Comparison of Pacific, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and North Atlantic naval combat

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

Did the Fulmars and RAF Hurricanes do as well as the USN fighters at Midway?
Provided the "escorting" Zeros cooperate by their usual chasing of individual glory rather than staying by their charges the Fulmars and especially the faster Hurricanes would have made mincemeat out of the matchstick incendiaries, AKA Vals and Kates. There's nothing in the IJNAF that can withstand a few seconds of eight .303 in the backside.
 
Last edited:
Provided the "escorting" Zeros cooperate by their usual chasing of individual glory rather than staying by their charges the Fulmars and especially the fastest Hurricanes would have made mincemeat out of the matchstick incendiaries, AKA Vals and Kates. There's nothing in the IJNAF that can withstand a few seconds of eight .303 in the backside.

They got a few chances at Ceylon but didn't get very many, for example in one of the clashes a squadron of Hurricanes caught a squadron of D3A on their own but they only got 4 of them (one later crash landed on the carrier). Probably because the Vals in particular were hard to catch - very agile, good dogfighters. Wildcats had trouble getting them too sometimes. The 'Kates' were more sitting ducks.

To be fair, Stukas could be like that too. I know in the MTO the land based DAF fighters sometimes caught them and mauled them but sometimes most of them got away. They had a trick they did to produce oily smoke during a dive and a sharp spiraling turn which made it look like they'd been hit and were going down. Like the D3A they were slow but quite agile.
 
They got a few chances at Ceylon but didn't get very many, for example in one of the clashes a squadron of Hurricanes caught a squadron of D3A on their own but they only got 4 of them (one later crash landed on the carrier). Probably because the Vals in particular were hard to catch - very agile, good dogfighters. Wildcats had trouble getting them too sometimes. The 'Kates' were more sitting ducks.

To be fair, Stukas could be like that too. I know in the MTO the land based DAF fighters sometimes caught them and mauled them but sometimes most of them got away. They had a trick they did to produce oily smoke during a dive and a sharp spiraling turn which made it look like they'd been hit and were going down. Like the D3A they were slow but quite agile.

The Stuka and Ju88 were armoured with SS tanks, as were most Axis aircraft in the ETO/MTO.
 
The Stuka and Ju88 were armoured with SS tanks, as were most Axis aircraft in the ETO/MTO.

Hurricanes routinely made short work of Stukas regardless of any armor, though they often failed to even intercept Ju 88s (due to speed and altitude) such as over Malta.
 
Unescorted and obsolete



Agree with 90% of that. The dive bombers range was significantly different - I was being pretty generous with the Ju 87D I don't think it's actual strike range was anywhere near that far. But even if that was right, D3A is still ~300 miles longer range, which matters a lot in naval combat.
.

The JU87D had and could use DTs, so it's range was variable depending upon mission requirements. As we've discussed the RN had to come to within range of even the most heavily loaded Ju87s.
 
Hurricanes routinely made short work of Stukas regardless of any armor, though they often failed to even intercept Ju 88s (due to speed and altitude) such as over Malta.

The Martlets and F4F-4s had the same (actually worse because of their slow climb rate) issues.
 
Ah, no, the F4F-3 was roughly on par with the Zero, likely due to training and tactics as much as anything else. I doubt I'm the only one who would point this out.
The USMC pilots at Midway begged to differ. They stated very clearly that they believed the F4F-3 to be completely outperformed by the Zero and the USN TAIC report comparing the F4F-4 to the Zero states the same about the F4F-4. The difference in weight between an F4F-3/4 is only about 400lb, with both aircraft having the same engine. OTOH, the Sea Hurricane 1B is ~900lb lighter than an F4F-4 and has ~20% more power.
 
Last edited:
There was only one E8 "Dave" at Midway, flying from the Battleship Haruna, but you felt compelled to put that in. Right?

I never states I was making a Midway a cutoff, as Pedestal was several months later than Midway. I was comparing aircraft active in 1942. There were D4Y stationed in the Pacific through the second half of 1942.



You got me here, that was an oversight. I just saw first flight in 1941. It's what I get for being hasty.



The point about the Stukas and their normally very limited range, and same for the MC 202 and Bf 109s available) is that while you implied Pedestal was under attack by 600 aircraft, the reality is that 1) most of those 600 planes were not modern aircraft and many were not even really combat aircraft (rather recon or liaison), and 2) only a small percentage of the actually effective strike aircraft could attack the convoy at any one time.

The TO&E posted by Slaterat showed 26 x Ju 87D from I/StG 3, and 14 x Ju 87B & R . So that means at the very most, there were maybe a dozen Ju-87R flown by Italian pilots. Probably more like half a dozen. The elite StG 2 unit which sunk Southampton was in Russia by then.

