Controversial Ideas: Did We Ever Need an Independent Air Force

[XBe02Drvr]

Why is the Navy strategic and the Army tactical?

It's a matter of reach. The Navy can project national power directly to the enemy's shores, and with the advent of SSBNs, and SLCMs, into the enemy's heartland. The Army is all about winning battles on land, and even in the case of large and widespread campaigns (post D-Day, Korea, Vietnam), the focus is essentially on the battlefield, not overarching strategic concerns.
The one flaw I see in the current system is USAFs traditional disinterest in CAS, special ops, and battlefield transport, and their insistence that they know the Army's needs better than the Army itself does. They have consistently attempted to interfere in the Army's attempts to supply its own aviation needs (Apache, Comanche, Chinook, Caribou, Buffalo, etc, etc). I think all army cooperation functions with the exception of long range heavy transport should be given to the Army.
Sorry Biff, but that's my "grunt's eye" take on the matter.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[XBe02Drvr]

the USAF managed to keep BOMARC to themselves (probably because it was labeled as a fighter)

No, it was a matter of range. Nikes and Hawks were point defense weapons, analagous to 90MM radar directed Skysweeper AA guns, while Bomarc was a long range interceptor designed to take out Bulls, Bears, and Bisons out beyond the DEW line. With the advent of SAGE, all continental air defense (interceptors, AAA, and missiles) was controlled by a network of huge electron tube "supercomputers" run by the Air Force ADC. This was the predecessor of what we now call NORAD, but with far more primitive technology. The Army didn't have the technology or the infrastructure to target a Bomarc on a bomber 200+ NM away.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Zipper730]

Deleted

 

[BiffF15]

It's a matter of reach. The Navy can project national power directly to the enemy's shores, and with the advent of SSBNs, and SLCMs, into the enemy's heartland. The Army is all about winning battles on land, and even in the case of large and widespread campaigns (post D-Day, Korea, Vietnam), the focus is essentially on the battlefield, not overarching strategic concerns.
The one flaw I see in the current system is USAFs traditional disinterest in CAS, special ops, and battlefield transport, and their insistence that they know the Army's needs better than the Army itself does. They have consistently attempted to interfere in the Army's attempts to supply its own aviation needs (Apache, Comanche, Chinook, Caribou, Buffalo, etc, etc). I think all army cooperation functions with the exception of long range heavy transport should be given to the Army.
Sorry Biff, but that's my "grunt's eye" take on the matter.
Cheers,
Wes

Wes,

I see thinks a bit different regarding roles an attitudes. First, the USAF does lift for not only itself but for all the other branches and our allies. Our tankers sit alert for other countries to this day. Those tankers also carry men & equipment while dragging fighters (USAF, USN, USMC, other countries) or force extending other tankers, transports, bombers etc. It would be tough for the Army to have a heavy lift capability that was for moving only their gear (hint they don't move their stuff often as it is for the most part already in place).

Second your data on the USAFs attitude towards CAS is pre-Desert Storm 1. It has totally changed to the point that Buffs and Bones sit at 30k plus plinking 500 and 1000 pounders for hours on end. I have seen the CAS system in action and it is light years ahead of where it was in 1990. I can not emphasize the Light Years point enough. The Army guys want 24/7 presence over them and we try to do that. It's an immense undertaking! We even do night strafe now and have lost a few guys doing that. We pretty much have full day capes at night. The A10 rocks at CAS but remember it was designed for killing tanks in a Fulda Gap scenario and by default using the then current tech it was good at CAS. Using today's capes all the other fighters can do a great job at CAS too, and oh by the way they have missiles to protect themselves (along with a radar for detection and ID). The Hog did fantastic in DS1 but it was a dream set up for them. Same for the Eagles.

As for special ops the USAF is far more vested than you know and have been for decades. Same goes for battle field transport such that our latest airlifter was designed around it, AKA the C17.

Your data, in my experience was accurate in 1990 but has changed pretty dramatically in the interim.

V/R,
Biff

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Your data, in my experience was accurate in 1990 but has changed pretty dramatically in the interim.

