swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,954
- Jun 25, 2013
I suspect some portion of the support in the Army was to poke a stick into the Navy's eye.
Controversial Ideas: Did We Ever Need an Independent Air Force
- Thread starter Zipper730
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I suspect some portion of the support in the Army was to poke a stick into the Navy's eye.
Well, let's face it USAF was the flesh and blood child of the Army, and the Navy didn't have any paternity claims there. But when the newborn USAF started claiming the Navy was obsolete and should be abolished, cooler heads prevailed, and as far as I know, an RAF style takeover of naval air by USAF was never seriously contemplated on Capitol Hill. Then along came Korea, and naval air proved its worth again.
Cheers,
Wes
parsifal
Colonel
Sorry Parsifal but I have to take issue with your perspectives. While it's undoubtedly true that there was continual tension between Bomber Command and Coastal Command, with the latter often being Cinderella while Bomber Harris was the wicked stepmother, your contention that CC lacked SUFFICIENT resources until the Battle of the Atlantic was effectively over is simply not backed up by the statistics.
Yes it is. I base that on Correlli Barnetts book on the RN ops, which includes about 1/3 of the 800 page book concentrating on this very issue. He goes through every nuance of the issue in painful detail, and at the end of it for any objective analysis, the conclusion has to be the bomber offensive oriented RAF High command was virtually criminally insane. It wasn't just Harris. At the time this debate was raging he wasn't the main player, so depicting him as the "wicked stepmother" as you put it is making flippant of a very serious failing within the RAF as a whole. If there had been no separate command for the RAF, the problem would never have arisen.
Barnett is the go to reference for this issue but I find Professor Tim Benbow a reasonable source for a short article as well
You can find one of his articles here. Its very short, I admit, but he summarises the main problems in your arguments pretty well
The Admiralty, the Air Ministry and the Battle of the Atlantic, 1940-43
In one of the paragraphs he states:
"The main problem was the strategic tunnel vision of the RAF leadership and their dogmatic obsession with winning the war by bombing. The majority of senior airmen – and this applied to Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, as much as to Harris, head of Bomber Command – were utterly mesmerised by the strategic air offensive against Germany. They refused to countenance any reduction in the effort devoted to it and bitterly resisted any suggestion that aircraft be transferred to the other roles of air power".
U-boat successes reached their peak at the end of 1940 with 96 Allied ships lost for zero submarines sunk. That timeframe is coincident with the introduction of ASV Mk I. Prior to that point, the odds of a CC aircraft spotting a submarine were incredibly small. I have some sympathy for Harris's refusal to allow more heavy bombers to transfer to CC during this timeframe because they would spend a lot of time simply punching holes in the sky with little chance of success.
I disagree. CC did not sink any U-boats for a long period, principally because they lacked an effective AS weapon to do so (against a submerged Uboat) , and an effective airborne radar detection system. However this does not mean that CC did not have a profound effect on the zones of operations for BDU. You really need to read U-Boat command's (BDU) daily war records to understand the profound effect the air patrols were having. Uboats at the beginning of the war operated very effectively in the North Sea particularly off the east coast. The SR ASW a/c like the Ansons by the end of 1939 had made this far less attractive. Not that the a/c could do much, because they lacked the tools to do anything. But they could spot ahead of the convoys, force the U-boats to submerge and alert convoys for re-routing. Forcing the Uboats to operate further afield meant they spent far less time on station, and massively reduced the tonnages they could achieve as a result. The average numbers of U-Boats able to remain on station fell from 7 in 1939, when operating mostly in local waters, to just 3 after they were forced out to the western approaches. U-Boats at this stage did not have the legs they acquired later, their effective range was about 3500 nm and their endurance typically about 18 days.
The U-Boats for a time were diverted to the Norwegian coast where tonnages dropped but the losses were more serious, since the losses were mostly being inflicted on the vital Norwegian tanker fleets. This led to a change by the Norwegian shipowners that ultimately would have war changing consequences. The Norwegian tanker fleet was transferred to British (allied) control just days before Norway was attacked and explains why the british were so reticent to take direct action against Norway when they should have.
Shifting the hub of operations effectively removed most of CC a/c from the equation and losses again began to climb. It would be March 1941 before airfields in Iceland were ready and the existing fleets of Ansons, Hudsons and other medium range a/c had an effective patrol range not exceeding 400 miles from the bases in the British Isles There was no protection or AEW provided in the vital Western Approaches from the fall of france until May 1941, though aircraft suitable for the job were available, men like Portal were so obstinate in their opposition that nothing concrete was done. Meanwhile, on that year alone, the British and neutrals lost more than 6million tons of shipping…..These losses were totally avoidable and can be laid completely and squarely at the feet of the RAF senior leadership.
Once ASV Mk II was introduced in 1941, we see U-boat losses increase substantially so that, by the end of 1941, we were losing just 10 ships for every submarine sunk, which is a HUGE improvement over the previous year.
Uboat losses is a "nice to have" result, but far from critical. The critical issue was shipping losses, and the shipping losses were overwhelmingly affected by the number of contacts made by BDU. The factors affecting contacts were the numbers of uboats on station, and the number of days the U-Boat could remain on station. Successful contacts by Uboats was a direct function of how long they had to reamin submerged to avoid detection, the distance they were forced to operate from bases, whether they were spotted enroute. This last point was particualalry telling, a U-Boat spotted could allow convoys to be re-routed and thereby avoid any loss at all from that U-Boat. The numbers of aircraft assisting the surface escorts was crucial in this, but this in turn made the air assets subordinate to the escort command, and this in turn was unacceptable to the bomber barons, even if it meant losing the war.
