Controversial Ideas: Did We Ever Need an Independent Air Force

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Its a matter of opinion I guess. My opinion is that in the post war era we do need an independent air force, but in the prewar period it probably did more harm than good. all that rubbish about the 'bomber will always get through' and the failure to develop a proper air to ground liason is traceable back to the post wwi zealots
 
It's an interesting question since the USAAF wasn't independent during WW2. The RAF, however, was.

My suspicion is that the war would have been considerably longer had the RAF not been an independent force and hence able to push for things like heavy bombers. A more tactically-focused RAF would have been rather similar to the Luftwaffe: unable to mount strategic bombing efforts. Without the RAF heavies at night, the Allied strategic bombing effort would have been far less capable and I suspect German production figures would have been higher overall than was the case.

Additionally, the lack of a night strategic force would free up men and resources for the daylight campaign. How many single-engine day fighters can be produced for the same costs of a 2-seat, twin-engine, radar-equipped night fighter?
 
Honestly, I am of the opinion that the experiment failed. The Air Force really doesn't like to move mud and that's what is needed more than anything any more. There is nothing sadder than a zoomie made to sit in an A-10 and blow stuff up at close dangerous range instead of flashing past the battlefield at high altitude and Mach 2. (yes, I exaggerate but as with all stereotypes, there is a bit of truth at it's core.)

I think Tac air should be rolled back into the Army and optimized for that purpose. Let the Navy have Strategic and Space forces. Split the transports between them as appropriate. Then we can stop the duplication of resources and both the Navy and Army the support each actually needs at lower cost - especially with the ending of the ludicrous F-35 boondoggle at the same time.
 
Honestly, I am of the opinion that the experiment failed. The Air Force really doesn't like to move mud and that's what is needed more than anything any more. There is nothing sadder than a zoomie made to sit in an A-10 and blow stuff up at close dangerous range instead of flashing past the battlefield at high altitude and Mach 2. (yes, I exaggerate but as with all stereotypes, there is a bit of truth at it's core.)

I think Tac air should be rolled back into the Army and optimized for that purpose. Let the Navy have Strategic and Space forces. Split the transports between them as appropriate. Then we can stop the duplication of resources and both the Navy and Army the support each actually needs at lower cost - especially with the ending of the ludicrous F-35 boondoggle at the same time.
That ludicrous F-35 is the most advanced weapons system in the world now being produced by 3 different countries, I guess the Italians and Japanese must have been misled with its capabilities as they invested billions into the program and are now rolling their aircraft down the production line. While the development program procurement and spending was royally screwed up (and not all the fault of LMCO) the aircraft is now just about operational and has proven its capabilities becoming less and less the scorn of the anti-aviation and ignorant news media. The F-35B is now about the same price as the F-22A (if the production line for that aircraft was opened) What you state is straight from obsolete 1980s armchair thinking, its a different world and there is no reason to put ANY pilot "at close dangerous range" as SOP to support boots on the ground. Depending on the region and the tactics of the fight I see a day when UAVs will fulfill a close support TAC role with better accuracy and less risk to ALL operators.
 
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Just like the LOCKHEED F-104 was the best aircraft when they were sold to Europe in the 60's? Same scam different decade.
 
An Independent Air Force would have served the military and our Country well during WWII although we prevailed with the system we had. Remember the old adage " United we stand, Divided we fall". Congress and the Pentagon could not administer the old system today. It is always easier and more efficient to deal with one source of control than many.
 
Just like the LOCKHEED F-104 was the best aircraft when they were sold to Europe in the 60's? Same scam different decade.
Thanks for the laugh!
If the F-104 was a scam, then so was the B-29 and other types that pushed the envelope of existing technology for the day.
The F-104 program had no more issues than the F-16, which had, by the way, the same unwarranted hostility and hyped claims piled against it by the F-15 loyalist camp.
The F-104's advances and records forced the Soviets to scramble for a new-threat solution - not many "scams" can boast that claim.
 
Just like the LOCKHEED F-104 was the best aircraft when they were sold to Europe in the 60's? Same scam different decade.
Kind of funny since that scam produced over 2,500 aircraft on at least 4 production lines, operated by 15 different countries and was the first fighter to hold speed and altitude records simultaneously. The Italians were really scammed, kept building them until 1979 and retired them in 2004. Yea, that was one hell of a scam!
 