The only relatively effective long range Strike aircraft available to the Axis during Pedestal were the 144 x Ju-88A they had stationed in Sicily. No doubt the reason they had so many of these in Theater is that they were the only really effective maritime strike aircraft the Axis had at the time. These were pretty good strike aircraft, though nowhere near as lethal of ship killers as say, the D3A. Or the Stuka. But the problem was their range far outstripped that of any of their fighter escorts. Even if you count the 8 x Bf 110C and 12 x Ju88C heavy fighters that were in Theater, these may best Skuas or Fulmars but would have a hard time against even Sea Hurricanes, let alone any of the land based fighters. This and the prevalence of the obsolescent Italian Trimotors in the force breakdown perhaps explains why so many of the air strikes against Pedestal resulted in "no damage".

Basically the only real danger zone was when they were coming within range of the German fighters (and Stukas) near Sicily and / or Tunis. The vast majority of this impressive force of 600 aircraft were no threat to Pedestal and the ones which could credibly attack did so piecemeal, and in much smaller number.



I don't know the actual distance to the target but the Southampton was sunk more than a year before Pedestal, during Operation Excess.

The IJN flew a single sortie with an experimental D4Y in all of 1942, AFAIK, but the 'Dave" and 'Alf" flew dozens of recon sorties in 1942 because the IJN regularly used their cruiser seaplanes for Recon during their carrier battles.

I didn't make a Midway cutoff either, but I am comparing the USN and RN in 1942 (and earlier for the RN for specific examples).

The Stukas could and did carry DTs as did the 109s but again, the RN had close to within range of the Axis air bases, so range wasn't an issue for the Axis aircraft. In any even you obsess about range when the typical carrier battle in 1942 rarely featured strikes by either side that exceeded 200nm. The Stukas they flew against Pedestal were carrying a much heavier bomb load (1 x 500 and 2 x 250KG bombs according to a post war pilot interview) than a Val. The RMI trimotor bombers were at least as good as the IJNs long range TE bombers, not to mention the HE111.

As we've seen the IJNAF launched lots of piecemeal attacks in 1942.

The JU87R range didn't shrink from 1941 to 42, as per the reference I provided earlier and it was ~690nm with a 500kg bomb and two DTs.
 
Last edited:
They got a few chances at Ceylon but didn't get very many, for example in one of the clashes a squadron of Hurricanes caught a squadron of D3A on their own but they only got 4 of them (one later crash landed on the carrier). Probably because the Vals in particular were hard to catch - very agile, good dogfighters. Wildcats had trouble getting them too sometimes. The 'Kates' were more sitting ducks.

To be fair, Stukas could be like that too. I know in the MTO the land based DAF fighters sometimes caught them and mauled them but sometimes most of them got away. They had a trick they did to produce oily smoke during a dive and a sharp spiraling turn which made it look like they'd been hit and were going down. Like the D3A they were slow but quite agile.

I think you are referring to the Fulmars intercepting the D3A strike after Hermes was sinking or sunk.
 
The USMC pilots at Midway begged to differ. They stated very clearly that they believed the F4F-3 to be completely performed by the Zero and the USN TAIC report comparing the F4F-4 to the Zero states the same about the F4F-4. The difference in weight between an F4F-3/4 is only about 400lb, with both aircraft having the same engine. OTOH, the Sea Hurricane 1B is ~900lb lighter than an F4F-4 and has ~20% more power.

Well, the aircraft itself certainly was inferior to the Zero in many ways, but the combat record was much better.

For example during June the 4th at Midway, the Wildcat squadrons lost 19 x F4Fs, breaking down as follows:

VF-3 (Yorktown) - 5 lost
VF-6 (Enterprise) - 1 lost (ditched near the carrier)
VF-8 (Hornet) - 12 lost (one ditched near the carrier)

They claimed 45 Japanese planes, they actually got 29. That's still in their favor. That is from First Team.

Compare that the debacle with the Hurricanes and Fulmars off of Ceylon, against the same opponents.

On 5 April, the Japanese lost 7 aircraft while the British lost 26 . This included (per Wikipedia):

8 x Hurricanes from 30 Sqn
8 x Hurricanes from 258 Sqn
4 x Fulmar from 803 and 806 NAS
6 x Swordfish from 788 NAS

Here is the breakdown of one of the engagements at 7:40 AM - 21 Hurricanes from 30 Sqn and 6 Fulmars from 803 and 806 NAS scrambled from Ceylon bases and intercepted a raid by 14 x D3A bombers (with another 38 D3A nearby also flying a strike), escorted by 9 x A6M. The fighters "attacked the bombers before any bombs were dropped". In the resulting air battle 5 x D3A and 1 x A6M were shot down, vs. 8x Hurricanes and 3 x Fulmars.

Later, 19 D3A from Shokaku attacked the harbor and sunk the "merchant cruiser" HSM Hector, being attacked by 258 Sqn RAF Hurricanes. The Hurricanes shot down one D3A and damaged another, losing another 8x Hurricanes.

As we know between 5 and 8 April the IJN sunk 31 ships and bombed Ceylon.
 
Compare that the debacle with the Hurricanes and Fulmars off of Ceylon,
This is one example, just one. Using but one example is confirmation bias. The F4F fought across the Pacific, giving multiple points of reference. In the case of the Hurricane, one example at Ceylon is about as informative as none. We could just as easily compare the Dewoitine D. 520 or Yakovlev Yak-9 to the Zero. Using a sole point of reference does not make a conclusion. We see the same silliness with the Spitfire, citing its defeat over Darwin as an indication of the Zero's technical superiority.

