Combat records - claims vs. losses

[Stig1207]

Italians
Units: 17 Sqn (CR 42?), 71, 72, 80, 153 Sqns (MC.202), 151, 352 Sqn (G.50), 353 Sqn (G.50?), 373, 384 Sqns (MC 200)
Claims 9 Tomahawks, 3 x Hurricanes
Losses: 3 x MC.200, 4 x MC.202, 1 x G.50
Casualties: 1 x KiA, 2 x PoW, 2 x WiA

4 December
1 MC 202 destroyed in crashlanding and 1 force-landed (though attributed to engine failure) and 2 damaged.

5 December

16 claims for Ju 87's (112 Sqd 6 and 250 Sqd 10)

1 Hurricane loss was force-landed due lack of fuel.

8 December

German claims were 1 Hurricane, 1 P-40, 1 Valentia, 1 Boston

9 December

3 Bf 109's claimed by Tomahawks.

 

[Schweik]

On the 4 December entry, this is what it says - and this is what I counted:

MC. 200 force landed; Ten Felice Mezetti WiA - 1 x MC.200
4 x MC 202's damaged (not counted)
MC.200 Shot down S. Ten Arrigo Zancristoforo KiA- 1 x MC.200
MC.200 Shot down; Ten Vittorio Conti PoW - 1 x MC 200
MC.200 damaged; pilot WiA
MC.202 MM7866 destroyed in crash landing; S Ten Lorenzo Chellini rescueed - 1 x MC.202
MC202 MM7874 force-landed due to engine failure; M.LLo Marcello Lui safe - 1 x MC.202
2 MC202s damaged; T. Col Bruno Brambilla and Ten Pierfrancesco Conti returned - 2 x MC.202
G.50 crash-landed after collision; Ten Guiseppe Vitali PoW -

The key word here being returned, to me that means the pilots were initially MiA but then showed up later, which in turn means that the planes did not land safely at the base but went down somewhere else. I believe I mentioned this in my comment for that day. At any rate that is how this word is used in the British records, where pilots lost or force-landed planes but made it back to friendly lines on a fairly routine basis. In fact on that same day in Shores' summary for the British casualties it says "Hurricane II was shot down by an MC.202, force-landed; 2/Lt T.A. Meek returned next day." and It's possible it means something different to the Italians.

I think the British are just a bit more wordy. The Italian records seem to be very minimalist compared to the British or German and also tend to de-emphasize losses.

 

[michael rauls]

Very cool stuff! I could be wrong but while the Germans are definitely getting the better of the Brits in air to air engagements
it looks like this may be at least partially due to the type of mission each side is performing i.e. the British seem to be attacking bases and other German assets on the ground alot more than Gremans and Italians are British ones.
If your lumbering off to battle with a 500 lb bomb strapped to your plane or just spending a larger portion of your time down low straffing assets on the ground thats going to put you at a big disadvantage in air to air but could still be advantageous overall in terms of winning the campaign.

 

[Schweik]

Above source is probably Mediterranean & Southern Front 1941-1942. Vol. I available here
https://web.archive.org/web/20130928070316/http://lesbutler.co.uk/claims/tonywood.htm The film references are micro film.

The source agrees well with MAW I on German claims for both 10 and 11 December except that here the Jg53 claims are for Hurricanes not P-40's.
In your post #39 for 11 December you have German claims of 1 P-40 and 6 Bostons; I suspect you have got 10 and 11 December mixed up somehow when transcribing.

That is fixed. Corrections are fine but posts of data should include records from both sides.

 

[BiffF15]

On the 4 December entry, this is what it says - and this is what I counted:

MC. 200 force landed; Ten Felice Mezetti WiA - 1 x MC.200
4 x MC 202's damaged (not counted)
MC.200 Shot down S. Ten Arrigo Zancristoforo KiA- 1 x MC.200
MC.200 Shot down; Ten Vittorio Conti PoW - 1 x MC 200
MC.200 damaged; pilot WiA
MC.202 MM7866 destroyed in crash landing; S Ten Lorenzo Chellini rescueed - 1 x MC.202
MC202 MM7874 force-landed due to engine failure; M.LLo Marcello Lui safe - 1 x MC.202
2 MC202s damaged; T. Col Bruno Brambilla and Ten Pierfrancesco Conti returned - 2 x MC.202
G.50 crash-landed after collision; Ten Guiseppe Vitali PoW -

