True enough, but freed from the limitations of Armythink, USAF was able to go beyond "robust air defense" and focus (perhaps to excess?) on "globalthink".
Cheers,
Wes
Controversial Ideas: Did We Ever Need an Independent Air Force
- Thread starter Zipper730
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Cheers,
Wes
- Thread starter
- #142
Well the global aspect is the offensive side of things, the air-defense part was already starting to come together in 1940-1941, and after Pearl Harbor, it frankly put a firm boot in their ass to improve things (I would hope so!)
As for offensive: Was the USN more fundamentally geared for strategic operations than the Army (when I say strategic I do not mean bombing cities, I mean simply from the standpoint of operations that are aimed at the big picture and winning the war)
Of course everyone thinks of themselves as devoted to "the Big Picture" (you're too young to remember the 1950s TV series of that name that purported to be history, but was essentially US Army propaganda). But without the means to carry it out and the experience to effectively utilize those means, "big picture" thinking is essentially flawed. The Army rarely practices amphibious operations or seaborne logistics until a combat operation makes it necessary. The Marines have historically had unrealistic expectations of the Army when they got far enough inland to depend on Army logistics. Your Big Picture is apt to be based on faulty premises if you don't have an intimate grasp of all the moving parts, something, in my (prejudiced) opinion, the Navy has a broader experience of.
Cheers,
Wes
- Thread starter
- #144
Why?
Look at it this way: the Army's good at local logistics, such as getting troops, tanks, artillery, ammo, etc, from the dispersal yard to the battlefield. The Navy and the Air Force are daily practitioners of global logistics and intimately familiar with the practices, problems, and pitfalls that go along with it. If an F-18 on a carrier off the coast of DPRK sucks up a stray bolt off the flight deck and destroys one of its engines, the Navy can have a new engine delivered by COD flight in about twenty four hours, if they've used up their spares onboard. Same thing for the Air Force if they lose an engine in a garden spot like Diego Garcia or Bagram. They do this stuff every day and know how to make it work. Consequently their big picture is based on an accurate and detailed knowledge of their capabilities and a more realistic assessment of the outcome of an operation, IMHO.
Cheers,
Wes
Last edited:
- Thread starter
- #146
Was the Army more limited in this role due to lack of practice in peacetime?
Yes and because they lack the means of intercontinental logistics and are a captive "customer" of the Air Force and the Navy, neither of which views Army cooperation as the top of its priority list.
Cheers,
Wes
- Thread starter
- #148
I meant what I asked in context of the pre-1947 timeframe.
Well then, customer of the Navy. AAF didn't have what you could call "heavy lift" capability on an intercontinental scale. Top of the line was the C-54 (DC-4) which couldn't carry tanks, half-tracks, heavy artillery, etc. That capability didn't come along till the mid 1950s with the C-124 Globemaster.
Cheers,
Wes
parsifal
Colonel
Regarding the refusal of the RAF to pour sufficient resources into the Battle of the atlantic, I regard this one issue enough to argue against the establishment of a separate air force. Of itself, this one failing trumps all other counter arguments. That the RAF was prepared to lose the war rather than change their priorities is indictment enough to strongly (and overwhelmingly, IMO) support the validity of having a separate independent airforce. The RAF, to the bitter end, in 1942, did not want to divert resources away from its precious (and largely ineffective at least to that point) bomber offensive rather than admit they got it wrong. it took the initial persuasion of getting Churchill and his adviser lindemann onside and then a direct intervention by Churchill to get the bomber barons to change their priorities. that, to me, is verging on the criminal.
This is a somewhat more balanced overview of the issues for people to consider....
https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol15/tnm_15_4_19-41.pdf
This is a somewhat more balanced overview of the issues for people to consider....
https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol15/tnm_15_4_19-41.pdf
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
To be honest, only the Luftwaffe with their Me323 had "heavy lift" until transport technology improved postwar.
Other than that, virtually all militaries relied on their navies to move AFVs from point "A" to point "B" - however, the U.S. Army and the Imperial Japanese Army both possessed considerable sea-going assets in order to move their equipment.
The IJA is one of the few armies in history that had aircraft carriers.
Boy am I glad that maritime ASW patrol in the American system rests where it belongs, with the Navy. Can you imagine getting USAF interested in subhunting? "You guys are COASTAL Command. What's with this mid-ocean BS? That's not your area of responsibility. You don't need VLR aircraft to do your job!"
Cheers,
Wes
Fascinating! Tell us more.
buffnut453
Captain
Sorry Parsifal but I have to take issue with your perspectives. While it's undoubtedly true that there was continual tension between Bomber Command and Coastal Command, with the latter often being Cinderella while Bomber Harris was the wicked stepmother, your contention that CC lacked SUFFICIENT resources until the Battle of the Atlantic was effectively over is simply not backed up by the statistics.
U-boat successes reached their peak at the end of 1940 with 96 Allied ships lost for zero submarines sunk. That timeframe is coincident with the introduction of ASV Mk I. Prior to that point, the odds of a CC aircraft spotting a submarine were incredibly small. I have some sympathy for Harris's refusal to allow more heavy bombers to transfer to CC during this timeframe because they would spend a lot of time simply punching holes in the sky with little chance of success.
