Comparison of Pacific, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and North Atlantic naval combat

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

And yet, oddly, the F4F did much better against all the best Axis fighters (including both Bf 109 and A6M) than the Hurricane or Sea Hurricane did, let alone the obsolescent Fulmar, Skua, or Sea Gladiator. The Dauntless, like it's Japanese counterpart the D3A, sunk far more warships than the Swordfish or Albacore ever did, and the American fleet defeated the Japanese fleet, while the RN fleet, even with considerable support from land based aircraft, was crushed.

The Fleet Admirals would love to have had a carrier born P-40F, it was 40 mph faster than a Wildcat or a Hurricane, and was a much more lethal combat aircraft, but even in the unlikely event it could be made to handle carrier takeoffs and landings (they could take off from carriers but I don't think that landing gear could handle the landings) they couldn't for the same reason they stopped using the F4F-3, because the wings didn't fold.

A P-40F by the way, was a far cry from a Hurricane. As I've pointed out repeatedly, both types of fighters, along with all the other Anglo-American types, saw combat side by side in both the MTO and the Pacific. P-40F/L was used mostly in the MTO (equipping 5 US fighter wings, 2 RAF Sqns and 1 Free French) but it was also used in the Pacific, by the 49th Ftr Group. The P-40F/L units held their own quite well against both Luftwaffe and Japanese opponents, (unlike the Hurricane) but it was never going to be a carrier aircraft. That just shows you that the communiques from that particular moment in the war were not necessarily reflective of the reality or the position over time. For a brief time everybody wanted the P-40F, then newer generation of fighters started to arrive.

At the time that memo was sent, the full lessons of Midway hadn't sunk in, the main pertinent to this discussion and the F4F-4 being the success of Sqn leader and Lt Commander Jimmy Thach. While some Wildcat units got slaughtered at Midway, as we have already discussed, First Team shows us that Jimmy Thach did quite well during that same battle. His new combat tactic the soon to be universal Thach Weave, enabled his small flight of 6 x F4F-4 Wildcats to fend off a much larger flight of 20 x A6M and shoot down 3 A6M at the cost of 1 Wildcat.

I don't remember ever seeing a Hurricane unit fight off a numerically superior number of A6Ms (or Ki-43s) let alone manage a ratio like that.

Thach was the first to demonstrate that with the correct tactics the Wildcat could take advantage of it's flight characteristics relative to the A6M. As these tactics and other guidelines were systematically spread through the Navy fighter squadrons, they managed to achieve parity with the A6M and Ki-43 units they encountered. This cannot be said of the Hurricane, the Fulmar, or the Skua.

The Hurricane, compared to the Wildcat or Martlet, was not fully a carrier fighter. It was really only a CAP fighter. All it could be used for was defending the fleet, especially against the kind of strikes that the convoys often encountered - small numbers of unescorted and often obsolescent bombers or miscellaneous maritime patrol or sea planes - He 115, Ar 196, SM. 79, CANT 1007, Z.506, FW 200 and etc. Hurricanes could also contend with Ju 87s, and if they could catch them, Ju 88s. But by the time of Pedestal the Hurricane was hard pressed to hold it's own against a Bf 109F or G, an MC 202, or an A6M or Ki-43.

According to Armored Carriers.com, the main flaw of the Sea Hurricane was it's poor range and endurance:

The Sea Hurricane's range was recorded as about 450 miles. But it was loiter time that meant the most for carrier operations.
Sea Hurricanes carried only enough fuel to sustain themselves for 1 hour at combat power, and 4.5 hours at full-economical settings. The Fulmar and Martlet could stay aloft for 2 hours and 2 hours 45 minutes under combat power, and 6 hours economical.
The consequence of this was carriers being forced to turn into the wind far more often to take-off and land Sea Hurricanes. So they were often held as 'alert' aircraft on the deck while their longer-legged stablemates maintained the CAP.


This is just another example of why range is so important in carrier operations. Now the Fulmar had decent range (Wildcat was significantly better), but the Fulmar didn't have much of a chance against any modern fighters, especially Zeros, while the Wildcat certainly did as the historical record shows us.
 
