Controversial Ideas: Did We Ever Need an Independent Air Force

[swampyankee]

I think one fundamental difference between navies -- especially blue-water fleets with long histories, like the RN* -- and air forces is that navies have viewed their roles to include support of army operations, logistics, and trade protection. Some early advocates for independent air forces, people like Douhet and Mitchell, don't seem to have had the same sort of grand strategic vision. Instead, they seemed to have had a very tactical, excessively focused view of war and combat, one that permitted one element, the strategic bomber, to reign supreme in their thinking. I think that air forces have definitely improved in this regard over time, mostly as the type of massive, global conflict that independent air forces were created for did not exist.

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* While the USN has a much shorter history than the RN, I think it's traditions and goals have been influenced by those of the RN, and it's evolved a grand strategic vision that is roughly similar. I think that other navies, such as those of Germany or Russia have evolved a much different vision.

 

[Zipper730]

I think one fundamental difference between navies -- especially blue-water fleets with long histories, like the RN* -- and air forces is that navies have viewed their roles to include support of army operations, logistics, and trade protection.

Did the Army also have a grand strategic vision?

Some early advocates for independent air forces, people like Douhet and Mitchell, don't seem to have had the same sort of grand strategic vision. Instead, they seemed to have had a very tactical, excessively focused view of war and combat, one that permitted one element, the strategic bomber, to reign supreme in their thinking.

They were kind of rigid, had a one size fits all policy, and only believed in one kind of war -- total war. Conflicts range from skirmishes, to small-scale conflicts and brush-fires right on up to global total wars.

 

[swampyankee]

Did the Army also have a grand strategic vision?
They were kind of rigid, had a one size fits all policy, and only believed in one kind of war -- total war. Conflicts range from skirmishes, to small-scale conflicts and brush-fires right on up to global total wars.

...and any war must be treated as absolutely critical to national survival.

 

[Zipper730]

...and any war must be treated as absolutely critical to national survival.

So that would be "yes"?

 

[swampyankee]

So that would be "yes"?

Mostly, I'm talking about the vision of the people who push the strategic bombing solves everything view of war, which seems to be a large basis of the USAF's core belief.

 

[buffnut453]

Then how did the US Navy despite having a lot of battleship Admirals manage to see carriers see any development at all despite treaties restricting their number, and massive numbers of flying boats to sink merchant shipping?

Every navy in WW2 had a bias towards battleships, even the IJN. It was only through the experience of WW2 that the true value of aircraft carriers came to light. As to your second point about "massive numbers of flying boats", where were those quantities when Pearl Harbor couldn't maintain an adequate long-range aerial search in late 1941? I also fail to see what flying boats have to do with the establishment of an independent air force.

And the USAAC was bomber-centric. The Army itself would likely have been preferential to attack and observation planes based on it's natural preferences. I'm surprised about that as they'd be useful for escorting the attack planes and carrying out strafing missions.

It's less to do with the utility of the aircraft and more to do with a mindset that either was or wasn't aligned to an air campaign, part of which includes both defensive and offensive counter-air missions. The independent RAF established an integrated air defence system before 1939 which included ground-based observers, radar stations and, crucially, a network of C3 nodes to direct the fighting. The Army-led USAAC didn't get a radar into service until early 1941 and, as we know from the history books about Pearl Harbor, there was no integrated air defence C3 capability worthy of the name.

I'm sorry but Fish-heads will ALWAYS gravitate towards grey bobbing things with popguns, while Pongoes will inevitably prioritize tanks, artillery and the PBI over anything else. It's in their DNA. If you want an air campaign run properly, you need an independent air force.​

 

[Shortround6]

Then how did the US Navy despite having a lot of battleship Admirals manage to see carriers see any development at all despite treaties restricting their number, and massive numbers of flying boats to sink merchant shipping?

Actually the treaties helped the development of aircraft carriers. Everybody was pretty much maxed out on Battleships in the 1922 treaty (England got to Build the Nelson and Rodney) and in an effort to save work already done on several large ships they were converted to aircraft carriers (US= Saratoga and Lexington, Japan got to keep the Akagi and Kaga, Britain kept/converted the Furius and sisters and the Eagle.) later treaties did spell out tonnage without the restrictions on battleships in the later treaties perhaps fewer carriers and more battleships would have been built. Most countries tended to build right up to the limits (and abot over) in every class restricted by the treaties.
You also have understand some of the strategic differences between flying boats and land based aircraft. Flying boats are more expensive per airplane (making the hull watertight is not easy) but are cheaper to build bases for, especially if you want a number of bases spaced a distance apart for only a flew airplanes per base.
SInce they don't need runways all you need is a suitable area of water, a ramp and apron in front of the hanger (and not all bases even had hangers) and quarters for the base personnel and visiting aircrew. No building long runwars in remote areas and keeping said runways in good shape.