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I think the F-104 scam has nothing to do with the actual performance of the aircraft and rather more to do with the less-than-savoury business machinations of Lockheed, aided and abetted to some degree, no doubt, by the US Government.

As regards advocates for returning air power solely to the Army and Navy, I get rather tired of the whole "we don't need an air force, we just need soldiers who can fly to move mud" argument. The whole point of an independent air force was to maximally exploit the ubiquity of air power...to strike numerous targets, at all echelons of command, and at considerable distance. While we have, indeed, spent the past 15 years in asymmetric fights against low-tech adversaries, that may not be the case in the future. Just look at the news reports of the emerging air threats coming into Russian service or the expansionist actions by the Chinese military.

We need aircraft that can operate safely and successfully in complex, multi-layered and multi-participant threat environments like Syria...and that latter example is tame compared to the operating environments that we may have to face in the future. And the time to figure out how to deal with those threats is NOT once we get there. We need to prepare NOW. That requires assets that have more capabilities than simply "getting down and dirty" in a tactical fight...particularly when those current adversaries lack advanced air defences. Measuring our future needs against what we're doing today is a dumbass way to implement ANY strategy.
 
The gorilla in the room with the argument "we need an independent air force to sink the enemy's CVs" is that land based based air (LBA) is traditionally incapable of doing that job. Even with todays whiz bangery you still need dedicated highly trained people to do that, and the enormous handicap for LBA vs assets kept on board is that the assets kept on board are there, on the spot, trained for purpose. and are highly trained for the task at hand.

That's just a small part of this recurring problem. Too often, the air force gets too full of itself, and swept up by its own hype that it can win the war single handedly. It cant. It has to work as part of a team, and the roles of assisting the grunts is fundamentally different from the role of protecting the fleet, or sinking submarines or transporting stuff...whatever the role is you need people who know how to do that job. . the air force tries to do all these things, and does a reasonable job at most of it, but if the role gets too specialized it always seems to flounder. Fleet defence and maritime strike are two areas that the general air force is no good at at all. mud thumping is another.

Just sayin guys.
 
Having previously served on a mud-moving squadron, I'm afraid I'll respectfully disagree with your statement that we were "no good at all". One of our biggest problems was Army personnel who couldn't perform an adequate FAC role because they simply had no conception of what the world looked like from 200ft and 540kts. What did we do? We invited them over and flew every last one of them on a low-level training mission to show them how futile it was to use "small tree to right of white building" as a target location. Once THEY understood what we needed, unsurprisingly, the quality of service WE could provide improved dramatically!

It also bugs me when people equate CAS solely with A-10s. Yes, it's a fantastic beast and is needed on occasion...but CAS is way more than that single platform and many missions simply don't require aircraft to get down in the weeds. Sometimes it's necessary...but certainly not as a matter of course.
 
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Parsifal,

How about the cost associated with getting a certain air dropped weapon onto the opponents HQ when it's accessible by both land and sea based assets? The sea based assets bring a large chunk of a nations defense dollars into close proximity of bad guys as well while carrying out the mission.

Cheers,
Biff
 
well yes Biff. I agree, but in places like Korea and the gulf of Tonkin. carrier based assets proved far safer to the air assets, and able to concentrate the necessary firepower far more effectively than the land based guys. In Korea the problem arose very rapidly, and initially the land based assets were based in southern japan. The lions share of force projection was conducted by the assets afloat and despite the presence of some very sophisticated hardware on the other side, they were unable to do much to those assets.

In comparison, during the later conflict in Vietnam, there were several incidents of airfields ashore being successfully interdicted by the guerillas. We lost several RAAF caribous because of that sort of tom foolery. I'm sure the US suffered similar losses. I don't think there were such losses during both Iraq wars, but there were for the other side.....the position of the assets were known, and they were hunted down and neutralized in various ways.

So I don't buy the argument that the asset afloat is necessarily more at risk. Whatever environment you want to postulate (nuke or conventional, stand up fight or hiding in the weeds guerilla warfare) I think the assets are safer, more mobile and more effective, pound for pound than the land based guys. I know your gonna love that, but I am what I am....a rusted on old salt.
 
buffnut453 said:
It's an interesting question since the USAAF wasn't independent during WW2. The RAF, however, was.
Good point, though out of curiosity, in terms of it's functional autonomy from the US Army how did it compare in relationship to the USN and USMC?