Last edited:
By the way, in your assessment of naval operations between the USN and IJN in 1942, you overlooked a pretty big one - the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.

This was 2 x US carriers (Hornet and Enterprise) vs. 4 x IJN Carriers (Shōkaku, Zuikaku, Zuihō, and Jun'yō)
Total number of aircraft was 136 aircraft on the USN side, 199 on the IJN side.

USN lost 1 carrier sunk (Hornet), and another heavily damaged (Enterprise) Japanese had two heavily damaged (Shokaku and Zuiho)
USN also lost 1 destroyer
US lost 81 aircraft, IJN lost 99

This adds a bunch of sorties to the number of Japanese sorties for 1942, as the Japanese made several consecutive strikes. I'll count up the totals later.

During the Battle Hornet was hit by a damaged dive bomber, you can see the attack here


Here just before


and right after
 
USN pilots were heavily trained in deflection shooting, which was not necessarily typical in all Air Forces (I know that some of the early units in the DAF had no air to air gunnery training at all, this was a major complaint of Clive Caldwell). Skillful deflection shooting was one of the things which made the Thach Weave and other tactics developed by the Wildcat pilots work
 
Can any rational person look through stars and stripes spectacles, then swap them for union jack spectacles and recognize they're still looking at the same scene from the World Cherry Picker Championships? As a Naval Aviation fanboy, I'm finding this thread highly entertaining.
 
"The 78 x M202 and Re2001 and 43 BF109Fs and 8 Bf110s = 129 'modern' fighters."

Just to cherry pick a stat or two, Shattered Sword documents the KdB with 113 A6M's in their OOB, so not a whole lot of difference there. And no, I do not consider 1 M202 or 1 Bf110 equal to two or three A6M's, that's just ridiculous.

I think you are also missing a bigger point here that may or may not have been mentioned and here's a question for you.

What was KdB's true superiority in naval conflict in 1941-1942?

Do you think even "just" the four carriers KdB brought to Midway would have had that many attacks on the Pedestal convoy for "no damage"? If so you are deluding yourself.

To save time I'll just go ahead and answer the above question.,

KdB could plan, prepare and launch a coordinated strike from SIX aircraft carriers using some of the finest naval aircraft of their generation being flown by some of the best naval aviators in the world. We're talking over 350 aircraft with a heavy fighter escort. THAT is why KdB would have shredded the Pedestal convoy and its escorting RN carrier force. You make much of the German and Italian bombers being better by a factor of X over their IJN counterparts, what you fail to realize or take in to account is that the AXIS may have been trained to bomb things on land, their IJN counterparts trained to bomb and torpedo fast moving/maneuvering targets on water. Big difference.

A fully constituted KdB in the summer of '42 had the potential to sweep ANY opposing force sent against it from the seas, armored decks or not. You doubt that, look no further than the excellent torpedo attack on Yorktown, neither the Germans nor the Italians could have pulled that off IMHO. And that was with a handful of attack aircraft being shot at/down by those poorly performing F4F's and some of the finest AA fire in the world, bar none shooting at them. They still pulled off a classic anvil/hammer attack, something the MTO AXIS air fleets were incapable of.

That the poorly preforming USN F4F's and the fragile flimsy flattops they were operating from went toe to toe with them and gave as good (or better) than they got I'll leave for you to explain.
 
Last edited:

I'm not cherry picking jack shit and I'm not wearing any spectacles. There's only one person in here doing that, don't lump me in with him. I'm just picking apart his delusions.
 
"The 78 x M202 and Re2001 and 43 BF109Fs and 8 Bf110s = 129 'modern' fighters."

He's also seriously exagerrating the number of MC 202 etc. available. The document posted by slaterat

which you can see here

Swordfish vs Devastator

Only shows 27 MC202 stationed on Pantelleria (51 Stormo). The text says 10 Re 2001 flew in from Rome to Sardinia, and "26 other fighters Re2000s, Cr 42s and MC 200 wof Reparto Volo and 54 Stormo CT were available in flights on Pantelleria and at Palermo Boccadifalco, Reggio Calabria, Castelvantrano and Sciacca for base defense.