The big difference, IMO is the bag of meat in the chair. Put combat experienced and Zero-familiar pilots into those Ceylon Hurricanes and Darwin Spitfires and you'll see different results.
 
Last edited:
This is one example, just one. Using but one example is confirmation bias. The F4F fought across the Pacific, giving multiple points of reference. In the case of the Hurricane, one example at Ceylon is about as informative as none. We could just as easily compare the Dewoitine D. 520 or Yakovlev Yak-9 to the Zero. Using a sole point of reference does not make a conclusion. We see the same silliness with the Spitfire, citing its defeat over Darwin as an indication of the Zero's technical superiority.

The big difference, IMO is the bag of meat in the chair. Put combat experienced and Zero-familiar pilots into those Ceylon Hurricanes and Darwin Spitfires and you'll see different results.

Hurricanes over Singapore or over DEI did not particularly shine either, so two more examples even if Ki-43s made also contributions, especially over Malaya.
 
Well, the aircraft itself certainly was inferior to the Zero in many ways, but the combat record was much better.

For example during June the 4th at Midway, the Wildcat squadrons lost 19 x F4Fs, breaking down as follows:

VF-3 (Yorktown) - 5 lost
VF-6 (Enterprise) - 1 lost (ditched near the carrier)
VF-8 (Hornet) - 12 lost (one ditched near the carrier)

They claimed 45 Japanese planes, they actually got 29. That's still in their favor. That is from First Team.

Compare that the debacle with the Hurricanes and Fulmars off of Ceylon, against the same opponents.

On 5 April, the Japanese lost 7 aircraft while the British lost 26 . This included (per Wikipedia):

8 x Hurricanes from 30 Sqn
8 x Hurricanes from 258 Sqn
4 x Fulmar from 803 and 806 NAS
6 x Swordfish from 788 NAS

Here is the breakdown of one of the engagements at 7:40 AM - 21 Hurricanes from 30 Sqn and 6 Fulmars from 803 and 806 NAS scrambled from Ceylon bases and intercepted a raid by 14 x D3A bombers (with another 38 D3A nearby also flying a strike), escorted by 9 x A6M. The fighters "attacked the bombers before any bombs were dropped". In the resulting air battle 5 x D3A and 1 x A6M were shot down, vs. 8x Hurricanes and 3 x Fulmars.

Later, 19 D3A from Shokaku attacked the harbor and sunk the "merchant cruiser" HSM Hector, being attacked by 258 Sqn RAF Hurricanes. The Hurricanes shot down one D3A and damaged another, losing another 8x Hurricanes.

As we know between 5 and 8 April the IJN sunk 31 ships and bombed Ceylon.

The IJNAF achieved surprise against Ceylon on 5 April and many of the Fulmars and Hurricanes lost that day were shot down as they were taking off, some with their LG still extended.

BWOC, the USMC received accurate radar warning and used radar GCI to make a perfect interception and bounce of the IJN formation, yet the ultimate results were about the same as at Ceylon. At Midway there was a single IJN strike of 72 strike aircraft and 36 Zeros.

The two IJN strikes against Ceylon were composed of (5 April) 91 strike aircraft and 36 Zeros and (9 April) 91 (mainly Kates) strike aircraft and 41 Zeros plus 85 Vals and 9 Zeros in a 2nd strike directed initially at Hermes. During the 9 April strikes the RAF/FAA defence was not caught on the ground and the kill/loss ratio was not as bad as on 5 April, but the defending fighters were still outnumbered 2-1 by Zeros. The RAF also achieved complete surprise against the KB as 9 Blenheims bombed the KB's flagship although they sunsequently suffered severely from the CAP and an encounter with the Zeros and some Vals returning from the Hermes strike.
 
That is a bit misleading because not all of the Japanese aircraft - or fighters - were in the same place, and not all of the fighters were actually engaging the Hurricanes. Nor were the losses the same. The Hurricanes and Fulmars consistently lost at a rate of about 2-1 or worse, similar to the Buffalo and the P-39, whereas F4F units, including those flown by the Marines, were able to achieve rough parity.
 
The IJNAF achieved surprise against Ceylon on 5 April and many of the Fulmars and Hurricanes lost that day were shot down as they were taking off, some with their LG still extended.

BWOC, the USMC received accurate radar warning and used radar GCI to make a perfect interception and bounce of the IJN formation, yet the ultimate results were about the same as at Ceylon. At Midway there was a single IJN strike of 72 strike aircraft and 36 Zeros.

*SNIP*
Yes, and the MAJORITY of those USMC fighters (20 out of 26) were Buffalos, not F4Fs.
 
Yes, and the MAJORITY of those USMC fighters (20 out of 26) were Buffalos, not F4Fs.

The USMC pilots had few kind words for the F4F-3, and seemed to consider them as no better than the F2A-3s.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back