Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
^^^ This
Was going to bring up these issues in a similar post but Buff worded it better than I could.
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The one thing that can and must happen in late 1940 is expansion and modernization of airfields in Malaya and the supporting logistics and maintenance infrastructure in Singapore.
The Buffalos came with 100% reserves but Far East Command struggled to find places to store them. They ended up dispersing them around airfields in Singapore. Adding 4 or 5 times the number of aircraft to the mix makes that challenge considerably more difficult.
151 MU struggled.to accomplish all its tasks with the existing fleet of aircraft. Therefore additional MU resources are vital to support the expanded air fleet under consideration here.
except the US types did not use (or were not supplied) with British radios, british oxygen equipment and a number of other little details the Air Ministry thought were essential.As far as transporting them to Malaya could US types be sent directly from the USA west coast? It has to be faster than to the Uk and then trans shipping to Malaya in Uk bottoms.
One might go a step further in basing the whole Far East and USA purchasing strategy around supplying Malaya, Australia, New Zealand and India with the US types all sent directly from the USA.
The 200 Hurricanes could have been procured from CC&F in Canada, shipment from Vancouver.200 x Fairey Battles
200 x H. Hurricanes
100 x Skuas/Rocs
with ~30% of the above in reserve for 10 x FB squadrons, 10 x HH squadrons and 5 x Skua/Roc squadrons
You have just got to admire the Japanese for their faulty logic. So, they take on the World's 2 Global Superpowers, UK and USA, in a preemptive strike, seize their territory and oil, murder their citizens, subjects, nurses and Pows and then expect them to negotiate a peace settlement after 6 to 9 months where they keep everything.Being an Aussie, I am finding this thread most interesting. I have pulled out my copy of Churchill's 'The Second World War, Book lll' just to gain an understanding of Churchill's thinking at the time. His main concern appeared certainly to be with the Middle East, Africa and India region(s).
His immediate concern certainly was not for the Malayan Peninsular. A message, written by Churchill on the 11th August, addressed to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand gave a very good indication of Churchill's thoughts at the time. It appears that he felt that on-going U.K. negotiations with Japan and the threat of the large U.S. Pacific fleet in the area, 'must be a grave preoccupation to the Japanese Admiralty', was enough response.
He also suggests that English forces could, 'defend Singapore, which if attacked- -which is highly unlikely—ought to stand a long siege'. He then goes into deployment of naval and army forces if required. The only reference that he makes to air forces is in relation to the home front, and, maybe you could read into his message, the North Africa and the Middle East. No doubt that Dill would have read this message a day after his own writing to Churchill. It must have read as a slap in Dill's face.
Unfortunately, Australia at the time was saddled with hierarchy that only toed the line to anything British. We had no Air Force to speak of at the time. Despite some very clear-thinking RAAF and industrial leaders in our fledgling aviation manufacturing industry who were also hampered by this mentality. As was RAAF flight crew training. Our immediate response to become involved in the Empire Training Scheme whose primary function was to provide air crew for the European theatre was another example. The battle for Darwin proved this. It was only a changed hierarchy that was beginning to remedy the problem. Firstly, the allowance to import certain P&W radial aero engines and then U.S. aircraft that could handle Australia conditions far better than the English aircraft. (This is by no means a slight on the U.K. machines).
It's too bad Australia wasn't given full command and control over Malayan defence, starting with the beginning of the Singapore naval base in 1929/30.Unfortunately, Australia at the time was saddled with hierarchy that only toed the line to anything British. We had no Air Force to speak of at the time. Despite some very clear-thinking RAAF and industrial leaders in our fledgling aviation manufacturing industry who were also hampered by this mentality. As was RAAF flight crew training. Our immediate response to become involved in the Empire Training Scheme whose primary function was to provide air crew for the European theatre was another example.
Command should have been given to the Royal Navy, so no surrender and fight to the last ditch, and admirals who surrender Island fortresses get hung from the yard arm.It's too bad Australia wasn't given full command and control over Malayan defence, starting with the beginning of the Singapore naval base in 1929/30.
