Controversial Ideas: Did We Ever Need an Independent Air Force

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

I'm afraid that I'm going to have to take issue with this part:
The U.S. did not "barely disguise" the bombing of civilian centers. They did bomb cities, but cities that had industrial centers, transportation hubs and military complexes; therefore targets of importants - which included Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

To have an all-encompassing Air Force is not a viable option. It was tried with the Luftwaffe and in the end, it was more of a hindrance to their war effort.

Each branch of service has unique mission profiles as well as equipment requirements (Army, Navy Marines) and there is no reason why they shouldn't be allowed to have their own air arms. In this modern day and age, a dedicated "Air Force" would be best suited for Strategic Bombers, Missile and Space, Global Transport, etc.
 


Parsifal,

I see your point historically. However, what does the B-2 bring to the table? Inter-continenetal range, or essentially unlimited with aerial refueling thereby keeping it safe on home soil until such a time as it's needed. Stealth allows avoiding an enemies defenses. Todays fleet is no doubt well protected, but still more friendly people and equipment are at risk for longer vulnerability windows than with an asset like the B-2.

I think there is something to having a fleet, your fleet, off the coast or near a bad actors home. There is nothing like a reminder your opponent has a longer, sharper stick than you do. However, the real bad guys are not as easily intimidated and that I think is the value of assets like the B-2, F-22 & F-35.

Food for thought.

Cheers,
Biff
 
GrauGeist said:
The U.S. did not "barely disguise" the bombing of civilian centers.
Click to expand...
Okay, maybe you're right -- they might very well have been better disguised.

Regardless, the city-busting raids on Japan were aimed primarily at morale.
Nagasaki and Hiroshima.
Click to expand...
They were selected because they hadn't been burned down before, they had an industrial or military value, but had a large population. It seems obvious that the goal was the population while being able to hide behind a military objective. I'm not going to criticize the morality of the conduct, but that seemed the goal -- right or wrong.
To have an all-encompassing Air Force is not a viable option. It was tried with the Luftwaffe and in the end, it was more of a hindrance to their war effort.
Click to expand...
Agreed, they did not need a paratrooper arm, artillery didn't need to be controlled by them, and carrier aviation got it.
Each branch of service has unique mission profiles as well as equipment requirements (Army, Navy Marines) and there is no reason why they shouldn't be allowed to have their own air arms.
Click to expand...
Agreed
In this modern day and age, a dedicated "Air Force" would be best suited for Strategic Bombers, Missile and Space, Global Transport, etc.
Click to expand...
At best...
 

Zipper730,

Which cities in Japan were of military / industrial importance that had little or no population immediately surrounding them? Or any other country? Transportation in a country at war was thin so one needed to be able to walk to work. They also used highly flammable home construction materials as well which only compounded the problem. And of course they picked cities that had not been hit hard, you want your adversary to have a clear understanding of what is being brought to bear against them. It's called war, not peace, for a reason.

Just my opine.

V/R,
Biff
 
All cities selected as Atomic Bomb targets had a specific criteria:
Military complexes
Industrial and manufacturing complexes
Transportation hubs

They also had to remain free of any prior bombing in order to make the damage from the Atom Bomb set a clear example to the enemy as well as provide damage assesment for later study (Nagasaki was the exception)
In addition, the selection requirement needed that they be isolated from any neighboring cities by isolating geography to contain the blast.
 
While thinking of atomic bombs as humane weapons seems absurd I have always wondered how the alternative is viewed as humane?
Best alternative, bomb Japan with conventional weapon bombs/incendiaries/mies killing tens of thousands more, burn hundreds of thousands out of their homes with winter coming (Japan is not a tropical land) paralyze transport even more so fuel (coal) cannot be moved to provide heat so thousands die of exposure And food cannot be moved so thousands starve to death.
Sounds ever so much more humane than using two atomic bombs. (sarcasm)
Worst alterternative. Japan does not surrender in the winter of 1945/46 and the Invasion takes place in the Spring/summer of 1946. Even more destruction and loss of life on both sides.
 
Kokura was the primary target of the second atomic bomb.
3 bomb runs was made by Bockscar on Kokura before they gave up, and decided they might be able to see the target area better over Nagasaki.

I was stationed just outside of Kokura in the mid 60s, at the old Kokura arsenal, then named Yamada Camp, with over 400 munitions storage points, a lot of them underground bunkers with over 200,000 lbs explosive storage capacity each.
It wasn't discovered by the Allies until very late in WW2, a very definite legitimate military target.
 
fubar57 said:
Hiroshima was a city of considerable military importance.
Click to expand...
Yes
It contained the 2nd Army Headquarters, which commanded the defence of all of southern Japan.
Click to expand...
Yes, but, far as I know, the target was selected also because it had a large population around it (i.e. it was a city)

BiffF15 said:
Which cities in Japan were of military / industrial importance that had little or no population immediately surrounding them? Or any other country?
Click to expand...
The point was that the criteria for the use of the nuclear bomb was that it be a city or population center that had some form of military objective surrounding it.

