Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
The Ulster Queen (a converted ferry) did exceptionally well largely down to Captain and the effectiveness of the crew. During attacks when he saw a group of approaching torpedo bombers he would leave the defensive ring and head directly at the incoming aircraft. As a result he put his gunners in a good position to fire but also disrupted the attacking formation.1) HMS Ulster Queen (6 x 4in, 1 x quad pom-pom and several 20mm) claimed 4 x AA kills during PQ18. USS Wainwright was the destroyer described above, but really her gunnery was not exceptional. Lundstrom rather carefully examined USN AA in the Pacific and it was no better than the RN's despite some claims to the contrary.
The Ulster Queen (a converted ferry) did exceptionally well largely down to Captain and the effectiveness of the crew. During attacks when he saw a group of approaching torpedo bombers he would leave the defensive ring and head directly at the incoming aircraft. As a result he put his gunners in a good position to fire but also disrupted the attacking formation.
Re the USS Wainwright we will have to agree to disagree on this. She was became very important to the defence of the convoy while she was there, not because of the number of aircraft she shot down, but because of her ability to keep attacking formations away from the convoy. This was due to her accurate long range fire which was far better than the average RN fleet destroyer.
On the 4th July while approaching the convoy to refuel, she was credited with keeping one attack at such a distance that the torpedo's were not a threat, on a second attack that got closer she shot down one of the senior officers. Officially she wasn't part of the convoy escort being assigned to the Cruiser escort but happened to be refuelling and was in the right place at the right time. When she finished refuelling and was about to leave the convoy another large group of He111 approached and split into two groups. She opened fire at one group starting at 10,000 yards and kept firing until it was considered to be too close to the convoy, when she switched to the second group. Of the first group only one bomber launched its torpedo which missed and of the second group two ships were hit.
A couple more comments
1) If the Germans were totally happy with the Italian Torpedo's they wouldn't have asked for the blueprints of the Japanese torpedo's. The main problem with the Italian torpedo's was they didn't work that well in shallow water.
2) Germany lost 42% of its trained torpedo bomber crews. That shows how few they had to start off with
This statement fascinates me.
Please tell me, if you would, how the Royal Navy would be able to launch effective air attacks at night, against Japanese elements, in 1942.
This is with the understanding that the IJN was well trained and well versed in night warfare.
Who said that? Or did you just make it up?
I
Why is the KB always considered this unstoppable force able to launch an overwhelming strike against a carrier TF with all six fleet carriers, or even four carriers, when historically, they were never able to deliver on that premise?
By Aug 1942 (remember Pedestal was just one operation) the Axis AFs in the ETO/MTO had flown THOUSANDS (yes I am shouting) of strike sorties against Allied naval and merchant ships. The Axis AFs were fully trained in maritime strike operations and the Luftwaffe were considered by the USN as superior to the IJN:
Information Bulletin · No. 29
Antiaircraft Action Summary · World War II
October 1945
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
UNITED STATES FLEET
...ENEMY TACTICS AND EQUIPMENT
German
German air attacks against our surface forces were more effective than those of the Japanese, prior to the latter's use of suicide tactics, for the following reasons:
- German aircraft were superior.
- German pilots possessed greater skill.
- German attacks were more highly co ordinated.
- Our own air defense was weaker.
- Our surface forces were not as modern or heavily armed as those in the Pacific."
But the KB was never 'fully constituted' against USN carrier TFs and performed poorly against it, in terms of coordinated strikes with the KBs full strength. The fact that the IJNAF was able to penetrate USN CAP at Midway, to repeatedly hit and cripple Yorktown with two strikes of 18 and 10 aircraft each speaks volumes about the poor performance of USN radar GCI and F4F-4 performance. The USN was quite open about this and yet when the USN's own criticisms are brought up it gets ignored or considered an insult. USN AA performance in 1942 varied from poor prior to Santa Cruz to excellent at Santa Cruz. See Lundstrom for a analysis of USN AA performance.
This has been explained and I've referenced the explanations. What I don't understand is why pointing out known deficiencies in USN carriers and aircraft is considered a slight on the USN? Rather, it should be remembered that they overcame these issues with solid tactics, training and Intel, but we also have to bear in mind that the IJN also made many mistakes.
