE corner were too far forward to be defendable in the first place. But for those in the NW to survive, many, many more fighters plus improved warning systems would have been required.


Rainwater on airfields was a perpetual problem on airfields throughout South East Asia throughout the war during the wet season. This is the all weather airfield at Mingaladon, Burma in 1945 when many lessons had been learned.
View attachment 692660

View attachment 692662

View attachment 692661

In the dry season, dust then became the

But just how badly affected by rain were these northern airfields?

At Kota Bharu the Japanese landing force anchored just before midnight and the first troops landed just after 0200 8th Dec. The first Hudson strike, of several in those first few hours, of 7 aircraft took off at 0208. The Buffalo det was airborne at 0630.

At Gong Kedah the Vildebeests took off just after 0600 but ran into heavy rain offshore splitting them up.

The various bombers at Kuantan, Sungei Patani, Alor Star and Tengah were all able to take off at first light to attack the Japanese at Kota Bharu. But like the Vildebeests they rain into heavy rain preventing them finding the enemy.

The problem with waterlogging wasn't so much with the runways as the dispersal areas, forcing concentration of aircraft in the open where they became easy targets so long as they remained on the ground. But aircraft can't stay airborne forever. Maintenance was also carried out in the open (would hangars really have provided more than nice targets with aircraft concentrated in them?). Add to that inadequate air raid warning systems and limited AA defences so what British fighters there were, were caught on the ground as the Japanese began to bomb the airfields. And the Japanese were careful to use smaller bombs to wreck aircraft but leave the facilities as intact as possible for their arrival.

By landing at Singora in Thailand at 0400 8th Dec, the Japanese quickly captured the airfield (also noted as rain sodden) and by first light were flying in Ki27s from 3 Sentais (over 100 aircraft). An airfield at Patani was also quickly captured. Against that the RAF had 14 Buffalos plus a dozen Blenheim If fighters in northern Malaya.

While Kota Bharu fell on 9 Dec, Alor Star in the very north west didn't fall until the 13th. But by then the RAF had been driven out of it and other bases, by the Japanese ability to strike at them regularly and with virtual impunity. Being forced to withdraw from these forward bases then hinders the ability to strike back at the Japanese at Singora even before the airfields in the NW were overrun.

Operations from 8th to 23rd December, 1941

www.britain-at-war.org.uk

Arguably, the airfields in the NE corner were too far forward to be defendable in the first place. But for those in the NW to survive, many, many more fighters plus improved warning systems would have been required.


Rainwater on airfields was a perpetual problem on airfields throughout South East Asia throughout the war during the wet season. This is the all weather airfield at Mingaladon, Burma in 1945 when many lessons had been learned.
View attachment 692660

View attachment 692662

View attachment 692661

In the dry season, dust then became the problem.
View attachment 692663

Hi
Airfields throughout the Theatre were problematic in rain. My father (a British anti-tank gunner with the 36th Division) flew as an air despatcher for six months (1944-45) on USAAF C-47s of 9 and 12 Squadron 3rd CCG, an incident from his memoirs follows:

For those interested in the problems of the Theatre then the book 'Commanding Far Eastern Skies, A critical analysis of the Royal Air Force air superiority campaign in India, Burma and Malaya 1941-1945' by Peter Preston-Hough.

Mike

 

[Admiral Beez]

The chances of the Buffalo's hitting the Japanese airfields were certainly better than trying to strafe the Japanese ground troops in the Jungle or even along the roads.

If only the RN's Skuas, then being removed from fleet service were instead dispatched to RNAS Sembawang. The FAA crews will need some months to train up on CAS rather than naval strike. With good ROE they could also hit the IJA landing ships once they entered Malay waters. However, I suppose those personnel who were flying Skuas moved to other types, including Fulmars and Albacores.

On the Buffaloes, had they saved Force Z from the Bettys and Nells, what chance does the naval force have in the coming days? AIUI, the IJN had two Kongo class battlecruisers with many Long Lance equipped cruisers and destroyers approaching from the south in case the IJNAS failed. I don't believe the IJN had a carrier along, so provided PBY recon discovers the IJN force in time, perhaps the Vilderbeests and the few Swordfish at Singapore will have a chance at glory?