It looks bad when a country attacks a population center that has no military value; however if you attack a population center that does have some military value (Kokura, Hiroshima, Nagasaki all did), you can hide behind the military value even if the target was the population (this was largely the objective since March, 1945). I'm not criticizing the morality of what was done (bombing cities was quite routine conduct at the time, and the reason we used a nuclear bomb was because we had them before anybody else did), just merely trying to see through what was said to get down to what was done and why.

As for it being a war: I don't think that really requires a clarification

GrauGeist said:
All cities selected as Atomic Bomb targets had a specific criteria:
Military complexes
Industrial and manufacturing complexes
Transportation hubs
Click to expand...
Yes but note the fact that they were selected because they were cities...
They also had to remain free of any prior bombing in order to make the damage from the Atom Bomb set a clear example to the enemy as well as provide damage assesment for later study (Nagasaki was the exception)
Click to expand...
I thought Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Kokura were all bombed to some extent, but were simply not wiped out?
In addition, the selection requirement needed that they be isolated from any neighboring cities by isolating geography to contain the blast.
Click to expand...
What's the point of that?
 
Zipper730 said:
Yes but note the fact that they were selected because they were cities...
Click to expand...
Virtually every city that was bombed during WWII had strategic importance because of it's proximity to military/industrial activity. Regardless of theater: ETO, MTO, Eastern Front, the Balkans, PTO and CBI.

There was absolutely no difference between the Atomic bombs and conventional bombs and like I mentioned before, the bombing of Tokyo killed, injured and displaced far more people than Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.
Sadly, that never seems to come up in conversations - it's like the current trend to villify rifles with a black finish and furniture, yet blue or nickel finished rifles with wood furniture are ignored...they both have the same function and acheive the same results - so too, with the atomic bombings versus the conventional bombings.

One familiar argument is that the Atomic Bomb survivors died of radiation exposure. Yes, this is true, but a great many survivors of Tokyo eventually died of their terrible burns or pulminory complications, too.

Zipper730 said:
I thought Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Kokura were all bombed to some extent, but were simply not wiped out?
Click to expand...
No, due to various reasons, the selected target cities had largely escaped any form of bombing with the exception of Nagasaki, which had been bombed about five times on a limited scale.

Zipper730 said:
YWhat's the point of that?
Click to expand...
The point being that the effects of the bomb would serve as a demonstration to the Imperial Japanese High Command that the damage they were seeing was from a single bomb.
It would also allow for accurate damage assesment by the Allies, as Atomic Bombs had never been used before.
 
GrauGeist said:
Virtually every city that was bombed during WWII had strategic importance because of it's proximity to military/industrial activity.
Click to expand...
Yes, but with Bomber Command for instance, most of the city bombing raids were carried out to attack the population. Even Harris said that with the exception of Essen, the general target was the city center, and industrial level destruction was a bonus.

With Japan, there might have been a bit more concern of industrial objectives but morale seemed first on the list when we were firebombing...
There was absolutely no difference between the Atomic bombs and conventional bombs
Click to expand...
That wasn't the point in the post I made about "barely disguised" attacks on population centers (I would concede that they weren't "barely disguised" but were more moderately disguised): Frankly what I was getting at was that they selected a target that had a military value and had a population around it -- since many city-busting raids were often aimed at morale first, with military/industrial objectives (however substantial) being either a secondary objective (or a bonus).
the bombing of Tokyo killed, injured and displaced far more people than Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.
Click to expand...
I have no idea how many were displaced, but from what I remember 100,000 or so were killed in Tokyo, 80,000 in Hiroshima, and 60,000 in Nagasaki...
One familiar argument is that the Atomic Bomb survivors died of radiation exposure. Yes, this is true, but a great many survivors of Tokyo eventually died of their terrible burns or pulminory complications, too.
Click to expand...
And birth-defects, that's really largely the only thing that makes me particularly squeamish about the bombings.
No, due to various reasons, the selected target cities had largely escaped any form of bombing with the exception of Nagasaki, which had been bombed about five times on a limited scale.
Click to expand...
Understood
Ok
 
In the fire bombings, there was also latent carcinogens released both from the cleanup and the groundwater that created complications for survivors, too.

The death toll of the Tokyo bombings have often been at a low estimate, but the population of Tokyo at the time saw a population density between 103,000 and 135,000 citizens per square mile out of a total population of almost 6.6 million (as of spring 1944).
During one bombing, nearly 16 square miles were burned out in a single night.

So the death toll has varied between 100,000 and 200,000 with roughly 1 million injured (most sources seem to agree on this number) and over 1 million displaced, although that figure has been estimated to be as high as 1.5 million.

