Controversial Ideas: Did We Ever Need an Independent Air Force

parsifal said:

"The strategic air offensive against Germany 1939-45", which talks about official RAF policy and summarises it as "a means of direct attack on the enemy state with the object of depriving it of the means or will to continue the war."

The chapter goes on to state that in this way the RAF came to believe it was the principal means to victory, and later as it became self evident that outright victory was unachievable, to create the conditions needed to attain victory by other means.

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So attempt to create victory on your own, and if that doesn't work -- work with the other services to win?

XBe02Drvr said:

During WWI (the pre-Moffet years) naval aviation was pretty small and scattered and didn't have the massed resouces, cohesiveness, the sense of power, or the experience of making a difference in the battles being fought on the surface beneath their wings that Army aviation had.

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When you said scattered, did they have a standardized training?

As for massed resources and sense of power, this indicates that the issue was that they didn't enjoy the success and have the abilities that the Army Aviators had, and as a result didn't get such an overinflated view of themselves.

Besides, people who have to work together in a shipboard environment tend to have a greater sense of teamwork and interdependence than landlubbers. This value tends to permeate the entire service.

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This might have been one of the biggest things. You'd think the Army would have a strong sense of teamwork

Aviation in a maritime environment is a different animal than the terrestrial sort, and since its objectives are essentially naval, what's to be gained by being a separate service with a whole separate bureaucracy?

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The RAF tried it: I don't think we would have made it work. The USAAS didn't seem to have much interest in carriers, so those would have probably never taken off.

It's hard enough interfacing blackshoes and airdales on a ship as it is, without having them answering to two separate masters.
Cheers,

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Why, they don't typically get along?

Zipper730 said:

1) When you said scattered, did they have a standardized training?

2) As for massed resources and sense of power, this indicates that the issue was that they didn't enjoy the success and have the abilities that the Army Aviators had, and as a result didn't get such an overinflated view of themselves.
3) This might have been one of the biggest things. You'd think the Army would have a strong sense of teamwork

4) Why, they don't typically get along?

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1) They had a number of instructors in a number of locations that gave lip service to "standards", but mostly did things their own way. Admiral Moffet centralized and standardized the process.
2) There's a difference between one scout plane on this battleship and one on that cruiser, and a seaplane in the next bay looking for subs on the one hand, and on the other, three squadrons of bombers on the same field setting off en masse to hit an ammo dump ten miles behind German lines. Get the picture?
3) When you lose a battle on land, you retreat, regroup, and counterattack. When you lose a battle at sea, you lose your home and your shipmates and you feed the sharks, possibly because an AA gunner flinched when that kamikaze came straight at him and missed his target. Or maybe a damage controlman waded into a flooding compartment to stop the leak and brought the wrong tools, or maybe a firefighter didn't have the balls to walk that inch and a half nozzle into that flaming compartment. You depend on your shipmates.
4) Culture clash. Blackshoes tend to be obsessed with discipline, spit-and-polish, and chickenshit rules, often to an absurd degree. Airdales tend to be a little less formal, a little more laid back, and more concerned with performance than appearances.
A carrier has two wardrooms: "clean shirt" where ship's company blackshoe officers dine in class A's, starched shirts and glistening shoes, and then there's "dirty shirt" where air wing officers show up in flight suits with scuffed up boots or flight deck protective gear or BDUs. The height of formality here might be undress khakis.
In the enlisted ranks most of the talent tends to gravitate to nuclear power or aviation. The blackshoe rates have to make do with the rest.
Cheers,
Wes

XBe02Drvr said:

1) They had a number of instructors in a number of locations that gave lip service to "standards", but mostly did things their own way. Admiral Moffet centralized and standardized the process.

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Ok

2) There's a difference between one scout plane on this battleship and one on that cruiser, and a seaplane in the next bay looking for subs on the one hand, and on the other, three squadrons of bombers on the same field setting off en masse to hit an ammo dump ten miles behind German lines. Get the picture?

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Larger numbers of aircraft under the command of one immediate organization?

3) When you lose a battle on land, you retreat, regroup, and counterattack. When you lose a battle at sea, you lose your home and your shipmates and you feed the sharks, possibly because an AA gunner flinched when that kamikaze came straight at him and missed his target. Or maybe a damage controlman waded into a flooding compartment to stop the leak and brought the wrong tools, or maybe a firefighter didn't have the balls to walk that inch and a half nozzle into that flaming compartment.