Thanks for the reply, Biff. I'm sorry if you misunderstood, but it was not my intention to suggest the Army should be involved in tanking or heavy lift. I was thinking more of the Buffalo/ Sherpa/Spectre-gunship sort of mission. And I admit I'm kind of out of touch with the state of the art of PGM technology. Does USAF embed CAS pilots with the infantry to do FAC duty these days, like USMC? Are ground based designators still used today, or is it all airborne turret pods?
Cheers,
Wes

 

[XBe02Drvr]

As for special ops the USAF is far more vested than you know and have been for decades.

Yes, but in current USAF culture is a specialty in special ops a mainstream pathway to promotion, or is it still treated as an ugly stepchild? There's not much glamour, prestige, or inspirational PR in the low slow and dirty end of things.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[buffnut453]

I'll let Biff speak for the USAF but the RAF does still employ fast jet aircrew in the FAC role. That said, it's not always necessary if you get a bright Pongo who can think faster than 30mph and has the imagination to appreciate that a solitary tree does not constitute a viable landmark for aircrew.

 

[buffnut453]

Yes, but in current USAF culture is a specialty in special ops a mainstream pathway to promotion, or is it still treated as an ugly stepchild? There's not much glamour, prestige, or inspirational PR in the low slow and dirty end of things.
Cheers,
Wes

Actually, I'd say precisely the opposite. Given the current emphasis on spec ops missions, "low, slow and dirty" has a lot more cache than it used to have. Also bear in mind that spec ops crews often would prefer to stay on mission rather than get promoted into the halls of power.

It's interesting how things have changed in recent years away from a focus on fast jets. Biff gave one example of B-52s being used on CAS missions (who'da thunk'd that one in 1990?). To cite one other small example, it's been common practice for decades to grant the best trainee his/her choice of aircraft type on which to specialize. In years past, pretty much every such candidate would pick a fast jet. In recent years, top students more often choose multi-engine aircraft because of the perceived advantages in securing a post-service flying career. In short, this isn't your Dad's Air Force any more.

 

[BiffF15]

Thanks for the reply, Biff. I'm sorry if you misunderstood, but it was not my intention to suggest the Army should be involved in tanking or heavy lift. I was thinking more of the Buffalo/ Sherpa/Spectre-gunship sort of mission. And I admit I'm kind of out of touch with the state of the art of PGM technology. Does USAF embed CAS pilots with the infantry to do FAC duty these days, like USMC? Are ground based designators still used today, or is it all airborne turret pods?
Cheers,
Wes

Wes,

I was a pilot embedded with the 24th ID in 1990. Had been embedded guys since The Vietnam timeframe or just after. Ground, airborne pods / designators and PGM still used and very well. I worked with a fast jet guy who did a combat jump into Panama with the Army (wore the gold star on his jump wings).

He also called in a AC130 on a sniper hiding in a barracks. Dropped the barracks but did not hit the sidewalk that went around the building.

Cheers,
Biff

 

[BiffF15]

I'll let Biff speak for the USAF but the RAF does still employ fast jet aircrew in the FAC role. That said, it's not always necessary if you get a bright Pongo who can think faster than 30mph and has the imagination to appreciate that a solitary tree does not constitute a viable landmark for aircrew.

The 19th USAF Cief of Staff was a Spec Ops guy.

I trained my two enlisted tactical air controllers (ETACs) in Desert Shield first by demo, then by giving them 8 hours of continuous fighters. By the end of the day I was almost horse from debriefing and they were as proficient and good as most pilots. It helped that they were sharp and eager to learn (that is an awesome thing regardless of rank). One had a near photographic memory and could really sing. He was a voice activated jukebox! Pretty cool when your HUMVE had no radio for tunes.

Cheers,
Biff

 

[buffnut453]

The 19th USAF Cief of Staff was a Spec Ops guy.

I trained my two enlisted tactical air controllers (ETACs) in Desert Shield first by demo, then by giving them 8 hours of continuous fighters. By the end of the day I was almost horse from debriefing and they were as proficient and good as most pilots. It helped that they were sharp and eager to learn (that is an awesome thing regardless of rank). One had a near photographic memory and could really sing. He was a voice activated jukebox! Pretty cool when your HUMVE had no radio for tunes.