The key word here being returned, to me that means the pilots were initially MiA but then showed up later, which in turn means that the planes did not land safely at the base but went down somewhere else. I believe I mentioned this in my comment for that day. At any rate that is how this word is used in the British records, where pilots lost or force-landed planes but made it back to friendly lines on a fairly routine basis. In fact on that same day in Shores' summary for the British casualties it says "Hurricane II was shot down by an MC.202, force-landed; 2/Lt T.A. Meek returned next day." and It's possible it means something different to the Italians.

I think the British are just a bit more wordy. The Italian records seem to be very minimalist compared to the British or German and also tend to de-emphasize losses.

Schweik,

How were planes that landed short but returned at some point handled or notated?

Cheers,
Biff

 

[Schweik]

Very cool stuff! I could be wrong but while the Germans are definitely getting the better of the Brits in air to air engagements
it looks like this may be at least partially due to the type of mission each side is performing i.e. the British seem to be attacking bases and other German assets on the ground alot more than Gremans and Italians are British ones.
If your lumbering off to battle with a 500 lb bomb strapped to your plane or just spending a larger portion of your time down low straffing assets on the ground thats going to put you at a big disadvantage in air to air but could still be advantageous overall in terms of winning the campaign.

You are both right and wrong. In a larger sense you are right - the British Strategy is focused on the ground war first and foremost, and secondarily on destroying Axis assets including their air bases, ships, air transports and other communications and logistics. Effectively though, especially during the battles, they are ignoring the Luftwaffe and concentrating on attacking the Afrika Korps.

However at this stage the British fighters are not yet carrying bombs themselves. The bombing is being done by Marylands, Bostons and Blenheims. I am not sure (and in fact I don't think) they ever did put bombs on Tomahawks, though the Kittyhawks were already there by December and would soon be flying with bombs (allegedly at the insistence of Clive Caldwell who did some of the first flying tests with Kittyhawks and Hurricanes carrying heavy -250 kg+ bombs to prove the concept.)

The British fighters were flying four kinds of missions - fighter sweeps, what you might call 'free' escort, close escort, and strafing. Close escort was the most dangerous because to keep formation with the bombers, the British fighters had to slow down to the cruise speed of the bombers. This was Caldwells big beef - the cruise speed of a Blenheim was about 95 knots IIRC. Way too slow for safety when enemy fighters are around.

In the 'free' escort and fighter sweep missions, the British were still making two fundamental errors - flying too low, at around 6,000 - 10,000 ft, and flying bad formations. The biggest problem with the formations was they still weren't flying in pairs, but rather Vics of three. The second issue was that they hadn't worked out any good system for responding to being bounced. They flew with 'weavers' roaming back and forth above and behind the formation, who were easy pickings and whose constant movement made the whole formation easier to pick off from a distance, and they often revered to Lufburry circles when attacked which put them on the defensive and was also deemed to be a mistake.

Strafing missions were often done after other combat (such as during a bomber escort), before returning back to base. Sometimes they were more organized as the main mission so to speak.

The Germans were better organized, flew in pairs / finger four flights and fought basically two ways - the first in small groups, often flights of four who would go on a 'free hunt' and pick off 'weavers' and stragglers in bounces from above, covering each other and using their altitude advantage to break off. Due to the defensive tactics of the British they could often get away with this without much risk. The second were much larger and more coordinated attacks in which they would often manage to achieve local air superiority by concentrating multiple units in an attack on an RAF squadron or two. In this manner they repeatedly achieved massacres of Hurricanes knocking down 8 or 10 in a single engagement. This backfired on them somewhat against Tomahawk units a couple of times though such as on Nov 22 where they had a substantial numerical advantage but still took unacceptably high losses.

It was more rare but they did also sometimes launch big Stuka or Ju 88 missions against Allied troops or airbases, sometimes in coordination with the Italians and these days often blew up into big brawls.

 

[Schweik]

Schweik,

How were planes that landed short but returned at some point handled or notated?