Denied LR and VLR resources with which to counter the increasing numbers of U-Boats losses in absolute terms remained high, though the increasing numbers and proficiency of the escorts did result in some decreases in sinkings. That does not mean that Britain remained in mortal danger. In 1941 she lost just under 5 million tons of shipping whilst replacing it with just over a million tons of new construction. With the neutral shipping sources now virtually dried up as a replacement pool, 1941 in most respects was a worse year for Britain than even the dismal results of 1940. And all the while, like Nero as Rome burned, the RAF leadership carried blithely on.
There's an uptick in shipping losses in the first 4 months of 1942, to 20 ships lost for every submarine, as the U-boat force changed tactics and only surfaced at night.
Uboats had been attacking at night since the beginning of the war. Since September 1940, they had been employing rudel taktiks agains the convoys. These were abruptly ended after march 1941 9at least until the americans joined) after the aces took some severe losses.
However, that increase in losses is reversed thanks to the introduction of the Leigh Light, after which the U-boat threat goes into terminal decline.
Don't agree at all. Aircraft as a direct defensive weapon for convoys were hardly ever so employed. They were far more effective operating well away from the convoys. The big killers for the U-Boats were radar equipped escorts, ahead throwing weapons, and the use of HFDF to intercept U-Boat course and speed reports. Breaking of the U-Boat ciphers at the end of 1942 was a stroke of immeasurable luck for the allies that cannot be overstated, but still it was the allocation of VLR air resources that remained the key. I should mention also the formation of specialized hunter killer groups to reinforce local convoy escorts as beig very useful, but again, this was only ever going to work if AEW assts were included in the battle.
By the end of 1942, only 7 ships were being lost for every U-boat sunk and by the middle of 1943, we're in the range 1-2 ships lost for every U-boat.
And who knew??? Certainly not the RAF high command.
My view is that CC really couldn't do much about the U-boat threat until ASV came on the scene.
And as outlined above, you would be wrong. Totally.
Could CC have used more resources? Yes, absolutely. Have you ever seen a military organization that doesn't want more stuff or complain of its ability to perform its mission? I certainly haven't! However, CC had ENOUGH resources to win the Battle of the Atlantic and CC started winning that war at the beginning of 1941, not as you posit in 1942 or later.
By 1941, CC had enough short and medium range air assets, but virtually no lr or VLR assets, and by 1941 that was exactly what they needed. Lucky for Britain, U-boats remained a low priority for the Nazis. If, as Donitz had wanted there were 300 Uboats available, it would have been a VERY different story to the one history tells, and the RAF had no way of knowing that wasn't happening
U-boat successes reached their peak at the end of 1940 with 96 Allied ships lost for zero submarines sunk. That timeframe is coincident with the introduction of ASV Mk I. Prior to that point, the odds of a CC aircraft spotting a submarine were incredibly small. I have some sympathy for Harris's refusal to allow more heavy bombers to transfer to CC during this timeframe because they would spend a lot of time simply punching holes in the sky with little chance of success.
And in fact this is totally erroneous. Uboat sightings whilst they operated in coastal waters became an almost daily occurrence and enablke losses to remained very manageable until after the BOF. After that U-boats began to operate within the Mid atlantic gap, with devastating results. Resources should, and could have been diverted at this time, but the RAF simply refused.
Once ASV Mk II was introduced in 1941, we see U-boat losses increase substantially so that, by the end of 1941, we were losing just 10 ships for every submarine sunk, which is a HUGE improvement over the previous year.
This is grossly misrepresenting the known facts. The real changes that were affecting the battle were the increasing numbers of long range escorts, the introduction of surface radar for the escorts, improved training and co-ordination of the escorts, the partial closing of the MOMP after the Icelandic airfields, but critically a continued stubborn refusal by the RAF to release even a dozen long range a/c to fill the patrol gap in the MOMP. ASV was useful, but not critical to these battle alt3ering trends. What was potentially a battle changing element was the continued resistance by RAF to contribute long range assets to the battle.
Yes it is. I base that on Correlli Barnetts book on the RN ops, which includes about 1/3 of the 800 page book concentrating on this very issue. He goes through every nuance of the issue in painful detail, and at the end of it for any objective analysis, the conclusion has to be the bomber offensive oriented RAF High command was virtually criminally insane. It wasn't just Harris. At the time this debate was raging he wasn't the main player, so depicting him as the "wicked stepmother" as you put it is making flippant of a very serious failing within the RAF as a whole. If there had been no separate command for the RAF, the problem would never have arisen.
Barnett is the go to reference for this issue but I find Professor Tim Benbow a reasonable source for a short article as well
You can find one of his articles here. Its very short, I admit, but he summarises the main problems in your arguments pretty well
The Admiralty, the Air Ministry and the Battle of the Atlantic, 1940-43
In one of the paragraphs he states:
"The main problem was the strategic tunnel vision of the RAF leadership and their dogmatic obsession with winning the war by bombing. The majority of senior airmen – and this applied to Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, as much as to Harris, head of Bomber Command – were utterly mesmerised by the strategic air offensive against Germany. They refused to countenance any reduction in the effort devoted to it and bitterly resisted any suggestion that aircraft be transferred to the other roles of air power".
U-boat successes reached their peak at the end of 1940 with 96 Allied ships lost for zero submarines sunk. That timeframe is coincident with the introduction of ASV Mk I. Prior to that point, the odds of a CC aircraft spotting a submarine were incredibly small. I have some sympathy for Harris's refusal to allow more heavy bombers to transfer to CC during this timeframe because they would spend a lot of time simply punching holes in the sky with little chance of success.
