Could earlier arrival of No. 453 Squadron have saved Force Z? (1 Viewer)

[Admiral Beez]

RAAF No. 453 Squadron sortied six Buffaloes, which arrived over the sinking HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales. Later five more 453sq Buffaloes were sortied. Had these first six Buffaloes arrived before the first IJNAS strike, and the later five before the second strike, could Force Z have been saved? The Japanese bombers had no fighter escorts, but there were a lot of bombers.

Wave 1: The High-Level Level Bombing Raid (~11:13 AM), 9 Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers
Wave 2: The First Torpedo Strike (~11:40 AM) 18 Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers
Wave 3: The Combined Finishing Blow (~12:20 PM) 17 × Mitsubishi G4M and 9 × G3M
Wave 4: A final group of 9 G3M arrived over the sinking ships at 12:45 PM

HMS Prince of Wales was equipped with Type 281 air-warning radar, which successfully detected the incoming first wave of Japanese aircraft at approximately 10:40 AM, giving Phillip's a possible 20 min to send a radio warning to No. 453 Squadron.

The best chance for Force Z and the RAAF is to arrive after Wave 1 has departed, since those nine Nells scored only one relatively minor bomb hit on Repulse before departing. It's Wave 2's eighteen low level torpedo-armed Nells that the first six Buffaloes must break up. What are their chances? By the time the five additional Buffaloes arrive, Wave 3 will be arriving at two altitudes. I'd suggest that the fighters focus on breaking up torpedo attacks and leave the high altitude bombers to chance. The first six Buffaloes will be low on ammunition - should they stick around?

If only the 51 disassembled Hurricane Mk IIBs that arrived in Singapore on January 3, 1942 (and 9 more that arrived on Jan 13) had been sent earlier, arriving in October or November 1941. Imagine two dozen Hurricanes tearing into those unescorted IJNAS bombers.

 

[Shortround6]

There is a lot of space between possible and probable.

Many naval battles are decided by luck/chance.

"Wave 1: The High-Level Level Bombing Raid (~11:13 AM), 9 Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers"
Scored one hit on the Repulse with no serious damage. No flooding, no guns knocked out, no loss of propulsion.

"Wave 2: The First Torpedo Strike (~11:40 AM) 16 to 18 Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers"
One hit on the Prince of Wales but it was the hit that doomed both ships.
The Hit caused major flooding and loss of propulsion and loss of electrical power. Between the flooding (listing) and loss of electrical power the PoW only had two effective 5.25in turrets left and several of her octuple 2pdrs were without power. 2pdr mounts on the port side may not have been able to depress enough to deal with torpedo planes even under manual power.
A hit 150-200ft further forward would not have been as catastrophic, even if the outer shaft had been taken out of service. Less flooding and less disruption of power plant (generators and pumps). 150-200ft aft might have been a miss or blown the stern off. even if the rudder was lost the ship would have been on a more even keel and had most (all?) of it's electical power and pumps.
Repulse had just about the worst AA battery of any British capitol ships and was worse than many British cruisers. She was not up to task of defending the group (or herself).

"Wave 3: The Combined Finishing Blow (~12:20 PM) 17 × Mitsubishi G4M and 9 × G3M"
Several more hits on the PoW and 4 (?) on the Repulse. Battle is over at this point.

Japanese had two Kongo class BCs, eight heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, twelve destroyers and several submarines looking for Force Z.

Force Z had four destroyers which two were WW I relics. The Tenedos had been sent back due to low fuel. Japanese state of fuel......???
The Buffaloes may have been able to stop the 2nd wave from getting a critical hit.
They may have been able to stop the 3rd wave from getting as many hits and if the PoW had electrical power and was not listing so bad a much more effective AA defense.
But any major loss of speed could/lead to a surface engagement or submarine/surface engagement and then it is up to Japanese as to what would happen. The British do not have the aircraft strike forces to really engage the Japanese surface ships. Two British capitol ships cannot engage ten Japanese BC and CAs if the Japanese wish to press the engagement.
The British Destroyers have no chance against the Japanese destroyers due to sheer numbers.