Cheers,
Biff

If you mean the pilots, it's exactly as I transcribed above. Quite terse: aircraft damaged, so and so returned. Regarding the aircraft / ala attrition Shores doesn't get into that much detail though he does note several times around this period we are currently in (Nov-Dec 1941) where Axis bases were overrun and multiple damaged aircraft (Luftwaffa and RIA) that were still in the repair queue were captured by the Allies. I think the same happened to the British too a couple of times at least.

 

[Schweik]

4 December
1 MC 202 destroyed in crashlanding and 1 force-landed (though attributed to engine failure) and 2 damaged.

5 December

16 claims for Ju 87's (112 Sqd 6 and 250 Sqd 10)

1 Hurricane loss was force-landed due lack of fuel.

8 December

German claims were 1 Hurricane, 1 P-40, 1 Valentia, 1 Boston

9 December

3 Bf 109's claimed by Tomahawks.

I made these corrections except the Dec 4 one as noted.

 

[michael rauls]

You are both right and wrong. In a larger sense you are right - the British Strategy is focused on the ground war first and foremost, and secondarily on destroying Axis assets including their air bases, ships, air transports and other communications and logistics. Effectively though, especially during the battles, they are ignoring the Luftwaffe and concentrating on attacking the Afrika Korps.

However at this stage the British fighters are not yet carrying bombs themselves. The bombing is being done by Marylands, Bostons and Blenheims. I am not sure (and in fact I don't think) they ever did put bombs on Tomahawks, though the Kittyhawks were already there by December and would soon be flying with bombs (allegedly at the insistence of Clive Caldwell who did some of the first flying tests with Kittyhawks and Hurricanes carrying heavy -250 kg+ bombs to prove the concept.)

The British fighters were flying four kinds of missions - fighter sweeps, what you might call 'free' escort, close escort, and strafing. Close escort was the most dangerous because to keep formation with the bombers, the British fighters had to slow down to the cruise speed of the bombers. This was Caldwells big beef - the cruise speed of a Blenheim was about 95 knots IIRC. Way too slow for safety when enemy fighters are around.

In the 'free' escort and fighter sweep missions, the British were still making two fundamental errors - flying too low, at around 6,000 - 10,000 ft, and flying bad formations. The biggest problem with the formations was they still weren't flying in pairs, but rather Vics of three. The second issue was that they hadn't worked out any good system for responding to being bounced. They flew with 'weavers' roaming back and forth above and behind the formation, who were easy pickings and whose constant movement made the whole formation easier to pick off from a distance, and they often revered to Lufburry circles when attacked which put them on the defensive and was also deemed to be a mistake.

Strafing missions were often done after other combat (such as during a bomber escort), before returning back to base. Sometimes they were more organized as the main mission so to speak.

The Germans were better organized, flew in pairs / finger four flights and fought basically two ways - the first in small groups, often flights of four who would go on a 'free hunt' and pick off 'weavers' and stragglers in bounces from above, covering each other and using their altitude advantage to break off. Due to the defensive tactics of the British they could often get away with this without much risk. The second were much larger and more coordinated attacks in which they would often manage to achieve local air superiority by concentrating multiple units in an attack on an RAF squadron or two. In this manner they repeatedly achieved massacres of Hurricanes knocking down 8 or 10 in a single engagement. This backfired on them somewhat against Tomahawk units a couple of times though such as on Nov 22 where they had a substantial numerical advantage but still took unacceptably high losses.

It was more rare but they did also sometimes launch big Stuka or Ju 88 missions against Allied troops or airbases, sometimes in coordination with the Italians and these days often blew up into big brawls.

Great post. Sounds like I was mostly correct in the general dynamic but not all the particulars.
I have seen a couple pics of DAF Tomahawks with small (100lb, 250lb?) bombs but that doesn't mean this was common of course.

 

[Schweik]

I'm not sure, can you find a photo of one? I'm sure others here know definitively. At the very least I believe it was quite a while before they ever did put bombs or external tanks on Tomahawks if they ever did - same also with the AVG incidentally. I am not sure if I have ever seen a Tomahawk / P-40 B/C carrying a bomb. Every one I can remember is a Kittyhawk I or later.