The sooner Force Z boogies for Ceylon the better, I'd think. Wait for Indomitable and maybe Hermes. Then support Dorman at the Battle of Java Sea.

 

[EwenS]

The Skua squadrons converted onto, or reformed on, Fulmars during 1940/41.

There was a Japanese covering force to the east/north east which Force Z nearly ran into on the night of 9/10 Dec. But nothing coming up from the south (Java Sea area) until about Feb 1942.

Covering force was 2 battlecruisers, 3 cruisers and 8 destroyers.

 

[EwenS]

The sooner Force Z boogies for Ceylon the better, I'd think. Wait for Indomitable and maybe Hermes. Then support Dorman at the Battle of Java Sea.

And run the risk of running into the Kido Butai operating south of the island barrier around that time.

 

[Shortround6]

The FAA crews will need some months to train up on CAS rather than naval strike

You also need to train the army officers on how to call strikes. And you need radios for them to call strikes with.

There were reasons that the Luftwaffe was good at CAS in 1939 and 1940 and there was a lot more too it that simply putting Stukas into the air.

Dive bombers DO NOT equal ground support.
Dive bombers can do ground support.

You need ground commanders (and aides, like air officers) who have been trained to know what CAS can do, what it can't do, how many missions a day it can do (varies with distances flown) and other things.
Unlike artillery (assuming you have guns and ammunition) which is 24/7 Air support in WW II was pretty much daylight only, let's leave out the night 'nuisance' raids. It is also pretty much good weather.
If it is raining and you can't see a 1/2 mile there is no point in ordering a CAS strike.
Even in good weather you need a defined target. One that is visible to the aircraft. And that means visible from several thousand feet up to plane that is flying at 200mph or better.

Just because "Captain Jasper" can see the enemy moving down the road a 1/2 mile away doesn't mean the aircraft can, for the most part they can't even see Captain Jasper and his observation post. You can't give directions like "100yds east of the small hill with the big trees on it near where the road bends to the right".
To planes flying over 3 miles a minute they are going over a number of bends in the road (even if they can see the road at all times without over hanging trees) and a number of small hills every minute.
Not mention that things look different from the air.
CAS liaison officers have at least flown if they are not pilots, they know what things look like from the air. They can give better directions, even if it is things like 3 miles from the largest hill in the area and then narrow it down. They need a radio that can talk to the airplanes, trying to relay messages through the army radios to a higher command center that can then relay the messages to the aircraft doesn't work well.
having smoke rounds for infantry mortars can help mark targets that are within range of the mortars (or artillery except there was next to no artillery in Burma)
Laying out large panels on the ground (like several sheets staked out touching each other) even if it is just a indication that the enemy is "that way" can be a help.

Now part of the problem is that each ground unit that you want to work with needs to trained (or have several people who are trained ) to do this. Not much good training the aircraft with 1st division if the attack is hitting 2nd division a few weeks later. And it is not just a "division" it is down to at least battalion or regimental level.

You are also only going to get a few missions a day so they have to be timed for best effect.

If you want strikes on supply lines you need recon and timely recon to get the aircraft to the target area and against the Japanese in Burma things get iffy. The Japanese are just going to move off the road and into the Jungle if they can while the planes are overhead and move back onto the road when the planes leave. Some depends on how much truck, wagon traffic they have. If you can catch them in areas of agriculture fields where they have to move much further to cover then great.

And here is also where having an air liaison officer comes in handy, he may be able to suggest different defensive locations/ ambushes that would make better use of CAS aircraft than an infantry officer might pick if he was just considering the weapons in the infantry battalion. But it requires the planes show up in a timely fashion.

CAS support on it's own or without good direction from the ground doesn't work that well.

 

[EwenS]

You may find these titles of interest re RAF CAS

Amazon product ASIN 1902109643
View: https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/1902109643/

Amazon product ASIN 1902109651
View: https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/1902109651/

 

[Admiral Beez]

Perhaps you might like to reassess that statement in light of this study and especially the table on page 23 of the .pdf which shows Fighter Command aircraft and pilot strength in 1941/42. In particular note that the total number of Spitfires available to Fighter Command in the Spring of 1941 was only around 400!

https://bjmh.gold.ac.uk/article/download/1558/1671/

We can't strip all the Spitfires from the UK clearly, but there's no downside to sending a combined four hundred Spitfires, Hurricanes, Beaufighters, etc. to Malaya in 1941, especially once the Luftwaffe is nearly entirely focused on Barbarossa.