I disagree. CC did not sink any U-boats for a long period, principally because they lacked an effective AS weapon to do so (against a submerged Uboat) , and an effective airborne radar detection system. However this does not mean that CC did not have a profound effect on the zones of operations for BDU. You really need to read U-Boat command's (BDU) daily war records to understand the profound effect the air patrols were having. Uboats at the beginning of the war operated very effectively in the North Sea particularly off the east coast. The SR ASW a/c like the Ansons by the end of 1939 had made this far less attractive. Not that the a/c could do much, because they lacked the tools to do anything. But they could spot ahead of the convoys, force the U-boats to submerge and alert convoys for re-routing. Forcing the Uboats to operate further afield meant they spent far less time on station, and massively reduced the tonnages they could achieve as a result. The average numbers of U-Boats able to remain on station fell from 7 in 1939, when operating mostly in local waters, to just 3 after they were forced out to the western approaches. U-Boats at this stage did not have the legs they acquired later, their effective range was about 3500 nm and their endurance typically about 18 days.
The U-Boats for a time were diverted to the Norwegian coast where tonnages dropped but the losses were more serious, since the losses were mostly being inflicted on the vital Norwegian tanker fleets. This led to a change by the Norwegian shipowners that ultimately would have war changing consequences. The Norwegian tanker fleet was transferred to British (allied) control just days before Norway was attacked and explains why the british were so reticent to take direct action against Norway when they should have.
Shifting the hub of operations effectively removed most of CC a/c from the equation and losses again began to climb. It would be March 1941 before airfields in Iceland were ready and the existing fleets of Ansons, Hudsons and other medium range a/c had an effective patrol range not exceeding 400 miles from the bases in the British Isles There was no protection or AEW provided in the vital Western Approaches from the fall of france until May 1941, though aircraft suitable for the job were available, men like Portal were so obstinate in their opposition that nothing concrete was done. Meanwhile, on that year alone, the British and neutrals lost more than 6million tons of shipping…..These losses were totally avoidable and can be laid completely and squarely at the feet of the RAF senior leadership.
Once ASV Mk II was introduced in 1941, we see U-boat losses increase substantially so that, by the end of 1941, we were losing just 10 ships for every submarine sunk, which is a HUGE improvement over the previous year.
Uboat losses is a "nice to have" result, but far from critical. The critical issue was shipping losses, and the shipping losses were overwhelmingly affected by the number of contacts made by BDU. The factors affecting contacts were the numbers of uboats on station, and the number of days the U-Boat could remain on station. Successful contacts by Uboats was a direct function of how long they had to reamin submerged to avoid detection, the distance they were forced to operate from bases, whether they were spotted enroute. This last point was particualalry telling, a U-Boat spotted could allow convoys to be re-routed and thereby avoid any loss at all from that U-Boat. The numbers of aircraft assisting the surface escorts was crucial in this, but this in turn made the air assets subordinate to the escort command, and this in turn was unacceptable to the bomber barons, even if it meant losing the war.
Denied LR and VLR resources with which to counter the increasing numbers of U-Boats losses in absolute terms remained high, though the increasing numbers and proficiency of the escorts did result in some decreases in sinkings. That does not mean that Britain remained in mortal danger. In 1941 she lost just under 5 million tons of shipping whilst replacing it with just over a million tons of new construction. With the neutral shipping sources now virtually dried up as a replacement pool, 1941 in most respects was a worse year for Britain than even the dismal results of 1940. And all the while, like Nero as Rome burned, the RAF leadership carried blithely on.
There's an uptick in shipping losses in the first 4 months of 1942, to 20 ships lost for every submarine, as the U-boat force changed tactics and only surfaced at night.
Uboats had been attacking at night since the beginning of the war. Since September 1940, they had been employing rudel taktiks agains the convoys. These were abruptly ended after march 1941 9at least until the americans joined) after the aces took some severe losses.
However, that increase in losses is reversed thanks to the introduction of the Leigh Light, after which the U-boat threat goes into terminal decline.
Don't agree at all. Aircraft as a direct defensive weapon for convoys were hardly ever so employed. They were far more effective operating well away from the convoys. The big killers for the U-Boats were radar equipped escorts, ahead throwing weapons, and the use of HFDF to intercept U-Boat course and speed reports. Breaking of the U-Boat ciphers at the end of 1942 was a stroke of immeasurable luck for the allies that cannot be overstated, but still it was the allocation of VLR air resources that remained the key. I should mention also the formation of specialized hunter killer groups to reinforce local convoy escorts as beig very useful, but again, this was only ever going to work if AEW assts were included in the battle.
By the end of 1942, only 7 ships were being lost for every U-boat sunk and by the middle of 1943, we're in the range 1-2 ships lost for every U-boat.
And who knew??? Certainly not the RAF high command.
My view is that CC really couldn't do much about the U-boat threat until ASV came on the scene.
And as outlined above, you would be wrong. Totally.
Could CC have used more resources? Yes, absolutely. Have you ever seen a military organization that doesn't want more stuff or complain of its ability to perform its mission? I certainly haven't! However, CC had ENOUGH resources to win the Battle of the Atlantic and CC started winning that war at the beginning of 1941, not as you posit in 1942 or later.
By 1941, CC had enough short and medium range air assets, but virtually no lr or VLR assets, and by 1941 that was exactly what they needed. Lucky for Britain, U-boats remained a low priority for the Nazis. If, as Donitz had wanted there were 300 Uboats available, it would have been a VERY different story to the one history tells, and the RAF had no way of knowing that wasn't happening
U-boat successes reached their peak at the end of 1940 with 96 Allied ships lost for zero submarines sunk. That timeframe is coincident with the introduction of ASV Mk I. Prior to that point, the odds of a CC aircraft spotting a submarine were incredibly small. I have some sympathy for Harris's refusal to allow more heavy bombers to transfer to CC during this timeframe because they would spend a lot of time simply punching holes in the sky with little chance of success.