Flying boats are only really good for attacking unarmed merchant ships with poor escorts, once the shooting really starts every country involved starts raiding every warehouse, storage facility and quasi museum (and is deluged by nutball inventors) for every weapon they can get to stick on the merchant ships.
Large, slow flying boats don't do real well against anti aircraft.
Airborne radar changed the attacks to night attacks during the war.

 

[Zipper730]

Mostly, I'm talking about the vision of the people who push the strategic bombing solves everything view of war

Well yeah, it was a one-size-fits-all belief, and wasn't really an accurate representation of war-fighting. Wars can range from small regional conflicts to massive total wars, and strategic bombing is naturally a policy that lends itself to total-war - it was intended to be.

Every navy in WW2 had a bias towards battleships, even the IJN.

You got me backwards, I was trying to point out that the US Navy did develop a formidable aviation arm, even with limited carriers.

As to your second point about "massive numbers of flying boats", where were those quantities when Pearl Harbor couldn't maintain an adequate long-range aerial search in late 1941?

I just remember being told that they spent large amounts of money developing flying boats with the aim of interdiction of merchant shipping.

I also fail to see what flying boats have to do with the establishment of an independent air force.

They don't...

It's less to do with the utility of the aircraft and more to do with a mindset that either was or wasn't aligned to an air campaign

Well, the fact is that if you really take the idea to a logical conclusion -- we've been using things that fly since we've had catapults, bows, and arrows .

The fact is that aerial assets are essentially at their basic level, extensions of ground-based weapons...

• Observation: They help direct artillery
• Scout: Airborne surveillance with serious speed, agility further helps protect them.
• Bombers: An extension of artillery, able to fly much greater distance (though slower)

...and would eventually produce the changes that would produce the kind of warfare that we would remotely associate with aerial warfare...

• Observation: Since they can direct artillery, once their role is understood by the enemy (if not outright), turning any kind of gun you can use up onto them becomes a good move and sets in motion the first steps towards anti-aircraft artillery
• Scouts: As before, but because their ability to collect data on the enemy, they'd see themselves shot at once their role is understood (if not outright) by the enemy and effectively forms part of the steps towards anti-aircraft artillery
• Fighters: Once the scouts carry the appropriate armament, they start shooting at observation planes and other scouts attempting to gain control of the sky and effectively form an extension of defensive artillery.
• Bombers: Whether used to bomb troops on the battlefield, attack the movement of supplies, or attack centers of manufacture and blow-up people in their homes, the function is basically an extension of artillery (artillery had been used for all these purposes before). Their range makes them an easily good idea, and since their speed wasn't quite enough to be unstoppable -- these really lit a fire under the asses of an enemy state to produce dedicated anti-aircraft artillery.

And of course some fighters are more specialized to the defensive anti-bomber role (forming an extension of AAA), and both defensive/offensive anti-fighter roles allowing control of the airspace, and control to be taken from the enemies, it allows unrestricted aerial operations.

Yes, this is greatly simplified and doesn't include anti-shipping (which is just artillery), and ASW... consider that I'm a rather lazy guy

The independent RAF established an integrated air defence system before 1939 which included ground-based observers, radar stations and, crucially, a network of C3 nodes to direct the fighting.

True, but one should consider that for the US at least...

• The Army & Navy developed radar together
• The Army & Navy may very well have, at different points, had overlapping areas of responsibility in response to taking out ships approaching the coast
• Theater commands existed which involved Army & Navy personnel
  • North & Central Pacific: Admiral Nimitz
  • Southwest Pacific: General MacArthur
  • European Theater: General Eisenhower
• There were also specialized commands such as
  • Alaska Defense Command: I'm not sure if it had control over USN assets, but it was controlled by an Army General and included air-defense roles
  • Western Defense Command: Not sure if it had control over USN assets, but was controlled by an Army general and included air-defense roles, Alaska Defense Command was merged with this command
  • Eastern Defense Command: Briefly called the Northeast Defense Command, and then renamed, was also part of the European Theater of Operations

I'm not sure if there was anything like a modern day specified command structure in those days, but during the Great War (they didn't expect a sequel ), the RFC & RNAS prior to their amalgamation into the RAF, were able to mount strategic bombing offensives against Germany. Additionally, in the US prior to 1798, the fact is that the Secretary of War was once a department that covered both Army & Navy...