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Larger costs for failure...

Zipper730 said:

Larger costs for failure...

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Losing a land battle is often merely a temporary setback. Losing a sea battle usually entails losing your ship and most of your shipmates. As a weapon, your ship is GONE, while a battalion ashore is impaired and deteriorated, but still an organized weapon which can be reinforced, re-equiped, and re-engaged in battle. The success or failure of an individual soldier is much less likely to affect the outcome of a battle and the survival of the unit. Sailors, with their much greater diversity of skills and responsibilities, are more interdependent on the competence and performance of each individual specialty in the crew.
I've experienced Army training (ROTC) and Navy training (boot camp and tech school), and the difference is night and day. Something a person who hasn't been there might have a hard time comprehending.
Cheers,
Wes

Don't kid yourself, don't think you know the Army because you went thru Army ROTC.

I went thru USAF basic in 1965, and Army basic in 1969, both different in many aspects, but neither told me what the real service was like once I got out of the training. They just barely prepared you to serve semi-effective.
You can't fairly judge a service until you've served in it several years. And then you're just judging who you served under and with. And under those circumstances.

It didn't take me long in either service to realize if I didn't do my job right, I, personally, would die, and very likely would take several friends and other people with me.
That certainly motivated me.

XBe02Drvr said:

Losing a land battle is often merely a temporary setback. Losing a sea battle usually entails losing your ship and most of your shipmates. As a weapon, your ship is GONE, while a battalion ashore is impaired and deteriorated, but still an organized weapon which can be reinforced, re-equiped, and re-engaged in battle. The success or failure of an individual soldier is much less likely to affect the outcome of a battle and the survival of the unit. Sailors, with their much greater diversity of skills and responsibilities, are more interdependent on the competence and performance of each individual specialty in the crew.

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I think I got what you're talking about, there is a wider range of skills that all have to be working for everybody to survive and be effectual.

I'm curious how tank-warfare, and artillery compare?

I've experienced Army training (ROTC) and Navy training (boot camp and tech school), and the difference is night and day.

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What did you do in the Navy if I may ask?

tyrodtom said:

Don't kid yourself, don't think you know the Army because you went thru ROTC.

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For regular everyday Army ROTC, you're right. I didn't have the "standard" ROTC experience. Because of a scheduling conflict, I got assigned to drill with a Pershing Rifles company whose faculty advisor was a Special Forces captain who had just returned from a tour in SE Asia. While the other companies marched around and practiced fancy drill, we were out in the boonies practicing recon, ambush, demolitions, camouflage, survival, etc. Shortly, we got "drafted" holidays, weekends, and vacations to act as aggressors (pseudo VC) at an Army base that was prepping draftees for Vietnam. In those days the Army's training, equipment, and doctrine was all about a tank war in Europe, and this counter-insurgency stuff was a mystery to most of the cadre. Their idea of war in Asia was shaped by Korea. I developed a strong distaste for the "Army way" which wasn't erased by three and a half years of sharing a base with them. Eating with them in the chow hall, drinking with them at the EM club, flying with them at the flying club, they were mostly great guys, but stuck in an incompetent organization.
That's my story, and I'm sticking by it.
Cheers,
Wes

My Dad was a WW2 combat Marine, several uncles were in the WW2 Navy. Have had many friends and acquaintances who were Navy or former Navy.

Plus I've had dealings with the Perishing Rifle ROTC graduates while I was in Texas, and Fort Polk. No different, on the average, that any other ROTC graduate. They still had to go thru the 90 day OCS course, and some come out ok, but some were sadly lacking.

But any view I could give on the Navy would still be just a outsider's view, so I won't comment.
That's my story, and I'm sticking to it.

I think I stated that wrong, I had encounters with the Perishing Rifle ROTC cadets, not graduates, while I was in Texas and Louisiana. I wasn't overly impressed.
Once I got out into the regular Army into Army aviation, I encountered various officers fresh out of OCS, but after they had also been through flight school most got some of the tempering they needed.
But when they were fresh out of OCS, they were in general a hard lot for enlisted men to deal with.

Zipper730 said:

What did you do in the Navy if I may ask?