 

[EwenS]

The Japanese subs were positioned to the North of the area where Force Z was located and sunk.

IJN surface forces were even further north and moving away from Force Z.

Neither was going to pose a threat to a damaged Force Z.

Map of movements is here:-
Naval Battle of Malaya 4-10 December 1941. British & Japanese movements 1957 map Stock Photo - Alamy

 

[Admiral Beez]

There is a lot of space between possible and probable.

Many naval battles are decided by luck/chance.

"Wave 1: The High-Level Level Bombing Raid (~11:13 AM), 9 Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers"
Scored one hit on the Repulse with no serious damage. No flooding, no guns knocked out, no loss of propulsion.

"Wave 2: The First Torpedo Strike (~11:40 AM) 16 to 18 Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers"
One hit on the Prince of Wales but it was the hit that doomed both ships.
The Hit caused major flooding and loss of propulsion and loss of electrical power. Between the flooding (listing) and loss of electrical power the PoW only had two effective 5.25in turrets left and several of her octuple 2pdrs were without power. 2pdr mounts on the port side may not have been able to depress enough to deal with torpedo planes even under manual power.
A hit 150-200ft further forward would not have been as catastrophic, even if the outer shaft had been taken out of service. Less flooding and less disruption of power plant (generators and pumps). 150-200ft aft might have been a miss or blown the stern off. even if the rudder was lost the ship would have been on a more even keel and had most (all?) of it's electical power and pumps.
Repulse had just about the worst AA battery of any British capitol ships and was worse than many British cruisers. She was not up to task of defending the group (or herself).

"Wave 3: The Combined Finishing Blow (~12:20 PM) 17 × Mitsubishi G4M and 9 × G3M"
Several more hits on the PoW and 4 (?) on the Repulse. Battle is over at this point.

Japanese had two Kongo class BCs, eight heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, twelve destroyers and several submarines looking for Force Z.

Force Z had four destroyers which two were WW I relics. The Tenedos had been sent back due to low fuel. Japanese state of fuel......???
The Buffaloes may have been able to stop the 2nd wave from getting a critical hit.
They may have been able to stop the 3rd wave from getting as many hits and if the PoW had electrical power and was not listing so bad a much more effective AA defense.
But any major loss of speed could/lead to a surface engagement or submarine/surface engagement and then it is up to Japanese as to what would happen. The British do not have the aircraft strike forces to really engage the Japanese surface ships. Two British capitol ships cannot engage ten Japanese BC and CAs if the Japanese wish to press the engagement.
The British Destroyers have no chance against the Japanese destroyers due to sheer numbers.

My thinking is if the first six Buffaloes can break up the torpedo bombers of Wave 2, and the second five Bufflaoes again focus on stopping Wave 3s torpedo bombers, we must just get Force Z out of there. I don't know if Wave 4 was torpedo or level bombers.

 

[EwenS]

This was the closest an IJN subs got to Force Z


9 December 1941:
SE of Indochina near Poulo Condore Island (05-00N, 105-30E). At 1415 (local), I-65 reports sighting "two enemy battleships, course 340, speed 14 knots" to SubRon 5 aboard YURA. This is Vice Admiral Sir Tom Phillips' Force "Z" with the new battleship HMS PRINCE OF WALES, old battlecruiser HMS REPULSE, destroyers HMS ELECTRA, EXPRESS, TENEDOS and Australian destroyer HMAS VAMPIRE. Phillips had sortied from Singapore to find and attack the Malaya invasion transports.

LtCdr Harada's report is received by YURA, light cruiser KINU and the 81th Naval Communications Unit in Saigon. The reception is poor and YURA needs another 1.5 hours to decode and relay the message to Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo aboard flagship CHOKAI.