The Army-led USAAC didn't get a radar into service until early 1941 and, as we know from the history books about Pearl Harbor, there was no integrated air defence C3 capability worthy of the name.

That was a major f***-up -- I'd almost swear there was some kind of secrecy issue that prevented the alarm from being sounded.

I'm sorry but Fish-heads will ALWAYS gravitate towards grey bobbing things with popguns, while Pongoes will inevitably prioritize tanks, artillery and the PBI over anything else. It's in their DNA.

Not really, in WWI, the RFC & RNAS were carrying out strategic bombing raids against Germany, the RFC actually couldn't do them quite as often as the RNAS because of the simple fact that they needed CAS operations more. The IJNAS & IJAAS were both able to mount bombing campaigns against China.
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You also have understand some of the strategic differences between flying boats and land based aircraft.

I didn't know they were more expensive, but it does make sense.

I should point out for bombing raids, while seaplanes have limited use (the US Navy was able to mount a PBY raid in the Pacific on land targets at night), the RNAS (1917) and IJNAS used land-based bombers.

 

[buffnut453]

Zipper,

You're missing my point entirely. Just because any Army or Navy CAN mount air operations does NOT mean that they do it particularly well. You cite the IJAAF and IJN in China and yet they consistently failed to overwhelm and adversary that was, in air combat terms, woefully inadequate.

There's a difference between a short-sighted, tactically-focused effort and the true benefits derived from independent air power which enables management of various tactical, operational and strategic capabilities into an integrated air campaign. The whole reason the RAF was formed in 1918 was precisely because the powers-that-be felt that the air campaign would be run better by an independent RAF than by separate, competing campaigns run by assets owned and controlled by the other 2 services.

You clearly aren't going to be convinced so I don't want this to turn into yet another argumentative thread...but the facts remain that the ubiquity and reach of air power demand a different mindset than simply "observation, scouting and bombing" or "anti-ship". Look at Desert Storm where the early air attacks, focused primarily on Iraqi air defences, entirely dislocated the enemy's defences. Oh...and they used Apache gunships to help in that role. Would an Army-run air campaign look ANYTHING like that? I suggest not...they'd just do what the Army ALWAYS does which is to fight through the adversary, ignoring the potential to use strategic reach to unhinge the adversary's C3 capabilities.

Cheers,
B-N

 

[Zipper730]

You're missing my point entirely. Just because any Army or Navy CAN mount air operations does NOT mean that they do it particularly well.

True enough

There's a difference between a short-sighted, tactically-focused effort and the true benefits derived from independent air power which enables management of various tactical, operational and strategic capabilities into an integrated air campaign.

The problem is that the tactical benefits can be potentially quite lacking in an independent air-force, though there were exceptions.

 

[buffnut453]

The problem is that the tactical benefits can be potentially quite lacking in an independent air-force, though there were exceptions.

But in order to fix those perceived tactical weaknesses associated with an independent air force, the Army (in the US case) would simply restart production of A-10s because "that's what the soldiers want". Which is PRECISELY the argument I'm making about the Army fixating on the tactical battle.

Much as I LOVE the A-10 (it's truly an AWESOME killing machine), it's a one-trick pony. It's GREAT for the current fights we're engaged in but, frankly, it's next to useless for anything more advanced. It simply won't survive in a modern integrated air defence environment. So swapping out a bunch of F-22s, F-35s, F-15s and F-16s for additional squadrons of A-10s will leave us MASSIVELY vulnerable for anything other than low-intensity, COIN-type ops.

 

[Zipper730]

Deleted

 

[swampyankee]

Perhaps the question should be expanded from "Did We Ever Need an Independent Air Force?" to "would a single, unified military force make more sense than separate army, navy, and air force?"

I'm not entirely sure how I would answer that question -- and my answer would probably be different for country with a total military of 10,000 vs one with a military of 1,000,000.