There were also a couple of other gaps in training on the British side. Caldwell, Duke and Gibbes, among others, emphasized the lack of adequate training and in particular somewhat bitterly mentioned that they got no air to air gunnery training, (or in most cases any marksmanship training at all). Caldwell developed a method of shooting at the flying shadows of other aircraft on the desert floor as a means of helping teach deflection shooting, and this technique eventually received official approval and gradually spread throughout the DAF in early 1942. Training on type was also somewhat limited. In an interview with the Australian war memorial Gibbes was impressed that American Warhawk / Kittyhawk II pilots arriving in Theater in mid 1942 could routinely pull of three point landings in their aircraft without wrecking.

I think you can also say that the Tomahawk IIb certainly was an inferior fighter to the Bf 109F-4 and the MC 202. However, it was not so inferior, that even in spite of the severe training and Tactical deficits, the LW could routinely manage serious one sided massacres with impunity the way they so often did against Hurricane units. Typically in a substantial engagement against Tomahawks the Luftwaffe lost a few planes, what the precise ratio was we can perhaps estimate after some more data has been entered. It also appears that JG. 27 was doing better against the British in general than other LW units like JG. 53 and later JG. 77did. But once JG. 27 lost a few of their key guys like Marseille, Schulz and Stahlschmit, their morale declined and they became much less effective.

Also while the Bf109F-4 and MC 202 were extraordinarily good fighters for Dec 1941, they remained in service with relatively minor improvements through the year of 1942 and well beyond. By Mid 1942 new Allied fighters were coming into Theater, including later mark P-40s, P-38s, Spit Vs, P-39s, and A-36 [P-51A dive bombers]. As we will see, the Kittyhawk II and III performed much better against the 109F4 and the MC202, and even against 109G and MC 205 later in 1943. The Spit V for all it's faults also seems to be roughly at parity with the 109F4 in my opinion in North Africa, though here again we will be able to look at the numbers more closely. The P-38 suffered initially in some encounters but also took a toll on Axis fighters in several engagements and made it possible for the higher flying B-24s to smash a lot of Axis airbases and other facilities. The Fw 190 did wreak some havoc initially with the arrival of the elite JG.2, but the British and Americans seem to have adjusted to dealing with those with what they had available to them in subsequent engagements.

Once the Spit IX arrived in early 1943 the writing was on the wall for the Axis. It is pretty clear that it owned all the Axis fighters.

 

[Schweik]

On the Strategic level, many LW pilots and quite a few Afrika Korps officers, including Rommel, complained that the LW fighter units heavily emphasized scoring air to air victories while neglecting the ground war. There are some extended quotes in Shores to this effect. The 109 pilots in particular almost universally detested flying escort to Stukas and Ju 88s, as this required them to lower their speed and altitude and expose themselves to attack.

Some LW pilots, again several quoted by Shores, also noted that the emphasis was put on the experten and raising their victory tally's, while other pilots were basically put into supporting positions. Something like a dozen experten got about half the German air to air victories in the Theater (I have the exact numbers somewhere but would have to look for it).

 

[michael rauls]

I'm not sure, can you find a photo of one? I'm sure others here know definitively. At the very least I believe it was quite a while before they ever did put bombs or external tanks on Tomahawks if they ever did - same also with the AVG incidentally. I am not sure if I have ever seen a Tomahawk / P-40 B/C carrying a bomb. Every one I can remember is a Kittyhawk I or later.

There were also a couple of other gaps in training on the British side. Caldwell, Duke and Gibbes, among others, emphasized the lack of adequate training and in particular somewhat bitterly mentioned that they got no air to air gunnery training, (or in most cases any marksmanship training at all). Caldwell developed a method of shooting at the flying shadows of other aircraft on the desert floor as a means of helping teach deflection shooting, and this technique eventually received official approval and gradually spread throughout the DAF in early 1942. Training on type was also somewhat limited. In an interview with the Australian war memorial Gibbes was impressed that American Warhawk / Kittyhawk II pilots arriving in Theater in mid 1942 could routinely pull of three point landings in their aircraft without wrecking.