I-65 surfaces and starts a tail chase but a sudden squall cloaks the British ships. While Harada continues the chase, a Kawanishi E7K "Alf" from the KINU buzzes I-65, mistaking it for an enemy submarine. Harada crash-dives. When he surfaces 30 minutes later, the contact with Phillips' force is lost.


10 December 1941:
140 miles east of Kuantan, Malaya. I-58 is stationed farther N than I-65. Shortly after midnight, I-58 is running on the surface when her lookouts spot the approaching British ships 660 yds off the starboard bow. I-58 dives immediately.

Kitamura attempts to fire a full six-torpedo salvo on the leading PRINCE OF WALES, but his first torpedo tube's outer door jams. POW passes by. [1]

REPULSE comes by next. Kitamura fires all his remaining torpedoes, but misses. He reports Force Z proceeding SSW at 24 knots. The report is received by light cruiser SENDAI that relays it to Vice Admiral Ozawa's flagship, cruiser CHOKAI. At 0615, I-58 loses contact with Force Z.


The max surface speed of these subs is 20 knots. I-58 is reported in another source to have followed Force Z at 16 knots.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Middlebrook and Mahoney in their book Battleship give the time line as

10.15 Japanese scout spotted by force Z
11.13 first bombing attack
11.40 first torpedo attack
11.58 Repulse asks for air cover
12.20 453 squadron airborne
12.35 Repulse sinks
13.20 453 squadron arrives
13.23 Prince of Wales sinks

They then adjust things so force Z asks for air cover at 10.18 and 11 Buffalo from 453 squadron arrive at 11.30, but they have compressed the take off time from 22 minutes historically to 12 minutes, it becomes 11.40 without the adjustment.

Assuming the Buffalo arrive "just in time" the ships had only signal lamps to communicate with the fighters, requiring the fighters to notice the lamp or spot the IJN aircraft themselves. Maximum range AA fire as indicators would be about the only way to "control" the fighters. Also the IJN torpedo bombers came in faster and higher than the British ones meaning they were initially thought to be low level bombers.

The fighters then have to linger over the ships for another 40 minutes despite the fuel they would have used trying to intercept and probably the usual excess ammunition usage of inexperienced pilots.

As a rough estimate it was around 175 miles from Singapore to where Force Z was attacked.

RAF performance figures, Buffalo, 4x0.50 inch machine guns, 250 rpg for the fuselage pair, 500 rpg for wing guns. Figures at 15,000 feet,

Buffalo
255 mph, range 520 miles, endurance 1.78 hours, 92 gallons of fuel
255 mph, range 840 miles, endurance 3.28 hours, 133 gallons of fuel
180 mph, range 900 miles, endurance 4.9 hours, 133 gallons of fuel.

Flight time from Battleship says they were doing economic cruise, deduct 2 hours for round trip, another 30 minutes for reserves, leaving say 2 hours patrol time, assuming maximum fuel and no combat.

Hurricane IIA, 8x0.303 inch machine guns with 300 rpg.
281 mph, range 314 miles, endurance 1.12 hours, 97 gallons of fuel
168-176 mph, range 524 miles, endurance 3.12 hours, 97 gallons of fuel

Flight time, deduct 2 hours for round trip, another 30 minutes for reserves, leaving say 30 minutes patrol time.

The IJN submarine report on 9 December put the British force around 120 miles from the IJN cruiser force. Dusk on 9 December brought IJN floatplane reports of the British position, there were 53 level and torpedo bombers in the area as another IJN float plane announced a sighting report and dropped a flare to let the other aircraft know exactly where. Under the flare Admiral Ozawa in Chokai started the emergency it is us not them procedure, turned away and all IJN aircraft were recalled. Admiral Kondo further to the north with the 2 Battlecruisers then took charge, concentrating forces.

Force Z was doing 26 knots when a flare estimated at 5 miles range ahead was spotted, the force turned away, it did not pick up anything on radar.

 

[Shortround6]

As a rough estimate it was around 175 miles from Singapore to where Force Z was attacked.