Hermes was sunk before any Fulmars arrived as were the other ships sunk by that strike. The Fulmars attacked after the Vals had finished their strikes. Of course there was no fighter cover over the two RN heavy cruisers sunk on 5 April. I didn't include the IJN strikes directed at Ceylon on 5 and 9 April.
You all can continue, I'll read but I'm out on this one, it smacks too much of those hurricane/P-40/Mustang "debates" years ago.
Merely referencing your constant belittling of IJN equipment, training and pilot performance in comparison to their MTO AXIS counterparts. (over a couple of threads)
Not considered "unstoppable", just far ahead of both the RN and the USN when it came to massed carrier attacks. Yes yes, Taranto, I'll give the RN that ONE shot but not on the same scale.
Never able to deliver? So Pearl Harbor was an accident? How's the Hermes career post March 1942, or Dorsetshire and Cornwall? Or the mass of merchant ships sitting on the bottom of the Indian Ocean?
I think Glider already addressed this earlier up thread.
One might pay close attention to issue #5.
Must be why the USN lost those battles.
Criticism of the USN isn't "ignored" or "considered an insult" far from it, but it's your constant flag waving over the RN and belittling of everything from Pearl Harbor to Midway as a cakewalk for the USN compared to RN's operations in the MTO or even off Ceylon. You contend that the RN faced much harder and more numerous opposition on a magnitude so much greater than the USN did in the Pacific that they can't be compared. Perhaps a re-evaluation of some of your statements is in order.
??? We know what happened historically at Ceylon in April 1942, and the RN was defeated, but the losses were not severe and the KB never even located the RN's fleet carriers. Coral Sea was not about an invasion of Australia, and no Fletcher didn't have to fight and wouldn't have until reinforced, if the full KB arrived. By defending Ceylon, and the IO the RN was also defending Australia and also the entire Allied strategic situation. But I think your comments here, might be considered 'flag waving' N'est-ce pas?ou're free to expound your ideas, but make no mistake, the KdB would have absolutely savaged the RN in the Indian Ocean in March of 42 and Sommerville knew it, hence his tactics. Fletcher had no choice at Coral Sea (hence his tactics), he had to stand and fight, and fight he did, he did have the option to wait for TF16 had KdB shown up in force, but it was still GAME ON. After all, SOMEONE had to man up and help defend Australia, the RN sure as hell wasn't capable of it.
And whether you like it or not, or acknowledge it or not, the IJN and the USN were the varsity squads of carrier air warfare, the BPF was never more than the size/capability (after a training session with U.S.S. Saratoga) of a Task Group in the Pacific War.
Sorry, I don't believe you mean any of that.
This all reminds me of a fella I used to know, he was a big, dyed in the wool Hurricane fan, at the slightest inference that the P-40 might have been equal to the Hurricane he'd be off on a tear. God forbit you mentioned to him that it might actually be a better plane than the Hurricane. Hell, I remember going a couple of rounds with that guy over his contention that the Mustang wasn't as good as late marques of the Hurricane, and that he could prove that with facts.
You all can continue, I'll read but I'm out on this one, it smacks too much of those hurricane/P-40/Mustang "debates" years ago.
IOWs, you made it up. Placing all the naval AFs into their proper historical context isn't belittling, rather it's discussing naval aviation history. The IJNAF deployed aircraft that would not have been acceptable to any other AF, this gave them lightweight aircraft with good performance by naval AF standards but it came at a real cost in survivability. The IJNAFs aircraft were not modern by 1942 land based AF standards, nor were most naval AFs aircraft,but the RN was pitted against a very powerful land based AF with better performing and more modern aircraft than those deployed in the Pacific. The RN was pitting their obsolescent biplanes and not quite fighters against an array of Spanish Civil War era antiques from Italy (also biplanes, cloth covered trimotors etc.) and a handful of good but exceedingly short range German planes. This is just a fact, and any "belittling" is being done by those who pretend this isn't true.
The records state that 6 Fulmars got there before or as Hermes was attacked, and 6 more arrived after she was sunk.