I think you can also say that the Tomahawk IIb certainly was an inferior fighter to the Bf 109F-4 and the MC 202. However, it was not so inferior, that even in spite of the severe training and Tactical deficits, the LW could routinely manage serious one sided massacres with impunity the way they so often did against Hurricane units. Typically in a substantial engagement against Tomahawks the Luftwaffe lost a few planes, what the precise ratio was we can perhaps estimate after some more data has been entered. It also appears that JG. 27 was doing better against the British in general than other LW units like JG. 53 and later JG. 77did. But once JG. 27 lost a few of their key guys like Marseille, Schulz and Stahlschmit, their morale declined and they became much less effective.

Also while the Bf109F-4 and MC 202 were extraordinarily good fighters for Dec 1941, they remained in service with relatively minor improvements through the year of 1942 and well beyond. By Mid 1942 new Allied fighters were coming into Theater, including later mark P-40s, P-38s, Spit Vs, P-39s, and A-36 [P-51A dive bombers]. As we will see, the Kittyhawk II and III performed much better against the 109F4 and the MC202, and even against 109G and MC 205 later in 1943. The Spit V for all it's faults also seems to be roughly at parity with the 109F4 in my opinion in North Africa, though here again we will be able to look at the numbers more closely. The P-38 suffered initially in some encounters but also took a toll on Axis fighters in several engagements and made it possible for the higher flying B-24s to smash a lot of Axis airbases and other facilities. The Fw 190 did wreak some havoc initially with the arrival of the elite JG.2, but the British and Americans seem to have adjusted to dealing with those with what they had available to them in subsequent engagements.

Once the Spit IX arrived in early 1943 the writing was on the wall for the Axis. It is pretty clear that it owned all the Axis fighters.

I can't remember where I saw them off the top of my head. I'll take a look through a few books i have where I think one might reside and I saw one on the net maybe 6 months or so ago. Remember it vividly. Was taken from the front. Was definitely a Tomahawk as the air intake was much further back than a Kityhawk and one roundel was clearly visible.

 

[michael rauls]

I'm not sure, can you find a photo of one? I'm sure others here know definitively. At the very least I believe it was quite a while before they ever did put bombs or external tanks on Tomahawks if they ever did - same also with the AVG incidentally. I am not sure if I have ever seen a Tomahawk / P-40 B/C carrying a bomb. Every one I can remember is a Kittyhawk I or later.

There were also a couple of other gaps in training on the British side. Caldwell, Duke and Gibbes, among others, emphasized the lack of adequate training and in particular somewhat bitterly mentioned that they got no air to air gunnery training, (or in most cases any marksmanship training at all). Caldwell developed a method of shooting at the flying shadows of other aircraft on the desert floor as a means of helping teach deflection shooting, and this technique eventually received official approval and gradually spread throughout the DAF in early 1942. Training on type was also somewhat limited. In an interview with the Australian war memorial Gibbes was impressed that American Warhawk / Kittyhawk II pilots arriving in Theater in mid 1942 could routinely pull of three point landings in their aircraft without wrecking.

I think you can also say that the Tomahawk IIb certainly was an inferior fighter to the Bf 109F-4 and the MC 202. However, it was not so inferior, that even in spite of the severe training and Tactical deficits, the LW could routinely manage serious one sided massacres with impunity the way they so often did against Hurricane units. Typically in a substantial engagement against Tomahawks the Luftwaffe lost a few planes, what the precise ratio was we can perhaps estimate after some more data has been entered. It also appears that JG. 27 was doing better against the British in general than other LW units like JG. 53 and later JG. 77did. But once JG. 27 lost a few of their key guys like Marseille, Schulz and Stahlschmit, their morale declined and they became much less effective.

Also while the Bf109F-4 and MC 202 were extraordinarily good fighters for Dec 1941, they remained in service with relatively minor improvements through the year of 1942 and well beyond. By Mid 1942 new Allied fighters were coming into Theater, including later mark P-40s, P-38s, Spit Vs, P-39s, and A-36 [P-51A dive bombers]. As we will see, the Kittyhawk II and III performed much better against the 109F4 and the MC202, and even against 109G and MC 205 later in 1943. The Spit V for all it's faults also seems to be roughly at parity with the 109F4 in my opinion in North Africa, though here again we will be able to look at the numbers more closely. The P-38 suffered initially in some encounters but also took a toll on Axis fighters in several engagements and made it possible for the higher flying B-24s to smash a lot of Axis airbases and other facilities. The Fw 190 did wreak some havoc initially with the arrival of the elite JG.2, but the British and Americans seem to have adjusted to dealing with those with what they had available to them in subsequent engagements.