I had not realized they were so close.
Even damaged and making 10 knots that means the Japanese only had around 17-18 hours (less?) to intercept and attack with air, surface or subs.
How many hours from the 1st Torpedo attack to sundown/dark?
Japanese bombers were heavily shot up. A second strike that day is probably out of the question? Time back to base, rearm/repair light damage and take-off fly back might mean arriving after dark?
Japanese Cruiser force steaming at 24 or more knots might intercept where? If at all?
Could Japanese subs running at 20 knots catch them before getting close to Singapore?
Of course if the damaged British ships can do even 18 knots (10 hours to home) the Japanese have very little chance of intercepting with anything.

 

[buffnut453]

I think the short answer is that earlier request for air support from Force Z would have prevented the loss of HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales on 10 Dec 1941. However, Force Z would remain an operational liability; it was too small to engage Japanese forces or even to protect itself, which means it's simply adding to the assets that Far East Command must protect with the scarce assets available. In all likelihood, had Force Z survived beyond 10 Dec 1941 it would have been withdrawn to protect India. If not, it probably would have been sunk in Singapore or during a later engagement if it had sortied from the RN base.

 

[Admiral Beez]

In all likelihood, had Force Z survived beyond 10 Dec 1941 it would have been withdrawn to protect India.

Agreed. For starters, with her very short endurance at speed and rubbish air defence, HMS Repulse has no business being in the Pacific theatre. Would Phillips be the PacFleet commander during Java Sea? He might be tempted to try his ships' luck alongside Doorman et al.

 

[buffnut453]

Agreed. For starters, with her very short endurance at speed and rubbish air defence, HMS Repulse has no business being in the Pacific theatre. Would Phillips be the PacFleet commander during Java Sea? He might be tempted to try his ship's like alongside Doorman et al.

You raise a good point. The only way Force Z could remain a force in being and stand any chance of success is if it combined with the NEI's naval assets. If nothing else, that would have created a more balanced fleet. I still don't think it would have made much difference in the long run...but it might have given the Japanese forces a bloody nose or two.

 

[yulzari]

Let us be hard hearted and look at this from the overall Malayan and Burmese campaigns. If Force Z survived to attack the Japanese transports and did significant damage to them it is likely that the Japanese would be able to sink the entire Force Z sortie. Á grave loss and desperately sad for the relatives of those lost and a horror to those who died. I do note that, by the time that the Japanese army were approaching Singapore they were extremely short of supplies generally and ammunition in particular. In our AH of notable losses of the Japanese transports ships this would be even worse and British Intelligence should be aware of this. It sets up a Wellingtonian Lines of Torre Vedras. Drawing the Japanese out of the jungles etc.of the peninsula onto the more open planned defensive ground north of Johore where the concentrated British forces in Malaya, close to their supplies in Singapore, can let the Japanese destroy themselves onto the well supplied prepared defence without the means to force the issue.

Á more minor consequence is that the landings in the DEI relied upon the reuse of said, now sunken or damaged, transports so the pressure on the DEI is more limited.

IOTL, where Force Z is sunk anyway, the Royal Navy withdrew to Ceylon so is no worse off if Force Z can engage the Japanese transports ships this convoys. Strategically it does not have to defeat the Japanese fleet but only the transports nor need it survive the engagement as long as it hits enough transports to weaken the Japanese army that lands in Malaya. Of course it needs a bold army commander to risk a Torre Vedras gamble but such a one, enacted by the excellent staff work of which General Percival was capable, in support of said bold commander may have led to a very different Malayan campaign. However, I do recognise that the ongoing support of Malaya from across the Indian Ocean would be a hard task and the end result might not avoid a slower defeat but it would need the Japanese to divert troops from the Burmese campaign and possibly Sumatra to keep up the pressure and allow a very different Burmese campaign which remains inside Burma and later allows both an earlier progress of the liberation of Burma and allow the Burma Road to remain open to supply China which could benefit from more effort in Yunnan and Burma to keep the Road clear to get those supplies.