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I was a Training Device Technician. My primary responsibility was a Radar Scope Interpretation Trainer which was used by VF-101, the east coast F-4 RAG squadron to teach interception tactics and ECM procedures. It was a large 17 cabinet analog computer consisting of 1960s electron tube technology with the occasional transistor here and there. My secondary job was the Aviation Training Aids branch, a library of audio visual equipment, films and tapes used by all military and DOD activities in the area. We had daily contact with USAF, Army, Marines, Coast Guard, as well as Ships Repair and other DOD civil service operations. Besides the F-4 squadron, there was an ASW test and development squadron, and later on, an entire wing of RA-5C Vigilantes. The submarine squadron downtown at the naval Base had most of the last diesel boats in the Navy, and there was a destroyer squadron detachment that had a few old beat up DEs.
The ASW guys had a lab right next to my trainer, we shared a coffee mess, and they were always offering rides in their planes and choppers.
Most of these folks enjoyed talking with anybody who showed an interest in what they did, leading to numerous opportunities to "go along for the ride". One of my boot camp buddies wound up on a diesel sub downtown, which is how I got a chance to experience that. Another buddy from TD school wound up in charge of the Pilot Landing Aid Television system on the LEX, which is how I got to watch Pensacola Nuggets get their carrier quals. The RAG squadron guys took me up in the F-4 a couple times to see how the radar worked in flight so I could tweak the trainer into a more accurate scope display. When they discovered I could hold onto my lunch, I got a couple of opportunities to go up in the TA-4F "aggressor" birds on Air Combat Maneuvering syllabus hops. Long before the movie "Topgun", I pretty well understood what ACM was about. Meanwhile, in the Navy flying club (conveniently situated 100 yards from my barracks) I managed to accumulate 400 hours of flying time, a multi engine Commercial License, and most of the work towards my CFI.
With all the experiences, it was certainly the most intense four years, three months, twelve days, and four hours of my life. Thanks for asking.
Cheers,
Wes

tyrodtom said:

Plus I've had dealings with the Perishing Rifle ROTC graduates while I was in Texas, and Fort Polk. No different, on the average, that any other ROTC graduate. They still had to go thru the 90 day OCS course, and some come out ok, but some were sadly lacking.

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I'm afraid our company was something of a black sheep in Pershing Rifles, as we seldom entered any of their drill competitions. We sucked at drill; too busy playing green beret out in the woods. The "sadly lacking" types didn't last long in our company. The Captain saw to that. Our guys did the 90 day thing between junior and senior years at school, and if they weren't ready by then, they were history. The basic field training down at Indiantown that regular ROTC did between junior and senior years, our guys did sophomore - junior right after they were sworn in. The Captain had friends in the system. And if he decided at the end of your junior year you weren't ready for the ninety day course, you were out of PR, out of ROTC, and subject to immediate induction to serve your commitment as an enlisted soldier. It happened to a classmate of mine. His name is on "the wall".
Cheers,
Wes

XBe02Drvr said:

By the end of WWII, the aviators in the Navy had clearly and unequivocally vanquished the battleship admirals and were in charge. Infantry still ruled the Army. Need I say more?
Cheers,
Wes

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DISREGARD!
This post is a fat-finger-tiny-screen malfunction! Can't seem to make it go away.
Cheers,
Wes

Deleted

Zipper730 said:

I'm curious if we ever did...

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No. The Air Force, as an independent service, is merely duplicating what the Navy is already providing. The Air Force should be folded back into the Army, as while strategic bombing has its use, the Army needs the tactical support, and must needs be in full control of it.

Besides which, why support redundancy, when there is no need?

maxmwill said:

No. The Air Force, as an independent service, is merely duplicating what the Navy is already providing. The Air Force should be folded back into the Army, as while strategic bombing has its use, the Army needs the tactical support, and must needs be in full control of it.

Besides which, why support redundancy, when there is no need?