 

[Zipper730]

I figure independent air-forces often focus too much on very rigid methods on achieving a goal rather than the goal: The goal is power-projection -- impose the will of your nation on the target country. It doesn't necessarily require a city smashing campaign to do it, it can be done potentially by simply hammering important resources and transportation.

On small countries you'd mostly be using CAS and Interdiction

 

[buffnut453]

I figure independent air-forces often focus too much on very rigid methods on achieving a goal rather than the goal: The goal is power-projection -- impose the will of your nation on the target country. It doesn't necessarily require a city smashing campaign to do it, it can be done potentially by simply hammering important resources and transportation.

On small countries you'd mostly be using CAS and Interdiction

It rather depends on the effect you're seeking to achieve. The Western powers haven't signed up to "city smashing campaigns" since WW2. I'll cite Desert Storm, again, as an example of how air power selectively degraded not just the adversary's ability to resist but also his will to resist. The integration of air power and psyops thoroughly degraded not just national C3 and air defences, but also the front-line Republican Guard units...and that was before the land campaign even got underway.

Note that CAS is more about supporting the ground force commander's mission than imposing your will on the enemy. Often CAS requests occur when an adversary refuses to be intimidated...in other words, our will hasn't been adequately imposed on the enemy.

It's also worth noting that direct firepower is not the only way to impose one's will on an enemy. Sometimes a softly-softly approach can work far better than going in with all guns blazing. Not always...but sometimes.

 

[Zipper730]

It rather depends on the effect you're seeking to achieve.

Doesn't that vary with every war? Ultimately the goal is to win, or get something favorable out the deal.

The Western powers haven't signed up to "city smashing campaigns" since WW2.

Actually we did quite a bit in Korea, and I'm not entirely certain of the campaigns into Laos and Cambodia (Operation Barrel Roll, and Menu) from 1965-73.

Regardless, that generally seems to be the opinion, but it's not the desires of the Air Power types: Their goals were to collapse enemy morale by destroying the will to resist (often by battering the population with aerial bombardment), and since the nuclear bomb -- the general aim was to basically take this up to eleven and, more or less, turn the target nation into a moonscape.

I'll cite Desert Storm, again, as an example of how air power selectively degraded not just the adversary's ability to resist but also his will to resist. The integration of air power and psyops thoroughly degraded not just national C3 and air defences, but also the front-line Republican Guard units...and that was before the land campaign even got underway.

I'm not sure what kind of psyops were used provided they're not classified, but I figure psychological warfare is something used by all military branches.

As for the use of attacking command, control, and communications: Is this something specific to the USAF? Does communications mean specifically the transfer of data, or transport too?

Note that CAS is more about supporting the ground force commander's mission than imposing your will on the enemy. Often CAS requests occur when an adversary refuses to be intimidated...in other words, our will hasn't been adequately imposed on the enemy.

Most strategists of all stripes generally would focus on the big picture first, and then the steps needed to achieve the goal right?

Sometimes a softly-softly approach can work far better than going in with all guns blazing. Not always...but sometimes.

True, and sometimes it can be done by diplomacy (the military's presence can make an impression without firing a shot)

 

[buffnut453]

Doesn't that vary with every war? Ultimately the goal is to win, or get something favorable out the deal.

I'm thinking at a far more granular level than the blindingly obvious goal of winning the war. Google "effects-based operations" to get some indication of what I'm trying to portray. The goal is to determine what effect you wish to apply to the enemy and then work out the most efficient way to accomplish that. For example, if you want to degrade a Soviet-era integrated air defence system, you could just bomb the hell out of every radar and missile site but that's expensive in terms of bombs dropped and, likely, losses sustained. Taking out the C3 bunkers, comms towers and vital threat radars may be sufficient to achieve the same effect, with less risk of collateral damage and likely fewer friendly losses.

Actually we did quite a bit in Korea, and I'm not entirely certain of the campaigns into Laos and Cambodia (Operation Barrel Roll, and Menu) from 1965-73.

Which rather shows how ineffective bombing of cities is towards attaining wartime objectives since the end result of those wars was Won-0, Drawn-1, Lost-1. I'm not being facetious, just simply observing that hammering cities clearly didn't achieve the strategic effect needed...which is why we don't do it any more.

Regardless, that generally seems to be the opinion, but it's not the desires of the Air Power types: Their goals were to collapse enemy morale by destroying the will to resist (often by battering the population with aerial bombardment), and since the nuclear bomb -- the general aim was to basically take this up to eleven and, more or less, turn the target nation into a moonscape.

