Controversial Ideas: Did We Ever Need an Independent Air Force

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And not all Red squirrels are red...

A friend of mine's older brother was a chopper pilot in 'Nam. A couple years after he got back, he was hand raising a baby squirrel that had fallen out of its nest. It grew fast but he had to get rid of it when it mistook his fingertip for a peanut and bit all the way through. Who knew squirrels needed glasses?

Oh, and Air Force stuff...yadda yadda. Carry on! ;)



-Irish
 
A friend of mine's older brother was a chopper pilot in 'Nam. A couple years after he got back, he was hand raising a baby squirrel that had fallen out of its nest. It grew fast but he had to get rid of it when it mistook his fingertip for a peanut and bit all the way through. Who knew squirrels needed glasses?

Oh, and Air Force stuff...yadda yadda. Carry on! ;)



-Irish

That was impressively close to being relevant. :)
 
The question can be argued in exactly the wrong way, i.e., something like "we need an independent air force because operating above the ground is fundamentally different than operating on the ground" By that logic, there should be an independent submarine force because operating under the water is fundamentally different from operating on the water.
 
* While the USN has a much shorter history than the RN, I think it's traditions and goals have been influenced by those of the RN, and it's evolved a grand strategic vision that is roughly similar. I think that other navies, such as those of Germany or Russia have evolved a much different vision.
And don't forget, it was an American naval officer, Alfred Thayer Mahan, who took that strategic vision, already well understood in naval circles, and codified it and sold it to the outside world. My paternal great grandfather was in charge of the Universalist missionary system in Japan in the 1890s and 1900s, and imported great quantities of western publications as requested by his Japanese friends. Mahan's book was very popular with them.
Cheers,
Wes
 
The question can be argued in exactly the wrong way, i.e., something like "we need an independent air force because operating above the ground is fundamentally different than operating on the ground" By that logic, there should be an independent submarine force because operating under the water is fundamentally different from operating on the water.


Which is more or less what DKM did with its uboat command during the war. whilst still a subsidiary of the navy, Doenitz's command in large measure operated separately to the rest of the navy, and benefitted from that separation.
 
By that logic, there should be an independent submarine force because operating under the water is fundamentally different from operating on the water.
There was, and it was run by Hyman Rickover, who did things his own way and the rest of the Navy be damned!
Cheers,
Wes
 
Here's one reality I don't often see mentioned: while the US military planners suggested over 1 million allied casualties were "probable" (a figure I don't recall ever being challenged), how about the suggestion that it also saved a great many Japanese lives.
Both arguments have been made, however the exact details regarding projected details from what I remember ranged from 500,000 - 1,500,000 normally with some estimates as low as 50,000.
 
I think you're confusing estimated casualties numbers with the estimated killed.
Just as you evidently confused buildings destroyed in all the Sofia bombings, with the deaths in one raid.

A little over 14,000 Americans were killed in the battle of Okinawa. I think any person studying WW2 battles would estimate the deaths in a invasion of the Japanese main islands would be much, much, worse than the the battle of Okinawa.

And I really don't see how any of this relates to the original question posed in this thread.
 
I think you're confusing estimated casualties numbers with the estimated killed.
True enough
Just as you evidently confused buildings destroyed in all the Sofia bombings, with the deaths in one raid.
Those numbers were written in "Wings of Judgement" and was quoted from Ira Eaker. It seems that either the author or Eaker got it wrong -- I basically quoted from the book.
A little over 14,000 Americans were killed in the battle of Okinawa. I think any person studying WW2 battles would estimate the deaths in a invasion of the Japanese main islands would be much, much, worse than the the battle of Okinawa.
What I was pointed out was that to justify the use of nuclear weapons, it seems likely that the highest estimate would probably be the most likely to be used. Regardless, based on surface area, Okinawa's surface area is 1206.98 km^2

Shikoku has a surface area of 18800 km^2
Kyushu has a surface area of 36782 km^2
Kyushu has a surface area of 83453.57 km^2
Honshu has a surface area of 225,800 km^2​

For a total area of the main islands of 364835.57 km^2 which is 302.27 times the size of Okinawa. That being said, I'm not sure how many people lived on all those islands at the time, so I couldn't give you any figures for population at the time. Japan's total population was around 70,000,000 according to what somebody said, which is enormous, but I don't know what the population of the main islands were in 1945.