That's 37, maybe a few more, nowhere near 78.
 
An often stated but as far as I am aware, totally incorrect belief. RAF pilots had 25 flying hours plus of course ground instruction, dedicated to shooting, excluding some initial camera gun experience. I am not saying that this was sufficient for actual combat, just that they had a fair bit of training and pretty similar to any other airforce including the USN.
 

This is what I posted (post 231):

"These are all the strikes flown against USN carrier TFs in the Pacific:

Bougainville = 18 Bettys (plus ~5 more Nell sorties against Enterprise)

Coral Sea = 51 = 33 Val and 18 Kate

Midway = 28 = 18 Val and 10 Kate (two strikes)

Eastern Solomons = 27 Vals

Santa Cruz = 109 = 58 Vals and 51 Kates.
------------------------------------------------------

= ~229 IJN strike aircraft sorties against USN carrier TFs in all of 1942
.

The Axis flew about 80 strike sorties against the Illustrious TF on 10 Jan 1941 (before Illustrious entered Malta harbour).

The IJN flew about 180 attack sorties against units of the BEF on 5 and 9 April 1942.

The Axis AFs flew about 230 attack sorties against Pedestal alone during the time it was escorted by carriers or about the same as the number of strikes flown against all USN carriers during 1942."


For a variety of reasons. the KB, in 1942, never concentrated it's full strength against a USN carrier TF and never launched a full strike that actually connected with a USN carrier TF, and it was the RN, at Ceylon, who encountered the strongest assembly of KB carriers pitted against an Allied carrier TF. It seems obvious that the USN would have lost the battle of Midway if the USN carriers had been detected prior to the attack on Midway Island, and/or before Nagumo planned a 2nd strike against Midway island, and then dithered about an immediate launch against the USN carriers.
 

Who said that? Or did you just make it up?

I
Why is the KB always considered this unstoppable force able to launch an overwhelming strike against a carrier TF with all six fleet carriers, or even four carriers, when historically, they were never able to deliver on that premise?


By Aug 1942 (remember Pedestal was just one operation) the Axis AFs in the ETO/MTO had flown THOUSANDS (yes I am shouting) of strike sorties against Allied naval and merchant ships. The Axis AFs were fully trained in maritime strike operations and the Luftwaffe were considered by the USN as superior to the IJN:

"
Information Bulletin · No. 29

Antiaircraft Action Summary · World War II
October 1945
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
UNITED STATES FLEET


...ENEMY TACTICS AND EQUIPMENT
German
German air attacks against our surface forces were more effective than those of the Japanese, prior to the latter's use of suicide tactics, for the following reasons:

  1. German aircraft were superior.
  2. German pilots possessed greater skill.
  3. German attacks were more highly co ordinated.
  4. Our own air defense was weaker.
  5. Our surface forces were not as modern or heavily armed as those in the Pacific."


But the KB was never 'fully constituted' against USN carrier TFs and performed poorly against it, in terms of coordinated strikes with the KBs full strength. The fact that the IJNAF was able to penetrate USN CAP at Midway, to repeatedly hit and cripple Yorktown with two strikes of 18 and 10 aircraft each speaks volumes about the poor performance of USN radar GCI and F4F-4 performance. The USN was quite open about this and yet when the USN's own criticisms are brought up it gets ignored or considered an insult. USN AA performance in 1942 varied from poor prior to Santa Cruz to excellent at Santa Cruz. See Lundstrom for a analysis of USN AA performance.

That the poorly preforming USN F4F's and the fragile flimsy flattops they were operating from went toe to toe with them and gave as good (or better) than they got I'll leave for you to explain.

This has been explained and I've referenced the explanations. What I don't understand is why pointing out known deficiencies in USN carriers and aircraft is considered a slight on the USN? Rather, it should be remembered that they overcame these issues with solid tactics, training and Intel, but we also have to bear in mind that the IJN also made many mistakes.
 