Well, I consider myself an Air Power type and I don't subscribe to that approach. Col John Warden USAF would also strongly disagree. Yes, that approach may have been the focus for air power in the period pre-1945 and it certainly has some echoes in the post-war nuclear forces, but (thankfully) that thinking has had zero operational or tactical impact since 1945.

I'm not sure what kind of psyops were used provided they're not classified, but I figure psychological warfare is something used by all military branches.

At the unclass level, the USAF performed leaflet drops on a specific Iraqi division telling them that at a certain time the following night, the division to their left (or right) would be wiped out through air power. It only took a couple of nights for the bulk of the Iraqi army to realize that staying put in their trenches was a recipe for death, and hence we saw Iraqi soldiers surrendering to UAVs. Yes psyops can be carried out by all forces but I cited Desert Storm as a specific example of the effective integration of air power and psyops to break the will of the adversary's ground forces...and it worked a treat.

As for the use of attacking command, control, and communications: Is this something specific to the USAF? Does communications mean specifically the transfer of data, or transport too?

No, it's not specific to the USAF. C3 = command, control and communications and it remains a vital target to this day. Cut off the adversary's head and the limbs can't work properly...it's a principle that applies to the human body and to the command and control of military forces. Similarly, if the brain can't get messages to the arms, then it can't swing a punch, so you take out the adversary's communication links. Forces that can't be adequately controlled can't fight effectively and are easier to defeat. Only air power has the reach to perform this function and to do it not just for the leadership of one division or one corps but to take out the entire national chain of command in a very short space of time. ​

 

[parsifal]

No, it's not specific to the USAF. C3 = command, control and communications and it remains a vital target to this day. Cut off the adversary's head and the limbs can't work properly...it's a principle that applies to the human body and to the command and control of military forces. Similarly, if the brain can't get messages to the arms, then it can't swing a punch, so you take out the adversary's communication links. Forces that can't be adequately controlled can't fight effectively and are easier to defeat. Only air power has the reach to perform this function and to do it not just for the leadership of one division or one corps but to take out the entire national chain of command in a very short space of time.

This has met with very mixed results in terms airpower application. It worked in both of the wars in Iraq, and also in Bosnia. Failed utterly in Vietnam, Korea, and Italy. Debateable in NW Europe. I don't think German C3 failed as such in Normandy. Moreso their logistics. Same in North Africa

Moreover, Carrier Based air was just as successful (or not, depending on which battle is being considered) as land based air was

If Im missing something from the debate I do apologise.

 

[buffnut453]

This has met with very mixed results in terms airpower application. It worked in both of the wars in Iraq, and also in Bosnia. Failed utterly in Vietnam, Korea, and Italy. Debateable in NW Europe. I don't think German C3 failed as such in Normandy. Moreso their logistics. Same in North Africa

Moreover, Carrier Based air was just as successful (or not, depending on which battle is being considered) as land based air was

If Im missing something from the debate I do apologise.

The original question was whether we still needed an independent air force today. I did drift into some historical generalities but my points were primarily focused on the modern capabilities of air power which, through modern precision-guided munitions, is highly capable of interdicting C3 at all echelons of command simultaneously.

 

[Zipper730]

I'm thinking at a far more granular level than the blindingly obvious goal of winning the war.

Since I didn't have specifics I kind of focused around the very basic (as each war has it's own objectives).

Google "effects-based operations" to get some indication of what I'm trying to portray.

Done

The goal is to determine what effect you wish to apply to the enemy and then work out the most efficient way to accomplish that. For example, if you want to degrade a Soviet-era integrated air defence system, you could just bomb the hell out of every radar and missile site but that's expensive in terms of bombs dropped and, likely, losses sustained.

Predominantly this was actually the SOP in the Cold War and losses even with nuclear weapons would have been costly as ground-fire would exact a toll even on the F-105s.

Taking out the C3 bunkers, comms towers and vital threat radars may be sufficient to achieve the same effect, with less risk of collateral damage and likely fewer friendly losses.

I'm surprised there wasn't more emphasis on taking out command bunkers, communications towers, and the most vital threat radars in the USSR during the Cold War rather than just bombing every missile site. I'm not sure how easy it was to take out some of the command bunkers (as some were under mountains), though the communications facilities would have likely been easier as they would likely have either been on the surface or close to it.