And in fact this is totally erroneous. Uboat sightings whilst they operated in coastal waters became an almost daily occurrence and enablke losses to remained very manageable until after the BOF. After that U-boats began to operate within the Mid atlantic gap, with devastating results. Resources should, and could have been diverted at this time, but the RAF simply refused.
Once ASV Mk II was introduced in 1941, we see U-boat losses increase substantially so that, by the end of 1941, we were losing just 10 ships for every submarine sunk, which is a HUGE improvement over the previous year.
This is grossly misrepresenting the known facts. The real changes that were affecting the battle were the increasing numbers of long range escorts, the introduction of surface radar for the escorts, improved training and co-ordination of the escorts, the partial closing of the MOMP after the Icelandic airfields, but critically a continued stubborn refusal by the RAF to release even a dozen long range a/c to fill the patrol gap in the MOMP. ASV was useful, but not critical to these battle alt3ering trends. What was potentially a battle changing element was the continued resistance by RAF to contribute long range assets to the battle.
Somehow all the wolfpack attacks that DIDN'T happen aren't anywhere near as sexy and impressive as the score of U-boats sunk. No kills = no success. I can see where Bomber Command was coming from. As an aviator, and a sailor, I can see both sides of that one.
Been in a sub being hunted, and been in a P-3 doing the hunting.
Coastal Command should have been part of the RN from the get-go where it could have made its own purchase of Liberators.
Cheers,
Wes
- Thread starter
- #165
Probably true, but I'm curious why Army aviators were so willing to part ways with their service and the Naval aviators didn't feel the urge to part ways with theirs?
By the end of WWII, the aviators in the Navy had clearly and unequivocally vanquished the battleship admirals and were in charge. Infantry still ruled the Army. Need I say more?
Cheers,
Wes
- Thread starter
- #167
I'm talking about WWI still: Why was there an Army Billy Mitchell and no Navy counterpart?
Naval aviation was still in its infancy and not very much involved in the pressure cooker of rapid development over the trenches of the Western front.
Mitchell had the good fortune to command one of the largest concentrations of "modern" aircraft yet assembled, and proved the power of aviation over and behind the battlefield to an unprecedented level, fueling his strategic visions.
Naval aviators were still struggling to fulfill limited auxillary responsibilities to the fleet in their primitive flying boats. Not the kind of ego-building exercise Mitchell was treated to.
Cheers,
Wes
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Actually, Glen Curtiss was a huge advocate of Naval Aviation in the early years and it was William Moffett that fended off the "Battleship Mafia" and kept U.S. Naval Aviation alive during the inter-war period.
buffnut453
Captain
Never? Really? In a game of constantly changing tactics, I find it hard to concur with such a bald statement, particularly when it completely ignores other impacts that would have occurred had the RAF not been independent. For example, how long would the war have been prolonged without the strategic bomber offensive?
Apart from the Wellington, what RAF aircraft were available prior to May 1941 that had a range in excess of the Hudson? And the Wellington range increase over the Hudson was, what, 25%? Applying that to the existing 400 mile figure your provided gets us to 500 miles. That's actually not a lot of additional bang for the buck in maritime terms.
As to the losses being "totally avoidable", you're overstepping your argument I'm afraid. 100% success is impossible to achieve in reality. Let's also not forget that, as the range required for an MPA to fly increases, the area required to be covered increases as a function of the square of the range increase. That means you need a LOT more aircraft to adequately cover the extended area of coverage. They can't ALL see submarines and so, yes, you will end up punching a lot of holes in the sky for little tangible benefit.
It's not "nice to have". It's vital to winning the battle. Failure to sink a submarine means you have to go and chase after it again the next day, and the day after that, which is yet another big resource drain.
So, on the one hand, early shipping losses were entirely the RAF's fault but the winning tactic was the RN providing more radar-equipped convoy escorts? And no fault can possibly be laid at the RN's door for not having the requisite number of long-range escorts available to do the job sooner, or for applying suitable convoy tactics earlier? And before you say "the Navy had other jobs to do", surely the same applies to the RAF?
I don't disagree that more probably could have been done to bolster Coastal Command but we do need to be careful about applying the retrospectroscope and applying the benefits of hindsight that may not have been visible at the time. We now know how things went during the war and can see how the various strategic campaigns ebbed and flowed. That wasn't available at the time and we'd do well to remember that the info we have today is far better than the info available in 1940-41.
GG:
Actually, Glen Curtiss was a huge advocate of Naval Aviation in the early years and it was William Moffett that fended off the "Battleship Mafia" and kept U.S. Naval Aviation alive during the inter-war period.
IWellll....per our man Zipper this particular conversation happens to be WWI, before the Langley and the big shot in the arm it gave naval air. True, Glen Curtiss was an advocate of naval air, but he wasn't in the Navy and the Navy humored him in his demonstrations for the headline value. Even the most hidebound battleship admiral could see the potential for gunnery spotting. But: "Aircraft as a strategic weapon? That rattletrap contraption?? Come on now, what kind of fools do you take us to be?" Interwar, and especially after the advent of the Langley and the aircraft carrying airships, more naval visionaries began to see the possibilities.
Cheers,
Wes
Actually, Glen Curtiss was a huge advocate of Naval Aviation in the early years and it was William Moffett that fended off the "Battleship Mafia" and kept U.S. Naval Aviation alive during the inter-war period.