October 1941, load up HMS Ark Royal with every Fulmar and Swordfish/Applecore that can be found to make her CAG an oversized eighty to ninety aircraft, with intent to offload the surplus Fulmars into HMS Hermes in Simonstown (or Ceylon) and to make-up spares at RNAS Sembawang. Sail Ark Royal with Force Z to Singapore. Better to give Phillips his own air cover and risk sinking in the Gulf of Thailand in Dec than to sink to the bottom off Gibraltar in Nov.

If OTOH, Ark Royal is in need of a desperate refit, I suggest sending the entirety of Force Z to the US west coast yards. They'll miss Pearl Habour, but this is a good opportunity to update HMS Repulse's terrible AA. When Ark Royal is complete she'll be ready for Coral Sea, hopefully some folding Martlets and some Vindicators and Devastators can be scrounged up.

 

[MikeMeech]

You also need to train the army officers on how to call strikes. And you need radios for them to call strikes with.

There were reasons that the Luftwaffe was good at CAS in 1939 and 1940 and there was a lot more too it that simply putting Stukas into the air.

Dive bombers DO NOT equal ground support.
Dive bombers can do ground support.

You need ground commanders (and aides, like air officers) who have been trained to know what CAS can do, what it can't do, how many missions a day it can do (varies with distances flown) and other things.
Unlike artillery (assuming you have guns and ammunition) which is 24/7 Air support in WW II was pretty much daylight only, let's leave out the night 'nuisance' raids. It is also pretty much good weather.
If it is raining and you can't see a 1/2 mile there is no point in ordering a CAS strike.
Even in good weather you need a defined target. One that is visible to the aircraft. And that means visible from several thousand feet up to plane that is flying at 200mph or better.

Just because "Captain Jasper" can see the enemy moving down the road a 1/2 mile away doesn't mean the aircraft can, for the most part they can't even see Captain Jasper and his observation post. You can't give directions like "100yds east of the small hill with the big trees on it near where the road bends to the right".
To planes flying over 3 miles a minute they are going over a number of bends in the road (even if they can see the road at all times without over hanging trees) and a number of small hills every minute.
Not mention that things look different from the air.
CAS liaison officers have at least flown if they are not pilots, they know what things look like from the air. They can give better directions, even if it is things like 3 miles from the largest hill in the area and then narrow it down. They need a radio that can talk to the airplanes, trying to relay messages through the army radios to a higher command center that can then relay the messages to the aircraft doesn't work well.
having smoke rounds for infantry mortars can help mark targets that are within range of the mortars (or artillery except there was next to no artillery in Burma)
Laying out large panels on the ground (like several sheets staked out touching each other) even if it is just a indication that the enemy is "that way" can be a help.

Now part of the problem is that each ground unit that you want to work with needs to trained (or have several people who are trained ) to do this. Not much good training the aircraft with 1st division if the attack is hitting 2nd division a few weeks later. And it is not just a "division" it is down to at least battalion or regimental level.

You are also only going to get a few missions a day so they have to be timed for best effect.

If you want strikes on supply lines you need recon and timely recon to get the aircraft to the target area and against the Japanese in Burma things get iffy. The Japanese are just going to move off the road and into the Jungle if they can while the planes are overhead and move back onto the road when the planes leave. Some depends on how much truck, wagon traffic they have. If you can catch them in areas of agriculture fields where they have to move much further to cover then great.

And here is also where having an air liaison officer comes in handy, he may be able to suggest different defensive locations/ ambushes that would make better use of CAS aircraft than an infantry officer might pick if he was just considering the weapons in the infantry battalion. But it requires the planes show up in a timely fashion.

CAS support on it's own or without good direction from the ground doesn't work that well.