Cheers,
Biff

Entirely agree with your comment about being eager to learn. I just can't resist the occasional dig at the Pongoes 'cos...well, they deserve it. I've probably mentioned this before but my old squadron was training with the Hereford Hooligans. They'd provide the FAC for our jets coming in at 100ft in the UK's OLF range. At the start, the FACs would call out "solitary tree to east of small farmhouse" and then wonder why the pilots couldn't locate the target. Our response was to invite the entire Hereford team to spend 2 days with the squadron...and we flew every one of the FACs in the back seat of a Tonka to show them what the world looked like at 540kts and 250ft. Funnily enough, after 2 days of intensive training (and even more intensive socializing), the quality of the FAC support improved dramatically. To reciprocate, the squadron was invited to Hereford and we got to practice defensive driving and try out the urban simulator. Lots of fun was had by all...coupled with yet more intensive socializing! Happy days!

 

[XBe02Drvr]

One had a near photographic memory and could really sing. He was a voice activated jukebox! Pretty cool when your HUMVE had no radio for tunes.

Thanks for the stories! Those kind of experiences help make the memory of ugly or boring duty more pleasant.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Entirely agree with your comment about being eager to learn. I just can't resist the occasional dig at the Pongoes 'cos...well, they deserve it. I've probably mentioned this before but my old squadron was training with the Hereford Hooligans. They'd provide the FAC for our jets coming in at 100ft in the UK's OLF range. At the start, the FACs would call out "solitary tree to east of small farmhouse" and then wonder why the pilots couldn't locate the target. Our response was to invite the entire Hereford team to spend 2 days with the squadron...and we flew every one of the FACs in the back seat of a Tonka to show them what the world looked like at 540kts and 250ft. Funnily enough, after 2 days of intensive training (and even more intensive socializing), the quality of the FAC support improved dramatically. To reciprocate, the squadron was invited to Hereford and we got to practice defensive driving and try out the urban simulator. Lots of fun was had by all...coupled with yet more intensive socializing! Happy days!

"Walk a mile in my shoes...."
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Zipper730]

No, it was a matter of range.

That's not actually true...

The Army's air-defense role was essentially a continuation of ground-based artillery and coastal-defense: Previously part of this job was held by gunners on the ground and aircraft in the sky. When the USAF became an independent service, things sort of got balkanized.

The Army continued developing its AAA, which among other things included the Skysweeper. It had a listed range of 5-8 miles to an effective altitude of 30,000 feet, and a maximum effect altitude of 43,000 feet. Provided these numbers are remotely correct, it seems it would have only been of limited effectiveness against subsonic jet-bombers at altitude.

The Air to Air missiles were seen as a logical extension of this even before WWII ended and in the post-War period would grow to include the following

• MIM-3: Listed range of 25-30 miles, designed to kill jet-powered bombers like the B-47
• MIM-14: Listed range of 75-90 miles, and was designed to take out supersonic bombers like the B-58
• MIM-23: Listed range of around 1.2-16 miles at low altitudes it would appear, and later variants would extend high altitude range to around 50-62 miles

Problems occurred when it came to the USAF's role in national air-defense. They clearly had control of combat aircraft such as fighters and interceptors to kill bombers, and air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles were clearly their domain as well.

The problem was what to make of SAM's and SSM's: USAF probably felt that SAM's were a logical extension of air-defense, and SSM's a logical extension of bombardment; the US Army saw it as an extension of artillery (and both were technically right in their own way)