Page 453:
"From Torino Caselle via Pisa to Decimomannu came 153° Gruppo CT with 21
MC202s, 2° Gruppo Aut. CT with 19 Re2001s
362° Squadriglia of 22° Gruppo Aut. CT with 11 Re2001s

page 454:
27 MC202 stationed on Pantelleria (51 Stormo)
."
---------------
78
 
Why is the KB always considered this unstoppable force able to launch an overwhelming strike against a carrier TF with all six fleet carriers, or even four carriers, when historically, they were never able to deliver on that premise?

They certainly did deliver on the premise with both 4 and 5 fleet carriers, with devastating effect on the British at Ceylon (both ships and aircraft) and the Americans at Santa Cruz (ships but not so much aircraft). The RN air defense (fighters and AA) was just inadequate, whereas the USN was able to wreck the Japanese air fleet.


No they were not. The GERMANS were considered superior in ONE REPORT - (I am not shouting I just want to make sure you can read it) which you keep bringing up over and over again. You conveniently forget that at least half of the supposedly overwhelming force faced by Malta convoys in the Med were ITALIAN, and often flying extremely obsolete aircraft, relics of the Spanish Civil War.









Not that Italian pilots weren't good, many of them were and they did sink some RN ships, but taken as a whole, the Italian air forces were not anywhere near the standard of the Luftwaffe, nor was the Luftwaffe itself trained, designed or necessarily ready for maritime operations. Some of them were, but many were pressed into service from other Theaters, with experience and training almost exclusively in warfare over land.

As just one example of where the the modern German - Italian extremely limited range limited their use in Maritime warfare, the USS Wasp sailed twice to Malta to deliver fighters (to within the very short range of Spitfire Mk Vs). Both time the ships were packed with Spitfires and only flew 11 Wildcats for CAP, which was considered sufficient. Neither time were they attacked, despite the Axis desperation to prevent the reinforcement of Malta because the fighters were out of range to escort any bombers that could actually sink ships. Wasp then sailed to the Pacific where she was promptly sunk by a Japanese submarine.

You keep posting that one Navy report, and I could easily post one refuting your point. But that would make the debate even more obfuscated. I could bring up commentary by Eric Brown on how superior he thought the Martlet was to the Sea Hurricane, or by German or Japanese or Australian or British pilots on how badly they felt the Hurricane performed in air to air combat against German or Japanese fighters. Or mid-war analysis by various officers theorizing about what was good and what wasn't (including both sides of the debate about the F4F-4 within the US Navy). But the plural of anecdote is not statistic. Those are subjective analysis. You are cherry picking, and obfuscating the issue I suspect quite on purpose.

But the KB was never 'fully constituted' against USN carrier TFs and performed poorly against it, in terms of coordinated strikes with the KBs full strength.

The KB did very well against RN forces.


It isn't in the least controversial, what is controversial is that you are very selectively picking data points and trying to prove something that isn't real, namely that the Wildcat was inferior to the Sea Hurricane or Fulmar. As bad as the Wildcat was, they were able to make it work against modern enemy carrier and land based fighters. The same is not true for the RN types.

Let me state it outright - the F4F was not an ideal carrier aircraft, it certainly was a flawed design, and the F4F-4 was decidedly inferior to the F4F-3. A really ideal WW2 carrier fighter didn't exist in 1941 or 1942*, but of what was available worldwide, the A6M2 was the closest to the ideal and certainly the best in the world (excellent on the Tactical level, less so (due to attrition factors), on the Strategic), the Wildcat, as flawed as it was and certainly inferior in many ways to the A6M, was far superior to all the other Allied types. The Sea Hurricane, Fulmar, Sea Gladiator and Skua were all way down the list, barely adequate emergency stop gap measures at best. And as we know, no other navy had operational carrier fighters.