IWellll....per our man Zipper this particular conversation happens to be WWI, before the Langley and the big shot in the arm it gave naval air. True, Glen Curtiss was an advocate of naval air, but he wasn't in the Navy and the Navy humored him in his demonstrations for the headline value. Even the most hidebound battleship admiral could see the potential for gunnery spotting. But: "Aircraft as a strategic weapon? That rattletrap contraption?? Come on now, what kind of fools do you take us to be?" Interwar, and especially after the advent of the Langley and the aircraft carrying airships, more naval visionaries began to see the possibilities.
Cheers,
Wes
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GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Curtiss sold the Navy on the idea that they could have an aviation arm.
However, by 1920, there was a movement to have Army and Naval Aviation wrapped up into a single unit, much like the direction that the Luftwaffe took and it was Moffett who managed to save Naval aviation during that period.
Some of Moffett's accomplishments:
Aviator training program
Scouting aircraft (first trialed aboard USS Mississippi BB-23)
Helped form USN's Bureau of Aeronautics
Helped develop Naval aircraft tactics
Advocate and advisor of the introduction of the Aircraft carrier
And most importantly, he was the direct adversary of Billy Mitchell, who was the lead in the movement to combine all U.S. air units into a single department.
So yes, Moffett is the USN's "Billy Mitchell".
However, by 1920, there was a movement to have Army and Naval Aviation wrapped up into a single unit, much like the direction that the Luftwaffe took and it was Moffett who managed to save Naval aviation during that period.
Some of Moffett's accomplishments:
Aviator training program
Scouting aircraft (first trialed aboard USS Mississippi BB-23)
Helped form USN's Bureau of Aeronautics
Helped develop Naval aircraft tactics
Advocate and advisor of the introduction of the Aircraft carrier
And most importantly, he was the direct adversary of Billy Mitchell, who was the lead in the movement to combine all U.S. air units into a single department.
So yes, Moffett is the USN's "Billy Mitchell".
I guess you have to be a sailor to understand that the primary objective is to get the convoys through; sinking U-boats is a side benefit, not the ultimate scorecard of success. Given the known capabilities and limitations of the subs operating at the limits of their range it's obvious that having aircraft searching around and ahead of a convoy will have a disastrous affect on the subs' effectiveness. I've been on a diesel boat underway. They might get one shot at a convoy submerged, but can't hope to keep up with it for another attack without surfacing. If forced under by an aircraft, they can't even get into position for the initial attack. And remember, in the timeframe in question, they didn't have snorkels yet. The boat I rode, a cleaned-up GUPPY boat, could just about manage nine knots submerged if the Skipper was willing to kill his batteries in short order. U-boats, with all their bulges and protrusions were good for two or three knots less.
So if your convoy loses two ships instead of nine or ten because you've got a couple Libs prowling the vicinity, that's a success, even if you haven't added any scalps to your warrior pole.
And no, if you're limited in your VLR resources, you don't try to cover the ocean with random patrols. You concentrate on convoy routes, U-boat transit paths and replenishment rendezvous areas.
Cheers,
Wes
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buffnut453
Captain
They are both metrics of success. If you can't sink U-boats, then you will never, EVER win the battle. Every technological development in WW2 had a counter, either through technology, change of tactics or both and having U-boats continually available (because you're not sinking them) gives the adversary more options in developing a counter. Equally, focusing solely on U-boat sinkings at the expense of friendly shipping losses is a recipe for disaster. IMHO you need both, ergo my comment that sinking subs is not just a "nice to have".
Yes, if you have limited VLR resources then you do, indeed, focus on the areas you've suggested. However, the simple act of patrolling can provide the enemy with vital intelligence. If patrolling is too focused on specific areas or is tied to the passage of convoys, it can help inform an adversary of intentions and provide indicators of upcoming activity...which enables the enemy to better align his forces, and if you're not attritting those forces, then you're on a hiding to nothing.
I don't have any truck with the logic of Parsifal's analysis, just the overreaching when it comes to the blame game. Yes, the RAF was overly biased to the strategic bombing campaign but the Butt Report only came out in August 1941 which was the first rigorous assessment of just how inaccurate night bombing was at that stage of the war. We can't apply the retrospectroscope and expect the RAF in late 1940/early 1941 to say "You know, our bombing really isn't delivering results. We should put more emphasis on Coastal Command." We can make that analysis. The data simply wasn't available in that timeframe.
Yes, if you have limited VLR resources then you do, indeed, focus on the areas you've suggested. However, the simple act of patrolling can provide the enemy with vital intelligence. If patrolling is too focused on specific areas or is tied to the passage of convoys, it can help inform an adversary of intentions and provide indicators of upcoming activity...which enables the enemy to better align his forces, and if you're not attritting those forces, then you're on a hiding to nothing.
I don't have any truck with the logic of Parsifal's analysis, just the overreaching when it comes to the blame game. Yes, the RAF was overly biased to the strategic bombing campaign but the Butt Report only came out in August 1941 which was the first rigorous assessment of just how inaccurate night bombing was at that stage of the war. We can't apply the retrospectroscope and expect the RAF in late 1940/early 1941 to say "You know, our bombing really isn't delivering results. We should put more emphasis on Coastal Command." We can make that analysis. The data simply wasn't available in that timeframe.
parsifal
Colonel
Never? Really? In a game of constantly changing tactics, I find it hard to concur with such a bald statement, particularly when it completely ignores other impacts that would have occurred had the RAF not been independent. For example, how long would the war have been prolonged without the strategic bomber offensive?