However, this could digress into a whole AH thread so, keeping to the OP, the benefit of RAAF cover avoiding the loss of Force Z as IOTL is that it can affect the progress of the land battle and that effect might have major implications on the whole regional campaign from China to The DEI. Naval folk can advise me of the comparative numbers and qualities of the two fleet's radar and whether there is an opportunity for the smaller Force Z to effect á successful night action on the transport ships? The timings of the OTL action are a lesson in the value of radar piquet ships extending the warning period which would allow the RAAF fighters more time to arrive and engage the torpedo bombers which are the real ship killers. With no direct radio contact with the fighters the whole Royal Navy fighter direction system which proved so valuable in the Mediterranean is entirely lost.

 

[Admiral Beez]

However, this could digress into a whole AH thread so, keeping to the OP, the benefit of RAAF cover avoiding the loss of Force Z as IOTL is that it can affect the progress of the land battle and that effect might have major implications on the whole regional campaign from China to The DEI.

I think after making what can only be seen as a miraculous escape from multiple airstrikes, Phillips (or his COs and staff) will be reluctant to continue northward to engage any transport ships. And besides, The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) transports landed their troops 60 hours before Force Z was sunk, so the horse has left the stable. Which is a good thing considering the IJN submarines and surface units waiting up Malaya's coast.

My guess is that after their harrowing experience, Force Z will head southward. The question is, does Force Z re-enter Singapore? The naval base is on a dead-end and has already been under bomber attack for two days, and I have no faith that the Buffaloes can save Force Z a second time. If Repulse has the fuel, I recommend Force Z skip Singapore, meet up with HMS Mauritius as she departs and head straight for Ceylon to await orders and the arrival of HMS Indomitable in Jan 1942.

 

[EwenS]

I think after making what can only be seen as a miraculous escape from multiple airstrikes, Phillips (or his COs and staff) will be reluctant to continue northward to engage any transport ships. And besides, The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) transports landed their troops 60 hours before Force Z was sunk, so the horse has left the stable. Which is a good thing considering the IJN submarines and surface units waiting up Malaya's coast.

My guess is that after their harrowing experience, Force Z will head southward. The question is, does Force Z re-enter Singapore? The naval base is on a dead-end and has already been under bomber attack for two days, and I have no faith that the Buffaloes can save Force Z a second time. If Repulse has the fuel, I recommend Force Z skip Singapore, meet up with HMS Mauritius as she departs and head straight for Ceylon to await orders and the arrival of HMS Indomitable in Jan 1942.

I don't see any reason not to send them back to Singapore Naval Base.

Firstly they would need fuel for the nearly 2,000 mile trip to Trincomalee via Sunda Strait. All that high speed steaming must have burned a lot of fuel.

Secondly Singapore Naval Base was used for unloading ships from some of the reinforcement convoys right through into mid / late Jan 1942. One vessel that docked there on 13th Jan was the USS Mount Vernon (24,300 tons; 705ft long). The SS Sussex also arrived at the same time to discharge her cargo that included the 51 Hurricanes IIb. Both were in convoy DM1. The rest of the ships in DM1 discharged through Keppel Harbour.

Japanese bombers were active and inflicted some minor damage on ships in the various convoys but none were sunk while in harbour, but ships were being turned round in a couple of days. There were AA defences in place to which the ships would have added.

Edit:- Mauritius couldn't be made ready for sea until the early hours of 15th Dec. Her refit had been cut short on outbreak of war. Because she had been in dry dock until 2nd Dec, she had been deammunitioned, destored and her crew were in shore barracks as was normal practice. Her light AA was reactivated on the 7th and was able to engage Japanese air raids on 8th Dec. Everything else took a bit longer to organise.