The problem is not that other people can't admit that the Wildcat was deeply flawed, it's that you can't admit that there was any flaw in any RN or RAF aircraft, including and in particular the Swordfish, Albacore and Fulmar, all of which were poorly thought out designs and / or woefully obsolete.

The Seafire, Barracuda and Firefly were also basically disasters too but I don't want to open that can of worms yet. Lets stick to 1942 for now.

* That would arrive later in the form of the Hellcat, and later stll, the Corsair.
 

And yet he lists none of those extra units in the available air strength, presumably because they arrived late (on the 11th or 12th -Indomitable was bombed on the 12th) and did not necessarily participate in any of the fighting. He lists a total of 659 aircraft, of which only 540 were serviceable. And more than half were very obsolete Italian aircraft.
 

The Spitfires that flew off Wasp each carried 90IG DTs and were launched about 600nm from Malta, or about the same distance as Hornet's launch of the Doolittle B-25s against Tokyo.
 

The text states 659 front line axis aircraft and that number is only reached by adding all the aircraft stated. Aircraft serviceability always varies from day and day and even hour to hour, and the same was true on carriers.

We've already discussed the relative performance of IJN and RAI aircraft, and the majority (over 300) of the RAI aircraft had comparable or better performance than IJN aircraft, and many of the older aircraft were designated for Recon, ASW and ASR roles.
 
Dare I make an observation

Comparing the Japanese capability with the Luftwaffe.
There can be no doubt that in the first half of the war the Japanese were the best naval air power around. There aircraft were at least as good as the best in the world combined with training that was in many ways better than any other power. The Luftwaffe were far from well equipped and where they were equipped they lacked the training. Their aerial torpedo's were exceptionally poor and few in number. It was so bad that the Germans asked for and received the blueprints for the Japanese type 91 torpedo in August 1942. They then only built about 70 and relied on Italian torpedo's. The Luftwaffe specialists were integrated into the normal Luftwaffe bomber units and used on normal bombing missions during the BOB losing the core of the highly trained crews in these actions.
In Mid November 1941 6/KG 26 in Greece had eighteen torpedo's barely enough for one attack, so normal bombs had to be used.

Later on the pendulum had swung. The IJN were basically using the same aircraft and the experienced crews hadn't been replaced. However the Luftwaffe had developed a number of new weapons and the technology to support them was much improved. The biggest being the introduction of the Do 217, He177 and the use of remote control bombs.
They also had (until 1943) the use of an Italian training school to teach the Luftwaffe crews on torpedo tactics.
 

Which is wrong - there were three waves of strikes. The IJN also had 202 naval combat aircraft, not including seaplane scouts etc. This included:

82 x A6M2 (22 on Shokaku, 21 on Zuikaku, 19 on Zuiho, 20 on Jun'yo)
63 x D3A (21 on Shokaku, 24 on Zuikaku, 18 on Jun'yo)
57 x B5N (24 on Shokaku, 20 on Zuikaku, 6 on Zuiho, 7 on Jun'yo)