That's right, never. The problem wasnt the airforce, it was the refusal of the air force to deviate from anything other than the anointed role it had given itself, namely, of course, strategic bombing. This was seen as the one true role for the independent air force, and it was pursued at the cost of just about every other area of activity, with the exception of the fighter forces I guess. The areas of air transport, fleet air arm, maritime patrol close air support were virtually ignored, and it cost Britain dearly. a high price to pay for the kudos of an independent air force with a clearly identified role it could call its own.
Strategic bombing ended up a success, in the end. but not anything like the form the RAF had envisioned at the start of the war. From the perspective of what the RAF initially had in mind and what actually transpired , strategic bombing was an expensive failure. the RAF admitted as much at the end of 1941 after it was revealed that the average spread of bombs was something like 5 miles from the aiming point. They had entered the war with the misguided belief that unescorted bombers could undertake daylight attacks with , high survivability and that bombs could be dropped with mathematical certainty and that victory from the application of air power through strategic bombing alone could force the surrender of germany. The RAF wasn't unique in this regard, but it was one of the worst in their unshakeable belief in this balderdash. in fact what they needed to do at the
beginning was to submit to a co-operative, unified command system. until the Uboats were brought to heel there was not the slightest chance of the strategic bombing offensive, or the cross channel invasion, or any of the other offensive ideas of ever succeeding. What the U-boats could do was force Britain to the surrender table, something the RAF was preared to accept rather than deviate from its self appointed destiny.
you are applying the same misguided ideas as the RN did at the outbreak of the war. You dont need to protect or patrol vast areas of empty ocean to protect your convoys, you only need to protect the areas around those convoys themselves. so, Nope, they are totally avoidable, in most cases. And you don't need a lot of aircraft to protect a convoy. You are not searching vast areas of empty ocean, you are scouting ahead and around the convoy to detect the attacking subs. depending on how much time you need for re-routing of the convoy will determine how far from the convoy you need to patrol from that convoy. Usually a type VII has a maximum surface speed of around 15 knots, whilst a fast convoy had a speed of 10 knots. If the uboat is say 150 miles abeam of the convoy, the rate of closure will be 5knots, and it will take more than 48 hours for the Uboat to intercept but this in fact is unlikely to ever occur. additional air patrols around the threatened convoy will force the U-boat to submerge, reducing its intercept speed to below that of the convoy. Unless there are three or four wolfpacks closing in on a given convoy 9and this virtually never happened until 1942, a convoy provided with a high level of air support is unlikely to be ever caught. this was pretty much what forced the u-boats out of the coastal waters of Britain in 1939-40.
The arguments we are having now are virtually the same as were occurring at the time. there is no revisionism needed it all played out more or less as we are discussing now. what is incredible is that despite the facts that were as incontrovertible then as they are now, the RAF continued to plough doggedly on regardless, unshakeable in its belief that it could win the war single handedly.
That's right, never. The problem wasnt the airforce, it was the refusal of the air force to deviate from anything other than the anointed role it had given itself, namely, of course, strategic bombing. This was seen as the one true role for the independent air force, and it was pursued at the cost of just about every other area of activity, with the exception of the fighter forces I guess. The areas of air transport, fleet air arm, maritime patrol close air support were virtually ignored, and it cost Britain dearly. a high price to pay for the kudos of an independent air force with a clearly identified role it could call its own.
Strategic bombing ended up a success, in the end. but not anything like the form the RAF had envisioned at the start of the war. From the perspective of what the RAF initially had in mind and what actually transpired , strategic bombing was an expensive failure. the RAF admitted as much at the end of 1941 after it was revealed that the average spread of bombs was something like 5 miles from the aiming point. They had entered the war with the misguided belief that unescorted bombers could undertake daylight attacks with , high survivability and that bombs could be dropped with mathematical certainty and that victory from the application of air power through strategic bombing alone could force the surrender of germany. The RAF wasn't unique in this regard, but it was one of the worst in their unshakeable belief in this balderdash. in fact what they needed to do at the
beginning was to submit to a co-operative, unified command system. until the Uboats were brought to heel there was not the slightest chance of the strategic bombing offensive, or the cross channel invasion, or any of the other offensive ideas of ever succeeding. What the U-boats could do was force Britain to the surrender table, something the RAF was preared to accept rather than deviate from its self appointed destiny.
Apart from the Wellington, what RAF aircraft were available prior to May 1941 that had a range in excess of the Hudson? And the Wellington range increase over the Hudson was, what, 25%? Applying that to the existing 400 mile figure your provided gets us to 500 miles. That's actually not a lot of additional bang for the buck in maritime terms.
virtually all of them could do it. if slightly less effort was made in learning how not to bomb Germany.....lessons and technologies that weren't needed in 1940-41 . Putting all that off for a year or two, in the same way as the navy had to shelve its plans for blue water fleet additions in fa. vour of small and unsexy escorts was a necessary sacrifice the RAF had to make, but refused to do so. increasing the patrol ranges of any of the types so employed took time and effort, but not nearly as much as the wasted efforts on BC gadgetry. Wellingtons were modified in this way, so too were B-24s. B-24s unmodified had an effective patrol radius of about 600 miles, by the time the conversions to maritime patrol a/c had been completed, they had patrol ranges of around 1200 miles. there is no reason why any of the types used by BC could not be modified in the same vein....removal of most defensive guns, reduced payloads more fuel
As to the losses being "totally avoidable", you're overstepping your argument I'm afraid. 100% success is impossible to achieve in reality. Let's also not forget that, as the range required for an MPA to fly increases, the area required to be covered increases as a function of the square of the range increase. That means you need a LOT more aircraft to adequately cover the extended area of coverage. They can't ALL see submarines and so, yes, you will end up punching a lot of holes in the sky for little tangible benefit.