 

[yulzari]

I think after making what can only be seen as a miraculous escape from multiple airstrikes, Phillips (or his COs and staff) will be reluctant to continue northward to engage any transport ships. And besides, The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) transports landed their troops 60 hours before Force Z was sunk, so the horse has left the stable. Which is a good thing considering the IJN submarines and surface units waiting up Malaya's coast.

My guess is that after their harrowing experience, Force Z will head southward. The question is, does Force Z re-enter Singapore? The naval base is on a dead-end and has already been under bomber attack for two days, and I have no faith that the Buffaloes can save Force Z a second time. If Repulse has the fuel, I recommend Force Z skip Singapore, meet up with HMS Mauritius as she departs and head straight for Ceylon to await orders and the arrival of HMS Indomitable in Jan 1942.

It rather begs the question of what was it that Force Z was expected to do?

 

[Admiral Beez]

It rather begs the question of what was it that Force Z was expected to do?

I suppose what the RN is always expected to do, go into harm's way, against whatever odds. HMS Warspite's run into Narvik comes to mind, damn the mines and a dozen torpedo armed KM destroyers. Sometimes, like Admiral Phillips or Craddock, it doesn't work out.

 

[EwenS]

I suppose what the RN is always expected to do, go into harm's way, against whatever odds. HMS Warspite's run into Narvik comes to mind, damn the mines and a dozen torpedo armed KM destroyers. Sometimes, like Admiral Phillips or Craddock, it doesn't work out.

You make Second Narvik sound like the Charge of the Light Brigade with Warspite out in front and Vice Admiral Whitworth on the bridge shouting "Tally Ho", all as if it was a hunt back in Britain!

Narvik is over 100 miles up Ofotfjord and it took several hours to navigate the route. It was the 9 destroyers led by Cossack that led the run up Ofotfjord with Warspite bringing up the great. Warspite launched one of her Swordfish. It was airborne for over three hours during which it sank a U-boat. It was the destroyers Cossack & Eskimo that came off worst, but it was the destroyers, not Warspite that did most of the damage to the enemy.

 

[Shortround6]

According to at least one account, the Swordfish acted as spotter for the Warspite, directing fire when the Warspite could not actually see a target.
Confirmation would be nice but if true shows that Whitworth was being cautious.

A lot more cautious than the Germans who got their destroyers up the fjord without paddles and short of rocks.
They needed tanker support to return to Germany (or at least very far down the Norwegian coast) and they had expended some of their torpedoes and fair amount of ammo in earlier battles.
Only one of 3 tankers planned got to Narvik and at least one supply/ammunition ship failed to make it. The German operation had too many moving parts and when some of the parts failed a large part of the Kriegsmarine was trapped short of fuel and ammo facing superior forces.

 

[yulzari]

According to at least one account, the Swordfish acted as spotter for the Warspite, directing fire when the Warspite could not actually see a target.
Confirmation would be nice but if true shows that Whitworth was being cautious.

A lot more cautious than the Germans who got their destroyers up the fjord without paddles and short of rocks.
They needed tanker support to return to Germany (or at least very far down the Norwegian coast) and they had expended some of their torpedoes and fair amount of ammo in earlier battles.
Only one of 3 tankers planned got to Narvik and at least one supply/ammunition ship failed to make it. The German operation had too many moving parts and when some of the parts failed a large part of the Kriegsmarine was trapped short of fuel and ammo facing superior forces.

What? Nazi Germany failed from weak logistics! Who would have thought it?…….

 

[Admiral Beez]

While an aircraft carrier wasn't in the cards, could Force Z have been provided with FAA fighter cover from RNAS Sembawang? I'm thinking of a squadron of 24 Fulmars (plus six spares) shipping out in late October 1941 when Force Z is sent out, but on a fast transport to arrive in late November rather than with the ambling Force Z. By October 1941, the Fairey Aviation Company had built roughly 500–600 Fulmars, with production continuing at a healthy rate, so aircraft should be available. Aircrews may be another story.