Hi
Reference dive bombers, the Luftwaffe did not classify Ju 87s as CAS aircraft at the early stage of the war, as the German Air Historical Branch in a study dated 1 December 1944 mentions (two page translated extract from AP 3235):

The 'Middle East (Army & RAF) Directive on Direct Air Support' GHQ MEF and HQ RAF ME, of 30 September 1941 (from AP3235) has details of methods of support at that time:

Strictly speaking if you have mortars/artillery in range of the target to put smoke on it then you could put artillery fire on it. Much was done during WW1 on this including calling in CAS from Corps two-seaters by wireless telegraphy via the Central Information Bureau (from end of August 1918). Concerns were expressed by some officers, for example Lt.-Col. Chamier,commander of 15th (Corps) Wing, of CAS aircraft bombing targets as a first resort even when they were well in range of artillery which were more suitable for the size of target and would cause more damage. During WW2 there was some misuse of CAS when artillery would have been a better choice.

Mike

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

We can't strip all the Spitfires from the UK clearly, but there's no downside to sending a combined four hundred Spitfires, Hurricanes, Beaufighters, etc. to Malaya in 1941, especially once the Luftwaffe is nearly entirely focused on Barbarossa.

October 1941, load up HMS Ark Royal with every Fulmar and Swordfish/Applecore that can be found to make her CAG an oversized eighty to ninety aircraft, with intent to offload the surplus Fulmars into HMS Hermes in Simonstown (or Ceylon) and to make-up spares at RNAS Sembawang. Sail Ark Royal with Force Z to Singapore. Better to give Phillips his own air cover and risk sinking in the Gulf of Thailand in Dec than to sink to the bottom off Gibraltar in Nov.

If OTOH, Ark Royal is in need of a desperate refit, I suggest sending the entirety of Force Z to the US west coast yards. They'll miss Pearl Habour, but this is a good opportunity to update HMS Repulse's terrible AA. When Ark Royal is complete she'll be ready for Coral Sea, hopefully some folding Martlets and some Vindicators and Devastators can be scrounged up.

The danger I think your falling into is viewing all this with the benefit of Hindsight. How wonderful would all these aircraft have been, if operating in Malaya when Japan attacked. Without hindsight, if we have the shipping capacity to move all these aircraft and crew, along with the necessary spares, and the all important ground crews, I think we'll all pick the Middle East. Imagine, with, as you point out, the Luftwaffe focused on the Eastern Front, and these forces added to an already historically well performing RAF, how much better might we have prepared the ground for Operation Crusader.

Its an easier argument to make with Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff, for them going to the Middle East, reinforcing the opportunity to clear the Germans and Italians out of North Africa, while Hitler is looking east. Strategy for the Far East remains, looking for the Americans to manage the Japanese, and with the coming monsoon season in the South China Sea, surely the Japanese would be attacking until spring 42, by which time North Africa could be cleared, and forces diverted to Singapore.

Regarding the deployment of more Swordfish/Albacore's, I honestly don't know how many were available, my impression was they were always a bit short on numbers until maybe 1943.

HMS Ark Royal was lost in November 1941, having just ferried another load of Hurricanes to a flying off position to Malta, again reinforcing the need to keep reinforcing the Middle East of more aircraft. Its hard to find an alternative carrier, allowing her to be free for Singapore. The aircraft transporter, HMS Engadine was completed in November 1941, maybe she could have ferried aircraft to Singapore. We could possible improved the numbers of torpedo carrying aircraft in that theatre by sending some Swordfish/Albacore's, if available.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Its an easier argument to make with Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff, for them going to the Middle East, reinforcing the opportunity to clear the Germans and Italians out of North Africa, while Hitler is looking east.

If only history had seen Britain achieve a solid crushing of the Italians and Germans in North Africa, or before the Germans can arrive in 1941. Then Malaya might have got her reinforcements.

 

[EwenS]

We can't strip all the Spitfires from the UK clearly, but there's no downside to sending a combined four hundred Spitfires, Hurricanes, Beaufighters, etc. to Malaya in 1941, especially once the Luftwaffe is nearly entirely focused on Barbarossa.

Beaufighters? Hopelessly optimistic unless you intend to deprioritise the need for night fighters at home.

By the end of Sept 1941 only 183 Beaufighter Mark Ic had been built (of nearly 600 Beaufighters built until then) with there being losses from that. Re-equipment of Coastal Command squadrons began in Jan 1941 but was slow due to priorities, and the first squadrons to equip were sent to the Middle East, then aircraft and crews were siphoned off from squadrons in Britain to keep the ME squadrons up to strength.