The 200 Hurricanes could have been procured from CC&F in Canada, shipment from Vancouver.
Thoughts on the Hawker Henley? I like its internal centre-line bomb bay, rather novel for a single engined bomber of the time.
View attachment 564162
I wonder why the RAF never saw the need for a dive bomber for army CAS. But then again, outside of naval ops, we don't see many true dive bombers.I'm no expert but according to Wiki (I know):
"Accordingly, the Henley, which in line with RAF policy had not been fitted with dive brakes; bomb crutches; or specialized bomb sights and thus limited to attack angles of no greater than 70°
I wonder why the RAF never saw the need for a dive bomber for army CAS. But then again, outside of naval ops, we don't see many true dive bombers.
In 1941 when the Skuas were being withdrawn from FAA service they should have been sent to Singapore. Did the RAF and British army like the Vultee A-31 Vengeance?
You have just got to admire the Japanese for their faulty logic. So, they take on the World's 2 Global Superpowers, UK and USA, in a preemptive strike, seize their territory and oil, murder their citizens, subjects, nurses and Pows and then expect them to negotiate a peace settlement after 6 to 9 months where they keep everything.
^^^ This
Was going to bring up these issues in a similar post but Buff worded it better than I could.
Unless the additional squadrons I suggest are sent a lot of the airfields should have been closed.Hi,
In addition to those points there is also a need for additional ground personnel to support any increase in the number of air squadrons present. As I recall from "Bloody Shambles" or "Buffaloes over Singapore" the RAF and commonwealth forces were very short handed at the bases that they historically did have. In particular I seem tio rec ll reading that many of the airfields had very limited AA defenses around them and were frequently short handed of the manual labor required to repair damage etc.
Pat
Unless there's radar coverage or an Observer Corps at Penang and Kota Bharu, there's no point in having any squadrons North of Kuala Lumper.Unless the additional squadrons I suggest are sent a lot of the airfields should have been closed.
Thanks Tom, for your two excellent downloads. They contain so much interesting reading and knowledgeable information. I guess that I got away from the original thread with a very sweeping statement re Australia's situation at the time of the fall of Singapore.Hey guys,
A couple of interesting sources I ran across that include the thinking and justification relative to UK deployment and support of forces to Australia and Malaya, along with some Australian views on why and how well it was done. I found the late-interwar and early-WWII sections particularly interesting relative to this thread.
(http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:4453/SOURCE01)
(http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/APDC/media/PDF-Files/Historical Publications/HIST02-Power-Plus-Attitude-Ideas,-Strategy-and-Doctrine-in-the-Royal-Australian-Air-Force,-1921-1991.pdf)
German then Italian then Japanese forces had to be attacked in that order of course. The failing at Singapore to not hold out longer and surrender too early really has perplexed me for so long. The gew Buffalos and other aircraft that attacked the Japanese landings and beacheads on the Gulf of Siam were truly admirable. I have often wondered if the Prince of Wales had been left behind in Singapore. It could have been used as rearward fire support to protect the northern approach to Singapore and added to the AA defense of SingaporeWhat does the UK sacrifice to keep Malaya?
Germany was a direct, existential threat to Britain, proper, and, less directly, to the Commonwealth by the possible interdiction of transport through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal to India, South Asia, and Oceania. Where would the Churchill get those 500 aircraft to send to Malaya?
To solve this problem, the UK has to start at least a decade earlier: promote industrial development in the Commonwealth outside of the UK, an action which had been strongly deprecated by the government in London for many years, so that the Dominions, especially India, can put enough locally produced tanks, aircraft, artillery, and even ships into Malaya so that the Commonwealth forces in Malaya aren't operating on a threadbare shoestring.
German then Italian then Japanese forces had to be attacked in that order of course. The failing at Singapore to not hold out longer and surrender too early really has perplexed me for so long. The gew Buffalos and other aircraft that attacked the Japanese landings and beacheads on the Gulf of Siam were truly admirable. I have often wondered if the Prince of Wales had been left behind in Singapore. It could have been used as rearward fire support to protect the northern approach to Singapore and added to the AA defense of Singapore