virtually all of them could do it. if slightly less effort was made in learning how not to bomb Germany.....lessons and technologies that weren't needed in 1940-41 . Putting all that off for a year or two, in the same way as the navy had to shelve its plans for blue water fleet additions in fa. vour of small and unsexy escorts was a necessary sacrifice the RAF had to make, but refused to do so. increasing the patrol ranges of any of the types so employed took time and effort, but not nearly as much as the wasted efforts on BC gadgetry. Wellingtons were modified in this way, so too were B-24s. B-24s unmodified had an effective patrol radius of about 600 miles, by the time the conversions to maritime patrol a/c had been completed, they had patrol ranges of around 1200 miles. there is no reason why any of the types used by BC could not be modified in the same vein....removal of most defensive guns, reduced payloads more fuel
As to the losses being "totally avoidable", you're overstepping your argument I'm afraid. 100% success is impossible to achieve in reality. Let's also not forget that, as the range required for an MPA to fly increases, the area required to be covered increases as a function of the square of the range increase. That means you need a LOT more aircraft to adequately cover the extended area of coverage. They can't ALL see submarines and so, yes, you will end up punching a lot of holes in the sky for little tangible benefit.
you are applying the same misguided ideas as the RN did at the outbreak of the war. You dont need to protect or patrol vast areas of empty ocean to protect your convoys, you only need to protect the areas around those convoys themselves. so, Nope, they are totally avoidable, in most cases. And you don't need a lot of aircraft to protect a convoy. You are not searching vast areas of empty ocean, you are scouting ahead and around the convoy to detect the attacking subs. depending on how much time you need for re-routing of the convoy will determine how far from the convoy you need to patrol from that convoy. Usually a type VII has a maximum surface speed of around 15 knots, whilst a fast convoy had a speed of 10 knots. If the uboat is say 150 miles abeam of the convoy, the rate of closure will be 5knots, and it will take more than 48 hours for the Uboat to intercept but this in fact is unlikely to ever occur. additional air patrols around the threatened convoy will force the U-boat to submerge, reducing its intercept speed to below that of the convoy. Unless there are three or four wolfpacks closing in on a given convoy 9and this virtually never happened until 1942, a convoy provided with a high level of air support is unlikely to be ever caught. this was pretty much what forced the u-boats out of the coastal waters of Britain in 1939-40.
It's not "nice to have". It's vital to winning the battle. Failure to sink a submarine means you have to go and chase after it again the next day, and the day after that, which is yet another big resource drain.
Sorry but that is incorrect and it was a bitter lesson for the RN to learn that. Hardly any Uboats were sunk early in the war, yet the efforts of CC in protecting convoys was still vital. it can never be said that subs lost to air attack at sea were ever decisive . Something like 18f0 German boats were lost to air patrols plus an additional 80 or so of axis allied nations. overall Uboat losses amounted to over 700.....it was always the escorts that did the heavy lifting when it came to inflicting losses. The airpower was vital in assisting in the protection of convoys, less vital in sinking u-Boats.
So, on the one hand, early shipping losses were entirely the RAF's fault but the winning tactic was the RN providing more radar-equipped convoy escorts? And no fault can possibly be laid at the RN's door for not having the requisite number of long-range escorts available to do the job sooner, or for applying suitable convoy tactics earlier? And before you say "the Navy had other jobs to do", surely the same applies to the RAF?
The RN made as many and perhaps more mistakes, some of them unforced error, some forced as the RAF. I never claimed that they didn't. but the RAF is unique in that despite the absolute need for single unified commands in which the resources of the various services were pooled to a single force structure, so as to create synergies between the various parts and make the whole stronger, they simply refused to co-operate at all really. Whenever the issue of allocating the resources to these specialist commands arose, the bomber barons would trot out words like "dilution of effort', "diversion", even "robbing us of our assets" in emotive statements that bore no real resemblance to the crisis at hand. .
I don't disagree that more probably could have been done to bolster Coastal Command but we do need to be careful about applying the retrospectroscope and applying the benefits of hindsight that may not have been visible at the time. We now know how things went during the war and can see how the various strategic campaigns ebbed and flowed. That wasn't available at the time and we'd do well to remember that the info we have today is far better than the info available in 1940-41.
Sorry but that is incorrect and it was a bitter lesson for the RN to learn that. Hardly any Uboats were sunk early in the war, yet the efforts of CC in protecting convoys was still vital. it can never be said that subs lost to air attack at sea were ever decisive . Something like 18f0 German boats were lost to air patrols plus an additional 80 or so of axis allied nations. overall Uboat losses amounted to over 700.....it was always the escorts that did the heavy lifting when it came to inflicting losses. The airpower was vital in assisting in the protection of convoys, less vital in sinking u-Boats.
So, on the one hand, early shipping losses were entirely the RAF's fault but the winning tactic was the RN providing more radar-equipped convoy escorts? And no fault can possibly be laid at the RN's door for not having the requisite number of long-range escorts available to do the job sooner, or for applying suitable convoy tactics earlier? And before you say "the Navy had other jobs to do", surely the same applies to the RAF?
The RN made as many and perhaps more mistakes, some of them unforced error, some forced as the RAF. I never claimed that they didn't. but the RAF is unique in that despite the absolute need for single unified commands in which the resources of the various services were pooled to a single force structure, so as to create synergies between the various parts and make the whole stronger, they simply refused to co-operate at all really. Whenever the issue of allocating the resources to these specialist commands arose, the bomber barons would trot out words like "dilution of effort', "diversion", even "robbing us of our assets" in emotive statements that bore no real resemblance to the crisis at hand. .