So in Oct 1941 252 & 272 were in the Middle East (strength in Nov for Op Crusader = 24) and 143 and 248 (converted to Beaufighters June/July 1941) in Britain. 235 & 236 began to receive a few Beaufighters in Oct 1941. But it was the end of the year before they were up to strength and at the cost of 143 reverting to Blenheims. Even the OTU training CC crews was short of aircraft, flying 3 times the number of hours on Blenheim fighters than Beaufighters in Oct. It was the beginning of 1942 before numbers really began to build up in the Coastal squadrons. The first batch of 12 were allocated to Australia in Dec 1941 and shipped out in Jan/Feb 1942.

 

[EwenS]

There were a number of disembarked FAA squadrons actively employed in the Med in late 1941. These had mostly come from the carriers Illustrious and Formidable when they retired to the USA to undergo repairs.

803 & 806 with ex- RAF Hurricane I and 805 with ex Greek Martlet III combined to form a Naval Fighter Squadron providing air cover along the North African coast for resupply convoys for the Army. The former pair re-equipped with Fulmars in early 1942 and were sent to join the defence of Ceylon.

815 & 826 with Albacores and a few radar equipped Swordfish worked with the Wellington night Bomber squadrons to locate and illuminate targets as well as carrying out bombing and anti-shipping missions with torpedoes from bases in both Egypt & Cyprus. The were joined by 821 at the beginning of 1942.

828 with Albacores was sent to Malta in Oct 1941 on Ark Royal, where it joined 830 with Albacores & Swordfish on anti shipping duties from the island.

But it is the same old story. Remove these squadrons from the Med and what do you put in their place to fulfill the vital roles they were fulfilling.

The anti-shipping operations from Malta were particularly effective in interdicting the shipping supplying Rommel. In the latter part of 1941 it is the FAA not the RAF that is carrying out much of the torpedo bombing operations in the Med. In Nov 1941 there were only 12 Beauforts in the Med and Wellingtons had yet to take on the role.

 

[yulzari]

There were a number of disembarked FAA squadrons actively employed in the Med in late 1941. These had mostly come from the carriers Illustrious and Formidable when they retired to the USA to undergo repairs.

803 & 806 with ex- RAF Hurricane I and 805 with ex Greek Martlet III combined to form a Naval Fighter Squadron providing air cover along the North African coast for resupply convoys for the Army. The former pair re-equipped with Fulmars in early 1942 and were sent to join the defence of Ceylon.

815 & 826 with Albacores and a few radar equipped Swordfish worked with the Wellington night Bomber squadrons to locate and illuminate targets as well as carrying out bombing and anti-shipping missions with torpedoes from bases in both Egypt & Cyprus. The were joined by 821 at the beginning of 1942.

828 with Albacores was sent to Malta in Oct 1941 on Ark Royal, where it joined 830 with Albacores & Swordfish on anti shipping duties from the island.

But it is the same old story. Remove these squadrons from the Med and what do you put in their place to fulfill the vital roles they were fulfilling.

The anti-shipping operations from Malta were particularly effective in interdicting the shipping supplying Rommel. In the latter part of 1941 it is the FAA not the RAF that is carrying out much of the torpedo bombing operations in the Med. In Nov 1941 there were only 12 Beauforts in the Med and Wellingtons had yet to take on the role.

It all goes to show that the pressures of actual threats and fighting were causing a conscious decision to risk a weak Far East force to keep the existing actual war effort going. The decision point should be when Indo Chine falls to the Japanese but September 1940 is not a time when anything could be spared. As it was India had nothing but enough to deal with local unrest and what there was was put into the strategically forward points of Burma and Malaya.

Meanwhile Britain faced possible invasion, the Atlantic war, liberating Ethiopia and recovering Somalia, not to mention fighting Italy in Libya to protect Egypt and having fought and lost a continental war in Norway, France and the Low Countries. Oh and assisting Greece, dealing with Iraq and fighting a peer war with the French in Syria and coping with the risk of the French fleet falling to the Axis. Plus joining with the Soviet Union in occupying Iran, keeping a force towards Turkey and Russia to deal with any German movement through the Caucasus and maintaining convoys to take supplies, including the critical tanks, to Russia.

In the event the forces actually given to the Far East were just enough to deal with the Japanese even if the seaborne assault failed to be hit. They could have done the job more easily with better kit of course, but the failings were in the training, doctrine and strategy of the commanders. On paper the risk taken was indeed risky, but not reckless and was taken, as I said, consciously. Not simple neglect. The failure was in execution.

