Being able to hit the enemy with your full force and with an altitude advantage certainly helps doesn't it? You completely ignored the tactical disadvantage that the RAF/FAA fighters suffered from on 5 April. This also highlights the fact that fighters with an altitude advantage or parity, as in a meeting engagement with/by carrier fighters gave Allied Pilots tactical options when faced by Zeros.
Comparison of Pacific, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and North Atlantic naval combat
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Being able to hit the enemy with your full force and with an altitude advantage certainly helps doesn't it? You completely ignored the tactical disadvantage that the RAF/FAA fighters suffered from on 5 April. This also highlights the fact that fighters with an altitude advantage or parity, as in a meeting engagement with/by carrier fighters gave Allied Pilots tactical options when faced by Zeros.
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- #102
Even if that were true, which it is not, the combat records of the two types in Theater can show us that there was a big difference. Just as there was with the Hurricane of the Fulmar. Which is why the RN adopted the Martlet
.Some info regarding the A5M-4 and the defences encountered by the early USN carrier raids and the reason that Lexington was attacked by unescorted Bettys at Rabaul:
The two principal aviation units within the 24th Air Flotilla were the Chitose Air Group (kōkūtai) and the Yokohama Air Group. Authorized strength for the Chitose group was thirty-six twin-engine land attack planes (medium bombers) and forty-eight carrier fighters. Somewhat inexplicably the group lay in a backwater of Imperial Navy air allocations despite its direct confrontation with the United States Pacific fleet. Its bombers were obsolescent Mitsubishi G3M2 Type 96 land attack planes [NELL], an improved version of the twin-tailed mediums that in 1937 had bombed China from bases in Formosa and the homeland. Most crews were veterans of the previous December's strikes on Wake. The fighters were not the new Zeros, but rather Mitsubishi A5M4 Type 96 carrier fighters. The Yokohama Air group was equipped with huge Kawanishi H6K4 Type 97 flying boats [MAVIS], capable of extremely long patrol missions...
In Rabaul and at Truk, admirals also labored over important decisions. Rear Admiral Gotō, commanding 24th Air Flotilla, felt a raid on Rabaul was inevitable. From the search reports, he deduced that the American carrier force would steam to within 200 miles of Rabaul and strike at dawn. Ready as his own striking force he had eighteen land attack planes from the 4th Air Group. The same unit had twenty-six fighters at Rabaul as well, but none had the range to fly 450 miles to the target and back again. Sixteen were Mitsubishi A5M4 Type 96 carrier fighters [CLAUDE], and even with drop tanks their radius of action was only 250 miles. The ten Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero fighters at Rabaul did not, as yet, have drop tanks. Some members of Gotō's staff suggested to him that they wait until the next day to counterattack, but he had determined to attack that afternoon without fighter escort if need be. At 1310, Gotō ordered the 4th Air Group to sink the American carrier reported that morning. The Yokohama Air Group was also to maintain contact with one Type 97 flying boat, and to prepare for a dawn torpedo strike the next day. At Truk, Vice Admiral Inoue arranged to concentrate his surface ship strength (four heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and destroyers) to execute a night attack after dark on 21 February. (Both excerpts From First Team)
So the A5M was actually fairly numerous in the Pacific in 1942 nor were Zeros universally fitted with DTs. The last excerpts also shows much of the outright insanity displayed by the IJN higher command.
The two principal aviation units within the 24th Air Flotilla were the Chitose Air Group (kōkūtai) and the Yokohama Air Group. Authorized strength for the Chitose group was thirty-six twin-engine land attack planes (medium bombers) and forty-eight carrier fighters. Somewhat inexplicably the group lay in a backwater of Imperial Navy air allocations despite its direct confrontation with the United States Pacific fleet. Its bombers were obsolescent Mitsubishi G3M2 Type 96 land attack planes [NELL], an improved version of the twin-tailed mediums that in 1937 had bombed China from bases in Formosa and the homeland. Most crews were veterans of the previous December's strikes on Wake. The fighters were not the new Zeros, but rather Mitsubishi A5M4 Type 96 carrier fighters. The Yokohama Air group was equipped with huge Kawanishi H6K4 Type 97 flying boats [MAVIS], capable of extremely long patrol missions...