As for it's relation to the original post, it basically simply has to do with the fact that if a nation is going to use a weapon that wastes large numbers of civilians, to justify it one will want to use the biggest troop-death toll to do it. It makes it a less bitter pill to swallow.

I figure it would be best to drift back onto the original topic soon
 
Unity of command is usually more efficient. Even during the War the Navy Dept and War Dept competed with each other. The Battle of the Atlantic was drawn out for one reason because of a lack of VLR aircraft from interservice bickering between ADM King and the USAAF.
 
The Battle of the Atlantic was drawn out for one reason because of a lack of VLR aircraft from interservice bickering between ADM King and the USAAF.
As usual where the sea is involved, the Brits were ahead of us. They had Liberators sinking U-boats out in the U-boats' supposedly "safe" mid-ocean zone long before we did. And long before our Jeep carriers were a presence there.
Cheers,
Wes
 
Unity of command is usually more efficient. Even during the War the Navy Dept and War Dept competed with each other. The Battle of the Atlantic was drawn out for one reason because of a lack of VLR aircraft from interservice bickering between ADM King and the USAAF.
Nope.
Lack of escorts
lack of an effective command for the allies (until after 1940)
Refusal, for a time by the neutral, including the US, to use the protection afforded by Convoying
Superior SIGINT for the KM until the end of 1942
lack of an effective airborne DC until the latter part of 1942
no effective ASR until the latter part of 1942. For the US no effective co-ordination with air and surface assets until later.
Refusal by Uncle Ernie to allocate sufficient escort resources in the Atlantic. he hated the British so much he would prefer to lose the war than accept their help
 
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As usual where the sea is involved, the Brits were ahead of us. They had Liberators sinking U-boats out in the U-boats' supposedly "safe" mid-ocean zone long before we didescort carriers. . And long before our Jeep carriers were a presence there.
Cheers,
Wes
There were just 12 VLR a/c in CC in 1942, and the first kill was the end of 1941 from memory. About 30% of all uboat kills were due to air action.
The US did not invent Escort Carriers. they weren't even the second nation to have them. First nation was Britain, in 1917, followed by Japan in 1921. Langley was after the Hosho.

The wartime escort carriers were first fielded by Britain in 1941, after a disastrous attempt to use fleet carriers in hunter killer roles in 1939. They were again eventually used in this role in 1943, as a sort of light brigade to reinforce convoys being swamped by wolfpacks.

With the breaking of the uboat ciphers (on a regular repeatable basis) US CVE groups came into their own, basically to mysteriously "arrive" where Uboats had been ordered t assemble, usually either to form a wolfpack, or for re-supply
 
With the breaking of the uboat ciphers (on a regular repeatable basis) US CVE groups came into their own, basically to mysteriously "arrive" where Uboats had been ordered to assemble, usually either to form a wolfpack or to resupply.
My uncle flew TBMs off a Jeep carrier attached to the task group that captured U-505, although he arrived after that event was over. He didn't talk about it much, so I never got much from him in the way of details. I think he felt some guilt over attacking survivors who were trying to abandon ship.
Cheers,
Wes
 
Unity of command is usually more efficient.
That depends really more on the nation than it does the service: The German Naval & Army Air arms were able to coordinate quite well when bombing cities. During the secret rearmament, the Germans created the Luftwaffe: It coordinated quite well with the Army, and was quite good at close air support despite being an independent air arm (it didn't work so well with certain aspects of Naval aviation).

In the United States, it seemed inter service rivalry was a greater issue (Japan might have been the most pathological), and it was a problem long after the USAF became an independent air arm (mostly with the USN).

As usual where the sea is involved, the Brits were ahead of us. They had Liberators sinking U-boats out in the U-boats' supposedly "safe" mid-ocean zone long before we did. And long before our Jeep carriers were a presence there.
Ironically, they had a disregard for coastal command early on.
 

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