 

[Admiral Beez]

In the event the forces actually given to the Far East were just enough to deal with the Japanese even if the seaborne assault failed to be hit. They could have done the job more easily with better kit of course, but the failings were in the training, doctrine and strategy of the commanders. The failure was in execution.

When I look at the changes in the general staff in Malaya I'm led to wonder what could have been if competent command had been in place for some years before hostilities. As it was, in 1941 we see the arrival of half a dozen new senior commanders: CNC (Percival), C/O India Corp (Heath), C/O Aus. 8th Division (Bennett), C/O Fortress Singapore (Simmons), Air Marshall RAF (Pulford), C/O RN Far East (Phillips). No matter how competent these six men could have been, it is difficult to get the best out of your combined forces in such short time - for example, the RN's new C/O arrived only days before his fleet's destruction.

To give Malayan Command a chance at competent, well-led action, we need to deal with the command. In the six years before the Pacific War there were three changes in CNC at Malayan Command.

• 1935–1939 Major-General Sir William Dobbie
• 1939–1941 Lieutenant-General Sir Lionel Bond
• 1941–1942 Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival

Dobbie and Bond were both deemed old and both retired after relinquishing Malaya command. But imagine the difference if a driven commander had replaced Dobbie in 1938, someone with initiative, tactical and strategic thinking, and able to build relationships with his political and military masters back home, and get Govenor Sir Shenton Thomas onside instead of worrying about offending the plantation owners and Malays.

Instead of sending out Pulford in 1941, let's replace Air Marshall Babington in 1938 with someone to build up the colony's air defences. For a start, don't build airfields you don't have aircraft for, nor place them within easy seizure via amphibious assault.

 

[EwenS]

When I look at the changes in the general staff in Malaya I'm led to wonder what could have been if competent command had been in place for some years before hostilities. As it was, in 1941 we see the arrival of half a dozen new senior commanders: CNC (Percival), C/O India Corp (Heath), C/O Aus. 8th Division (Bennett), C/O Fortress Singapore (Simmons), Air Marshall RAF (Pulford), C/O RN Far East (Phillips). No matter how competent these six men could have been, it is difficult to get the best out of your combined forces in such short time - for example, the RN's new C/O arrived only days before his fleet's destruction.

To give Malayan Command a chance at competent, well-led action, we need to deal with the command. In the six years before the Pacific War there were three changes in CNC at Malayan Command.

• 1935–1939 Major-General Sir William Dobbie
• 1939–1941 Lieutenant-General Sir Lionel Bond
• 1941–1942 Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival

Dobbie and Bond were both deemed old and both retired after relinquishing Malaya command. But imagine the difference if a driven commander had replaced Dobbie in 1938, someone with initiative, tactical and strategic thinking, and able to build relationships with his political and military masters back home, and get Govenor Sir Shenton Thomas onside instead of worrying about offending the plantation owners and Malays.

Instead of sending out Pulford in 1941, let's replace Air Marshall Babington in 1938 with someone to build up the colony's air defences. For a start, don't build airfields you don't have aircraft for, nor place them within easy seizure via amphibious assault.

Dobie was appointed Governor of Malta after his time in Malaya. That lasted between April 1940 and May 1942.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Dobie was appointed Governor of Malta after his time in Malaya. That lasted between April 1940 and May 1942.

I missed that. Let's have Dobie take up his Malta role in 1938. Instead our CNC Malaya starts in 1938 right through to 1942, either surrendering to Japan or successfully holding the line.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Instead of sending out Pulford in 1941, let's replace Air Marshall Babington in 1938 with someone to build up the colony's air defences. For a start, don't build airfields you don't have aircraft for, nor place them within easy seizure via amphibious assault.

Ain't hindsight wonderful?
"Those yellow monkeys aren't competent to take on a professional European force. They wouldn't dare! We'd make short work of them."

 

[Admiral Beez]

Ain't hindsight wonderful?

Not so much hindsight. I don't know that Dobie wasn't a fine commander in Malaya. What I'm looking for is to break the revolving door of commanders in Malaya. Instead let's an established general staff from 1938-42. Maybe that's Dobie.