To some extent, it might have been difficult to properly estimate the full details of the USSR in some cases, and the USAF wanted to assign as many targets as a way of dictating budgets (assign as many targets for destruction, use that to dictate the number of weapons needed, use that to dictate procurement of weapons systems).

Which rather shows how ineffective bombing of cities is towards attaining wartime objectives

To me, it honestly seemed more like a combination of blood-lust, and future intimidation.

Looking at World War II, the results seem as followed

• UK: Failed
  • UK was not defeated in the war
• Bulgaria: Success
  • Bulgaria was knocked out of the war after we flattened Sofia in 1944 (if General Eaker's estimate in Wings of Judgement was right, 12,000 died)
  • Their vulnerability seemed to be a lack of preparation for this kind of bombing, and little to no means to retaliate in kind
• Germany: Failed
  • Almost all major cities were destroyed
  • Morale didn't falter despite teetering quite a bit as all the major cities were either destroyed or systematically being reduced to rubble
  • Was ultimately defeated by military occupation
  • Bombing probably did play a role in producing an anti-war sentiment
• Japan: Success
  • Japan had ironically been making overtures for surrender prior to March 1945 (We didn't agree to the terms)
  • Despite flattening nearly all their cities from March to August, 1945: They still were able to stubbornly hang on
  • Nuclear bombs seemed to be the deciding factor as the destruction was so rapid, so immense, they'd never seen it before, and were under the impression we had more of them than we did and figured we'd turn their country (and it's legacy) into a moonscape
  • Firebombing and nuclear-bombing has generally produced an anti-war sentiment

Korea the result seemed to be a failure, and has ironically been cynically exploited by the North Koreans to engender a hatred of us that continues to this day.

Drawn-1.

I'm honestly curious which was a draw?

I'm not being facetious, just simply observing that hammering cities clearly didn't achieve the strategic effect needed...which is why we don't do it any more.

I figured it was more related to looking bad (I know this makes me appear to be a very optimistic guy...)

Col John Warden USAF would also strongly disagree.[/quote]He's was the guy who had a theory that revolved around a series of rings right?

Yes, that approach may have been the focus for air power in the period pre-1945 and it certainly has some echoes in the post-war nuclear forces

Echoes? The goal was even more extreme than during WWII, lol.

At the unclass level, the USAF performed leaflet drops on a specific Iraqi division telling them that at a certain time the following night, the division to their left (or right) would be wiped out through air power.

The ability to threaten an enemy, and show them to be powerless to stop it is a powerful tool. The fact that our country has remarkable destructive capability also probably revealed itself in their fears. Also, we seemed to have been blasting away on the radio as well.

It only took a couple of nights for the bulk of the Iraqi army to realize that staying put in their trenches was a recipe for death, and hence we saw Iraqi soldiers surrendering to UAVs.

During 1991? I suppose we had drones for some time...

Yes psyops can be carried out by all forces but I cited Desert Storm as a specific example of the effective integration of air power and psyops to break the will of the adversary's ground forces

Understood

No, it's not specific to the USAF. C3 = command, control and communications and it remains a vital target to this day.

And when was this understood by all services?

Cut off the adversary's head and the limbs can't work properly...it's a principle that applies to the human body and to the command and control of military forces.

Unless you design your military to be able to operate in a decentralized manner, or even set-up a fail-deadly network. It runs with it's own risks too...

Only air power has the reach to perform this function and to do it not just for the leadership of one division or one corps but to take out the entire national chain of command in a very short space of time.

If you factor in SLBM's and ICBM's as air-power, then you're correct...
​

This has met with very mixed results in terms airpower application. It worked in both of the wars in Iraq, and also in Bosnia.

Seems to add up

Failed utterly in Vietnam, Korea, and Italy.

And we bombed nearly all of North Korea's cities (quite effectively, we pretty much ran out of anything to bomb), political issues seemed to prevent us from adopting a similar approach in Vietnam (which probably is a good thing) though we did hammer the capital and Haiphong a bit (fatalities seemed kind of low considering the tonnage of bombs we dropped -- we could have turned either city into a graveyard).

Debateable in NW Europe. I don't think German C3 failed as such in Normandy. Moreso their logistics. Same in North Africa

Yeah

Moreover, Carrier Based air was just as successful (or not, depending on which battle is being considered) as land based air was

Can you cite examples (I basically wish to know more)