• Ballistic missiles had proven themselves to be quite a formidable threat in WWII as they were damned near impossible to intercept, and the Germans were already working on variants with intercontinental range: The limiting variable was accuracy and warhead size/yield; the nuclear warhead would greatly improve the yield of the warhead, but were quite massive in size at the time; the accuracy was tied to the gyro-stabilization system, and decreased over range: Both were improving with time though, and it wouldn't be long before nuclear warheads that were about the same as the V-2's would be available.
• Cruise missiles were also quite a threat, but were easier to shoot down: Supersonic performance would greatly change this, and accuracy issues would be fixed by a sufficiently powerful nuclear warhead. The missiles would be cheaper than a manned aircraft as they would not require life-support equipment, would only be used once, and if they were shot-down, no valuable aircrews would have to risk their necks (or the heads, and bodies attached to them).
• The US Army and US Navy were both concerned about the USAF acquiring a monopoly on nuclear-weapons, with the fear that they would be rendered obsolete if this occurred: The US Navy was concerned about being able to deliver a bomb with it's aircraft; the US Army wanted a missile of some sort that they could deliver.
• The US Army wanted to have a role in national defense other than artillery units (which were of limited effectiveness), and holding down the population in the event of nuclear war, which naturally lead them to want to develop SAM's into ABM's; and develop some kind of ballistic missile capability.
• The USAF was expressing a concern that their A/C should get shot down by SAM's without a unified command (which is of course theirs): I'm not sure if this was remotely valid at first (in politics, the argument matters more than the facts), but eventually things were streamlined and coordinated without removing the Army from the equation.

Ultimately the USAF was able to retain some SAM capability by labeling the BOMARC as the F-99 (if you call it a fighter, it's under AF control... names have power ), and DoD restrictions which limited the Army from developing missiles with ranges in excess of 200 miles (I'm not sure to what extent the Navy was affected as they were able to develop the Regulus I & II), but this was lifted with Sputnik).

The US Army developed the following anti-ballistic missiles

• Nike Zeus-A: Range of 200 miles with a 20 kiloton warhead detonated in the upper atmosphere to destroy single warheads. It didn't enter service and was mostly a testbed for the Zeus-B
• Nike Zeus-B: Range of 250 miles with a 400 kiloton warhead detonated either in the upper atmosphere or space to destroy single warheads. It was briefly used with modifications as an ASAT.
• Nike Spartan: Range of 460 miles with a 5 megaton warhead detonated in space to capitalize on X-ray kill so as to blow up a payload bus, and thus destroy multiple targets at once. A more advanced version was proposed with a more powerful rocket, a smaller warhead (more accuracy) and greatly increased range which either meant it would be command guided part of the way, or all of the way with TVM
• Sprint: Point-defense ABM shaped like a cone. It is a twin-staged rocket (the others were three-staged) with a 40 kiloton enhanced neutron warhead to maximize neutron kill; the warhead is designed to withstand being blasted out of the silo by a powder-charge (at which point, it might very well be supersonic) then subjected to maneuvering loads of several hundred g's, over 100g of continuous acceleration allowing it to accelerate to Mach 12 in 5 seconds, and the ability to take 'shocks' as much as 25,000g (flying through explosions of nearby blasts and also withstanding being shot out the silo). It basically would fly for all of 15-20 seconds with the booster being blown up 1.2 seconds after launch after the top-stage hot-fires.

The range of some of them clearly are quite massive and the Nike Spartan and Sprint were controlled by a series of PAR's (Perimeter Acquisition Radar) and MSR's (Missile Site Radar): The PAR was a blocky structure with a slanted wall on one side, which mounted the radar. The radar had a range of several hundred miles (not sure if that was just line of site and had OTH capability) and acquired the missiles in flight (I wouldn't be surprised if it was given data from the BMEWS as well), which then passed on the data to the MSR which launched and controlled the missiles in flight.

The MSR looked like a pyramid which could carry a phased-array antenna on each side that was capable of being serviced while online. Controlling the Sprint was a particular concern because of the fact that it's enormous temperatures would produce a sheath of plasma around the missile. The command signal was narrow and something like a megawatt in power so it was able to get through all of that anyway.
The computers used were remarkable for the time, though if I recall their processing power 10 MIPS (similar to a SEGA Game Gear), and utilized a multiple CPU core. It was able to rewire itself on the fly to handle the failure of one of the CPU's, and had self-correcting computer code.

As amazing as all this is: The most amazing thing was that it came in within cost, to specification, and on time.