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I respectfully disagree. "Boots on the ground" heads should NOT be in charge of all airpower. This brings us back to the shortcomings of 1938 USAAC.
OTOH, "airheads" have no business dictating the Army's needs for CAS and battlefield transport. I think the "lower end" functions of the old TAC, such as FAC, CAS, and assault transport, SHOULD go back to the Army where it belongs.
You want to reduce redundancy? Look at flight training. All rotary-wing initial and basic should be under Army auspices, with a sprinkling of USAF, USN, USMC, and USCG instuctors there to make sure those service's needs are addressed in the curriculum. Ditto for fixed-wing, except here the sea services should be in charge. Here, my prejudices are showing, but based on my military experiences and studies and my years of civilian flight instructing, I'm convinced the AOA-referenced approach to flight training, as taught by USN, USMC, USCG, is superior to the airspeed-referenced approach taught by USAF and civil aviation.
I remember reading once that over the years, it averaged five to ten times as much transition training to qualify an AF exchange pilot to fly in a carrier squadron as it did to qualify a Navy pilot to fly AF.
As a CFI, I used to promote visual AOA awareness in addition to airspeed monitoring, despite the plane's lack of an AOA indicator. It's all in the "calibrated eyeball and seat of the pants", as I learned when I became a glider pilot. Much as a student can learn to visually detect tiny changes in pitch attitude and heading, with practice they can correlate that with sink rate (in S&L flight) to develop a feel for AOA. Once their heads are focused in that direction, they can gradually extend that feel to other flight attitudes. All pilots should be taught that way. Enough lecture. Apologies!
Cheers,
Wes

In the UK all basic flying training is done in one area the differences coming in at approximately advanced training where the skills differ.
A naval helicopter pilot has very different needs compared to an Army pilot but both need the same basic skills.

maxmwill said:

No. The Air Force, as an independent service, is merely duplicating what the Navy is already providing. The Air Force should be folded back into the Army, as while strategic bombing has its use, the Army needs the tactical support, and must needs be in full control of it.

Besides which, why support redundancy, when there is no need?

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Primary role for Navy air power is fleet protection. Given that fact, who's going to clear away air threats so the mud-movers can come in to support the Army? Who's going to develop synergistic air campaigns that strike multiple adversary echelons simultaneously to dislocate C3 and disrupt their decision-action cycle? Who's going to fight for highly-capable combat aircraft that fuse data from multiple sources and then augment it with advanced onboard sensors, effectively becoming automated mini-AWACS in the tactical environment...and package that in a stealthy platform that can survive the modern air threat environment?

I participated in a brigade-sized exercise in 2005 involving Air Force and Army ISR assets, the latter focused on medium-sized UAVs. The Air Force ISR stood back, away from hostile SA threats, and provided views of the entire battlespace, delivering unprecedented insights into adversary positions and potential courses of action. The Army-controlled UAVs were pointed at whatever the brigade HQ felt was interesting, resulting in a lot of time wasted as the UAV trundled (literally) back-and-forth across the exercise area with precious little useful intel to show for it, and certainly no ground-breaking enhancement in brigade-level operational effectiveness.

The Army wanting to own air power is like a dog chasing a car...they chase it eagerly, with real determination, but they wouldn't know what to do with it if they caught it!

XBe02Drvr said:

I respectfully disagree. "Boots on the ground" heads should NOT be in charge of all airpower. This brings us back to the shortcomings of 1938 USAAC.
OTOH, "airheads" have no business dictating the Army's needs for CAS and battlefield transport. I think the "lower end" functions of the old TAC, such as FAC, CAS, and assault transport, SHOULD go back to the Army where it belongs.
You want to reduce redundancy? Look at flight training. All rotary-wing initial and basic should be under Army auspices, with a sprinkling of USAF, USN, USMC, and USCG instuctors there to make sure those service's needs are addressed in the curriculum. Ditto for fixed-wing, except here the sea services should be in charge. Here, my prejudices are showing, but based on my military experiences and studies and my years of civilian flight instructing, I'm convinced the AOA-referenced approach to flight training, as taught by USN, USMC, USCG, is superior to the airspeed-referenced approach taught by USAF and civil aviation.
I remember reading once that over the years, it averaged five to ten times as much transition training to qualify an AF exchange pilot to fly in a carrier squadron as it did to qualify a Navy pilot to fly AF.
As a CFI, I used to promote visual AOA awareness in addition to airspeed monitoring, despite the plane's lack of an AOA indicator. It's all in the "calibrated eyeball and seat of the pants", as I learned when I became a glider pilot. Much as a student can learn to visually detect tiny changes in pitch attitude and heading, with practice they can correlate that with sink rate (in S&L flight) to develop a feel for AOA. Once their heads are focused in that direction, they can gradually extend that feel to other flight attitudes. All pilots should be taught that way. Enough lecture. Apologies!
Cheers,
Wes

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I don't know how it's done now, but in 1970 all services had their helicopter primary training done at Fort Wolters, Texas.
That's where I had my WOFT, I remember a couple of USAF and USN training squadrons, they even had a small training group for some Washington, D.C. cops, Vietnamese, and some other foreign nationals that we didn't know where they were from.