Once ASV Mk II was introduced in 1941, we see U-boat losses increase substantially so that, by the end of 1941, we were losing just 10 ships for every submarine sunk, which is a HUGE improvement over the previous year. There's an uptick in shipping losses in the first 4 months of 1942, to 20 ships lost for every submarine, as the U-boat force changed tactics and only surfaced at night. However, that increase in losses is reversed thanks to the introduction of the Leigh Light, after which the U-boat threat goes into terminal decline. By the end of 1942, only 7 ships were being lost for every U-boat sunk and by the middle of 1943, we're in the range 1-2 ships lost for every U-boat.
My view is that CC really couldn't do much about the U-boat threat until ASV came on the scene. Could CC have used more resources? Yes, absolutely. Have you ever seen a military organization that doesn't want more stuff or complain of its ability to perform its mission? I certainly haven't! However, CC had ENOUGH resources to win the Battle of the Atlantic and CC started winning that war at the beginning of 1941, not as you posit in 1942 or later.
Source of info on the ratio of Allied ships sunk to U-boats comes from Taffy Bowen's book "Radar Days".
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,022
- Jun 25, 2013
I don't think the problem with an independent air force, or independent marines, or independent special forces, or what-have-you is the independence, per se, but it's the subsequent bureaucratic battles that can end up causing either stupid decisions -- like all wars will be nuclear -- or ridiculous duplication of effort, not so much for front-line hardware but for all the back-end personnel needed to make the pointy end of the stick work. The reality has always been that any kind of strategic reach requires active cooperation between multiple services, be they navies and armies through centuries of history, or armies, navies, and air forces today.
Whether an independent air force is the optimum method to achieve that end is, I believe, still moot, not because of the independence, itself, but because there is a history of air force thinkers claiming that they could do it all alone, which was patent nonsense from the first day it was uttered and nobody but the True Believers took it seriously, but the True Believes, because they were loudest, absolutely certain, and got politicians' collective ears, the silly meme that wars could be won by guys who could jump out of comfy beds with clean sheets and fly over enemy cities, with all of the grime, bloodshed, dead, and maimed people on the opponent's side and none on yours, remained in vogue for decades.
Whether an independent air force is the optimum method to achieve that end is, I believe, still moot, not because of the independence, itself, but because there is a history of air force thinkers claiming that they could do it all alone, which was patent nonsense from the first day it was uttered and nobody but the True Believers took it seriously, but the True Believes, because they were loudest, absolutely certain, and got politicians' collective ears, the silly meme that wars could be won by guys who could jump out of comfy beds with clean sheets and fly over enemy cities, with all of the grime, bloodshed, dead, and maimed people on the opponent's side and none on yours, remained in vogue for decades.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The IJA operated several types of Escort or sub-Escort type carriers:
Akitsa Maru - landing craft depot ship; 8 operational aircraft (launch/recover), transport up to 30 aircraft.
Kumano Maru - landing craft carrier; 37 aircraft max., launch only.
Nigitsu Maru - landing craft depot ship (same as Akitsu Maru)
Shimane Maru - escort carrier; 12 aircraft (launch/recover)
Yamashio Maru - escort carrier; 8 aircraft (launch/recover)
The IJA also operated Type 3 transport submarines (armed only with defensive AA deck weapons)
Yu-1 class: 23 with 1 incomplete at war's end.
Yu-1001 class: 9 with 4 incomplete at war's end.
Yu-2001 class: 2 with 4 incomplete at war's end.
Yu-3001 class: 3 with 6 incomplete at war's end.
In addition, the IJA operated a broad range of other ships, like Tugboats, a former Australian cargo ship, assault ships, landing ships, etc.
In regards to the U.S. Army, they operated 127,800 ships of varying type. From cargo and troopships to minelayers, landing (assault) ships, tugs, aircraft repair depot ships and hospital ships.
Very interesting. Were these actually Army owned, operated, and crewed, or Navy assets assigned to Army command? I've spoken with a number of WWII sailors over the years who crewed on landing craft and minesweepers (they said) that were paid for out of the Army's budget and operated under Army command, but crewed by Navy personnel. One guy said: "The Skipper was a shavetail 2nd Louie 90 day wonder who didn't know port from starboard, and the real captain of the LST was the senior Boatswains Mate Chief who pretty much ran things. That Army guy almost got us all killed several times over."
Interesting relationship there.
Cheers,
Wes
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Nearly all Army ships were owned or leased by the Army.
Depending on the type of ship, it's mission profile and theater, the crew could be USN, USCG or Merchant Marine (Or a combination of each).
There's many instances where Coast Guard crews operated USN assets, too.
Depending on the type of ship, it's mission profile and theater, the crew could be USN, USCG or Merchant Marine (Or a combination of each).
There's many instances where Coast Guard crews operated USN assets, too.
Last edited:
- Thread starter
- #160
CVE's to transport fighter aircraft around?XBe02Drvr said:
They did own some transports at sea (from what I remember, combat ships were USN controlled, and non-combatants were anybody's, and boats whether combatant or not were anybody's), some say more than the Navy
Interesting way to look at it.parsifal said:
Patrick Blackett had said that the RAF was on the verge of being dismembered at the rate they were going.
The more services past a certain point cause more bickering basically?swampyankee said:
Correct
The vocal minority. I'm curious why they were able to get so much support in the Army, and so little in the Navy?