In Rabaul and at Truk, admirals also labored over important decisions. Rear Admiral Gotō, commanding 24th Air Flotilla, felt a raid on Rabaul was inevitable. From the search reports, he deduced that the American carrier force would steam to within 200 miles of Rabaul and strike at dawn. Ready as his own striking force he had eighteen land attack planes from the 4th Air Group. The same unit had twenty-six fighters at Rabaul as well, but none had the range to fly 450 miles to the target and back again. Sixteen were Mitsubishi A5M4 Type 96 carrier fighters [CLAUDE], and even with drop tanks their radius of action was only 250 miles. The ten Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero fighters at Rabaul did not, as yet, have drop tanks. Some members of Gotō's staff suggested to him that they wait until the next day to counterattack, but he had determined to attack that afternoon without fighter escort if need be. At 1310, Gotō ordered the 4th Air Group to sink the American carrier reported that morning. The Yokohama Air Group was also to maintain contact with one Type 97 flying boat, and to prepare for a dawn torpedo strike the next day. At Truk, Vice Admiral Inoue arranged to concentrate his surface ship strength (four heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and destroyers) to execute a night attack after dark on 21 February. (Both excerpts From First Team)
So the A5M was actually fairly numerous in the Pacific in 1942 nor were Zeros universally fitted with DTs. The last excerpts also shows much of the outright insanity displayed by the IJN higher command.
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- #104
They weren't at an altitude disadvantage in both engagements, even in the first one some of the Hurricanes were already at altitude. There were also many other engagements between A6M or Ki 43 with Hurricanes (into 1944!) and the latter always had the same outcome, pretty much - bad to dismal.
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- #105
Neither one of those statements are true.
Even if that were true, which it is not, the combat records of the two types in Theater can show us that there was a big difference. Just as there was with the Hurricane of the Fulmar. Which is why the RN adopted the Martlet
- (a) As evidenced by statements of pilots who flew them in
actual combat, the performance of the F2A-3 and F4F-3 types of air-
Planes is markedly inferior to that of the Japanese 00 1 Sento Kl -
Fighter in speed, maneuverability, and rate of climb. The fact that.
Marine Fighting squadron 221 gave such an excellent account of it-
self should not be allowed to becloud this fact, but is directly _.
attributable largely to an exceptionally fine organization of fight-
ing pilot personnel and apparent great vulnerability of enemy
bombers. In view of the foregoing it is recommended that F2A-3 and
F4F-3 type airplanes be not assigned as equipment for use in combat,
but be retained for use at training centers only. (MAG 22 CO report)
Lundstrom details the stationing of 64 A5M-4s in the areas raided by USN carriers and the early war lack of Zero DTs which led to an unescorted raid being slaughtered. You're quick to point out such details in the MTO, but not so much in the Pacific.
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- #108
That's just one report - fighter pilots don't like having an airplane roughly on parity with the enemy. That means a 1-1 exchange ratio on average when they engage enemy fighters, which isn't good for survival let along glory. Yet it was still far better than the Hurricane or Fulmar or Skua did against Zeros. Or for that matter the Spitfire Mk V.
The F4F was inferior in turn rate and definitely in rate of climb to the Zero. Speed depended on the Altitude - the F4F had better high altitude performance. It also had much better dive and high speed handling, two ingredients that proved critical in fighting with the Japanese aircraft. And of course, much better protected and more heavily armed. All this plus a lot of good gunnery training and the Thach weave, meant that F4F units did fairly well against the Zero. The Hurricane, Fulmar, etc. not so much. That's the reality and the historical record.
Eric Brown had this to say about the Martlet: "faster and more maneuverable than the Sea Hurricane"
This report:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/japan/intelsum85-dec42.pdf
compares the F4F-4 with the Zero:
page 5 indicates the measured speeds of the Zero:
SL = ______270mph (SAC data states F4F-4 as 284 mph)
5000ft =___287mph
10000ft =__305mph
Page 9 compares the Zero and F4F-4: and states that at all altitudes above 1000ft the Zero is superior in speed and equal below 1000ft. This kinda suggests that the F4F-4 was a bit slower than the official stats.
The FAA received detailed performance reports on the Martlet II and IV and both were inferior to the Sea Hurricane IB in climb and level speed and considerably inferior to the Sea Hurricane IIA/B/C. Some early fixed wing Martlets had no armour or SS tanks and were mainly used for training, and these aircraft are what Brown must have been referring to. Under about 15K ft the Sea Hurricane 1B was superior to the F4F-3/4 in speed and had a considerably better climb rate than the F4F-3/4, because it had a much better power to weight ratio and the same wing area.
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- Thread starter
- #110
The section you quoted from First Team was from one small raid, the Marshall Islands raid February of 1942. Shortly after that they were retired or sent to China. Pretending that the A5M was a significant part of the IJN force in 1942 is ludicrous. How many of those A5M were in action by Coral Sea? As I pointed out already, TWO A5M fighters were on the Shōhō at that time.
By contrast, at the time of Pedastal, the 'massive Axis air armada' of 600 planes that you bragged about was at least half flying boats, biplanes, and other obsolete types. Only about a third could be called modern.