In late August 1941 the Admiralty began discussing reinforcement of the Far East, with the decision taken, in principle in early Sept 1941 to send a modern capital ship to Singapore. By the 24-28 Sept, the final composition of Force Z is settled around HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. This is where my Fulmars enter the plan. The Admiralty knows Force Z will need aircover and that the four squadrons of RAF Buffaloes covering all of Malaya (over 60% the size of Great Britain) will be hard pressed on air defence if Japan moves. With no carrier available in Sept 1941 (HMS Ark Royal needs desperate refit, HMS Illustrious and Formidable in repair, HMS Indomitable not ready, etc.) the Admiralty decides on 28 Sept 1941 to send 30 Fulmars by fast transport (19 knots) to RNAS Sembawang. These arrive at Singapore on the 23 Nov 1941. From then until about 2 Dec, the FAA crews assemble the aircraft (folding wings should help speed that along) and begin test and familiarization flights, so to be operational on 7 Dec 1941. Force Z arrives on 2 Dec 1941 with the first flight of Fulmars overhead. On Dec 8, 1941 Japan invades Malaya, but now Singapore possesses an additional naval fighter squadron.

Can our twenty-four Fulmars save Force Z? I assume the RAAF Buffaloes will be withdrawn to other duties. To be the Fulmar, with its 5-hours of combat endurance and 6,000 rounds of ammunition seems ideal for killing unescorted Nells and Bettys.

 

[Shortround6]

It is possible that such a force could have been useful. Assuming of course that such a force was actually available, and the trained crews (ground crew and air crew) were available.

However,
"By October 1941, the Fairey Aviation Company had built roughly 500–600 Fulmars, with production continuing at a healthy rate, so aircraft should be available."
maybe in error. Fairey built 600 Fulmars by the end of Dec 1942.
The First 250 planes were Fulmar Is with the 1080hp engines they were bog slow.
The first Production Fulmar IIs start to show up in March 1941 with the 1300hp Merlin 30s.
Having 30 Mk IIs available in Sept 1941 is looking a bit dubious. FAA needs to replace the MK Is on existing carriers and forward land bases as fast as possible.

The whole Force Z plan was dubious at best and triumph of racism/wishful thinking/stupidity at worst.
Granted not a lot was known about Japanese capabilities in 1937-42 but what was known seems to have been ignored. The Idea of sending one new battleship and one old, crappy battlecruiser (with just about no back up/escorts) to "scare" the Japanese just seems incredibly stupid.
Japanese had 6 battleships and 4 battlecruisers (Yamato was unknown) Unknown is how many they were committing to use against the Americans and in what order.
Japanese had 12 Cruisers with 8in guns (Mogami gun swap was not known), British sent zero cruisers and were possible going to 'borrow" a few cruisers from the Indian Ocean convoy escort duty?
British knew that all/most of the Japanese capitol ships had refits or at least boiler swaps.
British knew that the Japanese carriers could carry a lot more planes than the British carriers could. How good the planes were is questionable but then the British were still using a lot of biplanes on their carriers.
Japanese had been fighting in China for years.
How long would it take for the Americans to come across the Pacific if the Japanese attacked the Philippines?
The Japanese had several months to beat up on the British and Dutch before the great American battlefleet shows up if there is no Pearl Harbor, leaving the Japanese free to battle the Americans without worrying about the British token force in their rear. White man's superiority was only going to go so far.

The Fulmars offer a limited capability for limited missions.
Yes Fulmars were sent to Ceylon in March of 1942? but that is 5-6 months later. A lot changed in those 5-6 months.

Two Squadrons of Blenheim fighters could have done about as well as Fulmars. They might have been as useful (or more useful) as recon planes.

The whole Force Z thing was a fiasco waiting to happen. The "escort" of 4 destroyers was a bad joke. Even the 2nd best DD didn't have the range to high speed steam from Singapore to the gulf of Thailand and back to Singapore and the old S class boat really showed that when it left early due to low fuel.