However, unlike Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were closely scrutinized because, these were the first Atom Bombs used in warfare. So the figure for killed and wounded from Hiroshima: 150,000 (of a population of 330,000) and Nagasaki: 75,000 (of a population of 250,000), seem to be the standard figures with a little variation depending who's report is read. But they tend to be very close.

So if we total Hiroshima and Nagasaki's dead and wounded, we come to a count of 225,000 (+/).
Now if we add Tokyo's dead and wounded (using the low death estimate), we get a figure of 1,100,000 casualties.

To be clear, I am not minimizing the Atomic Bombings or the effects it had physically or psychologically on the Japanese people or the world at large, but it seems that they tend to be played up as earth-shattering monsters of the universe when in actuality, Tokyo was complete hell on earth and quite possibly has had no equal in the history of warfare.

 
GrauGeist said:
In the fire bombings, there was also latent carcinogens released both from the cleanup and the groundwater that created complications for survivors, too.
Click to expand...
I suppose that makes enough sense. I've never heard much about birth defects caused by them admittedly.
Sounds about right
So the death toll has varied between 100,000 and 200,000 with roughly 1 million injured (most sources seem to agree on this number) and over 1 million displaced, although that figure has been estimated to be as high as 1.5 million.
Click to expand...
So 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 displaced, 1,000,000 injured and 97,000 (Tokyo Fire Department), 100,000-130,000 estimates by others.
I was mostly focusing on the dead, not injured or displaced.
They were mostly noteworthy because it was one bomb that did it rather than about 12,000-16,000 pounds a plane, of 240-300 planes
 
I get into this discussion often. Usually with some Army or Marine infantry type that sees only what's in front of their nose. With a few exceptions, most ground pounders only care about their immediate area. Air Power is best used to severely degrade the opposing force before contact is made. This is done through interdiction, disrupting the enemy's ability to sustain offensive and defensive operations in depth. Destroying supplies, the means to transport, command, control, communication and intelligence capabilities, before those assets reach the battlefield, is the main purpose of an Air Force. Air power minded commanders understand this. Ground force commanders have a tendency toward the misuse of the aircrafts main strength, the ability to strike deep in the enemy's rear. This attached video, an excerpt from the 1947 film "Thunderbolt," explains it perfectly.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=apMBBSDu7Ww
 
Fighterguy said:
I get into this discussion often. Usually with some Army or Marine infantry type that sees only what's in front of their nose. With a few exceptions, most ground pounders only care about their immediate area.
Click to expand...
I'm aware of this, but most strategists (all services) usually understand the need to isolate the enemy from his supplies.
Destroying supplies, the means to transport, command, control, communication and intelligence capabilities, before those assets reach the battlefield, is the main purpose of an Air Force.
Click to expand...
An Army/Navy with an air-arm could develop this capability...
 
Zipper730 said:
I'm aware of this, but most strategists (all services) usually understand the need to isolate the enemy from his supplies.
An Army/Navy with an air-arm could develop this capability...
Click to expand...
Let me clarify. Surface combat commanders, historically, would focus on the immediate objective/threat, to the point of funnel vision. Even today, we hear whiny complaints from surface combatants about CAS, and basically how that should be the Air Forces single, most important mission. Likewise, Navy aircraft generally focus on supporting surface fleet operations over deep strikes in enemy territory. In the Army, Navy, and Marine Corpse, their air operations have to share personnel, budget, training, and equipment procurement, where the emphasis is placed on the needs of the surface components. A jack of all trades, makes a master of none. Comparatively speaking, you wouldn't choose an experienced carpenter over a plumber to establish the best way to fix a leak. The attached video was chosen because it mentions the bombing of the Abby on Monte Cassino. Ground force commanders thought that was the solution to their immediate problem of busting through the Gustav Line. Using the plumber reference, Air Force leaders were more than willing to lay pipe wherever the ground commanders (the carpenters) wanted it. But without coordinating, or consulting, air power was misapplied. The plumber laid the pipe as directed by the carpenter. Now the pipes are in the way of HVAC ducting and electrical lines, having to be completely redone. The bombing of Monte Cassino allowed German forces to use the rubble as a more defensive position. As the video demonstrates, it was after Air Force commanders implemented Operation Strangles attack on German supply routes, reduced Kesselring's ability to sustain defensive positions along the Gustav Line, that German forces had to withdraw.
An independent Air Force allows for planning, doctrine, and procurement, just to name a few, requirements that focus on the specific needs and abilities of air power. Doing so increases operational effectiveness, and making it a force multiplier. This was demonstrated during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
 