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- #111
Yes but you are cherry picking
This chart says F4F-3 had a top speed of over 330 mph
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-1845-performance.jpg
This chart says F4F-3 had a top speed of 334 mph
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-1848-performance.jpg
This chart says F4F-3 has a top speed of 330 mph at 19,000 ft and 336 at 22,000 ft
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-detail-specification.pdf
This report says F4F-4 has a top speed of 319 mph
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-4058.pdf
This report says F4F-4 has a top speed of 318 mph
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-4058.pdf
This report says F4F-4 has a top speed of 316 mph
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-02135.pdf
This chart says F4F-4 has a top speed of 316-318 depending on the load
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-detail-specification.pdf
We all know that test conditions can change performance. How much fuel they put in, what altitudes are flown, and what kind of external fixtures are present. This is true for all aircraft, American, British, and Axis as well.
Could a Martlet loaded down with maximum possible fuel, some extra gear and maybe an extra antenna or bomb shackles fail to exceed 300 mph? Quite possible. Was that the norm? I don't think so.
Perhaps you can provide some sources for your claim regarding the A5M-4 being "retired". You were quick to point out the presence of obsolescent RMI fighters, but now you try to reject the obvious and well documented use of obsolescent aircraft by the IJN in 1942. If the IJN hadn't used the A5M-4 then what would they have replaced them with? Zero and most carrier aircraft production was hopelessly inadequate in 1942, forcing the IJNAF to use older types.
So you don't think the IJNAF had large numbers of "flying boats, biplanes, and other obsolete types"? The IJNAF was much more than just the aircraft on their fleet carriers.
Sorry but some of those are based upon prototypes or Grumman provided Specs rather than actual aircraft kitted out in 1942 armament, armour and SS tanks. The UK tests of the Martlet II and IV were well documented and were combat ready examples. The Martlets (F4F-3/4/A/B) also had single stage engines with FTHs of 14-15K ft versus the two stage engines in the F4F-3/4 with FTHs of ~20K ft, but then most naval air combat occurred at lower altitudes.
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This is the conclusion of an article about the 5 April raid:
"It is impossible to say with any degree of confidence what difference it may have made if the Hurricanes and Fulmars had been scrambled in good time, but it seems fair to suppose that they would likely have accomplished more at less cost than they actually did. All four means by which early warning might have been given failed. First, the Catalina that spotted some of the Japanese aircraft failed to recognize or report them. Then the Japanese avoided both the ground warning system and the Fulmar patrol by flying well off the coast during their approach flight. The fourth trip wire, radar, also failed, due to there being only one operational station and to it being sited too far north and suffering from a number of technical and operational problems. The radar failure was undoubtedly crucial. The difference that early warning could make was demonstrated just four days later, when the Japanese attacked Trincomalee. That day, the local radar station detected the Japanese at a range of 91 miles [146 km]. The early warning got the defending fighters airborne in good time and allowed them to draw first blood, when one section of Hurricanes bounced three Zeros and shot down two of them, and no serviceable fighters were caught on the ground. Something of the sort might have happened at Colombo, but 5 April 1942 was one of those days when, on the early-warning front, nothing went right. "
https://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/AA/00/06/81/82/00012/Fall-2014.pdf
Admiral Beez
Major
I thought we were looking at IJNAS Zeros vs. RAF Hurricanes? I think in the right hands the Hurricane would be about as able as the P-40.
The Zero fought Hurricanes in Burma? What the heck were was the IJNAS doing in Burma?
As an aside, you have to feel badly for the Hurricanes in Malaya. Early January 1942 the first batch arrive, the maintenance guys work around the clock to assemble the aircraft, and then the still mostly (except for the last three sleepless weeks) inexperienced Buffalo pilots transition over to Hurricanes. They didn't have a chance to acclimatize to their aircraft before they were all dead. The Dutch took over some of these Hurricanes and suffered the same fate.
Imagine instead if in the spring of 1941 two hundred Hurricanes with BoB-experienced pilots arrive. That would make for a fair comparison with the Zero.
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The emphasis of this discussion should not be on aircraft, but upon the tactical and grand tactical/strategic situations in which the combats occurred. Aircraft performance is overstated as a factor in determining the outcome of an engagement. Rather, it is typically determined by who has the advantage of surprise and/or numbers. As General NB Forrest stated:
"Get there firstest with the mostest"
"Get there firstest with the mostest"
special ed
2nd Lieutenant
- 5,717
- May 13, 2018
There is a National Geographic video and magazine article about the underwater wreckage at Truk, if I remember right. Impressive underwater shots of ships with decks covered with equipment, trucks, supplies and one A5M4. I always wondered why they would be receiving an A5M4.
Admiral Beez
Major
The Germans kept such detailed records of everything, to their determent at Nuremberg, but the Japanese seem to record nothing.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
From my foggy memory, the Japanese destroyed everything.