I don't disagree that more probably could have been done to bolster Coastal Command but we do need to be careful about applying the retrospectroscope and applying the benefits of hindsight that may not have been visible at the time. We now know how things went during the war and can see how the various strategic campaigns ebbed and flowed. That wasn't available at the time and we'd do well to remember that the info we have today is far better than the info available in 1940-41.
The arguments we are having now are virtually the same as were occurring at the time. there is no revisionism needed it all played out more or less as we are discussing now. what is incredible is that despite the facts that were as incontrovertible then as they are now, the RAF continued to plough doggedly on regardless, unshakeable in its belief that it could win the war single handedly.
buffnut453
Captain
I've seen several posters on here make claims along the lines that RAF (or USAAF) proponents thought they could win the war single-handed. I'd really, REALLY like to see some documented proof of those sentiments. Certainly Douhet et al had an overly optimistic perspective on air power's abilities but I'm pretty sure that, again, we're dealing in hyperbole to say that Portal et al thought they could win the war single-handed. Please, anyone, provide me a document where any senior RAF officer claims they can win the war on their own.
I'd also point out that inter-service battles for resources are not the sole preserve of the RAF. It happens between ALL services CONSTANTLY. We should also bear in mind the political drivers in the period 1940-41 when Bomber Command was the ONLY way that the Allies could take the war to Germany. Yes, it was hugely flawed but Churchill, among others, was desperate to be seen to be doing SOMETHING directly against Germany. Therefore, it's hardly surprising that Bomber Command fought for resources to achieve precisely (as they saw it) that political goal.
I'd also point out that inter-service battles for resources are not the sole preserve of the RAF. It happens between ALL services CONSTANTLY. We should also bear in mind the political drivers in the period 1940-41 when Bomber Command was the ONLY way that the Allies could take the war to Germany. Yes, it was hugely flawed but Churchill, among others, was desperate to be seen to be doing SOMETHING directly against Germany. Therefore, it's hardly surprising that Bomber Command fought for resources to achieve precisely (as they saw it) that political goal.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,954
- Jun 25, 2013
The Battle of the Atlantic was the sort of trade war that the RN had fought for centuries; they knew convoy was a powerful tool simply because the sea is large and a convoy is both tiny, and little harder to find than an individual ship, but also because convoys can be defended, something impractical for individual ships. During WWI, the RNAS found that even unarmed aircraft were a significant impediment to U-boat activities, as the U-boat commander had no way of knowing if the aircraft was armed or able to vector either armed surface ships or more aircraft to the area, so the response was to submerge. Forcing pre-snorkel diesel boats to submerge cuts down their time on station. Obviously, sinking a sub eliminates its effectiveness, but trade war is won by getting the goods to port.
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- Thread starter
- #178
So technological development played a role? What kind of aircraft and experience did the US Navy have from 1911-1918?
I'm curious if the ethos the USN had was different than the US Army towards the aviators themselves played a role here?
It had to do with this period because that's when things diverged from the roles envisioned by the USN and US Army from the USN to the US Army Air Service
Was the USN aware of the RNAS developments for seaplane tenders and aircraft carriers?
As for the carrier airships, the RAF had toyed with that one too: Some of the early specs for the R100 or R101 called for the airships to be able to carry 5 aircraft, bombs, or troops.
What roles did he envision for the US Navy?GrauGeist said:
From what I remember, this was the working of Billy Mitchell in his push for an independent air arm.
That's some impressive developments, but I'm curious who trained aviators prior to that, and weren't scouting planes available in WWI?
Why was it that he saw aviation as an extension of the Navy and the Army Aviators didn't see things the same way?
parsifal
Colonel
I rely principally on British official history, with the chapter entitled "The strategic air offensive against Germany 1939-45", which talks about official RAF policy and summarises it as "a means of direct attack on the enemy state with the object of depriving it of the means or will to continue the war."
The chapter goes on to state that in this way the RAF came to believe it was the principal means to victory, and later as it became self evident that outright victory was unachievable, to create the conditions needed to attain victory by other means.
The official history goes on to state that the stated objective of the RAF was that it had the advantage of being able to bring overwhelming force to bear immediately directly and destructively against the heartland of the enemy and that the RAFs role went above and beyond that of armies and navies. Herein lies the mistaken self belief of the independent air force. It believed that because it alone held the means to victory for Britain, then any co-eration with the lesser services was counterproductive.
The official history goes on to state that the 'new concepts not only claimed its own special and independent role against encroachments by the RN and the army but also in its theory claimed that the best defence is a good offense.
Should be proof enough except if you want to deconstruct the official history
There is nothing wrong with the RAF scrapping for resources, provided that scrapping passes the public interest test. Having decided to pour vast resources into the bomber forces, something I support incidentally, in the context of the maritime crisis facing Britain 1940-42 and the ongoing failure of its own campaigns in that period, was it reasonable for the RAF to continue doggedly on as it did and refuse to work as a team player as it should have been doing all along. I'm inclined to think not.
During WWI (the pre-Moffet years) naval aviation was pretty small and scattered and didn't have the massed resouces, cohesiveness, the sense of power, or the experience of making a difference in the battles being fought on the surface beneath their wings that Army aviation had. Besides, people who have to work together in a shipboard environment tend to have a greater sense of teamwork and interdependence than landlubbers. This value tends to permeate the entire service. Aviation in a maritime environment is a different animal than the terrestrial sort, and since its objectives are essentially naval, what's to be gained by being a separate service with a whole separate bureaucracy? It's hard enough interfacing blackshoes and airdales on a ship as it is, without having them answering to two separate masters.
Cheers,
Wes