Who are 'we'?
By in large I was thinking of the United States, though in truth, I suppose it could be technically said to apply for either the US or UK.

Basically, the primary justification for an independent Air-Force are twofold...
  • Strategic Bombing: The bombardment of targets far behind the lines of battle raging from airfields and ammunition-storage, to harbors, docks, and shipping yards, to railway marshaling yards, to directed attacks on population centers aimed squarely at terrorization of the civilization population with the aim of coercing a surrender
  • National Air-Defense: Basically coordinated air-defense of airfields and strategic targets from strategic bombing
While other types of operations (air-superiority, close-air support, interdiction) are generally considered to be routine operations carried out by air-arms that are part of an Army or Navy (etc), the fact is that neither of these operations intrinsically require an independent air-force, as they've been carried out before the creation of such an organization.

In regards to strategic bombing...
  • The Sikorsky Ilya Morumetz first flew in 1913 and seemed a purpose-built strategic bomber
  • The RFC & RNAS carried out raids far beyond the front lines of Zeppelin sheds
  • The Imperial Army & Naval air-services carried out coordinated airship raids against cities in Europe and the UK, with airship raids later giving way to bomber raids
  • The RFC & RNAS carried out retaliatory raids against German cities (the RNAS more so as they weren't as committed to CAS & BAI) before they were amalgamated into the RAF
  • The US Army Signal Corps was at least ordered to refrain from 'wanton and promiscuous attacks' on German cities in WWI, and might very well have carried out a few during this period
  • The IJNAS & IJAAS were both responsible for carrying out extensive raids against population centers in China, even attacks involving the use of biological warfare agents
  • The USAAF would carry out extensive raids throughout Belgium, France, Germany, as well as a variety of other countries, including Japan. These attacks ranged from attacks on specific targets to attacks on cities, usually barely disguised as area-bombing, ultimately leading up the use of nuclear-bombs against Japan
One could easily consider strategic bombing to be conceptually an aerial version of
  • Cavalry Charges: Men on horseback charging deep into enemy territory behind the lines to cause havoc on the infrastructure, setting fire to towns, and just stirring up generalized mayhem.
    • Cavalries used to be the preserve of knights, but later became a function of Armies as a general rule, which sort of makes strategic bombing an aerial cavalry charge with horses replaced with aircraft, and swords and fire replaced with explosives and incendiaries (poison gas was also often envisaged as well)
    • The similarity to cavalry charges was not lost on both proponents of independent air-forces (the Italians called their Air Force, the Cavalry of the Sky).
  • Naval Blockades: Aimed at strangling off a nation's supply by sea by turning away, or destroying anything and everything attempting to do so. As the name implies, it's a function of a Navy
  • Artillery Barrages: Aimed at a variety of things, but in the past were often aimed at cities, aimed at attacking the population to coerce a surrender. They were carried out both on land or at sea, and would be a function of an Army or a Navy.
The requirements to carry out such a campaign basically revolve around having a sufficient number of aircraft able to fly suitably long distances (enough to get deep inside enemy territory) from either home or from a forward deployed base, while carrying sufficient payload to have an effect. Since this usually resulted in large, multi-engined aircraft carrying out massive-raids, it required the ability to fly large multiple-crewed aircraft in formations, with skilled navigation ability overwater, over-land, and preferably at night as well.

In regards to air-defense
  • The British seemed to rely on the Army (ground and aviation) at the very least to fight off Zeppelin and bomber raids using acoustical detection systems, radio, ground based artillery, barrage balloons, and aircraft flying roving patrols
  • The IJAAS/IJNAS were both responsible for carrying out air-defense of the Japanese islands: Their primary shortcoming seemed to be that their airplanes weren't always able to fly high enough to catch B-29's
  • The USAAF was tasked with national air-defense, and the USN seemed responsible for protecting Naval bases at least
Either system could be satisfied with a specified command structure. SAC for example was a specified command, though it was also manned totally by USAF personnel (far as I know), but there's no reason that explicitly makes it physically impossible to have US Army, and US Naval aviators working together in such a command for this purpose.
 

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