Far more important to the ongoing debate I am referring to your claim that "The IJN flew about 180 attack sorties against units of the BEF on 5 and 9 April 1942. "
I'd really like to hear how you arrive at that number. If you are only counting strikes that found and attacked Carriers, this doesn't track. The only attack against a RN carrier was on April 9
After launching attacks against the port city of Trincomalee at 7:00 in the morning, a recon plane from Haruna spotted the Hermes and the KB launched 80 x D3A at 10:35. The first group of D3A, consisting of 32 dive bombers, found and immediately sunk Hermes. Not all of them actually got to drop bombs before Hermes was clearly done for, so they were forced to seek out other targets - The HMES Hollyhock, the Athelstone, the tanker Sergeant and the cargo ship Norvikien.
By your own criteria, the main argument you have been making for the last 15 pages -- the claim that the IJN launched 180 sorties against the BEF but only 27 at Midway (etc.) is complete B.S. - only 32 Japanese bombers attacked before the RN carrier was gone.
This is from the Wiki:
"They were spotted off Batticaloa, however, by a Japanese reconnaissance plane from the battleship Haruna.[41] The British intercepted the spot report and ordered the ships to return to Trincomalee with the utmost dispatch and attempted to provide fighter cover for them.[42] The Japanese launched 85 Aichi D3A dive bombers, escorted by nine Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters, at the two ships. At least 32 attacked them and sank them in quick order despite the arrival of six Fairey Fulmar II fighters of No. 273 Squadron RAF. Another six Fulmars from 803 and 806 Squadrons arrived after Hermes had already sunk. The rest of the Japanese aircraft attacked other ships further north, sinking the RFA Athelstone of 5,571 gross register tonnage (GRT), her escort, the corvette Hollyhock, the oil tanker SS British Sergeant and the Norwegian ship SS Norviken of 2,924 GRT.[43] "
They list their source as Bloody Shambles Vol II, which I don't have but I'm sure somebody here does.
Fixed it for you.
I don't see anyone claiming the F4F was a superb aircraft, it's really you who insists, against all the evidence, that woefully obsolete (or badly designed) aircraft like the Sea Hurricane, Fulmar, Skua, Swordfish and Albacore were superb, or at least better than everyone elses, and also simultaneously pretending that 1930's era Italian planes were more dangerous than the deadly dive bombers of the IJN carrier battlegroups.
Even though it only took 32 of them to sink a RN carrier...
So wait a minute, strikes against the RN which never find carriers but attack port facilities and cruisers count as attacks on carriers in your model, but strikes against the USN which don't find the carriers don't count?
How do you count aircraft that arrived after the only carrier present was sunk?
Is there some reason why your big argument uses different standards for the RN vs the USN?
I didn't count the two strikes directed against Ceylon on 5 April (91 strike aircraft) and 9 April (91 strike aircraft) . The IJN launched 4 strikes on 5 and 9 April. two strikes (182 strike aircraft) against Ceylon and two strikes (~138 to 173 strike aircraft) against units of the BEF.
More flag waving.
You were claiming the F4F was a superb aircraft
and presenting prototype performance figures rather than those for combat ready aircraft. I pointed out it's actual performance, just as I've pointed out the actual performance of all the aircraft under discussion. The problem here is that many people prefer to flag wave rather than have an honest discussion free of nationalist pretensions.
Who precisely has their thumb on the scale here? Who is emphasizing outlier data and demanding we ignore everything else?
Pretty sure Japan was an Axis nation, too...I don't think the KdB would of lasted 2 weeks against the combined forces of the axis in the Mediterranean.
Really? lol
I don't think the KdB would of lasted 2 weeks against the combined forces of the axis in the Mediterranean. Their tinder box carriers would of been quickly put on the bottom of the sea with their poor air cap and damage control. These are two very different theaters and different tactics and equipment. The much tighter waters of the Mediteranean, infested with aircraft and submarines, lead to the development of the armoured carrier and the sophisticated and effective air defense of the FAA. Conducting air strikes at night also became a specialty. The open waters of the Pacific lead to longer ranged aircraft with an emphasis on offence but limited to daylight flying only.