So you undercounted there were 120 bombers. But here is the thing - There was more than one wave of strikes I posted a summary. Running total of sorties in bold on the right.
  • First strike on the 26th Oct 1942 was 64 aircraft from three carriers (41 bombers - 21 D3A, 20 B5N +2 more in a command role) at about 7:40 am - 64 bombers + 23 fighters
  • Then Shokaku launched a second wave of 19 x D3A escorted by 5 x A6M at 8:00 am - 83 bombers + 28 fighters
  • Then Zuikako launched 16 x B5N escorted by 4 x A6M - 99 bombers + 32 fighters
During the initial contact in the morning, two SBD dauntless scouts by the way, unescorted, were able to hit Zuiho with two 500 lb bombs and taking their flight deck out of action.
Tgen, due to some confusion after a Japanese attack, the first 15 SBDs had to strike without their escort, and were attacked by 12 x A6M. Nevertheless, losing 2 with another 2 forced to jetison bombs and escape. 11 of them nevertheless attacked and hit Shokaku with at least 3 bombs.
  • Second wave continued on the 26th continued as 17 x D3A and 12 x A6M from the Jun'yo at 9:14- 116 bombers + 44 fighters
By this point Hornet was all but sunk, Enterprise was damaged by two bombs, Zuiho and Shokaku were damaged. But the Japanese spotted Enterprise and knew they needed to attack.
  • The third wave was launched on the 26th at 13:06 Jun'yo launched 7 x B5N and 8 x A6M - 123 bombers + 52 fighters
  • Zuikaku simultaneously launched her their strike of 7 x B5N, 2 x D3A, and 5 x A6M - 132 bombers + 57 fighters
  • then at 15:35 Jun'yo launched another strike of 4 x D3A and 6 x A6M - 136 bombers + 63 fighters
This battle, pitting 2 x US carriers (without any land based fighter defense) against 4 x IJN carriers, is a pretty close comparison to Ceylon, incidentally. It was a Japanese victory, but two of their carriers were put out of commission for months and had to return to Japan for repairs, and more importantly, unlike the clash between these same IJN units and the British five months earlier, the exchange in aircraft lost was even, in fact slightly favoring the Americans. And as we know, Japanese aircraft losses meant a much higher toll in dead or missing crew.

you also forgot many other smaller actions, and undercounted others.

For example on 7 August 1942, the Saratoga attacked what was then Japanese positions at Guadalcanal during the invasion by the Marines. Allied transports and amphibious vessels conducting landing operations were attacked by 27 x G4M escorted by 17 x A6M of the elite Tinian Kōkūtai . They were engaged by 8 x F4F, shooting down 5. The bombers missed the ships.

Then 9 x D3A attacked, but were intercepted by 15 x F4F, losing 5.

The Japanese forces never attacked Saratoga directly in this action (basically due to random luck), but they did attack naval ships and engaged Saratogas fighters.

the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal of 13-15 November pitted aircraft from one US carrier (Enterprise) plus land based planes, vs one Japanese (Jun'yo) - all that was available after Santa Cruz - with sizable surface fleets on both sides.

The US lost 2 x CLs, 7 x DD's with 2 x CA heavily damaged, 1 x BB damaged.
The IJN lost 2 x BB, 1 x CA, 3 x DD, and 7 x transports (4 more shot up after being beached)

More telling, the US lost 36 aircraft while the Japanese lost 64.

In the Eastern Solomons, (Aug 24-25) which you mentioned - the IJN had 177 aircraft available on carriers and land bases, and also launched multiple strikes. Again running totals on the side in bold.

at 14:50 27 x D3A and 15 x A6M launched from Shokaku and Zuikaku - 27 bombers- 15 fighters
then at 16:00, they launched a second wave of 27 x D3A and 9 x A6M -
54 bombers - 24 fighters

So what I see here is a lot of very careful filtering and cherry picking, trying to present both the IJN and the USN in the worst possible light, underplay Japanese activity and capability, while exaggerating (and really grasping at straws) to try to pretend that the Hurricane, Sea Hurricane, and / or Fulmar were still contenders as fighters in 1942. They were perfectly suited to seeing off Condors or chasing down a CANT 1007, but against the IJN or Japanese Army, they couldn't hold their own any more than they could against BF 109s and MC 202s.
 

I would say the Japanese were in sharp decline by mid-1943, though they still had a bite. The Germans were certainly continuing to improve.


Overall I think this assessment is pretty accurate, though as incredibly advanced and deadly as the remote control bombs were, they had a fairly limited impact because
  • they were not used in large numbers
  • the aircraft that launched them (Do 217 and He 177) proved to be exceedingly vulnerable in action, though on paper they look quite capable*
  • and the Anglo-Americans were quick to employ countermeasures such as jamming
The rather grim Japanese equivalent of the guided bombs etc. was the kamikaze, which while wasteful, could be quite effective.

* this may be because they had to operate beyond the range of potential escorts. All I can say is if you read the day to day operations, they got shot down rapidly. Squadrons were swiftly depleted and had to be rotated out.
 

Users who are viewing this thread