Once the Spit IX arrived in early 1943 the writing was on the wall for the Axis. It is pretty clear that it owned all the Axis fighters.

Well I did a quick internet search, typed in Desert Airforce Tomahawks and just thumbed through the images hoping id stumble across that same pic but no luck.
I'll check in a couple books later but right now I've got some work to do.( my wife has been on a 3 day trip with her sister and brother in law and shes comming home in a few hrs so I have to put the house back together)

 

[michael rauls]

I did a pretty thorough search. Even looked through all the photos I could find of individual groups like the 112Raf looking for that picture of a DAF Tomahawk with bombs and found.............nothing.
I'm starting to doubt what I thought I saw in that picture. Perhaps it was a Kityhawk and just the angle made it look like the beard was farther back and less deep. Although I think I know the difference but who knows posibly incorrectly titled picture, the power of suggestion.............a few beers.
Who knows maybe it was not a Tomahawk after all. But I haven't given up entirely yet. Will still keep my eyes out.

 

[Schweik]

Carl Moleswortth, who did most of the Osprey books on the P-40 so is probably a bit of an expert, says the P-40C / Tomahawk II did have a centerline bomb rack which could carry "a few 30 pound bombs or a small drop tank" - which is news to me and I don't even know how you put a 'few' bombs on a centerline rack. I know early P-40s did have wing hard points for small 30 or 40 lb bombs.

So it seems like you may not have hallucinated after all. Either way as a consolation prize, a nice video of P-40C in flight

Now I'll get back to transcribing.

 

[michael rauls]

Awesome video!!

 

[BiffF15]

Awsome vidio!!

Concur!

 

[Stig1207]

On the 4 December entry, this is what it says - and this is what I counted:

MC. 200 force landed; Ten Felice Mezetti WiA - 1 x MC.200
4 x MC 202's damaged (not counted)
MC.200 Shot down S. Ten Arrigo Zancristoforo KiA- 1 x MC.200
MC.200 Shot down; Ten Vittorio Conti PoW - 1 x MC 200
MC.200 damaged; pilot WiA
MC.202 MM7866 destroyed in crash landing; S Ten Lorenzo Chellini rescueed - 1 x MC.202
MC202 MM7874 force-landed due to engine failure; M.LLo Marcello Lui safe - 1 x MC.202
2 MC202s damaged; T. Col Bruno Brambilla and Ten Pierfrancesco Conti returned - 2 x MC.202
G.50 crash-landed after collision; Ten Guiseppe Vitali PoW -

The key word here being returned, to me that means the pilots were initially MiA but then showed up later, which in turn means that the planes did not land safely at the base but went down somewhere else. I believe I mentioned this in my comment for that day. At any rate that is how this word is used in the British records, where pilots lost or force-landed planes but made it back to friendly lines on a fairly routine basis. In fact on that same day in Shores' summary for the British casualties it says "Hurricane II was shot down by an MC.202, force-landed; 2/Lt T.A. Meek returned next day." and It's possible it means something different to the Italians.

I think the British are just a bit more wordy. The Italian records seem to be very minimalist compared to the British or German and also tend to de-emphasize losses.

There can reasonably be different interpretations of the text, however, it does say 2 MC. 202's damaged, pilots returned but not that the aircraft forced- or crash-landed short of base, nor that the pilots returned later. As well, in the narative for this day Shores states that total losses of MC. 202's was 2 crashlanded and 6 damaged.

 

[Stig1207]

16 December
No German claims

17 December
7 Hurricanes lost + 1 force-landed (at base?, damaged, pilot unhurt) + 3 damaged.

20 December

4 Tomahawks (1 112 Sqd, 3 250 Sqd) + 4 Blenheims (1 more Blenheim lost attempting to land in sandstorm, but not enemy action).

 

[gordonm1]

Deleted comment, Sorry if I spoke out of turn.