It was part of a system called either Safeguard or Sentinel (I'm not sure which came first). The initial idea called for protecting 25 of the most economically prosperous cities with a limited missile-shield under the guise of countering China (not the USSR, though almost certainly it would have been used for this purpose). It was later reduced to 14 cities, which still worked out as the positioning of the missile sites and radars were still able to provide effective coverage of the United States (Far as I know the data from all this would be forwarded to NORAD, so they'd have a complete picture of what was happening)

The reason the system ironically wasn't fielded was basically political in nature: Admittedly it probably was a good one. Either as part of the SALT treaties, or as part of a specific treat on ABM's, there was an agreement to not develop a massive ABM system, but only two sites with 100 missiles each.

• One site would be to cover the National Command Authority
• The other site would be whatever each country decided
• The missile configurations could be whatever the nation decided

The US decided not to cover Washington D.C. for reasons that make little sense, but put one up in Grand Forks that would effectively cover most of the US from missiles coming from over the pole. Advanced proposals for the Spartan were developed which had superior acceleration, but the ability to throttle down, reducing acceleration during the climb allowing for greater target acquisition, or a coasting ability allowing it to acquire targets while in space: Supposedly this loiter mode would allow more accurate interceptions and greater ranges (2,000 nm) allowing much of CONUS to be effectively covered from Grand Forks.

The system would use an infrared seeker implicating either an active homing to target, or a TVM capability.

The system was defunded after it had been operational for all of a day, though it kept running for practical purposes several months after the fact: The Russians of course fielded the ABM-1 & ABM-3, and later the ABM-4. The number of sites, their placement and coverage I'm uncertain of, but the fact is that they would generally try and ensure that they would in practice develop SAM's that usually had some degree of inherent ABM functionality.

In the event of the abrogation of the treaty, there were plans to develop a more advanced system that was also more compact and was modular configuration (something that would have been amazing in itself even if it had the same capabilities of the less mobile MSR's), with greater capability to deal with the possibility of FOBS (Fractional Orbital Bombardment System), and MaRV's (Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle). There were at various times improved versions of the Sprint that were proposed with 2-4 times the acceleration and 3-4 times the maneuverability as insane as that sounds.

 

[tyrodtom]

A lot of verbiage there Zipper, but what does any of it have to do with whether we needed a independent air force, or not ??

 

[Zipper730]

A lot of verbiage there Zipper, but what does any of it have to do with whether we needed a independent air force, or not ??

I was responding to XBe02Drvr, though I'll see what I can do with brevity...

 

[XBe02Drvr]

That's not actually true...

The Army's air-defense role was essentially a continuation of ground-based artillery and coastal-defense: Previously part of this job was held by gunners on the ground and aircraft in the sky. When the USAF became an independent service, things sort of got balkanized.

All of what you're talking (at length) about is a later time frame from what I mentioned. SAGE was the first attempt at centralizing and integrating air defense all along the northern reaches of the continent, and as such was the only system with the capacity and range to target and control missiles with the range of Bomarc. The Air Force developed and built SAGE and was the only service with the technology to do so.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Zipper730]

All of what you're talking (at length) about is a later time frame from what I mentioned.

True the Nike Zeus, Spartan, and Sprint all came later. The point is that both the USAF and US Army were capable of complex and integrated systems.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

True the Nike Zeus, Spartan, and Sprint all came later. The point is that both the USAF and US Army were capable of complex and integrated systems.

It's a matter of timing. When SAGE came along, only the Air Force had the technology and the budget to build it, as well as the vision to see the need for it. The Army's hi tech capabilities came along later.
The vision thing was the biggie, and a major reason we needed a separate Air Force, even with its delusions of grandeur. Infantry, "the queen of battle" has always dominated the culture, the rank structure, the priorities, and the mindset of the Army, and hasn't got a strategic bone in its body. Navies, since the days of the Punic Wars, have been compelled by the very nature of their element and their own mobility to think strategically. Unfortunately, despite the exploits of marines throughout the millennia, navies have seldom excelled at extended inland campaigns, thus don't quite qualify as the "Universal Force" (unless you're British, of course!).
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Zipper730]

It's a matter of timing.

True, but one has to consider that the USAF was carved out of the USAAF. If the USAAF was still around, it would have managed a robust air defense.