By the way, at that time the Army's approach to rotary flight training was AOA.
Plus there were so many aircraft in the sky in that region that keeping your eyes out of the cockpit was your key to survival.

XBe02Drvr said:

I respectfully disagree. "Boots on the ground" heads should NOT be in charge of all airpower. This brings us back to the shortcomings of 1938 USAAC.
OTOH, "airheads" have no business dictating the Army's needs for CAS and battlefield transport. I think the "lower end" functions of the old TAC, such as FAC, CAS, and assault transport, SHOULD go back to the Army where it belongs.
You want to reduce redundancy? Look at flight training. All rotary-wing initial and basic should be under Army auspices, with a sprinkling of USAF, USN, USMC, and USCG instuctors there to make sure those service's needs are addressed in the curriculum. Ditto for fixed-wing, except here the sea services should be in charge. Here, my prejudices are showing, but based on my military experiences and studies and my years of civilian flight instructing, I'm convinced the AOA-referenced approach to flight training, as taught by USN, USMC, USCG, is superior to the airspeed-referenced approach taught by USAF and civil aviation.
I remember reading once that over the years, it averaged five to ten times as much transition training to qualify an AF exchange pilot to fly in a carrier squadron as it did to qualify a Navy pilot to fly AF.
As a CFI, I used to promote visual AOA awareness in addition to airspeed monitoring, despite the plane's lack of an AOA indicator. It's all in the "calibrated eyeball and seat of the pants", as I learned when I became a glider pilot. Much as a student can learn to visually detect tiny changes in pitch attitude and heading, with practice they can correlate that with sink rate (in S&L flight) to develop a feel for AOA. Once their heads are focused in that direction, they can gradually extend that feel to other flight attitudes. All pilots should be taught that way. Enough lecture. Apologies!
Cheers,
Wes

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I agree, in part, and disagree in part.

To start with, the state of the art for communications and coordination for 1938 was far less reliable than that available now. So it can and is very doable.

As far as training, yes, with one added component, glider training. While with rotary, running out of fuel is a no win option, but with fixed wing, even the most advanced generation fighter can and will run out of fuel, even with the most experience pilot on the stick. Besides which, air combat maneuvering is all about the energy state and its management, and a sailplane is a good way to teach the basics of energy state management, as it needs no fuel.

maxmwill said:

I agree, in part, and disagree in part.

To start with, the state of the art for communications and coordination for 1938 was far less reliable than that available now. So it can and is very doable.

As far as training, yes, with one added component, glider training. While with rotary, running out of fuel is a no win option, but with fixed wing, even the most advanced generation fighter can and will run out of fuel, even with the most experience pilot on the stick. Besides which, air combat maneuvering is all about the energy state and its management, and a sailplane is a good way to teach the basics of energy state management, as it needs no fuel.

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You seem to be saying if you run out of fuel in a helicopter, you're dead.
Not true, you need to find a landing spot just like any fixed wing aircraft, just that it has to be a lot closer.
You become a unpowered autogiro, done correctly, you can perform a unpowered controlled landing in a helicopter with very little forward motion on ground contact.
In WOFT we practiced them practically every day with a instructor.
I had a engine failure in flight training when I was solo, landed intact in a soybean field in Texas.

tyrodtom said:

Not true, you need to find a landing spot just like any fixed wing aircraft, just that it has to be a lot closer.

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A friend of mine, on his way to an emergency medevac in a UH1under a 150 ft overcast in the rain, took a .30-30 round in the clutch and auto rotated nearly a mile to a clearing, just from the translational lift from his airspeed. Turns out he had flown rather low in a military aircraft over somebody's carefully guarded marijuana plantation on the Mohawk reservation. Extracting the bird turned into a minor international incident between the US, Canada, and the Mohawk Nation.
Cheers,
Wes