Fighterguy said:
Let me clarify. Surface combat commanders, historically, would focus on the immediate objective/threat, to the point of funnel vision.
Click to expand...
That's true, but you can train people to think more strategically. It's just you have to think of both tactics and strategy as a whole.
Even today, we hear whiny complaints from surface combatants about CAS, and basically how that should be the Air Forces single, most important mission.
Click to expand...
Well the way I see it, the strategic bombing guys saw it like this (pre-nuclear)
  • Strategic Bombing: After all we can attack the enemy from the inside out
  • Tactical Bombing: Mop up the supplies in movement
  • CAS: We'll do that if we can't win with the previous two.
The ground-guys want...
  • CAS: Protect the troops
  • Tactical Bombing: Impede the resupply of troops and equipment to the battlefield
  • Strategic Bombing: Take things out at the source
The problem obviously relies around obsessing around either CAS or strategic bombing
Likewise, Navy aircraft generally focus on supporting surface fleet operations over deep strikes in enemy territory.
Click to expand...
However they understand the concept of blockades, destruction of merchant shipping, strikes into enemy territory even if they favor support of surface operations.
In the Army, Navy, and Marine Corpse, their air operations have to share personnel, budget, training, and equipment procurement, where the emphasis is placed on the needs of the surface components.
Click to expand...
That comes down to personalities, as there were people in the US Army, USN and USMC who saw aviation to fulfill a variety of missions. I should point out that the US Marine Corps was very good at CAS/BAI, the US Navy was mostly geared for fleet-to-fleet engagements, but were also willing to interdict merchant shipping as well (which is interdiction), and were able to take the war onto land when they had to.
An independent Air Force allows for planning, doctrine, and procurement, just to name a few, requirements that focus on the specific needs and abilities of air power.
Click to expand...
The fact is that with areas of responsibility as established in WWII, it would be possible to allocate command set-ups that would allow proper defense of the US, and allow for strategic operations.
  • Alaska was under the command of the US Army: Far as I know the US Navy was involved as well, just the commander of the theater was an Army General
  • Parts of the Pacific were under the command of Admiral Chester Nimitz: Even though there were Army operations in the theater, the commander happened to be a Navy Admiral/Fleet-Admiral.
  • The Southwest Pacific Theater was under the command of General Douglas MacArthur: Though Navy operations occurred in this area, the command was under an Army General. General MacArthur understood how to carry out strategic operations.
  • The Continental United States: Not sure what the command was called, but it seems the US Army and US Navy were able to provide effective defense.
The issue largely is that the ground guys have to know what the aircraft can do, and the aircraft guys have to be able to communicate their abilities and strengths to the guys on the ground.
 
I'm afraid it's far more complex than that. Whenever there are budget considerations, priority will ALWAYS be given to a particular service's favourite needs. For the Army that will ALWAYS be heavy-iron land-based capabilities (tanks, artillery etc). It is HIGHLY unlikely that an air-centric army officer would advance to highest office, and hence the bias gets perpetuated over the generations as senior officers promote people like them. In the end, air capabilities will atrophy under the harsh glare of budget pressures.

Just look at the parlous state of the USAAC's pursuit capabilities in the run-up to WW2. People like Chennault were being sidelined because their thinking didn't align with their own USAAC leadership (the bomber will always get through) and "big army" really didn't care about pursuit aircraft...so the capability withered, morale was low and pursuit officers went for years without being promoted. I expect a similar situation would occur, but with more widespread impacts than just air-to-air combat, if the USAF or RAF were to be subsumed by the older services.
 
buffnut453 said:
Whenever there are budget considerations, priority will ALWAYS be given to a particular service's favourite needs. For the Army that will ALWAYS be heavy-iron land-based capabilities (tanks, artillery etc).
Click to expand...
Then how did the US Navy despite having a lot of battleship Admirals manage to see carriers see any development at all despite treaties restricting their number, and massive numbers of flying boats to sink merchant shipping?
Just look at the parlous state of the USAAC's pursuit capabilities in the run-up to WW2. People like Chennault were being sidelined because their thinking didn't align with their own USAAC leadership
Click to expand...
And the USAAC was bomber-centric. The Army itself would likely have been preferential to attack and observation planes based on it's natural preferences
"big army" really didn't care about pursuit aircraft...
Click to expand...
I'm surprised about that as they'd be useful for escorting the attack planes and carrying out strafing missions.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.

Users who are viewing this thread

Total: 1 (members: 0, guests: 1)

Similar threads

11th Air Force
Replies
7
Views
714
GreenKnight121
A
Perun: Building the Worst WW2 Air Force
Replies
13
Views
1K
pinehilljoe
D
8Th Air Force Fighter Groups
Replies
3
Views
1K
pbehn
P
C
Question about 8Th air force WW2
Replies
5
Views
1K
criannick
C
Why did the U.S. navy reject the F6U Pirate?
Replies
11
Views
746
Jabberwocky
J
Menu
Log in
Register